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  • I'm going to talk to you

    我想和你們談談

  • about power in this 21st century.

    這21世紀裡的權力。

  • And basically, what I'd like to tell you

    而基本上我想告訴你們的,

  • is that power is changing,

    就是權力正在改變。

  • and there are two types of changes

    有兩種改變

  • I want to discuss.

    是我想要探討的。

  • One is power transition,

    一是權力的轉移,

  • which is change of power amongst states.

    也就是國際中不同國家擁有的權力的改變。

  • And there the simple version of the message

    這種改變簡單說起來

  • is it's moving from West to East.

    就是權力正由西方移向東方。

  • The other is power diffusion,

    另一個則是權力的擴散

  • the way power is moving

    也就是權力移動的方式

  • from all states West or East

    從所有國家,西方或東方

  • to non-state actors.

    到非國家或非政府個體。

  • Those two things

    這兩種現象

  • are the huge shifts of power

    就是這世紀裡重要的

  • in our century.

    權力轉移。

  • And I want to tell you about them each separately

    而我想和你們分別聊聊這兩種現象

  • and then how they interact

    以及它們如何的互動

  • and why, in the end, there may be some good news.

    和為什麽,在最後,可能還是有好消息。

  • When we talk about power transition,

    在討論權力的轉移的時候,

  • we often talk about the rise of Asia.

    我們常常講到亞洲的崛起。

  • It really should be called

    但它真的應該要被稱為

  • the recovery or return of Asia.

    亞洲的回復,或重返國際舞臺。

  • If we looked at the world

    如果我們來看

  • in 1800,

    1800年的世界,

  • you'd find that more than half of the world's people

    你會發覺世界上過半的人口

  • lived in Asia

    住在亞洲,

  • and they made more than half the world's product.

    這過半的人口也生產世界上超過一半的產品。

  • Now fast forward to 1900:

    現在快轉到1900年,

  • half the world's people -- more than half -- still live in Asia,

    世界上一半的人口--超過一半的人仍然住在亞洲,

  • but they're now making

    但他們只有生產了

  • only a fifth of the world's product.

    世界上五分之一的產品。

  • What happened? The Industrial Revolution,

    有什麼事件發生了嗎? 工業革命。

  • which meant that all of a sudden,

    這表示一夕之間

  • Europe and America

    歐洲和美洲

  • became the dominant center of the world.

    成為了世界上的統治中心。

  • What we're going to see in the 21st century

    我們在二十一世紀會看到的

  • is Asia gradually returning

    是亞洲逐步地再擁有

  • to being more than half of the world's population

    世界過半的人口

  • and more than half of the world's product.

    和生產超過世界一半的產品。

  • That's important and it's an important shift.

    那是重要的一點,也是很重要的轉變。

  • But let me tell you a little bit about

    但讓我來告訴你們一些

  • the other shift that I'm talking about,

    我一開始談到的另一個轉變,

  • which is power diffusion.

    權力的擴散。

  • To understand power diffusion

    要了解權力的擴散,

  • put this in your mind:

    你們必須先設想:

  • computing and communications costs

    計算和通信的費用

  • have fallen a thousandfold

    跟1970年比起來

  • between 1970

    二十一世紀初的價格

  • and the beginning of this century.

    降低了整整一千倍。

  • Now that's a big abstract number.

    這聽起來像是個大而抽象的數字,

  • But to make it more real,

    但要讓這聽起來比較真實一點,

  • if the price of an automobile

    我們來假想如果汽車的價格

  • had fallen as rapidly

    也是跌了一千倍,

  • as the price of computing power,

    就像電腦計算能力的價格一樣,

  • you could buy a car today

    你今天可以去買一輛車,

  • for five dollars.

    而那只會花上你五塊美金。

  • Now when the price of any technology

    當任何科技的價格

  • declines that dramatically,

    如此戲劇性的降低,

  • the barriers to entry go down.

    入門的門檻也會跟著降低,

  • Anybody can play in the game.

    任何人都可以參與競爭。

  • So in 1970,

    在1970年,

  • if you wanted to communicate

    如果你想要啟動

  • from Oxford to Johannesburg

    從牛津到約翰尼斯堡

  • to New Delhi

    到新德里

  • to Brasilia

    到巴西利亞

  • and anywhere simultaneously,

    和任何地方的同步通訊,

  • you could do it.

