Name: 中國最大的經濟矛盾在哪裡？| DW 新聞 (China's biggest economic contradictions | DW News)
Uploaded: 2025-12-12T17:00:08.000Z
Duration: 28 min 24 s

轉承詞

The pattern of trade is changing a lot because of the tariffs, but

關稅讓貿易格局改變很多，但是

the tariffs have had precious little impact, in fact, none at all.

關稅的影響微乎其微，事實上，根本沒有影響。

程度副詞

I would say almost all the private developers or the major private developers in China nowadays are either bankrupt or not in very good financial situation.

我想說現在中國幾乎所有的私人開發者或主要的私人開發者，要嘛破產，要嘛財務狀況不太好。

And it's not over yet because there's still a lot of excess supply, possibly up to three to five years worth of unsold apartments and houses.

而且這還沒結束，因為還有很多過剩供應，可能高達三到五年的未售公寓和房屋。

China's trade surplus has now surpassed $8 trillion, a sign it's successfully weather the tariff war with the US but at home, weaknesses in key sectors like housing are becoming apparent.

中國的貿易順差現在已超過 8 兆美元，這顯示它成功應對了與美國的關稅戰，但在國內，房地產等關鍵領域的弱點正變得明顯。

To unpack the complicated economic landscape, I'm joined now by economist and author George Magnus.

為了深入解析複雜的經濟格局，經濟學家兼作者 George Magnus 現在加入了我們。

George, thank you so much for speaking to us again.

George，非常感謝你再次接受我們的訪問。

The November figures show that China's overall exports do not seem to be suffering as a result of the tariff dispute with the US Quite the opposite in fact.

十一月數據顯示，中國的整體出口似乎並未受到與美國關稅爭端的影響，事實上，情況恰恰相反。

And I'm trying to understand the dynamic behind this.

Has Beijing managed to find a whole lot of new buyers very quickly or has the surplus grown because China is importing less, or is there something else entirely going on?

北京是找到了很多新買家，還是因為中國進口減少導致過剩供應增加，或是另有原因？

Well, there are a couple, at least a couple of things going on here.

這裡面有幾個，至少有幾個因素在作用。

I mean, one is obviously the, the impact of the tariffs which the United States has levied on China and to some degree, kind of vice versa.

我的意思是，其中一個顯然是美國對中國徵收關稅的影響，以及某種程度上的相互影響。

I mean it, it is certainly having a pronounced effect on the pattern of trade between the United States and China and between China and other countries.

這確實對中美貿易以及中國與其他國家之間的貿易模式產生了明顯的影響。

So for example, Chinese exports to America are down by about a fifth roughly.

所以，例如，中國對美國的出口大約下降了五分之一。

But of course exports to other countries which are acting as transshipment points or trade diversion points are booming.

但當然，對其他作為轉運點或貿易轉移點的國家的出口卻蓬勃發展。

So the pattern of trade is changing a lot because of the tariffs.

所以貿易模式因為關稅而發生了很大的變化。

But the tariffs have had precious little impact, in fact, none at all, I would say, on the overall surplus that China is running with the rest of the world and the overall deficit, for example, that the Americans are running with rest of the world.

但關稅對中國與世界其他地區的整體順差，以及美國與世界其他地區的整體逆差，影響微乎其微，我甚至可以說根本沒有影響。

And you wouldn't expect the tariffs to have that kind of impact at all.

而且你也不會預期關稅會有那樣的影響。

So these surpluses and deficits, generally speaking, are basically they come from domestic imbalances between savings and investment.

所以這些順差和逆差，總的來說，基本上都源於國內儲蓄和投資之間的不平衡。

So they're determined at home, not abroad.

所以這些都是由國內決定的，而不是由國外決定的。

And in China's case in particular, it is because the country is pursuing a very mercantilistic kind of trade policy where they want the rest of the world to be dependent on them, but

而特別是中國，是因為這個國家奉行一種非常重商主義的貿易政策，他們希望世界其他國家依賴他們，但

they don't want to be dependent themselves on the rest of the world.

他們自己卻不想依賴世界其他國家。

So even though China imports a lot of stuff, right, you know, fuel, semiconductors, agricultural products, metals, Resources and so on, it doesn't import a lot of manufacturers.

