Name: 伊朗之後，中東下一場戰爭會是誰？🤔 (The Middle East's Next War After Iran)
Uploaded: 2026-03-13T17:26:39.000Z
Duration: 36 min 12 s

情態副詞

As all eyes on the Middle east remain fixated on the war between Iran and the United States and Israel, the stage is quietly being set behind the scenes for the next great era of conflict in the region that over the long run will be far more consequential than this current war and which will determine the course of Middle Eastern history for the next decade to come.

雖然大家都在關注 Iran 和 United States 和 Israel 之間的戰爭，但檯面下正默默地為下一場更重大的區域衝突鋪路，這場衝突的長遠影響將遠超目前的戰爭，並將決定 Middle east 未來十年的歷史走向。

The emerging Cold war between the Arab world's two greatest and wealthiest powers, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

這是一場正在萌芽的 Cold war，發生在中東兩個最偉大、最富有的國家 Saudi Arabia 和 United Arab Emirates 之間。

In many ways, the evidence of this newly emerging Cold war between them is already visibly apparent.

在許多方面，這場新興 Cold war 的跡象已經顯而易見。

In late December of 2025, Saudi warplanes directly bombed a UAE weapons shipment in Yemen that was bound for UAE backed separatists in the country.

在 2025 年 12 月下旬，Saudi 的戰機直接轟炸了 UAE 在 Yemen 的武器運輸，這些武器原本是要運送給 UAE 在當地支持的 separatists。

While Saudi and Emirati backed forces in the country openly battled against each other on the ground, vicious insults were hurled at each other across social media with Emiratis accusing the Saudis of bullying their smaller neighbor and supporting political Islamic and the Saudis blasting the Emiratis as being anti Islamic too pro Israel and fueling chaos across the Middle east by supporting separatists.

儘管 Saudi 和 Emirati 在當地支持的部隊在地面上公開交戰，但在 social media 上也互相惡言相向，Emiratis 指責 Saudis 欺凌較小的鄰國並支持 political Islamic，而 Saudis 則抨擊 Emiratis 是 anti Islamic、過度親 Israel，並透過支持 separatists 在 Middle east 煽動混亂。

But the emerging Cold war between them extends far beyond Yemen, across the Greater Middle east and surrounding regions.

但他們之間的 Cold war 不僅限於 Yemen，而是擴展到整個 Greater Middle east 及周邊地區。

They support radically different sides in the brutal ongoing civil war in Sudan that is fueling one of the world's deadliest genocides.

他們在 Sudan 殘酷的內戰中支持截然不同的陣營，這場內戰正在助長世界上最致命的 genocides 之一。

They support different sides in the looming war in the Horn of Africa with the UAE backing Abiy Ahmed's government in Ethiopia and the breakaway state of Somaliland and Saudi Arabia backing the Eritrean and Somalian governments.

在 Horn of Africa 即將爆發的戰爭中，他們也支持不同的陣營，UAE 支持 Abiy Ahmed 的 Ethiopia 政府和獨立國家 Somaliland，而 Saudi Arabia 則支持 Eritrean 和 Somalian 政府。

Instead, they dramatically diverge on their position relating to Israel, with the UAE recognizing and allying with Israel despite the unresolved Palestinian issue and Saudi Arabia refusing to do so.

相反地，他們在對待 Israel 的立場上存在巨大分歧，UAE 承認並與 Israel 結盟，儘管巴勒斯坦問題仍未解決，而 Saudi Arabia 則拒絕這樣做。

They are increasingly bitter economic rivals with Saudi Arabia's goal is to diversify away from oil into the tourism, airline, finance and AI sectors directly encroaching on the UAE's regional leads in these industries that they achieved during their own drive to diversify away from oil earlier.

他們是日益激烈的經濟競爭對手，Saudi Arabia 的目標是實現經濟多元化，擺脫對石油的依賴，轉向旅遊、航空、金融和 AI 等領域，這直接侵蝕了 UAE 在這些產業上先前實現經濟多元化時取得的區域領先地位。

And while they used to work together under the logic of a more threatening mutual enemy in the form of the Islamic Republic of Iran that challenged them both, that historic logic is eroding away the weaker that Iran becomes through its punishing wars with Israel and the United States.

