Adrienne: And I'm Adrienne Hill. And today we're going to do something a little different.

我是愛德蓮，今天我們要講一些不一樣的。

We're going to explore one moment in history in depth. We're going to talk about how the

我們要深入探討歷史上一個重大事件。我們要聊聊

2008 Financial Crisis happened and the government response to it in the United States.

2008年金融危機為何發生，還有美國政府的應對。

Jacob: So let's get started.

讓我們開始吧。

[Theme Music]

[主題曲]

Jacob: The 2008 Financial Crisis was a big deal. Ben Bernanke said it could have resulted

2008年的金融危機是個大事。柏南奇說它原本可能會以

in a 1930s style global financial and economic meltdown with catastrophic implications. But

1930年經濟大恐慌模式的財務及經濟下滑，最後災難性收場。

what happened? Why did it happen? And why aren't we all huddled around burning trash

但究竟發生甚麼事?如何發生?為什麼我們不圍在燃燒的

cans forming a raiding party to go steal gas from other tribes in the wasteland?

垃圾桶旁，組成暴動軍團搶奪這座荒島上其他部落的石油?

By the way, if you're actually doing that, you probably didn't hear we survived the financial

順道一提，如果你真的做了，你可能還不知道我們已經撐過

crisis. Things got better. Seriously. Put down your crossbows.

金融危機。事情已好轉，沒騙你，放下你的弓。

Adrienne: To explain what happened, first we have to do a quick explainer about mortgages.

要解釋事情經過，首先我們要快速聊聊房貸。

And you might already know this, but basically someone that wants to buy a house will often

你可能已經認識它了，但基本上一個人如果要買房子，他會

borrow hundreds of thousands of dollars from a bank. In return, the bank gets a piece of

向銀行借上千萬的金額。銀行則會收到

paper, called a mortgage.

一張紙，叫做抵押件。

Every month, the homeowner has to pay back a portion of the principal, plus interest,

每個月，屋主需要償還一部分的本金，加利息，

to whomever holds the piece of paper. If they stop paying, that's called a default. And

給擁有抵押件的人，如果它停止還賬，這就叫做違約。

whomever holds that piece of paper gets the house.

擁有抵押件的人就擁有房子。

The reason I'm saying whomever holds the paper, rather than the bank, is because the bank,

為什麼我剛剛說擁有抵押件的人，不說銀行。因為銀行，

the original lender, often sells that mortgage to some third party. And the reason I say

這個最初的債權人，常常將抵押件賣給他方。我會說常常

often is because this happens all the time. I've had my house for nine months, and three

是因為這經常發生。我持有房子九個月，有三間

different banks have had the mortgage.

不同的銀行同時擁有抵押件。

Traditionally, it was pretty hard to get a mortgage if you had bad credit or didn't have

原本，要得到抵押件是很困難的。如果你信用差，沒有

a steady job. Lenders just didn't want to take the risk that you might "default" on

穩定工作的話。債權人大都不希望承擔你可能違約

your loan, but all that started to change in the 2000s.

的風險，但在2000年後，一切都變了。

And before we go further, a quick aside here. The story gets complicated fast, and it's

在我們進一步說下去前，先盡快提醒一下。這個故事突然變得很複雜，但是

a fascinating story. But we're trying to keep it relatively simple. So, I've asked Stan if

很有趣。我們會試著說簡單些。所以，我問過史坦

we could put some additional resources in the YouTube description. And Stan said "Yes." Thanks Stan!

可不可以在youtube連結放些其他資源，他說可以。謝咯，史坦。

Anyway, back to our story. In the 2000s, investors in the U.S. and abroad looking for a low risk,

回到我們的故事。在2000年初，美國跟國外的投資者都在找尋低風險，

high return investment started throwing their money at the U.S. housing market. The thinking

高報酬的投資品，並開始向美國房市撒錢。這思維

was they could get a better return from the interest rates home owners paid on mortgages,

主要是他們可以藉由屋主償還的利率得到更好的報酬，

than they could by investing in things like Treasury Bonds, which were paying very, very low interest.