    你是做得到的,

  • The technology was there.

    科技是有的。

  • But to be able to do it,

    但要真的去做,

  • you had to be very rich --

    你必須要非常的富有--

  • a government, a multinational corporation,

    像是政府、多國企業、

  • maybe the Catholic Church --

    或許天主教廷等才有可能

  • but you had to be pretty wealthy.

    總之你必須要非常有錢。

  • Now, anybody has that capacity,

    但現在,任何人都做得到,

  • which previously was restricted by price

    之前因為價格的限制

  • just to a few actors.

    使得能參與的個體極少,

  • If they have the price of entry into an Internet cafe --

    現在任何人付得起使用網咖的費用--

  • the last time I looked, it was something like a pound an hour --

    我上次看得時候一小時大概才一英鎊吧--

  • and if you have Skype, it's free.

    而且如果你有用Skype的話還免費。

  • So capabilities

    所以在以前

  • that were once restricted

    僅限於少數人特權

  • are now available to everyone.

    現在已經到了普及大眾的程度。

  • And what that means

    而這表示的

  • is not that the age of the State is over.

    並不是美國的時代已經結束了。

  • The State still matters.

    美國仍然很重要。

  • But the stage is crowded.

    但是國際舞台上變得更擁擠,

  • The State's not alone. There are many, many actors.

    美國並不孤單。還有很多很多的參與者。

  • Some of that's good:

    有些是好的:

  • Oxfam,

    像,樂施會,

  • a great non-governmental actor.

    這是一個很棒的非政府組織。

  • Some of it's bad:

    有些是不好的:

  • Al Qaeda, another non-governmental actor.

    蓋達組織,另一個非政府組織。

  • But think of what it does

    但想想這些

  • to how we think in traditional terms and concepts.

    對我們傳統的觀念做了哪些改變。

  • We think in terms of war

    我們用戰爭

  • and interstate war.

    或國與國之間的戰爭的角度來思考。

  • And you can think back to 1941

    而你們可以回想一下,在1941年

  • when the government of Japan

    日本政府

  • attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor.

    攻擊了美國珍珠港。

  • It's worth noticing

    值得一提的是

  • that a non-state actor

    一個非政府的組織

  • attacking the United States in 2001

    在2001年對美國的攻擊

  • killed more Americans

    比1941年日本政府

  • than the government of Japan did in 1941.

    殺的美國人還要多。

  • You might think of that

    你可以想成

  • as the privatization of war.

    這是戰爭的私有化。

  • So we're seeing a great change

    所以我們正看到了很大的改變

  • in terms of diffusion of power.

    發生在權力擴散這方面。

  • Now the problem is

    現在問題是

  • that we're not thinking about it in very innovative ways.

    我們並沒有用很創新的想法來考量這個現象。

  • So let me step back

    讓我們來重新檢視,

  • and ask: what's power?

    來問問: 權力是什麼?

  • Power is simple the ability

    權力,最簡單來說就是

  • to affect others

    “影響別人

  • to get the outcomes you want,

    去得到你想要的結果的能力。”

  • and you can do it in three ways.

    而這可以用三種方式達成:

  • You can do it with threats

    你可以使用威脅,

  • of coercion, "sticks,"

    強勢的逼迫--棍子;

  • you can do it with payments,

    你也可以使用金錢--

  • "carrots,"

    紅蘿蔔;

  • or you can do it by getting others

    或你可以讓別人

  • to want what you want.

    去想要你所想要的結果。

  • And that ability to get others to want what you want,

    而用這種使別人想要你所想要的能力

  • to get the outcomes you want

    來達到你想要的結果,

  • without coercion or payment,

    沒有威脅或金錢利誘

  • is what I call soft power.

    我稱之為軟實力。

  • And that soft power has been much neglected

    而軟實力常常被忽略

  • and much misunderstood,

    甚至誤解。

  • and yet it's tremendously important.

    但其實它扮演了極度重要的角色。

  • Indeed, if you can learn

    沒錯,如果你能學習

  • to use more soft power,

    去使用更多的軟實力,

  • you can save a lot

    你可以省下很多的

  • on carrots and sticks.

