Name: 德國為何難以應對中國？｜柏林簡報Podcast (Why Germany finds it so hard to handle China | Berlin Briefing Podcast)
Uploaded: 2025-12-26T17:12:29.000Z
Duration: 46 min 47 s

Okay, let's paint a picture of Germany in the last few decades and how it got high on three drugs all at the same time.

好的，我們來描繪一下德國近幾十年的樣貌，以及它是如何同時沉迷於三種「毒品」的。

基礎被動語態

One was cheap energy from Russia, another was guaranteed defense from the U.S.

一種是來自俄羅斯的廉價能源，另一種是美國提供的安全保障。

and the third was the mind bending growth of China's economy.

而第三種則是中國經濟那令人目眩神迷的成長。

Well, Germany's been learning some hard lessons about these addictions.

嗯，德國已經從這些成癮中學到了一些慘痛的教訓。

It's gone cold turkey pretty much on Russian energy.

它幾乎是徹底戒斷了俄羅斯的能源。

It's trying to get off at least parts of American defense.

它正試圖至少擺脫部分美國的防禦。

But as for China, that drug could prove the toughest of all to give up.

但至於中國，這種「毒品」可能證明是最難戒斷的。

And there could be some big decisions coming up in 2026.

而且在2026年，可能會有一些重大的決定。

So on today's Berlin briefing, we're going to stage a little intervention.

所以，在今天的柏林簡報中，我們要來進行一次小小的介入。

I'm joined here by Noah Barkin of the Rhodium Group and the German Marshall Fund.

今天和我一起的是 Rhodium Group 和德國馬歇爾基金會的 Noah Barkin。

He writes a monthly letter on Europe and a newsletter on Europe and China that's worth reading.

他每個月都會寫一封關於歐洲的信，以及一份關於歐洲和中國的電子報，非常值得一看。

And we have DW's own Clifford Koonin, who was based in Beijing for many years and returned just before the pandemic.

還有 DW 的 Clifford Koonin，他曾長期派駐北京，並在疫情前不久返回。

Well, we're going to start first of all with a diagnosis.

Then we're going to look at some possible solutions.

接著我們會看看一些可能的解決方案。

And finally we'll go through a scenario of crisis around Taiwan that could bring all of this addiction to a head.

最後，我們會探討一個圍繞臺灣的危機情境，這可能會讓所有這些成癮問題浮現。

But let's get started, Cliffen, with the diagnosis of this kind of addiction situation that we're talking about here.

不過，Cliffen，我們先從我們正在談論的這種成癮情況的診斷開始吧。

To Germany's sort of economic dependency on China, first of all on this market for its goods, but

德國對中國的經濟依賴，首先是中國這個商品市場，但

also as a source of really important raw materials.

Can you just quickly break down those two sides?

你能快速說明一下這兩方面嗎？

Well, I think one thing that struck me over the years, I attended many, many trade delegations visiting China under Gerhard Schroeder and then under Angela Merkel.

不過，Cliffen，我認為這些年來讓我印象深刻的一點是，我在格哈德·施羅德和安格拉·梅克爾時期，參加過許多次訪問中國的貿易代表團。

And what I always found amazing was the way that people were able to do two things at once.

而我一直覺得很驚訝的是，人們竟然能夠同時做兩件事。

You had this quite a strong moral approach about human rights and at the same time taking advantage of this incredible market access.

你們一方面有非常堅定的道德立場，關注人權，同時又利用了這個驚人的市場准入。

And Germany was always very good at juggling this.

But ultimately it was never, it never felt sustainable because there was too much sort of, it was a certain duplicity there that just never seemed that it could, could really last and kind of a compartmentalization.

但最終，這從來都不是，從來感覺都不可持續，因為這裡面有太多的，有點像是一種雙重性，似乎永遠無法真正持久，也無法真正區分開來。

You know, and that's why you talk about it in addiction and, you know, and

你知道，這就是為什麼你會說這是一種成癮，你知道，而且

getting, getting high on their own supply, you know, because basically you could, you could look at the car industry in China as a German invention.

