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  • ALVING: Good afternoon and welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations' discussion on

  • the future of artificial intelligence, robots and beyond. I'm Amy Alving, and I'll be your

  • moderator for today. We have a very distinguished panel here, and in your information, you have

  • a detailed bio on everybody on the stage, so we won't go into those specifics.

  • But briefly, let me introduce Professor Peter Bock, emeritus from George Washington University,

  • who has decades of experience in building and developing artificial intelligence systems.

  • Next to me we have Paul Cohen, also an academic from the University of Arizona, who is now

  • at my alma mater, DARPA, working for the Defense Department's most advanced research and development

  • organization. And we also have Andy McAfee from MIT, who comes to this from a business

  • and economic background with long experience looking at the impact of artificial intelligence

  • from an economic perspective. So we'll start today with thirty minutes of

  • moderated discussion amongst the panelists, and then we'll turn it over to the audience

  • for Q&A. I think in this area, it's important to make

  • sure that we have some common understanding of what we're talking about when we say artificial

  • intelligence. And so I'll ask Peter to start off by describing to us, what is artificial

  • intelligence more than just smart software? BOCK: Yeah, in my TED talk, I described people

  • who come up to me and say that AI is really the field that tries to solve very, very,

  • very hard problems, and I always found that definition a bit smarmy, because all of us

  • here are involved in solving very, very, very hard problems. That's not it at all.

  • It's a general purpose problem-solving engine that has a more or less broad domain of applications

  • so that a single solution can apply to many different situations even in different fields.

  • That's beginning -- a beginning definition for AI, and also probably a longer definition,

  • an engine that can eventually be broadened into beginning to imitate, shall we say, or,

  • in fact, emulate the cognition of our own thinking patterns.

  • I think I'll stop there and let the rest jump in.

  • ALVING: OK. So, Paul, I know that from your perspective, artificial intelligence is about

  • more than just crunching a lot of numbers. You know, the buzzword in -- out in the world

  • today is big data, big data is going to solve all our problems. But big data isn't sufficient,

  • is that correct? COHEN: That's right. So do you want me to

  • talk about what's AI or why big data isn't sufficient?

  • ALVING: Both. How does -- how does AI go beyond simply crunching a lot of numbers for big

  • data? COHEN: Let me give an example. I'm working

  • on a program -- managing a program at DARPA now called Big Mechanism. Big Mechanism is

  • sort of a poke in the eye to big data. But it's actually -- it's based on exactly this

  • distinction between crunching numbers and understanding what the data is telling you.

  • So the purpose of the Big Mechanism program is for machines to read the primary literature

  • in cancer biology, assemble models of cell signaling pathways in cancer biology that

  • are much bigger or more detailed than any human can comprehend, and then figure out

  • from those models how to attack and suppress cancer.

  • Now, data certainly is an important part of that, but I think the difference between big

  • data and Big Mechanism is that we seek causal models of something really complicated. Data

  • informs those models, but the understanding comes from those models. And AI has always

  • been about understanding, understanding the visual world, understanding speech, understanding

  • -- it's always been about understanding. ALVING: And so is the artificial intelligence

  • creating the understanding? COHEN: Yeah.

  • ALVING: Or are you building in the understanding... COHEN: No, no, the machine will read the literature.

  • I mean, you know, you see it in the papers. The papers say things like, well, you know,

  • we suppressed this gene and the following stuff happened, and so you take that little

  • piece of causal knowledge and you put it into your big, complicated model. And as the model

  • gets bigger and more complicated, you get a more and more refined understanding of how

  • cancer works. ALVING: So, Andy, I know you look at this

  • from more of an economic impact perspective. Where do you see this play between model-based

  • understanding and big data playing out in the market today?

  • MCAFEE: And this is the Jets versus the Sharks of the artificial intelligence world. There

  • are these two camps that have been going at it for as long as we've been thinking about

  • these problems. There's the model first camp. You need to understand cause and effect. You

  • need to understand the world before we can think about simulating it in a piece of -- or

  • embedding it in a piece of technology. There's the other part that says, No, actually.

  • And the best distinction I ever heard between those two approaches -- the one that brought

  • it home to me -- was the way a child learns language versus the way and adult learns language.

  • So if I were to start learning a language tomorrow, I would do it the model-based way.

  • I'd sit down with a grammar textbook. I'd try to understand how to conjugate the verbs.

  • I'd understand if there are masculine and feminine. I'd go through this arduous model-based

  • process of trying to acquire a new language. And like we all know, that's not how a two-year-old

  • does it. She just sits around and listens to the adults around her talking and talking

  • to her, and she builds up a very much data-first understanding of the world to the point that

  • she acquires language flawlessly, without having a single grammar lesson.

  • And what's further interesting about that is that if you ask her, why did you add the

  • S to that word? Why is it "I go" but "he goes"? She would say, "I have no idea -- I've never

  • heard the word conjugation before. I just know that's how language works."

  • So this divide is a really, really fundamentally important divide. The news from the trenches

  • that I can bring you is that in the world of -- in real-world applications, the data

  • side is winning. And there's almost a dismissive term for the model-based view these days among

  • a lot of the AI geeks that are doing work at Google and Apple and Facebook and putting

  • things in front of us. They call the model-based view "feature engineering," and they put kind

  • of air quotes around it, and they're almost quite dismissive about it.

  • And in general, in head-to-head competitions among different approaches in areas that we

  • care about, image recognition, natural language processing, artificial speech, things like

  • that, the model-based approach is the one that's winning these competitions and, therefore,

  • is being embedded in the commercial technologies that we're using.

  • COHEN: You meant to say the data... MCAFEE: I meant to say the data-based -- thank

  • you -- the data-based side is winning. My single favorite example of that -- this was

  • a crazy demonstration -- a team out of -- that founded a start-up called DeepMind built a

  • completely data-first learning system, and they asked it to play old-fashioned Atari

  • videogames from the 1980s. And they said, we're not going to even try to teach you the

  • rules of Pac-Man or Battlezone or anything like that. All you're going to do is try to

  • minimize this thing in the upper-right-hand corner called the score. You figure it out

  • from there. They pointed it at seven different Atari games.