    紅蘿蔔和棍子。

  • Traditionally, the way people thought about power

    傳統來說,大多數人想到權力的時候,

  • was primarily in terms of military power.

    主要都是以武力的角度來想。

  • For example, the great Oxford historian

    舉個例子:偉大的牛津史學家

  • who taught here at this university, A.J.P. Taylor,

    A.J.P.泰勒曾在這間大學教書。

  • defined a great power

    他定義一個強權

  • as a country able to prevail in war.

    為一個在戰爭裡能夠得勝的國家。

  • But we need a new narrative

    但我們需要一個新的闡述方法

  • if we're to understand power in the 21st century.

    來幫助我們了解二十一世紀裡的權力。

  • It's not just prevailing at war,

    這不只是在戰爭中得勝,

  • though war still persists.

    雖然戰爭持續在發生,

  • It's not whose army wins;

    這不是誰的軍隊可以贏,

  • it's also whose story wins.

    而也是誰的故事可以贏。

  • And we have to think much more in terms of narratives

    而我們必須要多多以故事的角度來想,

  • and whose narrative is going to be effective.

    看看誰的故事會是最有效的。

  • Now let me go back

    現在讓我回到

  • to the question

    有關於

  • of power transition

    權力轉移於

  • between states

    不同國家之間的問題

  • and what's happening there.

    和現在的情況究竟是如何。

  • the narratives that we use now

    我們現在所使用的闡述方法,

  • tend to be the rise and fall

    常常是強權的

  • of the great powers.

    崛起和殞落。

  • And the current narrative is all about

    而當前我們看到的全部都是

  • the rise of China

    中國的崛起

  • and the decline of the United States.

    和美國的衰退。

  • Indeed, with the 2008 financial crisis,

    沒錯,2008年的財務危機,

  • many people said this was

    很多人說這是

  • the beginning of the end of American power.

    美國強權結束的開始。

  • The tectonic plates

    世界政治的

  • of world politics were shifting.

    結構板塊正在轉移。

  • And president Medvedev of Russia, for example,

    而舉個例子來說:俄羅斯的總統梅德維傑夫

  • pronounced in 2008

    在2008年對外宣稱

  • this was the beginning of the end

    這是美國強權

  • of United States power.

    結束的開始。

  • But in fact,

    但事實上,

  • this metaphor of decline

    這種所謂衰退的象徵

  • is often very misleading.

    是非常誤導人的。

  • If you look at history, in recent history,

    如果你看看歷史,最近的歷史,

  • you'll see the cycles of belief

    你會看到每隔十到十五年,

  • in American decline

    就會出現對於

  • come and go every 10 or 15 years or so.

    美國衰退的看法。

  • In 1958,

    在1958年,

  • after the Soviets put up Sputnik,

    蘇聯把史普尼克1號送上太空之後,

  • it was "That's the end of America."

    很多人說「那是美國的末日。」

  • In 1973, with the oil embargo

    在1973年的石油禁運

  • and the closing of the gold window,

    以及美元和黃金互相轉換的結束,

  • that was the end of America.

    很多人也說那是美國的末日。

  • In the 1980s,

    在1980年代,

  • as America went through a transition in the Reagan period,

    當美國經歷了雷根總統任內的經濟轉換--

  • between the rust belt economy of the midwest

    從美國中西部的銹帶經濟

  • to the Silicon Valley economy of California,

    到加州的矽谷經濟--

  • that was the end of America.

    很多人也說那是美國的末日。

  • But in fact, what we've seen

    但事實上,我們所看到的

  • is none of those were true.

    是沒有任何一個關於美國末日的說法是事實。

  • Indeed, people were over-enthusiastic

    沒錯,人們在2000年代早期

  • in the early 2000s,

    是過度樂觀的,

  • thinking America could do anything,

    他們相信美國什麼都做得到,

  • which led us into some disastrous

    進而導致一些災難性的

  • foreign policy adventures,

    外交政策,

  • and now we're back to decline again.

