Name: 川普會從過往戰爭記取教訓嗎？美伊戰爭的潛在危機 | 全球故事 (US-Israel war with Iran: Will Trump learn from past wars? | The Global Story)
Uploaded: 2026-03-05T16:44:44.000Z
Duration: 26 min 15 s

America is backing you with overwhelming strength and devastating force.

美國正以壓倒性的力量和毀滅性的武力支持你們。

基礎被動語態

After Afghanistan and then Iraq and then Libya, Donald Trump was supposed to be the anti forever wars candidate.

在經歷了阿富汗、伊拉克，然後是利比亞之後，唐納·川普本該是那個反對永無止境戰爭的候選人。

We were having negotiations with these lunatics and it was my opinion that they were going to attack first.

我們當時正與這些瘋子進行談判，我認為他們會先發動攻擊。

They were going to attack if we didn't do it.

如果我們不這麼做，他們就會發動攻擊。

What lessons, if any, has the United States drawn from its recent past?

美國從近期歷史中學到了什麼教訓嗎？

We will act with the full power of the United States military.

我們將動用美國軍隊的全部力量。

We will act with allies at our side and we will prevail.

我們將與盟友並肩作戰，我們必將勝利。

From the BBC, I'm Tristan Redman in London and welcome to the global story on YouTube.

這裡是 BBC，我是 Tristan Redman 在倫敦報導，歡迎來到 YouTube 的全球故事。

I am a security analyst for the BBC, a long time previously a security correspondent for the BBC.

我是 BBC 的安全分析師，之前長期擔任 BBC 的安全記者。

We wanted to speak with you today about the possible comparisons between what is happening in Iran now and various different US Military interventions in the Middle East, North Africa and surrounding regions over the last few decades, trying to understand what lessons, if any, have been learned.

我們想和您聊聊，比較一下現在伊朗發生的事，以及過去幾十年來美國軍隊在中東、北非及周邊地區的各種軍事幹預行動，試圖瞭解我們學到了哪些教訓，或者說有沒有學到什麼。

Let's start with Iraq, which is an example, a comparison that a lot of people are making right now.

我們就從伊拉克開始吧，這是很多人現在都在做的比較。

You've done a lot of reporting, in depth reporting on this period of recent US History, particularly on the case that was made for the Iraq war and the buildup to it.

您對這段美國近期歷史做了很多深入的報導，特別是關於發動伊拉克戰爭的論述以及戰爭前的準備。

What are the similarities and differences between Iraq 2003 and Iran 2026?

2003年的伊拉克和2026年的伊朗有什麼相似和不同之處？

And the shadow of Iraq is hanging over what the US Is doing in Iran now.

伊拉克戰爭的陰影籠罩著美國現在在伊朗的行動。

And you can hear that explicitly referred to and brought up time and time again, including by Pete Hegseth, the secretary of war, secretary of defense, talking about this isn't going to be like Iraq.

你可以清楚地聽到，這被明確提及和反覆提出，包括國防部長 Pete Hegseth 在內，他提到這次不會像伊拉克那樣。

Our generation knows better and so does this president.

我們這一代人都更清楚，總統也一樣。

So you can see the framing of it is very much about what are supposed to be the differences.

所以你可以看到，它的定調非常強調那些所謂的差異。

There are differences, it's worth saying.

I mean, one of the differences is that the Iraq war had an enormous build up and a very explicit attempt to build a case for what was going to be regime change.

我的意思是，其中一個差異是，伊拉克戰爭有大規模的鋪陳，而且非常明確地試圖為即將到來的政權更迭找理由。

Now, that case ended up being settled on weapons of mass destruction.

現在，這個理由最終落在了大規模毀滅性武器上。

The Iraqi regime was required to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, to cease all development of such weapons and to stop all support for terrorist groups.

伊拉克政權被要求銷毀其大規模毀滅性武器，停止所有這類武器的研發，並停止對恐怖組織的所有支援。

The Iraqi regime has violated all of those obligations, the possession of these by Saddam Hussein's Iraq, nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons and missiles.