而且，過去他們曾在面對伊朗這個共同的、更具威脅性的敵人時攜手合作，但隨著伊朗與 Israel 和 United States 的戰爭越打越慘，這個歷史性的邏輯也逐漸瓦解。

With their historical mutual enemy becoming increasingly removed from the board in the Middle east, the otherwise natural rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE that has festered just beneath the surface for years is is increasingly erupting out into the open and it will shortly become the dominant geopolitical force that drives whatever happens in the Middle east next for the following decade and all of this may come as rather surprising to you since just last decade across the 2010s, Saudi Arabia and the UAE maintained closely aligned foreign policies with one another and were generally seen as solid, reliable allies.

隨著 Middle east 地區的共同敵人逐漸消失，Saudi Arabia 和 UAE 之間多年來一直隱藏的競爭關係，現在正越來越明顯地浮現，並將很快成為未來十年 Middle east 地區地緣政治的主導力量，這可能讓大家感到意外，因為就在上個十年，也就是 2010 年代，Saudi Arabia 和 UAE 之間的對外政策高度一致，普遍被視為堅實可靠的盟友。

Both countries were wary of the staunchly anti monarchist Islamic revolution in Iran's threats to their monarchies and viewed Iran's support for proxies across the Middle east as their shared top existential threat, followed by the pro democracy and Sunni anti monarchist movements that swept across the region during and after the Arab Spring movement as well.

兩國都警惕著伊朗那種堅決反對君主制的伊斯蘭革命對其君主制的威脅，並將伊朗在中東地區扶植代理人視為共同的首要生存威脅，其次是阿拉伯之春運動期間及之後席捲該地區的親民主和反君主制運動。

The royal families in both countries were primarily concerned about maintaining their positions of power in the status quo against these external anti monarchist threats.

兩國的王室家族主要關心的是在這些外部反君主制的威脅下，維持他們現有的權力地位。

Across the 2010s, both sought the protection of the United States to defend them against these threats, and

在 2010 年代，兩國都尋求 United States 的保護，以抵禦這些威脅，

they did not yet see each other as direct competitors.

而且當時他們還沒有將彼此視為直接的競爭對手。

Much of their friendliness during this earlier era was also built upon the personally cordial relationship between their de facto leaders, Mohammed bin Zayed or MBZ in the UAE and Mohammed bin Salman or MbS in Saudi Arabia.

在此之前，他們之間許多友好的關係，也是建立在兩國實際領導人，也就是 UAE 的 Mohammed bin Zayed（MBZ）和 Saudi Arabia 的 Mohammed bin Salman（MbS）之間個人友好的基礎上。

By the circumstances of geography, the UAE found itself in the unenviable position of being a much smaller country wedged in between two larger giants, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

由於地理位置的因素，UAE 發現自己處於一個不討好的境地，夾在伊朗和 Saudi Arabia 這兩個更大的國家之間。

After MBZ rose to power in the UAE in 2014, he began pursuing an aggressive foreign policy that was determined to elevate his country's relative position and which prioritized building a coalition with the Saudis against the Iranians after he had identified that the Saudi Kingdom was at that very moment in the midst of a succession crisis that his smaller nation had a once in a generation opportunity to influence and and benefit from.

在 MBZ 於 2014 年掌權後，他開始推行一項積極的外交政策，決心提升國家的相對地位，並優先考慮與 Saudis 結盟對抗伊朗人，因為他認為當時 Saudi 王國正處於繼承危機之中，他的小國有機會影響並從中獲益。

By that point, Saudi Arabia had been continually ruled by the many aging children of the kingdom's original founder, Ibn Saud, for the past 60 plus years.

到那時為止，Saudi 王國在過去 60 多年裡一直由其創始人 Ibn Saud 的眾多年長子女統治。

In 2015, Ibn Saud's 25th son, Salman became king at the youthful age of 79, which directly led to an internal power struggle amongst the younger members of the Saudi royal family to become the true power standing behind the throne.