    現在我們又回到了美國正在衰退這個論點。

  • The moral of this story

    這個故事的寓意指出

  • is all these narratives about rise and fall and decline

    所有這些有關崛起衰退再崛起的看法,

  • tell us a lot more about psychology

    告訴我們很多關於心理層面的想法,

  • than they do about reality.

    而不真正是對現實的描述。

  • If we try to focus on the reality,

    如果我們試著專注於現實,

  • then what we need to focus on

    那我們真的要關心的

  • is what's really happening

    是在中國和美國之間

  • in terms of China and the United States.

    真的在發生的事情。

  • Goldman Sachs has projected

    高盛集團預測

  • that China, the Chinese economy,

    中國和中國的經濟

  • will surpass that of the U.S.

    會在2027年

  • by 2027.

    超越美國。

  • So we've got, what,

    所以我們還有,

  • 17 more years to go or so

    大約十七多年

  • before China's bigger.

    才會等到中國比美國壯大。

  • Now someday,

    有一天,

  • with a billion point three people getting richer,

    當十三億人同時的富有起來

  • they are going to be bigger than the United States.

    他們會比美國還要強大。

  • But be very careful about these projections

    但我們應該謹慎來看,

  • such as the Goldman Sachs projection

    像是由高盛集團所提出的這些預測。

  • as though that gives you an accurate picture

    這些並不能告訴你們

  • of power transition in this century.

    這個世紀裡權力會如何真正的轉移。

  • Let me mention three reasons why it's too simple.

    讓我提出三個為什麼這些預測太簡易的原因:

  • First of all, it's a linear projection.

    第一,這些預測都是直線形的預測。

  • You know, everything says,

    你們知道,所有的資料顯示

  • here's the growth rate of China, here's the growth rate of the U.S.,

    這是中國的成長率,而那是美國的成長率

  • here it goes -- straight line.

    所以我們來就用這些成長率來做線形的預測。

  • History is not linear.

    歷史不是直線形的,

  • There are often bumps along the road, accidents along the way.

    歷史的長路上中間常常會有凸塊甚至有意外發生。

  • The second thing is

    第二點,

  • that the Chinese economy

    當中國的經濟

  • passes the U.S. economy in, let's say, 2030,

    在,我們假設2030年好了,超越美國的經濟,

  • which it may it,

    這有可能會發生,

  • that will be a measure of total economic size,

    那會是一個整個經濟體的測量,

  • but not of per capita income --

    但不是人均收入的測量--

  • won't tell you about the composition of the economy.

    也就是那並不會顯示整個經濟體的結構。

  • China still has large areas

    中國仍然有大部分的區域

  • of underdevelopment

    處於尚未開發的狀態,

  • and per capita income is a better measure

    而人均收入是一個比較好的測量方式,

  • of the sophistication of the economy.

    尤其對於中國如此複雜的經濟體。

  • And that the Chinese won't catch up or pass the Americans

    而中國人在人均收入

  • until somewhere in the latter part,

    在這個世紀後期,2050年以後

  • after 2050, of this century.

    都不會追上或超越美國人的人均收入。

  • The other point that's worth noticing

    第三點值得注意的

  • is how one-dimensional

    是這些預測

  • this projection is.

    都是只考慮單方面的。

  • You know, it looks at economic power

    你們知道,當測量經濟實力的時候

  • measured by GDP.

    採用的是國內生產總值,

  • Doesn't tell you much about military power,

    這沒辦法告訴你多少關於軍事實力,

  • doesn't tell you very much about soft power.

    沒辦法告訴你多少關於軟實力,

  • It's all very one-dimensional.

    這完全是一維化的。

  • And also, when we think about the rise of Asia,

    同時,當我們想到亞洲崛起,

  • or return of Asia

    或我早些對這個現象的稱呼

  • as I called it a little bit earlier,

    亞洲重返國際舞臺的時候,

  • it's worth remembering Asia's not one thing.

    我們應該要記得亞洲不是一個個體.

  • If you're sitting in Japan,

    如果你坐在日本、

  • or in New Delhi,

    新德里、

  • or in Hanoi,

    或是河內,

  • your view of the rise of China

    那你對中國崛起的看法

  • is a little different than if you're sitting in Beijing.

