Name: 伊朗為何急速走向死亡？ (Why Iran is Rapidly Dying)
Uploaded: 2025-11-19T17:32:29.000Z
Duration: 39 min 5 s

關係子句

Iran as a nation is arguably facing its greatest civilizational crisis that it has seen in centuries.

伊朗這個國家，可以說正經歷著數百年來最嚴重的文明危機。

Now, geopolitically speaking, Tehran has suffered continuous setback after setback over the last couple of years.

現在，從地緣政治的角度來看，德黑蘭在過去幾年裡可說是接連遭受挫敗。

In its decades long confrontation with Israel, the Islamic Republic's top declared enemy.

在與其聲稱頭號敵人伊斯蘭共和國以色列長達數十年的對抗中，

Its overseas proxies that it has spent billions of dollars and decades of time building up an arming like Hezbollah, Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and the Assad regime in Syria have all been either effectively crippled or completely destroyed.

它耗費數十億美元、數十年時間建立和武裝的海外代理人，像是真主黨、黎巴嫩、加薩的哈馬斯，以及敘利亞的阿薩德政權，都已經被有效削弱或徹底摧毀。

And exposing the Iranian heartland to direct hostile foreign attacks for the first time in decades.

這使得伊朗腹地數十年來首次暴露在直接的敵對外來攻擊之下。

and Israeli warplanes were subsequently able to relentlessly bombard the country's sensitive military and nuclear research sites with impunity.

和以色列的戰鬥機能夠不受懲罰地、持續不斷地轟炸該國的軍事與核研究基地。

An American mediated peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan simultaneously threatens to establish a continuous corridor of NATO Turkish influence across Iran's northern border in the South Caucasus, blocking off Iran from being able to maintain a direct land corridor with their ally Russia.

美國斡旋的亞美尼亞和亞塞拜然之間的和平協議，同時也威脅要在南高加索地區建立一個北約土耳其影響力的連續走廊，橫跨伊朗北部邊境，阻斷伊朗與其盟友俄羅斯的直接陸路聯繫。

While growing instability in the east with a wild Taliban regime in Afghanistan is resulting in unpredictable violent border skirmishes after the government accused its Afghan population of collective disloyalty and spying for Israel during the war, and

同時，東方阿富汗塔利班政權的動盪加劇，導致了不可預測的邊境暴力衝突，因為政府指控其阿富汗人口在戰爭期間集體不忠並為以色列間諜，

Tehran's decision to begin forcefully deporting millions of undocumented Afghans from the country across the border after the government accused its Afghan population of collective disloyalty and spying for Israel during the war.

德黑蘭決定在政府指控其阿富汗人口在戰爭期間集體不忠並為以色列間諜後，開始強行驅逐數百萬無證阿富汗人出境。

And yet, despite all of these enormous ongoing external crises, Iran's greatest contemporary problem that threatens its entire existence is not geopolitical, but

然而，儘管面臨所有這些巨大的外部危機，伊朗當前最大的生存威脅並非地緣政治上的，而是

Because in just a short amount of time, Iran might very well become the very first major society in the modern world to legitimately begin running out of water for its own people.

因為在很短的時間內，伊朗很可能成為現代世界第一個真正面臨缺水問題的主要社會。

And because Iran is such a huge country with more than 92 million people, that's not just a huge problem for Iran, but

而伊朗是一個擁有超過九千兩百萬人口的大國，這不僅是伊朗的巨大問題，

a huge problem for the entire rest of the world as well.

對於整個世界來說也是個大問題。

The situation has gotten so bad that it is now acutely visible even within the capital and the seat of the government's power in Tehran, which is also Iran's largest city.

情況已經變得非常糟糕，即使在首都德黑蘭，也就是伊朗最大的城市，政府權力的所在地，也顯而易見。

Roughly 10 million people live within the city limits of TEHRAN Today, about 11% of the country's total nationwide population.

如今，德黑蘭市區內居住著約一千萬人，佔全國總人口的 11% 左右。

And yet Tehran now consumes roughly a quarter of all of Iran's water supplies.

然而，德黑蘭消耗了伊朗約四分之一的水資源。

70% of Tehran's water supply is usually provided by a series of nearby dams and their reservoirs at Amir Kebir, Lar Mamlu and La Tian.

德黑蘭的水源供應通常有 70% 來自附近的幾個水壩及其水庫，包括阿米爾卡比爾、拉爾馬姆魯和拉提安。

But as of September of 2025, all four of their reservoirs are at critical and unprecedentedly low levels.