  • On three of those games, the system eventually got better than any human player. So I'm not

  • -- I personally am not taking a stand on the model versus data. I'm just saying, over and

  • over again these days, the data world is winning the competitions.

  • ALVING: Peter? BOCK: I couldn't agree with Andrew more. I'm

  • in that... MCAFEE: Boring panel.

  • (LAUGHTER) BOCK: I'm in the same camp that he describes

  • as being data-driven, not rule-driven. I have been developing, since 1980, programs that

  • he describes called collective learning systems that play games and get better than humans

  • at them, simple games, but it soon became obvious to me that it's interesting to play

  • games, but none of you out there is spending much of your life playing games, and do you

  • really want an opponent who is not a natural opponent to play games with you? I think you

  • should be talking to your therapist about that.

  • The ultimate result of that, which is a totally data-driven game -- that is, it's all -- it

  • doesn't have any rules at all -- is the art that you see being generated out in the place

  • where we were having lunch on the screen. That is trained by the masters. Simply we

  • show where all of these -- all the paintings of Van Gogh or Renoir or Rembrandt and so

  • forth, and then we say, here's a photograph. Render it in the style of that.

  • And when it's all through, you -- if you were to say to ELIZA, so what does this mean over

  • here? She would say, "I don't understand the question," because she doesn't know how to

  • answer questions like that. She just knows how to paint. Probably Van Gogh would be incensed

  • with the remark or at least simply turn away and walk into the fields to paint again.

  • And one last thing. It was Fu at Purdue University who said many years ago, if you have the right

  • features, almost any decision-making apparatus will work. If you don't have the right features,

  • no apparatus will work. So, once again, we have to say that the data side people do have

  • to pay attention to the extremely important aspect of extracting what you're looking at

  • and what the important aspects of that are or listening to or smelling or feeling and

  • use that, those features, as the basis for assembling a lot of statistical data.

  • Three of my graduate students are now building exactly the system that Andrew just described,

  • a natural language understanding system. They have read 11,000 English novels -- not the

  • students, the machine -- they haven't read any of them...

  • (LAUGHTER) ... which disturbs me a bit. And it can carry

  • on a coherent conversation. It's still under development, so I'm not ready to show it yet,

  • but it can carry on a coherent conversation with somebody who cares to converse with it.

  • It tends to wander around a bit, sort of like people who've had perhaps a few beers and

  • are talking about who knows what, but nonetheless, it is coherent and that's a step in the right

  • direction. It is understanding based on learning and experience.

  • COHEN: So we don't entirely agree about everything. Let's go back to your game example for just

  • a moment, because I don't want people to think that the distinction between model-based approaches

  • and data-based approaches is quite so cut and dried.

  • Humans who have played -- who have learned to play one videogame will learn to play the

  • next more quickly. That's not true of computers. It'll be a fixed cost per game. And the rate

  • at which the machine learns, the next game will be unaffected by anything it learned

  • in the first game. Now, why is that not true for humans? Well,

  • it's obviously because, as you learn games or, in fact, learn anything at all, they abstract

  • general principles from what they're learning. Call that models, if you like. It's as good

  • a word as any, but it is something that we know machines don't do very well. In fact,

  • DARPA has sunk vast amounts of money into programs with names like transfer learning,

  • right, where the goal is to try and transfer knowledge acquired in one context to another.

  • Can't do it. I also don't want to leave anyone with the

  • impression that we're trying to have humans build models of anything, right? We're trying

  • to have machines... BOCK: This is important.

  • COHEN: ... build -- trying to have machines build models of things by reading.

  • MCAFEE: With data, build the model. COHEN: With the data, build the model. And

  • it's not any old model. It has to be a causal model.

  • MCAFEE: Good. COHEN: Right? Because only when you have a

  • causal model does it make sense to say, push this button and the following thing will happen.

  • If it's not a causal model -- and so that sort of brings me to the fundamental limitation

  • of data-driven science as it is practiced today is that really what you've got there

  • is correlation versus cause. I mean, what it all boils down to is machines

  • are exceptionally good at finding associations between things that co-vary -- that's correlation

  • -- and they're exceptionally bad at figuring out what causes what, right? And, you know,

  • if you want to do science, if you want to change the world, it's important to understand

  • why things are the way they are, not just that if you, you know, profile your customer

  • in the following way, you can increase the probability that they'll buy some product.

  • BOCK: My experience is quite different, Paul. My experience is that these games that learn

  • how -- these machines that learn how to play games can be built to understand the general

  • purpose roles that hold by expanding their knowledge base so that one of the features

  • they have is, what is the game like? And they bring in and they notice the similarity. They

  • don't bother re-learning that lesson that greed is good and red is bad. They know that

  • already, and, in fact, a disadvantage of that is that in some instances, green is bad and

  • red is good, and they have to unlearn that. Does that sound familiar to any of you?

  • ALVING: So it sounds like there's some agreement that there's a heavy emphasis on data-driven

  • autonomous systems today. They'll get better when they have more of a model-based understanding

  • that includes a causal... (CROSSTALK)

  • BOCK: And more resources. MCAFEE: And part of -- yep, more data is always

  • good, but part of I think what we're all excited about is a move away from what we -- what

  • some people call pure black box models. In other words, purely data-driven. And if you

  • ask the model, how did you arrive at that? It says, I have no idea.

  • We're getting better at building data-driven models that are not purely about black box.

  • So my colleagues who do image recognition using these -- the most popular toolkit today

  • is called deep learning. It's a class of algorithms that's just cleaning up in all these competitions.