    將會和你坐在北京的看法有些不同。

  • Indeed, one of the advantages

    沒錯,美國

  • that the Americans will have

    在亞洲的權力分配裡

  • in terms of power in Asia

    將會有的優勢之一,

  • is all those countries

    是很多亞洲國家

  • want an American insurance policy

    會想要有美國作靠山

  • against the rise of China.

    來抗衡中國的崛起。

  • It's as though Mexico and Canada

    這就像是如果墨西哥和加拿大

  • were hostile neighbors to the United States,

    是美國危險的鄰居--

  • which they're not.

    他們當然不是。

  • So these simple projections

    所以這些例如高盛

  • of the Goldman Sachs type

    所做的簡單的預測,

  • are not telling us what we need to know

    並沒有告訴我們對於

  • about power transition.

    權力轉移所需要知道的東西。

  • But you might ask, well so what in any case?

    但你可能會問,好吧,但是如果中國真的崛起了那又怎樣?

  • Why does it matter? Who cares?

    這很重要嗎?為什麼我們應該去關心這件事?

  • Is this just a game

    這是不是一場

  • that diplomats and academics play?

    外交官和學術家們在玩的遊戲?

  • The answer is it matters quite a lot.

    答案是,這的確很重要。

  • Because, if you believe in decline

    因為,如果你相信衰退,

  • and you get the answers wrong on this,

    而你對於衰退的疑問的回答是不正確的

  • the facts, not the myths,

    事實,甚至不是神話,

  • you may have policies which are very dangerous.

    你可能會採取一些很危險的政策。

  • Let me give you an example from history.

    讓我從歷史來給你們舉個例子,

  • The Peloponnesian War

    伯羅奔尼撒戰爭

  • was the great conflict

    是那場

  • in which the Greek city state system

    希臘式城邦系統

  • tore itself apart

    被自己摧毀的大衝突,

  • two and a half millennia ago.

    這發生在大約兩千五百年前。

  • What caused it?

    什麼導致它的發生?

  • Thucydides, the great historian of the the Peloponnesian War,

    修昔底德,紀錄伯羅奔尼撒戰爭的偉大史學家,

  • said it was the rise in the power of Athens

    說是雅典為首的同盟的實力盛興

  • and the fear it created in Sparta.

    進而對斯巴達帶來恐懼而導致的。

  • Notice both halves of that explanation.

    注意這兩半的解釋,

  • Many people argue

    很多人會說

  • that the 21st century

    二十一世紀

  • is going to repeat the 20th century,

    將會重覆二十世紀:

  • in which World War One,

    像第一次世界大戰是

  • the great conflagration

    歐洲各國政治系統

  • in which the European state system

    摧毀自己

  • tore itself apart

    和摧毀歐洲在世界中心

  • and destroyed its centrality in the world,

    的導火綫。

  • that that was caused by

    而原因是由於

  • the rise in the power of Germany

    德國實力的崛起

  • and the fear it created in Britain.

    和它在英國造成的恐懼導致的。

  • So there are people who are telling us

    所以現在我們就聽到

  • this is going to be reproduced today,

    類似的歷史將會重演,

  • that what we're going to see

    而我們將會看到

  • is the same thing now in this century.

    同樣的事情發生在這個世紀。

  • No, I think that's wrong.

    不,我認為這是錯的。

  • It's bad history.

    這是拙劣的歷史。

  • For one thing, Germany had surpassed Britain

    我們必須知道,德國

  • in industrial strength by 1900.

    在1900年就已經在工業實力上超越了英國,

  • And as I said earlier,

    而我早些已經提到了,

  • China has not passed the United States.

    中國還沒有超越美國。

  • But also, if you have this belief

    但是,如果你相信中國已經超越美國,

  • and it creates a sense of fear,

    而那產生了一種恐懼感,

  • it leads to overreaction.

    這就會導致過度反應。

  • And the greatest danger we have

    而我們當前

  • of managing this power transition

    在管理這個權力朝東方轉移

  • of the shift toward the East is fear.

    最大的危險就是恐懼。

  • To paraphrase Franklin Roosevelt

    我來改述富蘭克林‧羅斯福

  • from a different context,

    在另一個場合所講的,

  • the greatest thing we have to fear is fear itself.