比起投資其他像利率非常非常低國庫券的金融商品，要好得多。

But big money, global investors didn't want to just buy up my mortgage, and Stan's mortgage.

但是大金主，全球的投資者不想只買我的抵押件或史坦的抵押件。

It's too much hassle to deal with us as individuals. I mean, we're pains. Instead, they bought

處理個人的抵押件太過麻煩，換句話說，我們將是痛苦來源。他們買入

investments called mortgage backed-securities. Mortgage backed-securities are created when

叫做MBS(不動產抵押貸款證券)的投資商品。MBS源自一些

large financial institutions securitize mortgages. Basically, they buy up thousands of individual

大型金融機構證券化抵押件。基本上，他們買入上千人的

mortgages, bundle them together, and sell shares of that pool to investors.

抵押件，將它們套為一組，最後將部分賣給投資者。

Investors gobbled these mortgage backed-securities up. Again, they paid a higher rate of return

投資者因此狂買MBS。再重述一次，它們的投資報酬率

than investors could get in other places and they looked like really safe bets. For one,

比其他金融商品高，有如安全、風險低的賭注。後面的一個結果是，

home prices were going up and up. So lenders thought, worse case scenario, the borrower

房價不斷上升。所以債權人開始思考，投資商品組合每況愈下，債務人

defaults on the mortgage, we can just sell the house for more money.

不再支付房貸，我們只能將房子賣掉賺更多錢。

At the same time, credit ratings agencies were telling investors these mortgage backed-securities

同時，信用評級機構卻不斷告訴投資者MBS

were safe investments. They gave a lot of these mortgage backed-securities AAA Ratings--the

很安全。他們把許多MBS都評為3A等級，也就是

best of the best. And back when mortgages were only for borrowers with good credit,

投資中的極品。然而在那個房屋款項只貸予信用良好人的時代，

mortgage debt was a good investment.

抵押債務(房貸)是個不錯的投資。

Anyway, investors were desperate to buy more and more and more of these securities. So,

投資人如飢似渴買下證券。債權人

lenders did their best to help create more of them. But to create more of them, they

因而全力發行更多。為了發行，他們

needed more mortgages. So lenders loosened their standards and made loans to people with

需要更多抵押件，所以債權人寬鬆標準，將錢借給那些低收入

low income and poor credit. You'll hear these called sub-prime mortgages.

信用差的人。也就是所謂的次級房貸。

Eventually, some institutions even started using what are called predatory lending practices

最終，有些機構甚至開始使用掠奪性貸款

to generate mortgages. They made loans without verifying income and offered absurd, adjustable

產生更多抵押件。他們發放貸款時不再衡量收入，提供不合理的

rate mortgages with payments people could afford at first, but quickly ballooned beyond their means.

可調利率抵押貸款(ARM)，一開始申請人能承擔費用，但很快的，價格急遽飆漲。

But these new sub-prime lending practices were brand new. That meant credit agencies

然而，這些新的次級貸款剛出爐，意味著信用評級機構

could still point to historical data that indicated mortgage debt was a safe bet. But

可以藉由歷史數據證明房貸很安全，事實卻非如此。

it wasn't. These investments were becoming less and less safe all the time. But investors

這些投資顯得越來越不安全，但投資者

trusted the ratings, and kept pouring in their money.

依然相信評級，不斷撒錢

Traders also started selling an even riskier product, called collateralized debt obligations,

貿易市場的人也開始販賣風險更高的產品，叫做擔保債務憑證

or CDOs. And again, some of these investments were given the highest credit ratings from

或CDO。這些投資商品竟再度被給予

the ratings agencies, even though many of them were made up of these incredibly risky loans.