但到了 2025 年 9 月，這四個水庫的水位都降到了前所未有的最低點。

The usual level of annual rainfall that Tehran experiences is about 260 millimeters.

德黑蘭每年正常的降雨量大約是 260 毫米。

But in 2024, the capital only experienced a fraction of this at 140 millimeters, while preliminary estimates for 2025 suggest an even more catastrophic level of rainfall at just 100 millimeters.

但在 2024 年，首都的降雨量只有這個數字的一小部分，約 140 毫米，而 2025 年的初步估計顯示，降雨量將更為災難性，僅有 100 毫米。

With that in mind, these reservoirs around Tehran combined typically hold a long term average of 618 million cubic meters of water within them.

考量到這一點，德黑蘭周邊的這些水庫通常總共能儲存 6.18 億立方公尺的水。

But in 2024, they had dwindled down to just 485 million cubic meters remaining.

但在 2024 年，這裡的水量已經銳減到只剩下 4.85 億立方公尺。

And as of September 2025, they've withered away even further to just 258 million cubic meters of water remaining, meaning that half of Tehran's stored water reserves disappeared in just a single year.

到了 2025 年 9 月，水量更是進一步枯竭，只剩下 2.58 億立方公尺，這意味著德黑蘭儲備的水量在短短一年內就消失了一半。

Even worse, the La Tian Dam reservoir in particular, which usually holds about 95 million cubic meters of water, has shrunk by more than 90% and now contains just about 9 million cubic meters still remaining.

更糟的是，特別是拉提安大壩的水庫，它通常能儲存約 9500 萬立方公尺的水，現在卻縮減了 90% 以上，只剩下大約 900 萬立方公尺的水量。

The underground aquifers beneath the city have also begun collapsing and running dry after decades of chronic overuse, resulting in a rapidly accelerating rate of subsidence that has been seeing Tehran sinking into the ground beneath it by several millimeters a year, recently threatening the capital's infrastructure and buildings.

城市下方的地下含水層也因為長期的過度開採，開始塌陷和乾涸，導致地層沉降的速度不斷加快，德黑蘭每年正以數毫米的速度下陷，近期已威脅到首都的基礎設施和建築物。

Over the summer of 2025, the water crisis got so bad that the Iranian government was forced to just completely cut the taps in the capitol for half a day as the temperature soared to more than 100 degrees Fahrenheit, resulting in high energy demand from air conditioners on the city's grid that resulted in power cuts and rolling blackouts on top of the water cuts months beforehand.

在 2025 年夏天，水危機變得如此嚴重，以至於伊朗政府被迫在首都實施半天的完全停水，當時氣溫飆升至攝氏 38 度以上，導致冷氣機對城市電網造成巨大能源需求，進而引發了停電和分區輪流停電，而這是在幾個月前就已實施的停水措施之上。

In late 2024, the Iranian government was already demanding that offices, schools and even banks in the capital all had to be shut down on particularly bad weather days in order to conserve power.

在 2024 年底，伊朗政府已經要求首都的辦公室、學校甚至銀行，在天氣特別惡劣的日子必須關閉，以節省電力。

While officials were cautioning that if nothing was done to ration their energy, Tehran could become forced to adopt a four day work week during the summer when demand on the grid was particularly intense.

官員們警告說，如果沒有採取節約能源的措施，到了夏天電網需求特別大的時候，德黑蘭可能會被迫實施四天工作週。

The government has already started rationing the water supply in the capital by cutting off households water supply for three to six hours a day.

政府已經開始實施首都的供水配給，每天切斷住家供水三到六小時。

And in some cases the water pressure has gotten so low that it now fails to reach some high rises in the city, forcing their residents to carry bottled water or buckets up to their apartments for all of their water needs.

在某些情況下，水壓變得非常低，甚至無法到達城市的一些高樓，迫使居民們必須將瓶裝水或水桶搬到公寓裡，以滿足他們所有的用水需求。

Instead, the crisis has gotten so bad in Tehran that questions have even been raised about the city's long term habitability, while the government has even announced that it's currently investigating relocating the capital away from Tehran to somewhere else that doesn't have as many Water and infrastructure related issues.