2015年，Ibn Saud的第25個兒子Salman以79歲的「高齡」繼位，這直接引發了沙烏地王室年輕成員之間的一場權力鬥爭，爭奪成為王座背後真正的掌權者。

Early on in this power struggle, MBZ identified a young and ambitious MBS as his favored candidate and began providing his support and backing, hyping him up through lobbying to the Americans, the Saudis and other Westerners and solidifying his credibility in the process.

在這場權力鬥爭的初期，MBZ看中了年輕且野心勃勃的MBS，並開始提供支持和後盾，透過向美國人、沙烏地人和其他西方人遊說來推捧他，同時也鞏固了他的信譽。

The hard work ultimately paid off and despite MBS Only being King Salman's seventh son, MbS was appointed as Saudi Arabia's defense minister in early 2015 at the age of just 29 years old and a few months later he was appointed as Deputy Crown Prince, positioning him to control the levers of power in the country thanks to the direct intervention of MBZ and the uae.

這些努力最終有了回報，儘管MBS只是Salman國王的第七個兒子，但他卻在2015年初以29歲的年紀被任命為沙烏地阿拉伯的國防部長，幾個月後又被任命為副王儲，藉由MBZ和UAE的直接介入，讓他得以掌握國家權力。

And with that, the UAE was able to utilize the far more powerful Saudi Arabia as effectively a force multiplier of their own ambitions.

就這樣，UAE得以利用更強大的沙烏地阿拉伯，作為他們自身野心的強力助推器。

For years afterwards, the personal relationship between MBZ and MBS blossomed.

之後許多年，MBZ和MBS的個人關係蓬勃發展。

At 24 years his senior, MBZ reportedly saw a younger version of himself in MBS.

據說，MBZ比MBS年長24歲，他在MBS身上看到了年輕時的自己。

Someone who understood the radical transformations that were necessary for their countries to survive in a post oil future.

一個瞭解為了在後石油時代生存，國家必須進行的根本性轉變的人。

And most importantly of all, a man willing to get his hands dirty to do what was necessary for survival.

最重要的是，一個願意為了生存而親自動手、做必要之事的人。

A sort of mentor mentee relationship is reported to have developed between them and the two men pursue closely aligned agreements, aggressive foreign policies against their shared enemies and in support of their shared allies and backers.

據說他們之間發展出了一種亦師亦友的關係，兩人追求著高度一致的協議，對共同的敵人採取了激進的外交政策，並支持共同的盟友和支持者。

Saudi Arabia, which had been effectively a sleeping giant ruled by cautious old men for generations, suddenly transformed into a revisionist power like the UAE was.

沙烏地阿拉伯，這個幾代以來一直由謹慎的老人統治、形同沉睡巨人的國家，突然轉變成像阿聯酋一樣的修正主義強權。

Under their much younger, new ambitious leadership.

在他們年輕許多、雄心勃勃的新領導層之下。

MBS and MBZ sent troops together into Yemen in 2015 to intervene against the Iranian backed Houthis in the country.

MBS 和 MBZ 在 2015 年聯手出兵葉門，介入對抗伊朗支持的葉門胡塞武裝。

And then both men led their countries into the blockade of their Neighbor Qatar in 2017 in an attempt to pressure them into distancing from Iran, shutting down Al Jazeera and ending their alleged support for the Muslim Brotherhood, a transnational Sunni Islamist faction that advocates for a form of political Islam that's generally deemed to be anti monarchist and therefore deemed a threat to the Emirati and Saudi royal families.

接著，兩人在 2017 年領導各自國家封鎖鄰國卡達，試圖迫使卡達疏遠伊朗、關閉半島電視臺，並停止對穆斯林兄弟會的所謂支持。穆斯林兄弟會是一個跨國遜尼派伊斯蘭派系，主張一種政治伊斯蘭形式，這種形式通常被認為是反君主制的，是以被視為對阿聯酋和沙烏地王室的威脅。

MBS also boldly ordered the kidnapping of Lebanon's Prime Minister in 2017 and referred to Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the new Hitler.