  • If you do a deep learning algorithm to do image recognition, for example, it can get

  • pretty good at it, quite good at it. What's encouraging to me is if you -- you can then

  • -- my language is horribly informal -- you can query the algorithm to say, how are you

  • doing it? And it will say, well, you have to do edge detection, you have to do gradient

  • detection, so I've got these kinds of things. I intuited those things from the data, and

  • they're now built into the model. And our models I believe are now sophisticated

  • enough that we can say, oh, yeah, there's the edge detection going on over there. There's

  • the gradient sensing going on over there. We can learn about the world via querying

  • our models, which is a lovely development. BOCK: I suppose we should speak a little bit

  • about how that compares with human learning and biological models. Certainly, Andrew is

  • absolutely right. These machines have no idea how to answer verbal questions when they're

  • asked to recognize targets or artists. And they have no idea about that.

  • But it is -- let me postulate for you a moment that sometime in the future we have a being

  • called MADA, who is an artificially intelligent being on the same cognitive scale as we are,

  • OK, and it's sitting right here. Well, one morning I walk in and I say to MADA, "Good

  • morning, MADA." No response. I say, "Good morning, MADA." No response. "MADA?" And she

  • says, "I'm not speaking to you." You're not speaking to me? Why? "You know why."

  • (LAUGHTER) That's the sort of thing which will make me

  • go, eureka! ALVING: When your AI doesn't talk to you,

  • OK. (LAUGHTER)

  • BOCK: No, no, no, no. ALVING: Let's shift gears and talk a little

  • bit about what you guys see coming in the near term, in terms of artificial intelligence.

  • What's the most exciting thing that you think we're likely to see in the next couple of

  • years? You know, we've seen things like theory, for example. What...

  • BOCK: Nothing. ALVING: Nothing exciting?

  • BOCK: Nothing, other than the art, which is out there, which I invite you all to...

  • MCAFEE: I'm a lot more excited than that. Our brains are pattern-matching computers.

  • And what we're getting good at is building pattern-matching machines that over and over

  • again are demonstrating superhuman performance. I think that's a great development. I can't

  • wait until that's applied to something like medical diagnostics. I have a very good primary

  • care physician. There's no possible way he can stay on top of all the relevant medical

  • knowledge that he would have to read. There's no way he can be insured against forgetting

  • anything. He has good days and bad days. He wakes up tired. Human computers are amazing,

  • but they have lots of glitches. They have all kinds of flaws and biases.

  • BOCK: You think that's going to happen in a couple of years, Andrew?

  • MCAFEE: I think we're -- yeah. COHEN: Yeah.

  • MCAFEE: I don't say superhuman universal medical diagnostics.

  • BOCK: No, no, no, no. MCAFEE: But I think -- but I think...

  • BOCK: In the hands of physicians? MCAFEE: That's not because of technological

  • reasons. That's because of inertia and bureaucracy and regulation and stuff like that. My point

  • is, the things that I'm excited about are this dramatic increase in pattern recognition

  • ability and our efforts to combine what machines are good at with what our brains are still

  • really good at and better at and to find fruitful combinations of those two kinds of smarts.

  • BOCK: Let me clarify something I just said. And I know Paul wants to jump in here. When

  • I said nothing, I meant nothing that you will see. It's going on like crazy behind the scenes.

  • You wouldn't believe the horsepower of the engines that are running. But it's not going

  • to be self-parking cars, and it's not going to be this and that and the other that you

  • want -- a vacuum cleaner that really does a good job of vacuuming and doesn't break

  • your vase. And it isn't going to be a self-parking car that turns into the side of the car in

  • front of it, which I saw one of the manufacturers demonstrate a couple of years ago in Germany,

  • which sort of gives away a possibility of the carmakers. But, anyway, that's the sort

  • of thing... ALVING: So you don't see Amazon air-dropping

  • packages onto our doorsteps in the next couple years?

  • BOCK: No, not in two -- not in a couple of years, no.

  • ALVING: Paul? COHEN: No, I mean, to a great extent, I agree

  • with Andy. I think I'm -- you know, when I started in AI, things were mostly logical,

  • rule-based. There was almost no data to work with. What we've seen over the last twenty

  • years is kind of a perfect storm, a magical combination of, well, what is it? The web

  • makes vast amounts of data, structured and unstructured, available. Machine-learning

  • algorithms, the technology has just blossomed. These days, it's called data mining. There

  • really isn't that much difference. And so what we've seen is that AI has gotten

  • awfully good at solving problems that can be solved by various kinds of processing on

  • data, typically finding general rules from very large numbers of specific instances.

  • And so I agree with you. And I also think we've gotten good at figuring

  • out what machines are not good at and figuring out clever ways to get humans to help with

  • them, like crowd-sourcing, for example, you know, Mechanical Turk and things like that.

  • So I think it's a fantastic future. I'm very excited about Jeopardy!. I think that the

  • move of the IBM Watson team into medical diagnosis is going to be a real game-changer. But I

  • also think that the competitions those machines are cleaning up at are competitions designed

  • by the people who had particular technologies that they wanted to show off, right?

  • MCAFEE: They've got a thumb on the scales? COHEN: Well, no, I mean, it's just the nature

  • of things, right? You say, I can do the following. Let's have a competition to see if anyone

  • can do better than me at that. BOCK: That's right.

  • COHEN: So, you know, keep in mind a couple of things. For everything that Google and

  • Siri can do, they still can't regularly answer questions like this. If you're sitting in

  • this room, where's your nose? Right? So common sense continues to be an absolutely -- gosh,

  • you know, if I had one wish, it would be to solve that problem, to solve the problem of

  • common sense, the problem of endowing a computer with the knowledge that every five-year-old

  • has. And honestly, after all of this time, I really

  • believe that you can go a long way to solving some kinds of problems by clever processing

  • of data. For example, you can translate text from one language to another, but you can't

  • understand the text, right? I can have a machine take a message to somebody in Italy to reserve

  • a hotel and it'll do a spectacular job of turning it into Italian. But if you ask the

  • machine, what was that message about? It really doesn't know.