事實上，德黑蘭的危機已經嚴重到讓人質疑這座城市長期的宜居性，政府甚至宣佈正在調查將首都遷離德黑蘭，搬到其他沒有那麼多與水和基礎設施相關問題的地方。

Iran's current sitting president, Massoud Pezeshkian, has publicly stated that he has proposed relocating the country's capital further away to the south, somewhere near to the Persian Gulf, in order to be closer to strategic trade routes in the area.

伊朗現任總統馬蘇德·佩澤什基揚公開表示，他建議將該國首都遷往南部，靠近波斯灣的地方，以便更靠近該地區的戰略貿易路線。

But the problem is that the water crisis is not just a problem that's unique to Tehran.

但問題是，水危機不只是德黑蘭獨有的問題。

It is a problem that is facing the entire country from north to south and from east to west.

這是從北到南、從東到西，整個國家都面臨的問題。

Everywhere across the country, reservoirs are running dry and lakes are disappearing.

全國各地，水庫正在乾涸，湖泊正在消失。

The Iranian regime's own news agency, IRNA, reported in early October of 2025 that 19 of the country's largest reservoirs are currently on the verge of complete dryness and that three of them, left unnamed in the report have already hit 00% remaining capacity.

伊朗政權自己的新聞社 IRNA 在 2025 年 10 月初報導，該國最大的 19 個水庫目前瀕臨完全乾涸，其中三個水庫在報導中未具名，已經達到了 00% 的剩餘容量。

More than half of the dams across the country now hold less than 40% of their overall capacity.

全國超過一半的水壩目前的蓄水量不到其總容量的 40%。

Lake Urmia, once the largest lake in the entire Middle east that was in northwestern Iran, has nearly completely dried up, leaving behind nothing but a salty, dusty crust.

曾經是整個中東最大的烏爾米耶湖，位於伊朗西北部，如今幾乎完全乾涸，只留下鹽分和塵土的硬殼。

More than 280 cities across the country now face extreme water stress, like the city of Yazz, whose water supply ran out entirely as recently as March of 2025, which led to the city having to be entirely supplied by water tankers and bottled water for nearly a week until the taps could be restored.

全國超過 280 座城市正承受極端的缺水壓力，像是亞茲德市，其供水在 2025 年 3 月就已完全耗盡，導致該市近一週必須完全仰賴水車和瓶裝水供應，直到水龍頭恢復供水。

Rural communities across the country have been even more badly struck as hundreds of villages now rely completely on tanker trucks after their wells have run dry.

全國的鄉村社區受到的衝擊更大，數百個村莊在水井乾涸後，如今完全依賴水車運送。

Cities across the country are literally sinking as their underground aquifers have been completely, completely depleted, while cracks are forming in rail lines connecting the country's major cities.

全國的城市正在實際上下陷，因為地下含水層已完全枯竭，連接全國主要城市的鐵路線也出現裂痕。

Together, some Iranian officials have even warned about a looming day zero in Tehran and in other cities across the country, the day when the taps for millions of people may run dry completely.

總之，一些伊朗官員甚至警告，德黑蘭和其他全國城市可能面臨「零日」的逼近，也就是數百萬人的水龍頭可能完全乾涸的那一天。

It has gotten so bad that it has started to become exploitable by hostile foreign actors.

情況已經糟到開始被敵對外國勢力利用。

Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, was released a video in August of 2025 that directly encouraged the Iranian people to rise up and revolt against their conditions.

以色列總理班傑明·納坦雅胡在 2025 年 8 月發布了一段影片，直接鼓勵伊朗人民起來反抗他們的處境。

He said at the time, Iran's thirst for water is only matched by its thirst for freedom.

他當時說，伊朗對水的渴望，跟對自由的渴望一樣強烈。

Once Iran is free, Israel's top water experts will come to every city in the country with the most advanced technologies and knowledge to help Iran with water recycling and desalination.

一旦伊朗自由了，以色列頂尖的水專家將帶著最先進的技術和知識來到全國的每個城市，協助伊朗進行水資源回收和海水淡化。

Even though Netanyahu was the absolutely wrong man to make such a pitch to the Iranian people, he wasn't wrong about the fact that the water crisis has become the Iranian government's greatest strategic vulnerability.

儘管納坦雅胡是向伊朗人民提出這種請求的絕對錯誤人選，但他關於水資源危機已成為伊朗政府最大的戰略弱點這一事實，並沒有錯。

It is exacerbating the country's complicated ethnic fault lines as minority groups accused the regime of prioritizing water access for the Persian majority.