MBS 還在 2017 年大膽下令綁架黎巴嫩總理，並將伊朗最高領袖哈米尼稱為新的希特勒。

But then starting in 2018, the first signs of divergence between Saudi Arabia and the UAE and between MbS and MBZ personally began emerging that would eventually build up into their current full on cold war.

但到了 2018 年，沙烏地阿拉伯和阿聯酋之間，以及 MBS 和 MBZ 個人之間開始出現分歧的跡象，這些分歧最終演變成他們目前全面性的冷戰。

The war in Yemen against the Iranian backed Houthis had transformed into a visible quagmire for the Saudis.

對抗伊朗支持的胡塞武裝的葉門戰爭，對沙烏地阿拉伯來說變成了一個明顯的泥沼。

The deaths of hundreds of thousands of people in Yemen being caused by Saudi Arabia's intervention using American made weapons generated substantial international criticism which culminated with the Biden administration suspending U.S.

沙烏地阿拉伯使用美國製造的武器幹預葉門，導致數十萬人死亡，引發了大量的國際批評，最終導致拜登政府在上任後不久，於 2021 年 1 月暫停了對沙烏地阿拉伯的攻擊性武器銷售。

sales of offensive weapons to the Saudis almost immediately after Biden took office in January of 2021.

與此同時，胡塞武裝的飛彈和無人機開始反擊，轟炸沙烏地阿拉伯的城市和關鍵石油基礎設施。

Meanwhile, Houthi missiles and drones began bombing Saudi cities and critical oil infrastructure back in retaliation.

The first time that Saudi territory was directly attacked by a foreign power since Saddam did so back during the 1991 Gulf War.

這是自從 1991 年波灣戰爭期間，薩達姆入侵以來，沙烏地阿拉伯領土首次遭到外國勢力直接攻擊。

Al Riyadh and Abu Dhabi's objectives in Yemen also gradually diverged apart from each other.

葉門戰爭中，利雅德和阿布達比的目標也逐漸分歧。

Saudi Arabia grew primarily focused on maintaining security along their borders with Yemen, stopping the Houthi drone and missile attacks on their cities, ending the damage being done to their international reputation by the war, and

沙烏地阿拉伯主要專注於維持與葉門邊界的安全，阻止胡塞武裝的無人機和飛彈攻擊其城市，結束戰爭對國際聲譽造成的損害，

And they came to see that the best way of doing that was by reunifying Yemen under an internationally recognized central government where all sides, including the Houthis, shared in power.

他們認為，達成這目標的最佳方式是讓葉門在一個國際認可的中央政府下重新統一，讓包括胡塞武裝在內的所有派別都能分享權力。

Meanwhile, the uae, who was being attacked far less frequently by the Houthis and who was also suffering far less political fallout from the intervention, decided to consolidate their expanding influence in Yemen by backing the separatist STC faction, who wanted to secede and recreate the former state of South Yemen and in the process, secure their influence over the critical Babelman Deb Strait at the southern end of the Red Sea.

與此同時，阿聯酋受到的胡塞武裝攻擊較少，從幹預中受到的政治反彈也較小，是以決定透過支持希望獨立並重建前南葉門國的「南方過渡委員會」(STC) 分離主義派別，來鞏固其在葉門不斷擴大的影響力，並藉此確保他們對紅海南端關鍵的巴布·艾爾·曼德布海峽的控制權。

As a result, the UAE ended up securing its influence over a separatist southern state in Yemen, while the Saudis largely got left behind, holding the bag, bogged down in an unwinnable and politically ruinous war in the north against the Houthis.

結果，阿聯酋成功鞏固了對葉門南部分離主義州的影響力，而沙烏地阿拉伯則被留下，獨自面對在北方與胡塞武裝進行一場無法取勝且政治上毀滅性的戰爭。

And then, of course, came the killing and dismemberment of the Washington Post's colonist Jamal Khashoggi within the Saudi consulate at Istanbul in 2018, which the CIA quickly concluded had been personally ordered by MBS himself.