  • So I agree with you. I think that there is a class of problems -- there's a class of

  • problems on which AI is just doing magnificent things. And that class of problems is -- it's

  • the class that we would call making finer and finer distinctions, medical diagnosis

  • is about making finer and finer distinctions. Online marketing is about making finer and

  • finer distinctions. If you think about it, much of the technology

  • you interact with is about putting you in a particular bucket, right? And we're getting

  • awfully good at that stuff. We just can't basically understand language or see our way

  • around the world. ALVING: So let's follow up on the piece that

  • AI is good at today. And, Andy, I want to turn to you from an economic perspective.

  • As the things -- whatever they are -- that artificial intelligence is good at--take over,

  • gain more traction, you see some pretty profound implications in the economy, especially in

  • the workforce. Can you speak about that? MCAFEE: Yeah, exactly, because as Paul says,

  • what we're getting good at is combining where humans still have the comparative advantage

  • with where machines do. As the machines get so much better at important things, that balance

  • is shifting. So what smart companies are doing is buttressing a few brains with a ton of

  • processing power and data. And I think the economic consequences of that

  • are going to be really profound and are going to come sooner than a lot of us think. I mean,

  • there's both great news and real challenges associated with that. The great news is, you

  • know, affluence, abundance, bounty, better medical diagnoses, better maps for your cars,

  • just more good stuff, more goods and services in the world. It's really important not to

  • lowball that. I think it's the best economic news on the planet.

  • The challenge that comes along with that is that very few of us are professional investors.

  • We don't offer our capital to the economy; we offer our labor instead. And when I look

  • at what a lot of knowledge workers actually get paid to do -- and I compare that with

  • the trajectories I'm seeing with improvement in technology -- I don't think a lot of employers

  • are going to be willing to pay a lot of people for doing a lot of what they're currently

  • doing these days. It's pretty clear that tech progress has been

  • one of the main drivers behind the polarization in the economy, the hollowing out of the middle

  • class. Personally, I think we ain't seen nothing yet.

  • BOCK: Oh, I agree. It's the two years that I took exception with. I have -- may I do

  • a little show-and-tell? ALVING: Sure.

  • BOCK: This is the brain of an animal. Now, it's very, very much larger than it is in

  • real size. This is actually a half-a-millimeter from this side to this side. It is the brain

  • of an animal called drosophila, which some of you may know as the fruit fly.

  • And it has in it 100,000 neurons that are working to give it not only artificial intelligence

  • -- a natural intelligence, excuse me -- but also natural robotic capabilities. Our brain

  • is 100,000 times as powerful as this brain. It has 100 billion neurons in it, all of them

  • working as an adult, working together without much redundancy at all. Redundancy is -- another

  • name for redundancy in the brain is subtlety, OK? It seems to be redundant, but the situation

  • is just slightly different, so you need another set of neurons to make the distinction.

  • That is the resource limitation that I was talking about. We are about a factor of 10,000

  • away from being able to build something that is equivalent to us in resources. That sounds

  • really huge, but that's going to happen in less than twelve years.

  • ALVING: The factor of 10,000 is a hardware limitation you're talking about?

  • BOCK: Yes, is the hardware limitation in memory, in memory. That's going to happen in about

  • ten to twelve years. In 2024, you will see that imaginary being that I talked about called

  • MADA born. But when it's born, it will be like you were born. It won't be able to do

  • anything. In fact, you'll have to do everything for it and take care of it. And it will take

  • -- no surprises here -- thirteen years to become a teenager.

  • That's the sort of thing that I'm looking forward to in terms of breakthroughs, but

  • there are troubled waters ahead. We can discuss that later.

  • ALVING: Very good. Well, actually, this is probably a good time to turn to the audience.

  • Let me just summarize a little bit about what we've heard. Artificial intelligence is both

  • here now and not here for a while, depending on what aspect of artificial intelligence

  • you mean. From an economic perspective, from the things that are likely to impact our lives

  • in the near future, it's very data-driven. You're going to start to see more and more

  • of that. To really get to the full promise of artificial

  • intelligence, we have a ways to go. But that future has many bright things about it. There

  • are also profound implications in the labor market, for example. I think what Andy said

  • was Paul should go ask for his salary to be tripled when he walks out of the door and

  • the rest of us maybe will be in a little bit more of a difficult situation.

  • With that... COHEN: You really did it.

  • (LAUGHTER) ALVING: Or if you might not think so, and

  • then you get back to work. But with that, we'd like to open it up to the audience. I'll

  • invite you one at a time to ask your questions. Please wait for the microphone, which we have.

  • When you speak, please speak directly into it. Stand, state your name and your affiliation,

  • and then ask your question. So here's the microphone. Why don't we start in the back

  • here? QUESTION: Thank you. My name is Jaime Yassif,

  • and I'm -- I'm a AAAS science and technology policy fellow at the U.S. Department of Defense.

  • My background is biophysics, and I think in recent years it's been very exciting to see

  • the ability of image processing technology to develop in a way that allows automated

  • processes -- automated processing of images of cells and movies of cells in a way that

  • makes it much more efficient. Whereas it used to be that graduate students would have to

  • sit for months and click on many individual frames, now a computer can analyze data very

  • quickly. And so there are obvious implications for

  • health care and basic research and many other developments. What I'm curious about is, what

  • are the implications for image processing from satellites? I'm very interested in the

  • security field. And presumably this will carry over into those areas, as well. And as we

  • sort of turn more of those -- that analysis over to machines, what are the ethical implications

  • and how do we keep humans in the loop for the decisions that are linked to that? Thank

  • you. ALVING: Yeah, so my prediction came true.

  • We did not talk about ethics during the first half-hour, because I figured that would be

  • foremost in the audience's mind. So who would like to take that? Paul, do you want to take

  • that... COHEN: I don't know anything about satellite

  • imagery. And if I did, I probably wouldn't be talking about it. So, no, I'll pass on

  • that one. BOCK: I'm in the same position.

  • MCAFEE: I'll take a stab, even though I know nothing about satellite imagery. It doesn't

  • seem that that's a big enough exception that it would be immune from the term that you

  • identified... BOCK: Well, that's...