最高評級，儘管它們大多數是由風險極高的貸款組成。

While, the investors and traders and bankers were throwing money into the U.S. housing

在投資群、貿易商和銀行業者不斷向美國房市撒錢的同時，

market, the U.S. price of homes was going up and up and up. The new lax lending requirements

美國房價不斷上漲。新的寬鬆借貸門檻

and low interest rates drove housing prices higher, which only made the mortgage backed

和低利率則使房貸提升更高，卻也只顯得MBS

securities and CDOs seem like an even better investment. If the borrowers defaulted, the

和CDO好像是更好的投資。如果債務人違約，

bank would still have this super valuable house, right? No. Wrong. Let's go to the Thought Bubble.

銀行還是會持有這個價值高的房子，對吧?不，大錯特錯，讓我們進入思考泡泡。

Actually, let's go to the Housing Bubble. You remember bubbles, right? Rapid price increases,

事實上，讓我們看看房屋泡沫。記得泡沫吧? 價格迅速上漲，

driven by irrational decisions. Well, this was a bubble, and bubbles have an annoying

因於不理性的決策。這是個泡泡，泡泡

tendency to burst. And this one did. People just couldn't pay for their incredibly expensive

遲早會破滅，房屋也是。人們無法償還這些價格暴高的

houses, or keep up with their ballooning mortgage payments.

房債，趕上飆漲的房貸費用。

Borrowers started defaulting, which put more houses back on the market for sale. But there

債務人開始違約，房屋回歸市場拍賣。但根本

weren't buyers. So supply was up, demand was down, and home prices started collapsing.

沒有買家。因此，供給提升，需求下降，房價開始下跌。

As prices fell, some borrowers suddenly had a mortgage for way more than their home was

當價格下跌，一些債務人持有的抵押件價值比房子

currently worth. Some stopped paying. That led to more defaults, pushing prices down further.

還高。一些人停止償還費用，使得違約不斷，價格急遽下降。

As this was happening, the big financial institutions stopped buying sub-prime mortgages and sub-prime

此時，巨大金融機構停止購買次級房貸，次級房貸的

lenders were getting stuck with bad loans. By 2007, some really big lenders had declared

業者受困於呆帳間。2007年，一些有名的次級房貸業者最終宣布

bankruptcy. The problems spread to the big investors, who'd poured money into these mortgage

破產。問題蔓延至原本不斷撒錢購買MBS和CDO

backed securities and CDOs. And they started losing money on their investments. A bunch

的投資群。他們開始虧損，損失

of money. But wait. There's more.

一堆錢。等等，還沒完呢!

There was another financial instrument that financial institutions had on their books

有一項許多金融機構滯留帳上的投資商品

that exacerbated all of these problems--unregulated, over-the-counter derivatives, including something

使問題惡化，也就是那些未管制，場外交易的衍生危機，包括

called credit default swaps, that were basically sold as insurance against mortgage backed securities.

信用違約交換制度(基本上以保險形式發行，抗衡MBS)

Does AIG ring a bell? It sold tens of millions of dollars of these insurance policies, without

還記得美國國際集團嗎?在這個保險商品上，它賣掉的總價錢超過千萬，

money to back them up when things went wrong. And as we mentioned, things went terribly

而且在一切變混亂時，沒有應急費用。事情愈來愈糟。

wrong. These credit default swaps were also turned into other securities -- that essentially allowed

這些信用違約交換也被轉換為證券，卻又讓

traders to bet huge amounts of money on whether the values of mortgage securities would go up or down.

貿易業者注入大量金錢看這些證券價值是否會提升。

All these bets, these financial instruments, resulted in an incredibly complicated web

這些賭注，金融商品演變成資產，債務和風險

of assets, liabilities, and risks. So that when things went bad, they went bad for the

的連帶關係。當一切直轉而下時，整個金融系統

entire financial system. Thanks Thought Bubble.

也連帶被影響。謝謝思考泡泡。

Some major financial players declared bankruptcy, like Lehman Brothers. Others were forced into

許多主要金融鉅子宣告破產，像雷曼兄弟。其他則被迫

mergers, or needed to be bailed out by the government. No one knew exactly how bad the

被合併，或需要政府援助。沒人知道到底

balance sheets at some of these financial institutions really were--these complicated,

這幾間金融機構的資產負債表有多糟，這些複雜、

unregulated assets made it hard to tell.