然後，當然還有 2018 年在伊斯坦堡沙烏地領事館內發生的《華盛頓郵報》記者賈邁勒·卡舒吉被殺害並肢解的事件，美國中央情報局迅速認定這是 MBS 親自下令的。

All of these aggressive actions and controversies turned MBS into something of a pariah in the Western world, which dramatically impacted Saudi Arabia's ability to attract the foreign investors and capital that they needed to diversify away from oil into other industries like tourism and finance, to say nothing of the Houthi missiles and drones that were sometimes bombarding Saudi cities.

所有這些激進行動和爭議讓 MBS 在西方世界成為了某種意義上的「不受歡迎人物」，這極大地影響了沙烏地阿拉伯吸引外國投資者和資本的能力，進而影響了他們從石油產業轉向旅遊和金融等其他產業的計畫，更不用說有時轟炸沙烏地阿拉伯城市的胡塞武裝飛彈和無人機了。

Perhaps most symbolically of all, In March of 2022, Houthi missiles and drones slammed into a Saudi oil depot and blew it up on the outskirts of the city of Jeddah, just 11km away from where the Formula One Saudi Grand Prix was actively being hosted at at the time, leading to black smoke being visible from the attack directly from the circuit, and

最具象徵意義的，或許是 2022 年 3 月，胡塞武裝的飛彈和無人機擊中了吉達市郊的沙烏地石油儲存設施並將其炸毀，距離當時正在進行的 F1 沙烏地阿拉伯大獎賽賽道僅 11 公里，攻擊產生的黑煙從賽道上就能清楚看到，

probably no doubt influencing drivers, fans, and worst of all, investors, willingness to consider returning again.

毫無疑問地，這影響了車手、粉絲，最糟的是，還有投資者，他們是否願意考慮再次回來。

All of this meant that by 2021 and 2022, MBS and Saudi Arabia decided to abandon their previously aggressive foreign policy that had worked in tandem with the UAE since 2015.

這一切都意味著，到了 2021 和 2022 年，MBS 和沙烏地阿拉伯決定放棄他們自 2015 年以來與阿聯酋合作的、先前激進的外交政策。

But it generated for them significant instability and blowback, and

但這為他們帶來了嚴重的動盪和反彈，而且

they reverted back to focusing on building up stability, calm and predictability at home, instead to create the environment that they needed.

他們又回頭專注於在家裡建立穩定、平靜和可預測的環境，而不是創造他們需要的環境。

To attract all the foreign investment that they required for their Vision 2030 program.

以吸引他們 Vision 2030 計畫所需的所有外國投資。

MBS's grand idea to diversify the Saudi kingdom away from oil into the tourism, airline, business and finance industries.

MBS 試圖讓沙烏地王國擺脫石油，轉向旅遊、航空、商業和金融產業的宏大構想。

A vision that would never be successful, with investors fearful of parking their money and projects in a country where they could realistically get blown up in smoke.

一個永遠不會成功的願景，投資者害怕將資金和項目投入一個他們可能會被炸成灰燼的國家。

This shift away from the more aggressive policies of the 2010s meant burying the hatchet and improving their relations with their enemies.

這種從 2010 年代更激進政策的轉變，意味著要放下仇恨，改善與敵人的關係。

Saudi Arabia ended their failed blockade of Qatar in 2021 after having achieved 00 of their objectives there.

沙烏地阿拉伯在 2021 年結束了對卡達的失敗封鎖，在那裡他們沒有達成任何目標。

Qatar maintained relations with Iran, never shut down Al Jazeera, and continued financing Islamist groups across the region.

卡達與伊朗保持關係，從未關閉半島電視臺，並繼續資助該地區的伊斯蘭主義團體。

After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the west sheepishly ended MBS's pariah status by welcoming him back into the fold in order to maintain access to the Saudi oil fields.

俄羅斯在 2022 年入侵烏克蘭後，西方國家尷尬地結束了 MBS 的孤立地位，重新接納他，以便繼續取得沙烏地石油的開採權。

In 2023, China helped mediate a restoration in relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, while the Saudis also worked hard to reconcile their relations with Turkey as well.