這加劇了該國複雜的民族斷層線，少數族裔指責該政權優先為波斯主體民族提供水源。

And it is all a complicated story of government corruption and graft, terrible policies, clean climate change and geopolitical developments and intrigue that have led Iran to the brink of water bankruptcy today.

這一切都源於政府腐敗和貪汙、糟糕的政策、嚴重的氣候變遷以及地緣政治發展和陰謀，這些因素共同將伊朗推向了今日水資源破產的邊緣。

And to understand how the country got here, we have to go back in time to the late 1940s, when Iran was still ruled as an absolute monarchy by the Shah.

要了解這個國家是如何走到這一步的，我們必須回到 1940 年代後期，當時伊朗仍由國王統治，是一個絕對君主制國家。

In 1949, the Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, took a visit to the city of Las Vegas in the United States.

1949 年，伊朗國王穆罕默德·禮薩·巴列維（Mohammad Reza Pahlavi）參觀了美國的拉斯維加斯市。

He was there on official business to observe the marvel of the Hoover Dam that the Americans had constructed across the Colorado river, which created a vast reservoir behind it in Lake Mead that enabled the desert metropolis of Las Vegas to survive and to thrive.

他此行的公務是考察美國在科羅拉多河上建造的胡佛水壩的奇蹟，該水壩在米德湖（Lake Mead）後方形成了一個巨大的水庫，使得沙漠中的大都會拉斯維加斯得以生存和繁榮。

The Shah was interested in modernizing his own country, and

國王對現代化自己的國家感興趣，

building monumental dams and reservoirs in the similarly arid Iranian climate was of a very deep interest to him.

並且在同樣乾旱的伊朗氣候中建造宏偉的水壩和水庫，對他來說是極大的興趣。

He returned back to Iran from the Mojave Desert with a new ambition and with technical assistance and engineers that were provided to him by the Truman administration, who brought modern irrigation and drilling technologies that enabled Iran's farmers to begin draining their ancient aquifers at an unsustainable rate.

他從莫哈韋沙漠（Mojave Desert）返回伊朗時，帶著新的雄心，以及杜魯門政府提供的技術援助和工程師，他們帶來了現代化的灌溉和鑽井技術，使得伊朗的農民開始以不可持續的速度抽取他們古老的地下含水層。

Iran as a country has a very uneven distribution of water resources found across the country.

伊朗這個國家，其水資源的分佈極為不均。

Across a strip of land in the north of Iran near the Caspian Sea, the annual rainfall levels are high and average about 1,280 millimeters per year, similar to the levels that are seen in wet environments like New York City, which makes this whole area a lush, dense green forest that looks nothing like most westerners.

伊朗北部靠近裡海的一處狹長地帶，年降雨量很高，平均約攝氏一千二百八十毫米，跟紐約市那樣潮濕的環境差不多，這讓整片區域都成了茂密翠綠的森林，跟大多數西方人對伊朗的印象完全不同。

Popular perception of Iran but across the central plateau of Iran, that's the heartland of the Persian people, and

對伊朗的普遍印象，但在伊朗中部高原，也就是波斯人的腹地，

across the southern lowlands, annual rainfall will rarely ever exceed more than 100 millimeters.

以及南部低地，年降雨量很少會超過一百毫米。

The rainy season across these other parts of Iran usually only lasts between October and March, and

伊朗其他地區的雨季通常只持續十月到三月之間，

that'll leave the land extremely dry for most of the rest of the year.

這使得一年中的大部分時間土地都極度乾旱。

In some places, the entire year's worth of rainfall might fall during sudden torrential storms that last only a few days.

有些地方，一整年的雨量可能會在幾天內突如其來的暴雨中落下。

As a result, the Shah and his engineers wanted to modernize Iran and redistribute the availability of water throughout the country by diversions and dams to regulate water flows.

是以，國王和他麾下的工程師們想透過分流和水壩來調節水流，進而現代化伊朗並重新分配全國的水資源。

But he also ordered the establishment of water hungry industries like petrochemical and steel plants to be constructed in the drier parts of the country.

但他同時也下令在國內較乾旱的地區，建造石化和鋼鐵廠等耗水產業。

Within the central plateau, in the Persian majority region, at places like Isfahan and Fars, which tied the fate of Iran's heavy industries to geographic areas that lacked meaningful water supplies of their own and were over reliant on diversions of water from other parts of the country.