  • MCAFEE: ... which is that image recognition is one of these areas where the technologies

  • have gone from kind of laughably bad to superhuman good, to my eyes, just in the blink of an

  • eye. So AI will now give a superhuman performance on recognizing street signs as a car is driving

  • down the road, on recognizing handwritten Chinese characters, boom, boom, boom, on we

  • go. I think satellite imagery would clearly not be any exception there.

  • You bring up the, what ethical implications does that bring? In the field of defense,

  • there are immediate, really obvious ethical questions that are going on. We have tons

  • of drones. We have tons of automated machinery for warfare these days. To my knowledge, the

  • only place where we have a greenlight for the machine to make a firing decision is in

  • the demilitarized zone of North Korea. I understand there are some systems that will go off on

  • their own there. Aside from that, I believe that we always have a human in the loop before

  • any ordnance is deployed or anything is fired. ALVING: Yeah, let me jump in, even though

  • I'm just a moderator. I'll say that in the imagery analysis, that's been a big area of

  • investment in the Defense Department for a long time. And one of the lessons learned

  • in trying to offload some of the imagery analyst tasks to machines is that although there are

  • some things that machines are very good at, very prescribed tasks -- there's a set of

  • characters, match them to a part of the image to read a sign -- there are other things that

  • the machines are not good at because it's very difficult to train them.

  • And so the Defense Department has learned to kind of divide imagery analysis into things

  • that the machine's good at and things that the humans are good at. And it's not really

  • an either/or question. It's actually very analogous -- excuse me -- to some of the examples

  • about where machines are used in warfare. It's not either/or. There are humans in the

  • loop and there are machines doing some things... COHEN: Could I say a word about that? Yeah,

  • I worked for a while on surveillance video programs to try and understand surveillance

  • videos. And the system problem from my group and everyone else's is if you have two people

  • walking like this, and this one is A and this one is B, sometimes the labels will switch

  • when they go past each other. And, you know, you think, "Well, that's dumb.

  • I mean, humans wouldn't make that mistake. They would" -- and then you come up with a

  • whole bunch of answers, a bunch of fixes. You'd say, well, if one's wearing a yellow

  • shirt and one's wearing a red shirt, how could we possibly get confused? If one's male and

  • one's female, how could we possibly get confused? And here I think we're really seeing the boundary

  • between entirely data-driven methods and knowledge-driven or model-driven methods, because the algorithms

  • that get confused don't have that commonsense knowledge that you just regularly bring to

  • bear on the problem. And so there are problems in computer vision that are problems largely

  • because the machine just doesn't know anything. MCAFEE: Well, another category of things that

  • the machines are lousy at is novelty. So if something new shows up in an image for the

  • first time, the technology typically goes, "I have no idea here." We -- and, again, the

  • clever combinations are what's going to win the day here.

  • In sentiment analysis, companies pay a lot of money to find out how their brands are

  • doing, how their shows are doing on TV. People talk on Twitter and Facebook constantly, in

  • huge volumes, about these. You can mine that data to do sentiment analysis. This is a very

  • fine-grained, pretty advanced discipline by now.

  • However, when there's a new character on "Mad Men," for example, and the tweets light up

  • about that new character, the technology goes, "What on Earth just happened here? I have

  • no idea." They honestly have people manning the consoles, and when the technology gets

  • confused, they say, oh, yeah, that's because a new character showed up last night, and

  • put -- and we'll (inaudible) that into our infrastructure.

  • BOCK: You know, there's an interesting way to tell an image processing -- and once -- as

  • long as we move away from satellite, I get the same restrictions that Paul had, classification

  • and not knowing is a pretty strong limitation -- but, anyway, if you move away from that,

  • imagine yourself watching TV. You're watching, I don't know, an episode of some mystery,

  • thriller, and it's episode nine, and it's going.

  • And one moment, you see two people having lunch on the balcony. Next minute, you see

  • fighter jets coming down and bombing, and the next minute, it's a quiet peaceful yacht

  • on a lagoon. And the next minute, it's an ad, a commercial. In the same ten milliseconds

  • it takes for you to -- your brain to capture that image, you know it's a commercial.

  • We can't build a machine that's able to do that. It will think it's just another scene

  • in the thing or not know or -- and, by the way, of course, when it doesn't know, it doesn't

  • come back and say, "I don't know what that is." It just throws an exception or whatever.

  • This is a very interesting way to look at the ability of the machine to solve a problem

  • that Paul was talking about, the causal problem, the things happening one after the other.

  • We have built ELIZA engines that can detect roads from satellites actually, and we have

  • -- and do anomaly detection, novelty detection all the time. It's easy.

  • But there's an interesting limitation that also exists for you. It's worth mentioning,

  • perhaps. They will notice something new on the wall when they walk into the house. What

  • they won't notice is something that has been removed from the wall, because they've learned

  • the wall, which is most of the space, and if there's a little more wall, that doesn't

  • bother them. ALVING: Great.

  • BOCK: And you have the same trouble as humans, the same thing, with your spouse.

  • ALVING: We'll take another question here in front.

  • QUESTION: Hi, I'm Barbara Slavin from the Atlantic Council. And I'm completely illiterate

  • about these topics, but I have a son who programs computers, who writes code for a living. Will

  • we ever get to a stage where computers will be able to write the code and people who do

  • his sort of work won't be necessary anymore? BOCK: Well, if MADA's going to happen, MADA

  • could become a programmer. After all, she might become an actress. You notice I use

  • the feminine. It's because my graduate students all assume it's going to be a woman. I don't

  • know why. But, anyway, you sort of have to slip into some resonant kind of absorbing

  • state. Yeah. I mean, why not? They can be anything

  • they want that we can do. And, in fact, if it is really resource limited, suppose they

  • end up with ten times the memory that we have. ALVING: Paul?

  • COHEN: Yeah, there's a really interesting program just started at DARPA. It's sort of

  • an automatic programming program. And it's based on a change in the way people write

  • code that's happened over the last fifteen, twenty years.