所以即使中國進口了很多東西，像是燃料、半導體、農產品、金屬、資源等等，但他們並不進口很多製成品。

And the whole idea of China's trade policy manifests itself in booming exports but very, very little growth in imports.

而中國貿易政策的整個想法體現在出口蓬勃發展，但進口卻增長非常非常少。

And that's the problem for the rest of the world, including developed and emerging countries.

這對包括已開發國家和新興國家在內的整個世界來說，都是個問題。

So it's a problem for the rest of the world.

所以這對整個世界來說都是個問題。

But I'm wondering, is this desire for self reliance a problem for China as well?

但我很好奇，這種追求自給自足的願望，對中國本身也是個問題嗎？

I mean, the whole purpose of trade, right, is you want to export what you're particularly good at, what we call comparative advantage, so that you can import stu from other people, other countries that they're particularly good at.

我的意思是，貿易的整個目的，對吧，就是你想出口你特別擅長的東西，也就是我們所說的比較優勢，這樣你就可以進口別人，其他國家特別擅長的東西。

So by pursuing policies of self reliance and cleansing of supply chains and all of the kind of geopolitical stuff that's entered into the trade space, I mean, it's not a particularly efficient way of organizing your international commerce and transactions.

所以透過追求自給自足的政策，以及供應鏈的淨化，還有所有進入貿易領域的地緣政治因素，我的意思是，這並不是一個特別有效率的方式來組織你的國際商業和交易。

And of course it could lead to the kind of problems that we see manifest in China, for example, where lots and lots of things are being produced almost without regard for price or profit or efficiency.

當然，這也可能導致我們在中國看到的這類問題，例如，很多東西的生產幾乎不考慮價格、利潤或效率。

And I think that's also part of the problem.

Is there anything in particular that China is missing out on by pursuing this strategy in terms of imports from other countries?

中國透過這種策略，在進口其他國家的商品方面，有錯過什麼特別重要的東西嗎？

I mean there was, there's been quite a lot of discussion really about recently.

我的意思是，最近確實有很多討論。

I would say in particular about, you know, whether China can kind of snub its nose at the rest of the world and Europe in particular by saying, well, we don't really need anything that you've got, so we don't really need to import it.

我特別想說的是，中國是否能透過說「我們其實不需要你們擁有的任何東西，所以我們也不需要進口它」，來輕視世界其他國家，尤其是歐洲。

I mean, if Chinese households and Chinese citizens had the income and the wherewithal and the confidence to be able to spend money more, you know, with more gusto, I think they would happily import products from Europe and the rest of the world, including manufacturers.

我的意思是，如果中國家庭和中國公民有足夠的收入、財力和信心，能夠更「有活力」地花錢，我認為他們會很樂意進口歐洲和世界其他地方的產品，包括製造商的產品。

And I think that it's not right to say that there's nothing that the rest of the world produces that China doesn't want.

而且我認為，說「世界上沒有任何東西是中國不需要的」，這其實是不對的。

But it is certainly true to say that China's, you know, inability to import lots of things is contingent really on the well being of Chinese consumers, which is not all of that great at the moment.

但可以肯定的是，中國無法進口許多東西，這確實取決於中國消費者的福祉，而中國消費者的福祉目前並不是那麼好。

And I want to talk more about private consumption in a few moments.

But first of all, against the backdrop of all this geopolitical tension, we also recently got a glimpse of the government's next five year plan, which appears to be focusing on boosting industrial Strength.

但首先，在所有這些地緣政治緊張的背景下，我們最近也瞥見了政府的下一個五年計畫，該計畫似乎著重於提振工業實力。

Now you've written that this will widen a rift within China between the strong tech sector, which has world class brands, and

你寫道，這將加劇中國內部，在擁有世界級品牌的強大科技業，與

the rest of the economy which operates very differently.

其他運作方式截然不同的經濟體之間的分歧。

A lot of this is currently, you know, we're kind of grappling in the dark a little bit.

目前很多情況，我們都還在摸索中。

Quite recently in October, we had a very important meeting, so called fourth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party, which was hearing and opining, really and summarizing the key outlines of the 15th Five Year Plan, which will be unveiled in full in spring of 2026 at the National People's Congress.

就在最近的十月，我們召開了一個非常重要的會議，也就是中共的四中全會，會議聽取並評論、總結了第15個五年計畫的關鍵綱要，該計畫將於2026年春天在全國人民代表大會上全面公佈。

And we might get a little bit of a hint about what's in store for 2026 in the next few days when another important meeting called the Central Economic Work Conference takes place.