未管制的資產讓一切都難講。

Panic set in. Trading and the credit markets froze. The stock market crashed. And the U.S.

人民驚慌失措，貿易和借貸市場停擺。股市崩盤，美國經濟

economy suddenly found itself in a disastrous recession.

陷入大恐慌。

Jacob: So what did the government do? Well, it did a lot. The Federal Reserve stepped

所以政府做了甚麼?事實上，做了很多。美國聯邦儲備委員會介入

in and offered to make emergency loans to banks. The idea was to prevent fundamentally

提供銀行緊急借貸。這個提議主要為了預防主要的

sound banks from collapsing just because their lenders were panicking. The government enacted

大型銀行倒閉，只因他們的債權人慌了。政府制定一個

a program called TARP, the troubled assets relief program, and which the rest of us call

決策叫做TARP， 問題資產救助計劃，我們則稱它為

the bank bailout. This initially earmarked $700 billion to shore up the banks. It actually

銀行救助。這個起初計畫以7兆元救助銀行的方案

ended up spending $250 billion bailing out the banks, and was later expanded to help

最終以2兆5千億收場，之後還順勢幫助了

auto makers, AIG, and homeowners.

汽車商，AIG(美國國際集團)和屋主。

In combination with lending by The Fed, this helped stop the cascade of panic in the financial

跟FED合作後，平緩了金融系統的

system. The treasury also conducted stress tests on the largest Wall Street banks. Government

恐慌。財政部還對華爾街最大的銀行進行壓力測試。政府

accountants swarmed over bank balance sheets and publicly announced which ones were sound

會計師還掃過各間銀行的資產負債表，並公開宣布那些狀況良好，

and which ones needed to raise more money. This eliminated some of the uncertainties

那些需要籌更多錢。這消弭許多讓機構間借貸

that had paralyzed lending among institutions.

停擺的不安。

Congress also passed a huge stimulus package in January 2009. This pumped over $800 billion

2009年一月，國會也祭出大型經濟刺激計畫，對整個經濟體

into the economy, through new spending and tax cuts. This helped slow the free fall of

注入8000億元，透過刪減財務及稅收的幫助。這也平緩財務支出、

spending, output and employment.

輸出和就業率下降的速度。

Adrienne: In 2010, Congress passed a financial reform, called the Dodd-Frank law. It took

2010年時，國會推出財務改革，多德-弗蘭克法案。

steps to increase transparency and prevent banks from taking on so much risk. Dodd-Frank

它增加了透明性，也預防銀行承擔太多風險。多德-弗蘭克法案

did a lot of things. It set up a consumer protection bureau to reduce predatory lending.

幫助很大。它設立了消保局，抑止掠奪性借貸。

It required that financial derivatives be traded in exchanges that all market participants

它要求衍生性金融商品得在所有市場參與者的觀察下

can observe. And it put mechanisms in place for large banks to fail in a controlled predictable manor.

交易，並為此設立了機制，以免銀行無法控管大局。

But, there's no consensus on whether this regulation is enough to prevent future crises.

但在是否能預防未來危機時尚未達成共識。

Jacob: So, what have we learned from all this? Well, one key factor that led to the 2008

所以我們到底學到甚麼? 其實，導致金融危機的重大因素

financial crisis was perverse incentives. A perverse incentive is when a policy ends

就是不當誘因。不當誘因就是當一個決策

up having a negative effect, opposite of what was intended. Like, mortgages brokers got bonuses

最後引發負面效應，跟原本動機反其道而行。就像，抵押貸款經紀人透過

for lending out more money, but that encouraged them to make risky loans, which hurt profits in the end.