在中部高原，在波斯人佔多數的地區，像是伊斯法罕和法爾斯等地，這使得伊朗重工業的命運與自身嚴重缺水的地理區域綁在一起，並且過度依賴從國內其他地區引水。

Later, in the early 1960s, the Shah implemented a series of land reforms in the country that redistributed Iran's large feudal agricultural estates to smaller farmers and families that promoted their adoption of mechanized farming with state incentives.

後來，在 1960 年代初期，國王在全國實施了一系列土地改革，將伊朗龐大的封建農業地產重新分配給小型農民和家庭，並透過國家獎勵鼓勵他們採用機械化耕作。

Millions of Iranian peasants were granted new land to farm with their new mechanized equipment.

數百萬伊朗農民獲得了新土地，可以使用他們的新機械化設備耕種。

But it also led to a breakdown in Iran's traditional system of irrigation that had lasted for thousands of years before it that were called Khanate.

但這也導致了伊朗延續了數千年的傳統灌溉系統「汗納特」的崩潰。

Khanuts are effectively underground aqueducts that the Persians had perfected over millennia to transport water across the arid and hot central plateau.

汗納特實際上是地下水道，波斯人在數千年中不斷完善這種技術，以將水輸送到乾旱炎熱的中部高原。

But these khanates that had supplied Iranian cities with water for countless generations began to be steadily abandoned in the early 1960s as the new peasant farmers began switching over to motorized deep wells en masse in order to access the country's below ground aquifers, which had only limited supplies of water that takes thousands of years to naturally replenish and recharge.

然而，這些供應伊朗城市無數代用水的汗納特，在 1960 年代初期開始被逐漸廢棄，因為新的農民開始大規模改用電動深井，以獲取國家地下含水層的水源，而這些水源的供應有限，需要數千年才能自然補充和恢復。

The process of abandoning the country's traditional water management system in exchange for new and misunderstood technologies had already begun.

為了獲取新的、被誤解的技術而放棄國家傳統水資源管理系統的過程已經開始了。

But it would dramatically skyrocket to wildly unsustainable levels after the Islamic Revolution overthrew the Shah in 1979 and established the modern theocratic Islamic Republic in its place.

但在 1979 年伊斯蘭革命推翻國王並建立現代神權伊斯蘭共和國後，情況將會急劇惡化到極度不可持續的程度。

After radical Iranian students stormed the US embassy in Tehran and took 66Americans as hostages, diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States collapsed and the US initiated a trade embargo against Iran that has continued for decades ever since, restricting the country's access to the mechanized equipment and parts that it came to rely upon for its agriculture and irrigation beforehand.

在激進的伊朗學生衝進美國駐德黑蘭大使館並劫持 66 名美國人作為人質後，伊朗與美國的外交關係破裂，美國對伊朗實施了持續數十年的貿易禁運，限制了該國獲得先前農業和灌溉所依賴的機械設備和零件的管道。

During the Shah era and at almost the exact same time, Iraq launched a full scale invasion of Iran in 1980 that sparked a decade devastating, eight year long Iran Iraq War which led to the introduction of food and resource rationing in Iran.

在國王時代，幾乎在同一時間，伊拉克於 1980 年對伊朗發動了全面入侵，引發了長達八年、毀滅性的兩伊戰爭，導致伊朗實施食品和資源配給。

As the theocracy's first supreme leader, the Ayatollah Rufollah Khomeini began advocating for a policy of radical self sufficiency and food sovereignty in a world that appeared overwhelmingly hostile to his new regime, he began ordering a radical expansion in Iran's dams, wells and agricultural infrastructure, all in the name of this self sufficiency.

作為神權政府的第一位最高領袖，阿亞圖拉·魯霍拉·霍梅尼開始倡導一種激進的自給自足和糧食主權政策，因為他認為這個世界對他的新政權充滿敵意，他開始下令大規模擴建伊朗的水壩、水井和農業基礎設施，一切都是為了實現這種自給自足。

Before the 1979 revolution, there were fewer than 80,000 wells across the country.

1979 年革命前，全國的油井不到八萬口。

But within just three years after the rise to power of the Ayatollahs that number would more than double while hundreds of new dams were being actively planned as well.

但在阿亞圖拉掌權後的短短三年內，這個數字就翻了一倍多，同時還有數百座新水壩正在積極規劃中。

Most of them concentrated across the arid central plateau region.

大部分都集中在乾旱的中央高原地區。

After the long war with Iraq came to an inconclusive end in 1988, the regime's personal army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or the irgc was suddenly left without a clear military purp.