2023 年，中國協助調解沙烏地阿拉伯與伊朗復交，同時沙烏地也努力修復與土耳其的關係。

They stopped their airstrikes in Yemen, completely abandoned their campaign to permanently remove the Houthis there, and

他們停止了在葉門的空襲，完全放棄了永久驅逐葉門胡塞武裝的行動，並且

began lobbying for all sides in the war to de escalate and to form a unity government in Yemen under a power sharing agreement instead, whatever it took to stop the Houthis from shooting back at them.

開始遊說戰爭各方降溫，並在葉門透過權力分享協議組成聯合政府，無論如何都要阻止胡塞武裝反擊他們。

Meanwhile, without yet suffering any substantial blowback themselves, and

同時，在尚未遭受任何重大反噬的情況下，並且

with an economy that was already highly diversified away from oil, the uae, under the leadership of MDZ, has basically just continued maintaining their same aggressive foreign policy from the 2010s into the 2020s against their perceived threats and to project geopolitical power opportunistically, which has increasingly come to be viewed as running against Saudi Arabia's current interests by mbs.

阿聯酋的經濟早已高度多元化，擺脫了對石油的依賴，在 MDZ 的領導下，基本上延續了 2010 年代以來對其感知威脅採取的一貫強硬外交政策，並伺機投射地緣政治力量，這越來越被 MBS 視為與沙烏地阿拉伯當前利益相悖。

Unlike the Saudis, who began trying to keep countries in the region together in the 2020s in the name of stability, the Emiratis more often than not came to support an increasingly large array of separatists in their drive to expand their own influence.

與沙烏地阿拉伯在 2020 年代開始以穩定為名試圖將該地區國家團結起來不同，阿聯酋則經常支持越來越多的分離主義者，以擴大自身影響力。

In addition to carving out their influence in South Yemen with the Southern Separatist Project, the Emiratis also began backing the Somaliland secessionist project on the other side of the Red Sea in Somalia, developing a new port there at Berbera and quietly accepting Somaliland passports, effectively recognizing Somaliland's independence in everything but name.

除了在葉門南部透過南部分離主義計畫建立影響力外，阿聯酋還開始支持紅海另一邊索馬利亞的索馬利蘭獨立計畫，在那裡開發了柏培拉新港，並悄悄接受索馬利蘭護照，實際上在名義之外承認了索馬利蘭的獨立。

Further up the Red Sea in Sudan, after the civil war exploded there in 2023, Saudi Arabia and Egypt backed the military government and the Sudanese armed forces, while the UAE immediately backed the rebel Rapid Support forces instead because they viewed the government as having too many political Islamists from the old Omar Al Bashir regime who were still within their ranks.

紅海更北部的蘇丹，在 2023 年內戰爆發後，沙烏地阿拉伯和埃及支持軍政府和蘇丹武裝部隊，而阿聯酋則立即轉而支持叛軍「快速支援部隊」，因為他們認為政府內部仍有太多來自前歐馬爾·巴希爾政權的政治伊斯蘭分子。

In Libya, they began supporting the authoritarian Generalissimo Khalifa Haftar in the east against the more Islamist government in the west that was backed by Qatar and Turkey.

在利比亞，他們開始支持東部的威權將軍哈夫塔，對抗由卡達和土耳其支持的西部較為伊斯蘭化的政府。

While in Syria, following the rise to power of Ahmed Al Shara, a former Al Qaeda affiliated jihadist, the Saudis offered billions of dollars worth of capital for reconstruction, while the UAE has offered up very little because of their skepticism over Alshara's jihadist past.

至於敘利亞，在蓋達組織出身的聖戰士阿邁德·夏拉掌權後，沙烏地阿拉伯提供了數十億美元的重建資金，但阿聯酋因為懷疑夏拉的聖戰士背景，提供的援助卻很少。

In all of these countries, the Saudis began pursuing a pragmatic foreign policy of the 2020s that has been willing to work together with their ideological enemies like political Islamists in exchange for stability and calm, keeping conflicts contained and countries together, while the Emiratis have continued a policy of expanding their influence and power and crushing political Islamists abroad wherever they can find them by fueling more secular separatists across the region in Yemen, Somalia, Sudan and Libya, especially if they could provide the Emiratis access to ports and resources that their central governments weren't willing or able to provide themselves.