在接下來的幾天，當另一個重要的會議「中央經濟工作會議」召開時，我們可能會對2026年的發展有些許的預示。

But what I'm kind of reading between the lines at this juncture is that the emphasis, China is going to place emphasis on two very important things.

但我目前讀懂的弦外之音是，中國將會強調兩件非常重要的事情。

One is a persistence with the industrial policy that it's pursuing on a scale that is unprecedented in terms of size of gdp.

第一是持續推行其工業政策，這項政策的規模之大，以國內生產總值（GDP）而言可謂是前所未有。

It's possibly more than anybody, except the Russians and the Ukrainians are spending on defence.

這筆花費可能比除了俄羅斯和烏克蘭之外的任何國家在國防上的花費都還要多。

The government or the leadership certainly knows that it has to do more to encourage greater domestic demand and greater consumption.

政府或領導層當然知道，必須加倍努力來鼓勵國內需求和消費。

How they square this circle is really complicated and really difficult to predict because the policies that help one of these strategies, in other words industrial policy, damage the fight to promote consumption and vice versa.

他們如何解決這個難題，真的非常複雜且難以預測，因為有助於其中一項策略（也就是工業政策）的政策，反而會損害促進消費的努力，反之亦然。

So for example, if you just take one or two examples, a lot of the subsidies and the grants and the special favors that are granted to Chinese industries to produce more and to manufacture more electric vehicles or more pharmaceuticals or whatever.

所以，舉例來說，如果我們只看一兩個例子，中國產業為了生產更多電動車或更多藥品等產品而獲得的許多補貼、補助金和特殊優惠。

I mean, a lot of this money could go to supporting consumption.

我的意思是，這些錢的很大一部分本可以用來支持消費。

But isn't another example would be the exchange rate, the renminbi, which is probably quite cheap, quite undervalued at this particular point, and

但另一個例子不就是匯率嗎？人民幣，在這個時間點可能相當便宜，相當被低估，

the government could allow that to increase in value significantly.

That would obviously act to spur imports into China because it would make foreign goods cheaper for Chinese consumers.

這顯然會刺激中國的進口，因為這會讓外國商品對中國消費者來說更便宜。

But of course, if you allow the exchange rate to appreciate a lot, that's going to damage the exports, which is what they're very keen to promote.

但當然，如果你讓匯率大幅升值，那會損害出口，而出口正是他們非常想推動的。

所以，這有點像是「一方面」。

On the other, there are some things that you could probably do in China to help both industrial policy and consumption.

另一方面，中國有些事情或許可以同時幫助產業政策和消費。

But many things basically are conflicted.

但很多事情基本上是相互衝突的。

And what exactly is the source of that conflict?

而這種衝突的確切來源是什麼？

If you use the example of investing a lot in a sector like electric vehicles, why does that hamper the aim to boost private consumption.

如果你以在電動車等產業大量投資為例，為什麼這會阻礙提振私人消費的目標？

Well, if you spend for example, a lot of, I mean in with regards to electric vehicles, it's probably the case now that a lot of the subsidies have been unwound because of the big sort of boom in subsidies to electric vehicles is a few years behind us, although it's just kind of moved on to other sectors.

嗯，如果你花費很多，例如，就電動車而言，現在可能很多補貼已經取消了，因為電動車補貼的熱潮已經是幾年前的事了，雖然它已經轉移到其他領域了。

But the more resource you allocate to the promotion of key industries and to exports, I mean, you basically have a whole kind of infrastructure of policy which is being geared towards helping industries, firms, large companies, national champions.

但你投入越多資源在推動關鍵領域和出口上，我的意思是，你基本上就有一整套政策架構，都是為了幫助產業、公司、大企業、國家級企業。

And those resources could be used to spur household consumption through regulatory changes, tax cuts, income growth, Social Security, etc.