    我們最大的恐懼,就是恐懼本身。

  • We don't have to fear the rise of China

    我們不需要害怕中國的崛起,

  • or the return of Asia.

    或是亞洲重返國際舞臺,

  • And if we have policies

    而如果我們有

  • in which we take it

    把歷史放入考量

  • in that larger historical perspective,

    的政策,

  • we're going to be able

    我們將可以

  • to manage this process.

    有效度過這個過程。

  • Let me say a word now

    現在讓我來談談

  • about the distribution of power

    權力的分配

  • and how it relates to power diffusion

    以及它和權力的擴散的關係,

  • and then pull these two types together.

    然後在把這兩者連結在一起。

  • If you ask how is power distributed in the world today,

    如果你問說今天全球的權力是如何分配的?

  • it's distributed much like

    答案是

  • a three-dimensional chess game.

    那就像一場立體3D的三層西洋棋賽:

  • Top board:

    最上一個棋盤:

  • military power among states.

    不同國家的軍事實力。

  • The United States is the only superpower,

    美國是唯一的強權,

  • and it's likely to remain that way

    而這很有可能在

  • for two or three decades.

    未來二三十年保持如此,

  • China's not going to replace the U.S. on this military board.

    中國在這個層面不會取代美國。

  • Middle board of this three-dimensional chess game:

    中間的棋盤:

  • economic power among states.

    不同國家的經濟實力,

  • Power is multi-polar.

    實力是多極化的,

  • There are balancers --

    這有很多的平衡者:

  • the U.S., Europe,

    美國、歐洲、

  • China, Japan

    中國、日本

  • can balance each other.

    會平衡彼此。

  • The bottom board of this three-dimensional,

    最下層的棋盤:

  • the board of transnational relations,

    國家之間的關係,

  • things that cross borders outside the control of governments,

    外於政府控制而跨國界的東西,

  • things like climate change, drug trade,

    像是氣候變遷、毒品交易、

  • financial flows,

    財務流、

  • pandemics,

    全球流行病等,

  • all these things that cross borders

    所有這些跨越國界

  • outside the control of governments,

    而外於政府控制的東西,

  • there nobody's in charge.

    沒有人是真正的領頭。

  • It makes no sense to call this unipolar

    要稱之為單極化

  • or multi-polar.

    或多極化並不正確。

  • Power is chaotically distributed.

    權力很混亂的分散,

  • And the only way you can solve these problems --

    而唯一能解決這些問題的方法

  • and this is where many greatest challenges

    而這也是很多這世紀

  • are coming in this century --

    最大的挑戰

  • is through cooperation,

    就是合作,

  • through working together,

    同心協力的來解決。

  • which means that soft power becomes more important,

    這也表示軟實力越來越重要。

  • that ability to organize networks

    軟實力能夠組織、

  • to deal with these kinds of problems

    解決這些問題

  • and to be able to get cooperation.

    和組織合作的連結。

  • Another way of putting it

    另一種描述這的方式,

  • is that as we think of power in the 21st century,

    就是當我們思考二十一世紀裡的權力,

  • we want to get away from the idea

    我們必須摒棄

  • that power's always zero sum --

    權力是零和遊戲這個觀念--

  • my gain is your loss and vice versa.

    我的增是你的減。

  • Power can also be positive sum,

    權力的總和可以是正數,

  • where your gain can be my gain.

    也就是你的增加也可以是我的增加。

  • If China develops greater energy security

    如果中國開發了更多的能源保證

  • and greater capacity

    和更多的能力

  • to deal with its problems of carbon emissions,

    來處理它境內的碳排放的問題,

  • that's good for us

    那對我們有益、

  • as well as good for China

    對中國有益、

  • as well as good for everybody else.

    也對所有其他人有益。

  • So empowering China

    所以激勵中國

  • to deal with its own problems of carbon

    來處理它的碳排放問題

  • is good for everybody,

    對所有人都有益,

  • and it's not a zero sum, I win, you lose.

    而這不會是權力加總起來是零,

  • It's one in which we can all gain.

    而是所有人都從中獲益。

  • So as we think about power

    所以當我們想到

  • in this century,

    這個世紀裡的權力,

  • we want to get away from this view

    我們必須遠離

  • that it's all I win, you lose.