在所有這些國家裡，沙烏地阿拉伯開始採取 2020 年代的務實外交政策，願意與政治伊斯蘭等意識形態上的敵人合作，以換取穩定與平靜，將衝突控制在範圍內並維持國家團結。而阿聯酋則持續擴大自身影響力和權力，並在各地積極打擊政治伊斯蘭分子，透過在葉門、索馬利亞、蘇丹和利比亞等地扶植更多世俗分離主義者來達成目的，特別是當這些行動能讓阿聯酋獲得其中央政府不願或無法提供的港口和資源時。

And the Saudis reconciled with their old enemies like Iran, Qatar and Turkey, while the Emiratis maintained their confrontational posture towards them.

沙烏地阿拉伯與伊朗、卡達和土耳其等昔日敵人重修舊好，而阿聯酋則繼續與他們對抗。

Thus, as the 2020s have progressed, the Saudis have come to change their view on the UAE from a major ally with shared enemies and goals to a major source of destabilization in the Middle east that is posing a significant threat to the goals of their Vision 2030 economic diversification strategy.

是以，隨著 2020 年代的推進，沙烏地阿拉伯對阿聯酋的看法已從一個擁有共同敵人與目標的主要盟友，轉變為一個造成 Middle east 動盪的主要來源，對其「2030 經濟多元化願景」策略的目標構成了重大威脅。

Yemen and Sudan in particular are festering wounds of chaos nearby to Saudi Arabia that have substantial risks of geopolitical spillover that the Saudis would very much like to stabilize, no matter who ends up in power there.

葉門和蘇丹尤其成為沙烏地阿拉伯附近令人頭痛的混亂之地，存在嚴重的地緣政治外溢風險，沙烏地阿拉伯非常希望穩定這些地區，無論最終由誰掌權。

While the Emiratis remain more picky and would like to see non Islamists in power.

而阿聯酋則依然比較挑剔，希望看到非伊斯蘭分子掌權。

And barring that, they'd rather see outright state collapse or cleave off secessionist projects that are more secular and more amenable to them, as opposed to the ideological conflict that drove the Middle East's Cold war in the 2000 and tens between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

如果做不到，他們寧願看到國家徹底崩潰，或是分裂出更世俗化、更傾向於他們的獨立計畫，而不是像 2000 年代和 2010 年代推動沙烏地阿拉伯與伊朗之間 Middle east Cold war 的意識形態衝突。

The emerging Cold war between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the 2000s is primarily economic in nature.

沙烏地阿拉伯與阿聯酋之間在 2000 年代出現的 Cold war，本質上主要是經濟上的。

Right now, nearly half of the Saudi economy is still dependent on oil, while the UAE only relies on oil for about 25% of its own economy.

目前，沙烏地經濟仍有近一半依賴石油，而阿聯酋經濟對石油的依賴度僅約 25%。

In order to diversify further away from oil to secure their future, the Saudis are rapidly investing into alternative industries that the Emiratis have long dominated in their region.

為了進一步擺脫對石油的依賴以確保未來，沙烏地阿拉伯正快速投資於阿聯酋長期以來在其地區佔據主導地位的替代產業。

Saudi tourism megaprojects like neom, the Line and the Red Sea Project are all designed to transform the Saudi Kingdom into a global luxury tourism hotspot which traditionally has been dominated in the Middle east by the UAE.

沙烏地阿拉伯像是 Neom、The Line 和 Red Sea Project 等旅遊巨擘計畫，都是為了將沙烏地王國轉變為全球頂級旅遊熱點，而這塊區域傳統上是由阿聯酋在 Middle east 稱霸。

The Saudis creation of Riyadh Air in 2023 and their multi billion dollar Riyadh Airport expansion is, is specifically intended to challenge the regional airline dominance of UAE based carriers like Emirates and Etihad.