而這些資源本來可以用來透過監管改變、減稅、增加收入、社會保障等方式來刺激家庭消費。

So that's the kind of conflict you're often or governments are often facing this kind of conflict or incompatibility between policies that kind of take with one hand, but

所以這就是你經常面臨的衝突，或是政府經常面臨的衝突或不相容，就是一手拿走，但另一手給予，反之亦然。

如果我們個別來看幾個領域，從房地產開始，中國房地產的許多問題首次顯現，至少對公眾來說，大約在2020年，當時政府採取行動防止保麗龍形成。

If we look at a few sectors individually, starting with housing, a lot of the trouble with Chinese real estate first became apparent, at least to the general public in around 2020 when the government took action to prevent a bubble from forming.

為什麼它首先擔心事情會失控？

Why did it fear things were getting so out of control in the first place?

你又是如何評估它採取的應對措施的？

And how would you assess the measures it took in response?

嗯，你知道，當他們推出了所謂的「三條紅線」，也就是對中國房地產開發商的槓桿和負債設下了相當嚴格的限制，這並不是突然發生的。

Well, you know, when they introduced the so called three red lines which were quite strict limitations on the leverage and the liabilities which were permitted for China's real estate developers, this didn't happen out of the blue.

I mean, this happened 20 years into a housing boom in which, as we know from many, many other countries, experiences in the past.

我的意思是，這發生在房地產蓬勃發展了二十年之後，就像我們從許多其他國家過去的經驗中知道的那樣。

I mean these things basically are very, very powerful.

我的意思是，這些事情基本上都非常、非常強大。

You know, when the boom is going on, everybody is optimistic.

你知道，當景氣正旺的時候，每個人都充滿樂觀。

Banks are lending money hand over fist based on the collateral of property or land.

銀行以房地產或土地作為抵押品，大筆大筆地放款。

You know, people commit to expenditure patterns assuming that house prices will continue to rise as they have done, you know, for the last 10 years, et cetera.

你知道，人們會承諾支出模式，假設房價會像過去十年一樣持續上漲，等等。

E. So I think we all know what this story looks like.

所以我想我們都知道這個故事是什麼樣子。

The trouble is that when the party ends and the whole cycle goes into reverse, it happens first a little bit slowly, but

問題是，當派對結束，整個循環開始逆轉時，一開始會有點緩慢，

then very, very suddenly and the consequences can be very, very serious and last quite a long time.

但隨後會非常、非常突然，而且後果可能非常、非常嚴重，並持續相當長的時間。

I think the government did this in 2020 because they were worried about the financial instability risks that were building in the banking system developers who were kind of overextended.

我想政府在 2020 年這麼做，是因為他們擔心銀行體系中不斷累積的財務不穩定風險，以及那些過度擴張的開發商。

Almost all the private developers or the major private developers in China nowadays are either bankrupt or are not in very good financial situation, such that state funded or state owned Developers are basically taking on more and more of the role of managing China's housing market.

如今中國幾乎所有的私人開發商，或主要的私人開發商，都已經破產，不然就是財務狀況非常不理想，所以由國家資助或國營的開發商基本上承擔了越來越多管理中國房地產市場的角色。

Well, there's never a good time to do it except at the beginning when the pain may be that much less.

嗯，沒有什麼時候是最好的時機，除非是剛開始的時候，那時的陣痛可能會少很多。

So I think, you know, one probably has to conclude that it was inevitable that it was going to have to be done.

所以我想，嗯，我們大概只能得出結論，這件事遲早要做，而且是勢在必行的。

They chose to do it in 2020 and the consequences have been as bad as anybody might have expected them to be.

他們選擇在 2020 年這麼做，而後果一如大家所預期的那樣糟糕。

And it's not over yet because there's still a lot of excess supply, possibly up to three to five years worth of unsold apartments and houses, mostly in the kind of cities that most people don't really know.

而且這還沒結束，因為仍然有大量的過剩供應，可能高達三到五年的未售公寓和房屋，主要是在那些大多數人不太認識的城市。

I mean, we all know about Beijing and Shanghai and Shenzhen and so on, but

我的意思是，我們都知道北京、上海、深圳等等，但是

it's in the smaller cities there most of the excess supply is and it'll take a very, very long time for that to clear, especially because the cohorts of first time buyers, so the 25 to 35 year olds, is now declining in line with kind of population decline.

過剩供應主要是在那些較小的城市，而且需要非常非常長的時間才能消化，特別是因為首次購房者，也就是 25 到 35 歲的族群，現在正在隨著人口減少而下降。

And of course this huge rise in property prices also fueled household debt in China.

當然，房價的巨大漲幅也助長了中國的家庭債務。