    我嬴你輸這種看法。

  • Now I don't mean to be Pollyannaish about this.

    我無意做一個盲目而樂觀的人,

  • Wars persist. Power persists.

    戰爭仍然在發生,權力仍然重要,

  • Military power is important.

    軍事實力很重要,

  • Keeping balances is important.

    保持平衡很重要,

  • All this still persists.

    這些所有的仍然持續著,

  • Hard power is there,

    硬實力還是存在,

  • and it will remain.

    而且還會繼續存留。

  • But unless you learn how to mix

    但除非你學著將

  • hard power with soft power

    硬實力和軟實力

  • into strategies that I call smart power,

    混合成所謂我稱呼的巧實力,

  • you're not going to deal with the new kinds of problems

    你將無法處理我們正在面對

  • that we're facing.

    的新的問題。

  • So the key question that we need to think about as we look at this

    所以我們現在最需要思考的關鍵問題,

  • is how do we work together

    就是我們如何可以同心協力合作

  • to produce global public goods,

    來產生對於全球都有好處

  • things from which all of us can benefit?

    使得每個人都可以獲益?

  • How do we define our national interests

    我們如何定義我們的國家利益,

  • so that it's not just zero sum,

    使得權力的總和不會是零,

  • but positive sum.

    而是大於零。

  • In that sense, if we define our interests,

    如果我們能使用這種思維來定義國家利益,

  • for example, for the United States

    舉個例子:對美國來說

  • the way Britain defined its interests in the 19th century,

    英國在十九世紀定義國家利益的方法,

  • keeping an open trading system,

    是保持開放的貿易系統、

  • keeping a monetary stability, keeping freedom of the seas --

    保持貨幣穩定、保持航海的自由--

  • those were good for Britain,

    這些對英國有益,

  • they were good for others as well.

    也對其他國家有益。

  • And in the 21st century, you have to do an analog to that.

    而在二十一世紀裡,你必須要做出類似的舉動。

  • How do we produce global public goods,

    我們如何產生全球公共財,

  • which are good for us,

    那不只對我們有益

  • but good for everyone at the same time?

    也在同時讓所有人獲益,

  • And that's going to be the good news dimension

    而那就是屬於我們在思考

  • of what we need to think about

    二十一世紀裡的權力

  • as we think of power in the 21st century.

    的好消息的方面

  • There are ways to define our interests

    在定義國家利益的時候,

  • in which, while protecting ourselves with hard power,

    除了使用硬實力來保護自己,

  • we can organize with others in networks

    我們還能組織我們和其他人

  • to produce, not only public goods,

    來生產,不只有公共財

  • but ways that will enhance our soft power.

    還有能夠提升我們軟實力的方法。

  • So if one looks at the statements

    所以如果有人來檢驗

  • that have been made about this,

    官方對於此的發言,

  • I am impressed that when Hillary Clinton

    希拉蕊‧柯林頓在描述

  • described the foreign policy

    歐巴馬政府的外交政策

  • of the Obama administration,

    的發言給我很深刻的印象:

  • she said that the foreign policy of the Obama administration

    她說歐巴馬政府的外交政策

  • was going to be smart power,

    將會以巧實力為中心,

  • as she put it, "using all the tools

    她說:「使用我們外交政策

  • in our foreign policy tool box."

    工具箱裡所有的工具。」

  • And if we're going to deal

    而如果我們要面對

  • with these two great power shifts that I've described,

    我所提到的重大權力轉移:

  • the power shift represented by transition among states,

    由轉移在不同國家之間所代表的,

  • the power shift represented

    和由擴散遠離於政府

  • by diffusion of power away from all states,

    所代表的權力轉移,

  • we're going to have to develop a new narrative of power

    我們將會有一個對於權力的新的闡述方法。

  • in which we combine hard and soft power

    結合硬和軟實力

  • into strategies of smart power.

    來創造聰明實力的策略,

  • And that's the good news I have. We can do that.

    這就是我的好消息。我們真的做得到。

  • Thank you very much.

    非常謝謝你們

  • (Applause)

    (掌聲)

I'm going to talk to you

我想和你們談談

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