伊拉克政權違反了所有這些義務，薩達姆·海珊的伊拉克擁有核武器、化學武器、生物武器和飛彈。

I take the fact that he develops weapons of mass destruction very seriously.

我非常認真看待他研發大規模毀滅性武器這件事。

And it was a very explicit decision that even though the fundamental drive in Washington was just for regime change to remove Saddam for all kinds of reasons, they needed a justification for it.

而且，華盛頓方面雖然主要目標是更換政權，想辦法把薩達姆除掉，但他們也需要一個理由來支持這個行動。

They felt both for public opinion domestically and internationally, including in the un, in the Security Council.

他們覺得，無論是國內的民意，還是國際上的聲音，包括在聯合國、在安理會，都需要一個理由。

So great effort was placed in the US and also the UK in, in building that justification for war over months and going through diplomatic, international processes, trying to get weapons inspectors in, going through UN resolutions.

所以，美國和英國花了幾個月的時間，透過外交和國際程序，試圖讓武器檢查員進入，通過聯合國決議，來建立發動戰爭的理由。

But that was very different from what we've seen with Iran this time in which there's been almost no build up, there's been almost no attempt to make the case.

但這跟我們這次看到伊朗的情況完全不同，幾乎沒有任何鋪陳，也幾乎沒有試圖去論述。

And when it has been made just in the last few days, around the time that the war in Iran started, it's been quite chaotic and haphazard.

而且，在伊朗戰爭開始的這幾天，論述的內容也相當混亂、零散。

You can see echoes of some of the justification in the way the US has talked about imminent threats, potentially missile programs being reconstituted which could reach the U.S. nuclear enrichment.

你可以看到，美國談論迫在眉睫的威脅，以及可能重建的、能打到美國的核濃縮飛彈計畫時，有著一些過去論述的影子。

But no one has felt that that was quite made in the same way as Iraq.

但沒有人覺得，這和伊拉克戰爭的論述方式是完全一樣的。

When you hear some of these justifications which have been laid out by the Trump administration In the last 10 days or so, do you have a feeling of bells being rung and uncanniness to it?

當你聽到川普政府在過去十天左右提出的這些論述時，你會不會覺得似曾相似，有種莫名的熟悉感？

Well, what's odd is it's, it's a very faint echo of Iraq.

If they're ringing the bell, they're not doing it very hard because they, you saw them in the, in the period around the start of this war, the Iran war, reaching for some of those justifications which had echoes of Iraq.

So you saw, for instance, Steve Wyckoff at one point say, well, Iran is potentially very close to a large amount of nuclear enriched material.

They're probably a week away from having industrial, industrial grade bomb making material.

You had talk about the missile capability and Donald Trump referring to missiles which could potentially reach the United States.

但奇怪的是，這只是伊拉克戰爭論述的非常微弱的回聲。

如果他們真的在敲響警鐘，那也敲得不夠響，因為你看，在這次伊朗戰爭開始前的這段時間，他們試圖尋找一些聽起來有點像伊拉克戰爭的理由。

They've already developed missiles that can threaten Europe and our bases overseas and they're working to build missiles that will soon reach the United States of America, but actually no real evidence that that was close.

所以你看到，例如，Steve Wyckoff 曾經說，嗯，伊朗可能非常接近擁有大量的核濃縮材料。

And when you go back to Iraq, they'd spent quite a bit of time building up dossier's intelligence estimates to justify that kind of language.

This time it felt like they were just quickly reaching round for some of those comparisons, but actually without really having built them or thought through or made them convincing, because pretty quickly they were disposed of, actually you'd see them reach for one justification.

他們可能在一週內就能製造出工業級的炸彈材料。

We knew that there was going to be an Israeli action.

We knew that that would precipitate an attack against American forces.

我們知道那會引發對美國軍隊的攻擊。

And we knew that if we didn't preemptively go after them before they launched those attacks, attacks, we would suffer higher casualties and then effectively ditch it quite soon for another.