  • I used to write all my own code, every single line of it. Nowadays, I sort of assemble code

  • that other people have written. And there are lots of places online. You know, my favorite

  • is Stack Overflow, but there are other places like that, where you type in, in English -- you

  • say, you know, gosh, I want to be able to -- whatever it happens to be in, and some

  • really good programmer has already done it, so there's sort of no point in me trying.

  • And actually, I forbad my daughter from using Stack Overflow for the first six months, because

  • I was afraid she'd never learn to write code at all, but only assemble code. Anyway, so

  • DARPA has a program that's basically on automatic programming by assembling code.

  • BOCK: Wow, that field in computer science has been going on for years.

  • QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) COHEN: I'm sorry?

  • QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) COHEN: Well, I think that's really where the

  • science of the program lies. It's in figuring out how you tell the computer what you want

  • the code to do and how the computer then figures out which pieces of code to tie together.

  • But if you think about it, fifty years ago, we would have been having exactly the same

  • conversation about this amazing device called the Fortran compiler, right, which is basically

  • a bridge between the humans saying what they want and the machine code, except, you know,

  • the language was nowhere near as natural as it's going to be in future.

  • MCAFEE: To answer your question, no, you'd have to be a vitalist, literally. You'd have

  • to believe there's something ineffable about the human brain -- that there's some kind

  • of spark of a soul or something that could never be understood or...

  • BOCK: That programmers have. MCAFEE: ... and therefore put into a program.

  • I don't believe that. I'm not a vitalist. However, there are things that we do that

  • have proved really, really resistant to understanding, let alone automation. I think of programming

  • as long-form creative work. I have never seen a long-form creative output from a machine

  • that was anything except a joke or mishmash. COHEN: Yeah, I agree completely.

  • ALVING: So job prospects are good, which may... (CROSSTALK)

  • BOCK: Yeah, yeah. You're fine. ALVING: Another question here?

  • QUESTION: Hi, I'm David Bray, chief information officer at the Federal Communications Commission.

  • So we've already seen this year a company actually elect to its board an algorithm and

  • give it voting rights. Where do you see in the workplace workers actually seeing sort

  • of artificial intelligence or machine intelligence first? And what's going to disrupt the economy

  • the most? BOCK: Are you talking about high-level artificial

  • intelligence, replacing a human being? QUESTION: Or augmenting what humans are doing.

  • ALVING: I think your emphasis was on first. What is it that we'll next see out of the

  • chute? BOCK: Oh. Well, they already are -- we have

  • robots that people are using and they're interacting with them. You remember the headline in the

  • Japanese newspaper sort of about ten years ago, "Robot kills worker"? Murders was another

  • one, translation that was used. It was not, you know, accidentally kills or runs -- they

  • attributed intention to this robot. Well, who knows? You know, I doubt it, because

  • there wasn't any understanding of that basis. You know, if you asked it, why did you kill

  • a person? It would not say anything. OK, or say, I don't know.

  • ALVING: Well, asking about murderous robots... MCAFEE: So far, it's been routine knowledge

  • workers who are most displaced by technology. The reason that's a problem is that the American

  • middle class has been largely composed of routine knowledge workers. Your average American

  • doesn't dig ditches for a living and they're not a -- you know, they're not an executive

  • in a company. A payroll clerk has been a really good stepping stone to the American middle

  • class. We don't need payroll clerks anymore. To answer your question, where I see things

  • going next is basically an encroachment upward in that education or that skill ladder with

  • knowledge work. So, for example, financial advice today is given almost exclusively by

  • human beings. That's a bad joke. BOCK: It is.

  • MCAFEE: Right, that entire -- that should be algorithimized -- let alone the fact that

  • your stock broker giving you a hot stock tip is a bad joke. Again, there's no way a human

  • can keep on top of all possible financial instruments, analyze their performance in

  • any rigorous way, assemble them in a portfolio that makes sense for where you are in your

  • life and what your goals are. The fact that we're relying on humans to do

  • that, I think, is a bad joke. We'll all be better served by completely automated financial

  • advice, and it can be done so cheaply that people who are not affluent can have decent

  • financial planning. Fantastic. There are a lot of people who give

  • financial advice for a living these days. That's where I think it's going next.

  • BOCK: You know they talked about the bell curve of intelligence? You know, that doesn't

  • change with us, that we're all the same, we're the same as we were 70,000 years ago, we have

  • this bell curve of intelligence. But the bell curve of intelligence of machines is slowly

  • moving to the right, OK, to the right this way.

  • And for a long time, it was OK, because if you dug ditches, you could learn how to do

  • a -- what do you call it, a backhoe, you know? And you could learn how to run it. But there

  • are now transitions that are necessary from hardware operation to software operation,

  • where the transfer is not as easy, and we are going to displace workers eventually who

  • just can't find a place in the workforce anymore. ALVING: Question over here?

  • QUESTION: Hi, Esther Lee. I started the Office of Innovation and Entrepreneurship at Commerce.

  • Good to see you, Andrew. So my son -- four-year-old son's preschool just started STEM. I don't

  • know what they're doing in STEM, and they actually call it STEAM, because they add an

  • A for arts. And my daughter went to a robotics camp this year, this summer. I don't know

  • that they... MCAFEE: Your four-year-old daughter went to

  • a robotics camp? QUESTION: My five-year-old daughter went to

  • a robotics camp. (LAUGHTER)

  • ALVING: That makes it better. MCAFEE: OK.

  • (CROSSTALK) QUESTION: So I don't know that they know -- I

  • don't know if the content is going to prepare them for the kind of future we're talking

  • about. What needs to happen in K-12 education to really prepare kids for the world we're

  • talking about? I don't see a lot that's changed in K-12 from when I went to elementary school.

  • ALVING: So we got three academics on the panel. BOCK: None of whom have ever taught in K-12.