就像是「自給自足」，你知道，因為基本上你可以，你可以把中國的汽車產業看作是德國的發明。

I mean, it was ultimately VW being there, starting putting the, the Passats into the, with the, with the, they Became the car of choice for all the government cadres.

我的意思是，最終是福斯汽車在那裡，開始生產帕薩特，它們成為了所有政府官員的首選汽車。

And they sort of built up this incredible market out of nothing.

他們就這樣從無到有建立了一個驚人的市場。

I remember the first time I went to China in the mid-90s, the cars you saw on the road were the kind of.

我記得我第一次去中國是在 90 年代中期，那時候路上看到的車子都是那種。

They were the VW models from the mid-80s which were being produced in joint ventures.

它們是 80 年代中期的福斯車款，當時是以合資企業的形式生產的。

對啊，我的意思是，那時候是怎麼運作的？

They took minority stakes in Chinese car companies like Shanghai Auto and they built, they built sort of a couple of generation back models of some of the big sellers of vw.

他們收購了像上海汽車這樣的中國汽車公司的少數股權，然後他們就生產了幾代落後於主流幾年的大賣車款。

China immediately started to try and build its own versions of these, but

中國立刻開始試圖打造自己的版本，但是

And Germany always had this secret sauce, which is basically German innovation, German industrial ability.

而德國一直擁有這個祕密武器，那就是德國的創新能力和德國的工業實力。

I mean, it's just such an advanced technological giant.

我的意思是，它就是一個如此先進的科技巨頭。

And I suppose what we've seen over the last few years is how that the giant has become.

而我們在過去幾年看到的，就是這個巨頭變成了什麼樣子。

But it was really interesting to see how it did that and how it managed to justify a lot of different things happening at once.

但看到它是怎麼做到的，以及它如何同時處理這麼多不同的事情，真的很有意思。

Taking this quite high moral tone on human rights while taking advantage of the market.

一方面擺出很高道德姿態談人權，另一方面卻利用市場。

But as I say, it never really felt sustainable.

但就像我說的，這從來都不是長久之計。

So I think now we're really seeing that Germany is now reaping what it sowed.

所以我想現在我們真的看到，德國正在收割它自己種下的果實。

I mean, it's really a long story, as we hear there from Clifford.

我的意思是，就像我們從克里夫那裡聽到的，這確實是一個很長的故事。

The German companies got involved in China, China pretty early.

德國公司很早就開始參與中國市場。

And it was a growth market, but on a fairly small scale.

而那是一個成長中的市場，但規模相對較小。

But what was the period when this really started to get so huge that it became such a lucrative market for German carmakers that we are now even talking about this kind of addiction to it?

但究竟是什麼時候開始，這個市場變得如此龐大，對德國汽車製造商來說如此有利可圖，甚至讓我們現在都在談論這種經濟依賴呢？

Well, I think the good years for German industry in China started in the early 2000s, but

嗯，我認為德國工業在中國的黃金時期始於 2000 年代初期，但

really took off sort of in the early 2000s, I would say.

我會說，大概是在 2000 年代初期真正起飛的。

Europe was going through a financial crisis, the Euro debt crisis, which came shortly after the global financial crisis.

當時歐洲正經歷一場金融危機，也就是歐債危機，這場危機緊隨全球金融危機之後。

So European growth was struggling and there was a real need to look for other markets.

所以歐洲的成長陷入困境，大家真的需要尋找其他市場。

And China, you know, the timing was perfect.

而中國，你知道的，時機非常完美。

Of course, China held the Olympics in 2008.

當然，中國在 2008 年舉辦了奧運。

That was sort of a coming in the sort of.

In the years after that when Europe was going through this debilitating debt crisis, there was speculation the Eurozone would split apart.

在那之後的幾年，當歐洲正經歷這場令人痛苦的債務危機時，有人猜測歐元區可能會分裂。

China stepped in and not only as a market, but

also buying Greek bonds and supporting Europe that way.