而且我們知道，如果我們不先發制人地在他們發動攻擊之前就採取行動，我們將會承受更高的傷亡，然後很快就會為了別的事情而放棄。

Mr. President, did Israel forced your hand to launch these strikes against Iran?

總統先生，是 Израи 逼您對伊朗發動這些攻擊的嗎？

Did anyone pull the United States into this war?

You see, we were having negotiations with these lunatics and it was my opinion that they were going to attack first.

你看，我們當時正在跟這些瘋子談判，我認為他們會先動手。

如果我們不這麼做，他們就會攻擊。

And wavering between this talk of whether it's regime change or degrading the Iranian military as the real reason for it happening, what was the actual process that George W. Bush and his administration went through in 2003 to make that case?

在關於這場行動是為了政權更迭還是削弱伊朗軍隊的說法之間搖擺不定，喬治·W·布希和他的政府在 2003 年究竟經歷了什麼樣的實際過程來提出這個論點？

What were the main things that they had to hit and how did they do it?

他們必須達到哪些主要目標，又是怎麼做到的？

Well, what's interesting is it wasn't 2003.

This was an extended period from when George W. Bush famously described an axis of evil, including, it had to be said, Iran.

這是一個很長的時期，喬治·W·布希當時聲名狼藉地描述了邪惡軸心，其中必須提到伊朗。

And at the time, many, you know, the talk in Washington was Iraq first, then Iran.

當時，華盛頓的談論是先伊拉克，再伊朗。

But Iraq went so badly they never, you know, that never happened.

但伊拉克進行得太糟了，所以那從來沒有發生。

But they started to build that case for a year, effectively a year of building the case for war and of putting in place the pieces to do it.

但他們開始為戰爭鋪陳了一年，實際上是一年的時間來建立論點，並部署執行計畫。

Putting in place the case of, of weapons of mass destruction, once they'd fixed on that as the best justification.

部署大規模殺傷性武器的論點，一旦他們確定這是最好的理由。

And the UN process and all of that concurrent with a large scale military build up, not just the air and navy that we've seen in this Iran war, so very different in many ways.

聯合國的進程以及所有這些，都伴隨著大規模的軍事集結，而不僅僅是我們在這次伊朗戰爭中看到的空軍和海軍，所以很多方面都非常不同。

Well, that preparatory phase in terms of public opinion, where did it get them, the George W. Bush administration?

嗯，在公眾輿論方面，喬治·W·布希政府的準備階段，讓他們達到了什麼程度？

How much public support was there for war when the moment eventually came?

當時機最終來臨時，有多少公眾支持戰爭？

And I mean, it's interesting because when you talk to people now, everyone was like, I was always against it, but actually at the time, you know, public opinion in the UK was roughly split down the middle and in the US largely in favour.

我想，這很有趣，因為你現在跟人聊，大家好像都說，我一直都反對，但其實當時，你知道，英國的公眾輿論大概是各半，美國則大多支持。

It was post 9 11, post the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, which had killed 3,000.

那是在911之後，2001年9月11日美國遭受攻擊之後，那次攻擊造成了3000人死亡。

This was a United States still reeling from that.

當時的美國仍然從那次事件中恢復過來。

And we know that after September 11, Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully celebrated.

我們知道，在911之後，薩達姆·海珊的政權幸災樂禍地慶祝。

And that also has a transformative impact on public opinion.

這也對公眾輿論產生了巨大的影響。

And so public opinion was, if you like, more willing to go along with these national security considerations in those days.

所以，如果你願意的話，當時的公眾輿論更願意接受這些國家安全考量。

Well, I remember vividly in 2003, particularly the kind of the drumbeat of patriotism in some sectors of US Society that was that built up behind the Iraq war.

嗯，我還清楚記得2003年，特別是美國社會某些領域愛國主義的鼓譟，那是在伊拉克戰爭背後建立起來的。

You remember, you know, the French vetoed the UN Resolution in New York.