沙烏地在 2023 年成立 Riyadh Air，並斥巨資擴建 Riyadh 機場，這一切都是為了挑戰阿聯酋航空，像是 Emirates 和 Etihad 等區域航空龍頭。

And the Saudis declaration in 2022 that government contracts would henceforth only be given to foreign firms who relocated their regional headquarters to Saudi territory was an obvious and direct challenge to Dubai which for decades has been the epicenter of foreign business operations in the Middle East.

沙烏地在 2022 年宣佈，政府合約將只給予將區域總部遷至沙烏地境內的跨國企業，這明顯且直接地挑戰了杜拜，因為杜拜數十年來一直是 Middle east 外國企業營運的中心。

In other words, Saudi Arabia is attempting to directly challenge the UAE's current regional dominance in business, headquarters, finance and tour.

換句話說，沙烏地阿拉伯正試圖直接挑戰阿聯酋在商業、總部、金融和旅遊方面的區域主導地位。

While they're also trying to challenge Dubai and Abu Dhabi's positions as the most significant air and logistics links between Asia, Europe and Africa.

同時，他們也試圖挑戰杜拜和阿布達比作為亞洲、歐洲和非洲之間最重要的航空和物流樞紐的地位。

With Riyadh and Jeddah as alternatives, Saudi Arabia needs to succeed here in order to guarantee their post oil future.

以利雅德和吉達為替代選項，沙烏地阿拉伯必須在這裡成功，才能確保其後石油時代的未來。

But to do so means crowding out the UAE in their own already successful diversification away from oil strategy in the process.

但要做到這一點，意味著在這個過程中，要擠壓阿聯酋已經成功擺脫石油依賴的策略。

And the UAE is absolutely determined to to never allow that to happen lest they lose out on their own post oil future.

阿聯酋絕對決心絕不讓這種情況發生，以免他們也失去後石油時代的未來。

The Emirati leadership after all is well aware that Saudi Arabia is currently threatening to do to them what they themselves had previously done to Bahrain several decades ago.

畢竟，阿聯酋領導層很清楚，沙烏地阿拉伯現在正威脅要做他們幾十年前對巴林做過的事情。

for most of the 20th century it was actually Bahrain who was the major economic powerhouse in the Persian Gulf.

在20世紀的大部分時間裡，波斯灣主要的經濟強權其實是巴林。

The small island kingdom was the first in the region to discover oil in the early 1930s which they were able to utilize to gain an economic head start over everyone else.

這個小島國在1930年代初期是該地區第一個發現石油的國家，並利用這項優勢，在經濟上取得了領先地位。

Bahrain astutely invested their oil money to diversify their economy away from oil into different sectors like tourism and finance.

巴林明智地將他們的石油收入用於經濟多元化，將經濟從石油轉向旅遊和金融等不同領域。

And by the 1970s Bahrain was the undisputed financial center of the Gulf.

到了1970年代，巴林已成為海灣地區無可爭議的金融中心。

But then beginning in the early 1990s, the UAE began increasingly challenging Bahrain's decades of dominance.

但到了1990年代初期，阿聯酋開始日益挑戰巴林數十年來的統治地位。

They established finance centers in Dubai with less regulations and more capital, aiming and building ambitious world famous headline grabbing megaprojects that cemented the UAE's location on the map as a luxury tourism hotspot.

他們在杜拜設立了監管較少、資本較多的金融中心，並建造了雄心勃勃、享譽國際、引人注目的超級工程，鞏固了阿聯酋作為豪華旅遊熱點的地位。

Places like the Burj Al Arab, the world's first seven star hotel.

像是全球首家七星級酒店——帆船酒店。

The Palm Jumeirah and other reclaimed islands.

棕櫚島朱美拉以及其他填海造島。

And the Burj Khalifa, the world's tallest building.

還有世界第一高樓——哈里發塔。

By the middle of the 1990s and certainly by the early 2000s, the UAE had managed to use this strategy to eclipse Bahrain in virtually every sector of the economy, from finance to tourism.

到了1990年代中期，當然還有2000年代初期，阿聯酋成功運用這個策略，在從金融到旅遊的幾乎所有經濟領域都超越了巴林。