So I think when we go back to Angela Merkel, she saw China a bit as a savior, not only because German companies were making lots of money in China, but

also because China sort of supported the Eurozone at that time.

而中國介入了，不僅僅是作為一個市場，

而是購買了希臘債券，以此來支持歐洲。

And it's true that China did become Germany's biggest trading partner during this period.

所以我想，當我們回顧梅克爾（Angela Merkel）時，她有點把中國視為救世主，不只是因為德國公司在中國賺了很多錢，而是

因為當時中國在某種程度上支持了歐元區。

And it is that again, I mean, most of the last five, six, seven years, I think Clifford, if I'm not wrong, has been Germany's number one trading partner.

現在回想起來，感覺好像已經是很久以前的事了。

There's another side to this, as I just mentioned.

還有另一面，就像我剛才提到的。

There's also China as a source of important raw materials.

What is the story of that, Clifford, and how did that become so important?

Clifford，這個故事是什麼？又是怎麼變得這麼重要的？

Well, this is another dependency story, another addiction issue which is built up with.

嗯，這又是另一個依賴的故事，另一個逐漸形成的成癮問題。

Very few countries actually have an industrial policy.

Very few countries actually of any size can have an industrial policy because it's a centrally planned economy.

很少有國家，無論大小，能夠有產業政策，因為這是中央計畫經濟。

So it's been able to quite early on identified that things like rare earths and these other critical minerals were going to become leverage.

所以，中國很早就意識到，像是稀土和其他關鍵礦物將會成為籌碼。

And basically by industrial policy, to anyone not familiar with that term, so it means not simply allowing the market to do its thing, so really focusing.

基本上，產業政策，對於不熟悉這個詞的人來說，意思不是單純讓市場自由發展，而是真正聚焦。

This is strategically important for our country.

這對我們的國家來說，在戰略上非常重要。

And doing things like five year plans, centrally planning, deciding that each province has to perform a certain function.

還有像是五年計畫、中央計畫，決定每個省份必須執行特定功能。

A lot of the times these industrial policies are.

Don't make any sense, but they do have a kind of a predictability and they, and

沒有道理，但它們確實有某種可預測性，而且

And because of the sheer scale of China, they only have to hit the mark, you know, enough for the country to really thrive.

而且因為中國的規模實在太大了，他們只需要擊中目標，你知道的，足夠讓國家真正蓬勃發展。

And critical minerals is one example of where they, where investment.

而關鍵礦物就是一個例子，在那個地方，投資。

You know, these, a lot of these critical minerals, they're, they're nasty, you know, nasty products that, you know, you have to do all kinds of environmental damage to dig them up.

你知道的，這些，很多關鍵礦物，它們，它們是很糟糕的，你知道的，糟糕的商品，你知道的，你必須造成各種環境破壞才能挖出來。

But it's not really a problem when you've got, you know, a lot of wasteland that, you know, because critical minerals are, tend to be just quite shallow and you can just dig them up.

但這不是什麼大問題，當你有，你知道的，很多荒地，你知道的，因為關鍵礦物，傾向於很淺，你就可以把它們挖出來。

And China was very good at locating them.

And because this infrastructure that's built over the deck the last few decades, it's very good at extracting them, getting them out and getting them out of the country.

而且因為過去幾十年來，這套基礎建設已經建立起來了，它非常擅長開採、提取並將它們運出國。

So it set itself up as a, as a, I mean, and

所以它為自己打造了，我指的是，

this is true of so many industries in China, but

這點在中國的許多產業都適用，但

particularly with critical minerals, where you need volume for it to make sense.

特別是關鍵礦物，你需要有足夠的產量才划算。

all kinds of industries, electronics particularly, you know, have become very reliant on these critical minerals.

所有類型的產業，尤其是電子業，你知道的，都變得非常依賴這些關鍵礦物。

而且我們在過去幾個月裡已經看到了。

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德國為何難以應對中國？｜柏林簡報Podcast (Why Germany finds it so hard to handle China | Berlin Briefing Podcast)

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