  • ALVING: Right. (LAUGHTER)

  • BOCK: I assume. MCAFEE: No, I gave my TED talk in 2013. The

  • TED prize that year was given to a guy named Sugata Mitra. You should all go watch his

  • TED talk. It was fantastic. The point that he makes is our K-12 educational system is

  • really well designed to turn out the clerks needed for the Victorian Empire.

  • And he makes a very compelling case. And, you know, the implication is obvious -- we

  • don't need those kinds of workers anymore. And he said, basic arithmetic skills, the

  • ability to read and write with some proficiency, and the ability to be an obedient worker who's

  • going to do what they say -- what you tell them to do when you deploy them in Christchurch

  • or Ottawa or Calcutta or something like that. We don't need those people anymore.

  • My super short answer for how K-12 education needs to change is Montessori. I was a Montessori

  • kid for the early years of my education. And I am so grateful for that, like that hippie-style

  • of go poke at the world education. BOCK: I'll second that.

  • COHEN: Can I take a crack at -- so Andrew says, well, look, here's what's happening.

  • The machines are sort of moving into higher and higher echelons, for want of a better

  • word. Well, what's happening in education is that what used to be a masters is now sort

  • of roughly equivalent to a bachelor's. What used to be a bachelor's...

  • (CROSSTALK) COHEN: And we're going in the other direction.

  • So -- so -- exactly. Exactly. I mean, I think it really is a significant problem, is that

  • education is not getting better and machines are. So that's a problem.

  • But to your point, and this really worries me a lot, when we started the school of information

  • at the University of Arizona, we recognized that our children were taking exactly the

  • same courses as we had forty years earlier as if the information revolution had never

  • happened. And so we said, well, look, what should an information age curriculum look

  • like? And here's the bad news. It involves a lot of abstractions. It involves abstractions

  • like know what information is, understanding that data isn't what's in databases. Data

  • -- every data point actually tells a story. It came to be, right? It understands -- it

  • involves abstractions like game theory and -- I mean, lots and lots and lots of abstractions

  • that we learn in economics, in physics, in computer science, and so on.

  • Those are the abstractions that make the world work today. The reason that biology is essentially

  • computer science is that the underlying ideas are essentially the same.

  • BOCK: That's right. COHEN: And I can easily -- you know, we can

  • easily document it. Here's the problem. Depending on which theory of cognitive development you

  • follow, abstraction is a late-developing skill and, for many students, it never develops

  • at all. So people always thought that what's called

  • -- what Piaget called formal operations was sort of the late-stage of development occurring

  • eleven or twelve years old. It now appears that it's actually the product of a Western

  • upper-middle-class education, right? What Piaget thought was a natural developmental

  • stage actually isn't. So I am quite worried about it, because I

  • think that the things that tie fields together largely by merit of us understanding that

  • everything is an information process of one kind or another, that idea is very, very hard

  • to get across. And I know this because I teach the 100 level course at the University of

  • Arizona, and I look at these faces, and I can see they're not getting it.

  • MCAFEE: Really. COHEN: And we've worked for years to try and

  • get this across, and I just don't know what to do about it. It's a real problem.

  • BOCK: My daughter is a primary school teacher and has been for forty -- for thirty years.

  • And she says that things haven't changed a great deal for her, except the infusion of

  • an enormous amount of modern equipment. ALVING: Which they don't have to deal with.

  • BOCK: Oh, on the contrary, my grandson, who is -- was one of her students -- is an expert

  • on this machine and has been since he was four.

  • ALVING: But are the teachers experts? BOCK: She is. You know, we have to be a little

  • bit careful, you know? The generations are changing here. The younger generations, the

  • Millenials consider this all -- well, wasn't it like this when you were a kid? You know,

  • what's wrong? What's the big deal here, you know? Can't you handle five remotes at the

  • same time? Part of that is, of course, that I wish I was 72 again, you know? But nonetheless,

  • there is not much of a change from her point of view in terms of educational methods, and

  • that has to do with exactly what Paul was saying, bringing as much sensation Montessori-wise

  • into experience, feeling things, feeling egg whites as opposed to water. Very different

  • feels. ALVING: Let's take a question from the back

  • over here. QUESTION: Yes, hi. Jay Parker, I'm a department

  • chair in the College of International Security Affairs at National Defense University. There

  • were two points in the discussion here that seemed to me as linked, and I'm wondering

  • if Peter in particular can expand on them. You were talking earlier about this -- one

  • of the programs that you're involved with involves computers essentially reading 11,000

  • novels, but you said none of my graduate students read novels, and that's the problem, and you

  • made mention of the fact that STEM has been changed to add A, which strikes me as very

  • unusual, where arts, literature, all those things where we would think abstract learning

  • and wrestling with those concepts came from are dramatically shrinking as the very specific

  • technical kinds of education that you're talking about here is increasing.

  • And I wonder if you could kind of pull on that thread a little bit more and talk about

  • the implications and -- and what some possible alternatives might be.

  • BOCK: Well, imagine a driver who -- an artificially intelligent driver who has to drive you to

  • work and some of the obvious things that must -- it must know is it must know the route

  • and how the car works and so forth, but I maintain it also must know how to go to the

  • grocery store and how it must know how to go to the movies and play tennis or walk on

  • a beach and appreciate how the sunsets and so forth, because that will come into play

  • eventually. And if it is not answered correctly, both of them -- the natural and the artificial

  • intelligence -- are going to get killed, along with perhaps some other people who are not

  • in the car. What you know that is in -- what we call the

  • arts and social sciences and the humanities is a major part of why creativity and innovation

  • is almost exclusively an American thing. They do not teach those things in Europe. They

  • do not teach them in the universities in China. They do not teach them in the universities

  • in Europe. We teach the arts, the social sciences, and the humanities, the A in STEAM -- I'm

  • so glad to hear that. I was terribly afraid that they were just

  • going to take out everything except arithmetic and computers and all the technical subjects,

  • and I think it's very important for people to understand what the categorical imperative

  • is, Immanuel Kant, 1780. I think it's very important for people to understand what Galileo's

  • problem with Maffeo Barberini was, 1620. I think it's very important for...