1988 年與伊拉克的漫長戰爭以無結論告終後，該政權的特種部隊「伊斯蘭革命衛隊」（IRGC）突然失去明確的軍事目標。

And so the government under then President Akbar Hashemi Rasvanjani adopted a new purpose for the IRGC that they called the Reconstruction Jihad.

是以，當時由總統拉夫桑賈尼領導的政府為伊斯蘭革命衛隊賦予了新的使命，他們稱之為「重建聖戰」。

Adapting the IRGC to construction and development.

將伊斯蘭革命衛隊轉向建築和發展。

In order to maintain their influence and morale.

A new engineering firm run by the IRGC was established that was called the Katam Al Anibia Construction Company which quickly became the regime's go to contractor for building dams, tunnels and other water transfer projects.

一家由伊斯蘭革命衛隊經營的新工程公司成立，名為 Katam Al Anbia Construction Company，該公司迅速成為該政權建造水壩、隧道和其他輸水工程的首選承包商。

Another company called the Iran Water and Power Resources Development Company or the IWPCo was also founded as a state owned design firm by regime insiders.

另一家名為 Iran Water and Power Resources Development Company（IWPCo）的公司也由政權內部人士創立，作為一家國營設計公司。

While an incredibly powerful and opaque consulting and lobbying firm also run by regime insiders was founded called Mahab Go.

同時，一家由政權內部人士經營、極具影響力且不透明的顧問和遊說公司 Mahab Go 也應運而生。

All three of these companies were effectively run by the exact same people with close ties to the regime and they collectively formed a closed loop with no external checks and balances.

這三家公司實際上由與政權關係密切的同一批人經營，它們共同形成了一個封閉的循環，沒有外部的制衡。

The IWPCO company would design and commission dam projects that were usually based on old outdated Western blueprints and rarely ever considered any environmental studies.

IWPCO 公司負責設計和發包水壩專案，這些專案通常是基於老舊過時的西方藍圖，很少考慮任何環境研究。

The Mahab Gods company would then lobby the government for their approval and then the Katam Al Anibia Company would be immediately awarded the no bid contracts to actually build the projects and was shielded from any political oversight.

接著 Mahab Go 公司會向政府遊說以獲得準許，然後 Katam Al Anbia 公司會立即獲得免競標的合約來實際建造這些專案，並免受任何政治監督。

This network of IRGC and regime operated firms and companies that all worked together in tandem eventually came to be called the country's Water mafia.

這個由伊斯蘭革命衛隊和政權營運、緊密合作的公司網絡，最終被稱為國家的「水務黑手黨」。

And the rapid expansion of dam and water projects came to be seen as avenues for enriching themselves rather than benefiting the country.

水壩和水利工程的快速擴張，被視為中飽私囊的管道，而非造福國家。

Over the next few decades, the water mafia constructed hundreds of dams all across the country, usually without any environmental assessments or any long term planning at all.

在接下來的幾十年裡，「水務黑手黨」在全國各地建造了數百座水壩，通常沒有任何環境評估或長遠規劃。

Water from rivers were diverted by the water mafia to feed IRGC owned factories, plants and heavy industries at the expense of agricultural and municipal supplies to further enrich themselves.

「水務黑手黨」將河流的水引流，以供應伊斯蘭革命衛隊旗下的工廠、廠房和重工業，卻犧牲了農業和市政用水，以進一步充實自己。

Some of the most infamous water megaprojects that the Islamic Republic carried out following the war with Iraq include the 550,000 hectare project that began in 1996 in the Western provinces of Kujistan and Elam.

伊斯蘭共和國在與伊拉克戰爭後實施的一些最臭名昭著的水利大型專案，包括 1996 年在庫吉斯坦和伊蘭西部省份開始的 55 萬公頃專案。

Enormous amounts of land were confiscated by the government and the Karun river was diverted to feed industrial farms controlled by regime linked insiders.

政府沒收了大量的土地，並將卡倫河的水引流，以供應由與政權有關的內部人士控制的工業農場。

A mega dam along the Karun river called the Gotvand Dam was completed in 2011, despite ignored warnings by environmentalists that there would be enormous salt formation at the site if it went ahead as predicted.

卡倫河上的一座名為 Gotvand 的大型水壩於 2011 年完工，儘管環保人士曾發出警告，指出如果按照預期進行，該地點將會產生大量的鹽分沉積。