你還記得，你知道，法國在紐約否決了聯合國決議。

No French fries were going to be freedom fries, instead were going to be served in the canteen.

薯條不再是「自由薯條」，而是在餐廳裡供應。

And there was the revival of the Bart Simpson moniker for French people as cheese eating surrender monkeys.

還有像是「起司猴子」這種對法國人的貶稱又重新出現。

I mean, what is public opinion showing right now from what you've seen far a divided US, A US which is more opposed to this conflict with Iran than is supportive of it.

我是說，從你的觀察來看，目前的民意顯示美國社會分裂，反對與伊朗發生衝突的聲音比支持的聲音來得大。

And of course, but a polarized US With Republicans, supporters of Donald Trump far more likely to back this policy.

當然，美國社會兩極化，川普的支持者共和黨人更有可能支持這項政策。

I think politics does play a role in this because you've got the midterms coming up and those calculations that will be going on in Washington and in the White House will be partly about how long can you sustain a war where you don't have large scale public support, where you haven't made the case and where you potentially have economic impact from things like rising oil prices, gas prices at the pump in the US that is going to, you know, that's part of the equation, I think, and again, different from 2003.

我認為政治確實扮演了角色，因為期中選舉即將到來，華盛頓和白宮的這些考量，部分會取決於在缺乏大規模民意支持、尚未說服大眾，以及可能面臨油價、美國汽油價格上漲等經濟衝擊的情況下，能維持戰爭多久。我認為這也是考量的一部分，而且這又和2003年不同了。

But I think the other comparison which is correct, I think between Iran and Iraq is the question of is there a plan for what to do?

但我想另一個正確的比較點，在伊朗和伊拉克之間，就是有沒有後續計畫的問題。

Because the great failure with Iraq was there was no plan.

因為伊拉克最大的失敗就是沒有計畫。

It's extraordinary looking back, how they had put all this effort into the build up to the war, the justification for the war, the execution militarily of the war, but almost nothing about what would happen afterwards, you know, disastrous, I mean, absolutely disastrous.

回頭看，他們在戰爭的鋪陳、戰爭的理由、軍事上的執行上投入了這麼多心力，但對後續的發展卻幾乎毫無計畫，這實在是太不可思議了，災難性的，我是說，絕對是災難性的。

Some terrible decisions in the aftermath where the parallel opens up now is, is there a plan?

後續有些糟糕的決策，現在可以和當時做個對比，那就是：有沒有計畫？

Because in the run up to Iraq they'd actually, you know, the State Department had done lots of planning and it just got junked.

因為在準備伊拉克戰爭時，你知道，國務院其實做了很多計畫，結果就被丟掉了。

This time I don't think there has been any planning.

這次我認為根本沒有任何計畫。

And you can see that when you hear President Trump and other administration officials talk because they will say things at some points like, well, popular uprising would be great.

當你聽到川普總統和其他政府官員說話時，就能看得出來，因為他們有時會說，嗯，人民起義會很棒。

When we are finished, take over your government, it will be yours to take.

等我們結束後，你們的政府就由你們接管，就歸你們了。

Other points they go, well, maybe we can go for the Venezuela option, which is to have a effectively a leadership change, the Delsey Rodriguez option, you know, who was Nicolas Maduro's deputy, who suddenly takes over, but basically the rest of the regime remains in place.

有時他們又說，嗯，也許我們可以採取委內瑞拉模式，也就是進行一次實質上的領導人更迭，就像德爾西·羅德里格斯那樣，你知道，尼古拉斯·馬杜羅的副手，突然接管了，但基本上政權的其他部分都還在。

但這樣對美國人來說比較順從。

But also you have talk about, well, Maybe we don't get regime change.

但你也會聽到有人說，嗯，也許我們不會進行政權更迭。

字幕列表影片播放

川普會從過往戰爭記取教訓嗎？美伊戰爭的潛在危機 | 全球故事 (US-Israel war with Iran: Will Trump learn from past wars? | The Global Story)

significant

period

basically

potentially