  • MCAFEE: You think it's important for them to be able to recite the dates?

  • BOCK: No. (LAUGHTER)

  • There's only one date we need to know, and that is when George Washington stood up in

  • the boat -- was that it -- when he was crossing the Delaware or something. I don't know. I'm

  • kidding. MCAFEE: And maybe not even that one.

  • BOCK: Yeah, history was taught so poorly when we were -- when I was -- when we were students.

  • ALVING: But your point is that creativity is a fundamental element of even technology

  • innovation, forget the larger world. BOCK: Social sciences, arts and humanities

  • are an absolutely essential ingredient of creativity and innovation, absolutely essential.

  • ALVING: Yeah. Great. Next question? QUESTION: Bill Nitze with Oceana Energy. I

  • love the reference... ALVING: Could you use the microphone, please?

  • QUESTION: Yes, Bill Nitze with Oceana Energy. I love the reference to the categorical imperative,

  • because I think it applies to all intelligent machines.

  • BOCK: Which ones? QUESTION: And I think Isaac Asimov's "I, Robot"

  • rules are just dead wrong. BOCK: Absolutely.

  • QUESTION: Now, that leads to a broader question, though, about rules for intelligent machines.

  • If we attempt to anticipate the future, we are bound to make serious mistakes which will

  • have collateral consequences that we cannot even imagine. If we allow the big cloud -- that's

  • all of us with our reptilian brains -- to evolve those rules in an age of ever-accelerating

  • change, we're going to experience some interesting versions of a Thirty Years' War among ourselves

  • with robots. I mean, it could get really, really interesting. If you think the Luddites

  • were bad, wait and see what the Baptists are going to do down the road.

  • So what do we do? How do we approach this question of perhaps being the masters of psycho

  • history and just anticipating the ethical challenges enough to minimize the truly terrible

  • outcomes and slightly weight the future in favor of the better outcomes?

  • BOCK: Oh, boy. Oh, boy, oh, boy. ALVING: And how much time do we have to answer

  • that? BOCK: Yeah, really. I see it all the time.

  • The problem is -- but you know what? That problem has been here since the day I remember

  • thinking about it, which is a very long time ago, OK? It is not a new problem. It is a

  • growing problem, perhaps, but it is not a new problem.

  • We just have to make sure that we understand that students need to learn not things and

  • items and data, but how to think and how to understand and how to feel and how to associate,

  • even if not causally, associate, but also causally, but even if not causally.

  • And that has to be inserted in their education, but it has to be made to live, because as

  • a teacher, the three of us know our primary duty on that stage is -- well, not the primary

  • duty -- an essential duty is to entertain. We have to keep the students motivated. Otherwise,

  • they do this when we're teaching, especially if they're part-time students and they've

  • been working all day. So you have to keep them motivated. You have

  • to keep them understanding how everything sort of works together or let their minds

  • understand how they must think about how everything is linked together. The Thirty Years' War

  • is a wonderful example, because what we're seeing now is another one, of course, in a

  • slightly different part of the world. It's no longer Gustavus Adolphus against the Hapsburgs.

  • It's now something that we don't really understand yet going on over in the Middle East.

  • But it's about religion on the surface. The Thirty Years' War was about religion on the

  • surface, also. Maybe the answer partially to your question is, and it's a very vague

  • answer, it's one of those abstractions -- we need to get rid of more of the magic. We need

  • to stop listening to people who are not informed saying, "Well, what I believe is this and

  • I know it's true because I saw it with my own eyes." What a defensive statement. Which

  • eyes would they have seen it with? ALVING: On that note, I think we have time

  • for one brief question here on the aisle. QUESTION: Chris Broughton, Millennium Challenge

  • Corporation. Just to return the question of employment, which we've danced around our

  • entire session, recent Economist article citing a U.N. study estimating one-fifth of all global

  • employment potentially displaced by machines' artificial intelligence as we look to our

  • global population increasing from 6.7 billion to 9.0 billion in the same time period. What

  • credence do you give these statistics? And in the age of innovation that you talked about,

  • new products, services, possibilities for well-being and economic advancement, what

  • new types of employment do we see potentially? And will the new employment be able to keep

  • up with the old employment that's lost? Thank you.

  • MCAFEE: I give almost no weight to any point estimate that I've heard about net job loss

  • at any point in the future. And the simple reason I do that is because previous estimates

  • have been almost uniformly terrible. So is it 20 percent, is it 47 percent? I don't know.

  • Nobody knows. I do think the broad challenge, though, is

  • that we could be automating work and jobs more quickly than we're creating. The tendency

  • that we have is to low ball the creation side. That's why for 200 years allegedly smart guys

  • and Luddites and different people have been predicting the era of technological unemployment

  • and they've been wrong. The question is, is this time finally different?

  • I think this time is finally different. I'm fully aware there are 200 years of people

  • saying that and being wrong. I also think our homework is to make sure this time is

  • not different. And the way to do that is not to try to throttle back the technology or

  • channel it so it can't ever put anybody out of work. The right thing to do is create environments

  • that let the innovators and the entrepreneurs do what they do, which is come up with new

  • stuff, and as they're coming up with that new stuff, they need to hire people to help

  • them get that out there to market. That is our only real possible way to keep people

  • gainfully employed. I'm in my mid-forties. Let's say I've got

  • half a century ahead of me. I honestly believe that I'm going to live to see a ridiculously

  • bountiful economy that just doesn't need very much human labor. So I think we're getting

  • there in that timeframe. That's about the most confident prediction I can make.

  • ALVING: And on that note, we've reached the end of our session, so I will just remind

  • everybody that this meeting has been on-the-record. And please join me in thanking our panelists.

  • (APPLAUSE) END

ALVING: Good afternoon and welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations' discussion on

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人工智能的未來。機器人及其他 (The Future of Artificial Intelligence: Robots and Beyond)

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    richardwang 發佈於 2021 年 01 月 14 日
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