借出更多錢得到收益，但卻刺激他們最出風險更高的借貸，反倒減少獲益。

That leads us to moral hazard. This is when one person takes on more risk, because someone

這跟道德風險有關，道德風險是指一個人願意承擔更多風險，因為有其他人

else bears the burden of that risk. Banks and lenders were willing to lend to sub-prime borrowers because

承載這個風險的負擔。銀行和債權人願意借款給次級借貸者

they planned to sell mortgages to somebody else. Everyone thought they could pass the risk up the line.

因為他們計畫將抵押件賣給他人。每個人都覺得可以通過風險測試。

The phrase "too big to fail" is a perfect example of moral hazard. If banks know that they're

「大到不能倒」這個俗語是道德風險的最佳例子。如果銀行知道他們即將

going to be bailed out by the government, they have incentive to make risky, or perhaps unwise bets.

得到政府補助，他們就有誘因做出具風險或者是不明智的賭注。

Former Fed Chairman, Alan Greenspan summed it up really nicely when he said,

前美聯儲主席，格林斯潘歸納出一個貼切的結論，他說道

"If they're too big to fail, they're too big."

「如果他們大到不能倒，他們就真的太大了。」

Adrienne: When something terrible happens, people naturally look for someone to blame.

當不好的事情發生，人們自然而然會怪罪他人。

In the case of the 2008 financial crisis, no one had to look very far because the blame

在2008年金融危機中，

and the pain was spread throughout the U.S. economy.

和痛苦已經遍佈全美經濟體。

The government failed to regulate and supervise the financial system. To quote the bi-partisan,

政府在控制和監督金融系統上失策。引述兩黨

financial crisis inquiry commission report, "the sentries were not at their posts, in

金融危機調查報告，「哨兵沒有堅守崗位，主要

no small part due to the widely accepted faith in the self-correcting nature of the markets,

是因為市場上廣為接受的自我調節機制，

and the ability of financial institutions to effectively police themselves."

還有金融機構有效管理自己的能力。」

The report placed some of the blame on the years of deregulation in the financial industry.

這份報告將錯誤怪罪於金融行業幾年來的管理疏忽。

And blamed regulators themselves for not doing more. The financial industry failed. Everyone

也怪罪管理者不積極。金融行業倒閉。每個人

in the system was borrowing too much money and taking too much risk, from the big financial

都借太多錢、承擔太多風險，從巨大金融機構

institutions to individual borrowers. The institutions were taking on huge debt loads

到個人借貸。這些機構承受巨大債務負擔

to invest in risky assets. And huge numbers of home owners were taking on mortgages they couldn't afford.

投資風險性資產。而且許多房屋所有人辦理無法負擔的房貸金額。

But the thing to remember about this massive systemic failure, is that it happened in a

但要記住關於大型系統性失敗的事情就是，它源於

system made up of humans, with human failing. Some didn't understand what was happening.

由人組成的系統，因為人的失誤。有些人不知道發生甚麼事。

Some willfully ignored the problems. And some were simply unethical, motivated by the massive

有些人自願忽略問題。有些就是不道德，被龐大金額

amounts of money involved.

所影響。

I think we should give the last word today to the financial crisis inquiry commission

我覺得我們應該在金融危機報告書方面

report. To paraphrase Shakespeare, they wrote, "The fault lies not in the stars, but in us."

留下最後一句話。重述莎士比亞的話，他們寫道「錯誤不存於繁星當中，而是在我們當中。」

Thanks for watching.

謝謝收看。

Crash Course Economics is made with the help of all of these nice people. We're able to

速成班經濟學是由這些好心的人所創立。我們可以每個月

stave off our own financial crisis each month, thanks to your support at Patreon. You can

擊敗自己的金融危機，謝謝你在Patreon的支持。你可以

help keep Crash Course free for everyone, forever, and get great rewards at patreon.com.

讓速成班經濟學永久免收費，並在patreon.com得到回饋。

And given today's subject, be exuberant, but keep it rational.

今天的課到這裡，記得放大夢想，但要保持理性。