Name: 衛星如何揭示中國的入侵臺灣計劃 (How Satellites Reveal China's Taiwan Invasion Plans)
Uploaded: 2025-07-17T08:37:55.000Z
Duration: 38 min 32 s

In early January of 2025, a satellite captured a curious image of something happening in the

2025 年 1 月初，一顆衛星捕捉到了一幅奇特的畫面，畫面中發生了一些事情。

關係子句

Chinese megacity of Guangzhou near the country's southern coast. A dry dock in the city was busy constructing this strange-looking ship, something that a handful of foreign intelligence analysts at the time suggested could be a Chinese landing vessel. And then only a couple of months later, in March of 2025, the completed vessel and two other similar-looking ships were spotted by satellites again, this time off of China's far southern coastline practicing a series of interesting maneuvers. This time, the satellite captured the three barges connecting together to form a huge causeway from the rearmost barge, and then through the front barge directly towards a beach, with accompanying Chinese civilian cargo ships and ferries practicing right alongside them.

中國南部海岸附近的特大城市廣州。該市的一個幹船塢正忙於建造這艘外形奇特的船隻，當時有少數外國情報分析師認為這可能是一艘中國登陸艦。僅僅幾個月後，也就是 2025 年 3 月，衛星再次發現了這艘已完工的船隻和另外兩艘外形相似的船隻，這次是在中國遙遠的南部海岸線附近，它們正在進行一系列有趣的演習。這一次，衛星拍攝到三艘駁船連接在一起，從最尾的駁船形成一條巨大的堤道，然後通過最前面的駁船直接駛向海灘，與此同時，中國的民用貨船和渡船也在旁邊練習。

進階被動語態

And then, only a few weeks later after that, a series of photos taken by the Chinese themselves of the exercises began spreading around on the internet, showing the three barges from the perspective of being down on the ground on the beach itself, showing the long causeway from the rear barge connecting all the way to the front barge with an offloading ramp extending directly onto the beach, interestingly just wide enough to accommodate the offloading of a heavy main battle tank. It didn't take very long for many analysts to begin recognizing that these new barges could be a part of China's ever-evolving strategy to launch an all-out invasion of Taiwan at some point in the future. The island that the government of China regards as a rogue, renegade province that China's leader, Xi Jinping, has repeatedly promised would be brought under

之後僅過了幾周，一系列由中國人自己拍攝的演習照片開始在互聯網上流傳，照片顯示了三艘駁船在海灘上的俯視視角，顯示了從後駁船一直連接到前駁船的長堤，卸貨坡道直接延伸到海灘上，有趣的是，其寬度足以容納一輛重型主戰坦克卸貨。沒過多久，許多分析家就開始認識到，這些新型駁船可能是中國不斷演變的戰略的一部分，目的是在未來某個時候全面入侵臺灣。臺灣被中國政府視為一個叛逆的流氓省份，中國領導人習近平曾多次承諾將其置於中國的控制之下。

Chinese Communist Party rule some way or another, either through diplomacy or through force.

中國共產黨或通過外交或通過武力，以某種方式進行統治。

Of course, one of the biggest obstacles that has been standing in the way of an all-out Chinese invasion of Taiwan for decades has been the fact that Taiwan is an island, and in order to get their army over to that island, China will need to transport their soldiers, vehicles, and equipment over the sea in a titanic amphibious invasion like a modern 21st century version of the D-Day invasion of Normandy during World War II. And China is aware that any amphibious invasion of an enemy consists of two different steps. The first step is rather straightforward, and consists of actually assaulting the beach, storming and overcoming local enemy positions, and establishing a localized beachhead. The second step is more complicated, and is likely what these new barges are designed to help out with. After the initial beachhead is established, the invading force has to make the beachhead sustainable in order to actually hold onto it, and to expand their control even deeper into the enemy's territory. The beachhead has to be logistically supplied with adequate amounts of reinforcements, ammunition, fuel, food, medical supplies, and other materials to make sure that they don't just run out of supplies surrounded by hostile territory and implode in on themselves. So in order to make a beachhead sustainable, the invading force usually has to take over a nearby port that's ideally closely located to the initial beachhead. Through which they can then begin bringing in all of their necessary supplies and reinforcements for the troops to hold the beachhead, and then expand beyond it. But in most cases, securing a nearby enemy harbor to the beachhead that's still perfectly intact is no easy feat. During the Allied amphibious invasion of Normandy during

當然，幾十年來，阻礙中國全面入侵臺灣的最大障礙之一就是臺灣是一個島嶼，為了把軍隊運到島上，中國需要通過海上運輸阿兵哥、車輛和裝備，進行兩棲入侵，就像 21 世紀現代版的第二次世界大戰期間諾曼底 "登陸日"（D-Day）入侵一樣。中國知道，對敵人的任何兩棲入侵都包括兩個不同的步驟。第一步相當直接，包括實際突擊海灘、猛攻並攻克當地敵軍陣地、建立局部灘頭陣地。第二步則更為複雜，這可能也是這些新型駁船的設計初衷。在建立了最初的灘頭陣地後，入侵部隊必須使灘頭陣地可持續發展，以便真正守住灘頭陣地，並將其控制範圍擴展到

World War II, the Allies' solution to this problem were the now famous Mulberry Harbors, which have no doubt been studied extensively by Chinese military planners for a possible Taiwan amphibious invasion today. Rather than spending huge amounts of time and resources trying to capture well-defended enemy-occupied ports, that would probably be sabotaged and damaged anyway, and take even more time to repair and bring back online, the Allies' solution was to simply bring their own temporary portable harbors to the coast of Normandy instead. Merely hours after the Allies had established their beachheads in Normandy after the initial D-Day amphibious assaults, the many sections of the Mulberry Harbors were towed from England across the Channel and put into position in two different beachhead locations, Mulberry A and Mulberry B.

第二次世界大戰中，盟軍解決這一問題的辦法就是現在著名的桑葚港，毫無疑問，中國的軍事規劃人員已經對桑葚港進行了廣泛研究，以應對今天可能發生的臺灣兩棲入侵。與其花費大量的時間和資源去攻佔敵人佔領的防禦嚴密的港口，而這些港口很可能會遭到破壞和損壞，甚至需要更多的時間來修復和重新啟用，盟軍的解決方案是簡單地將他們自己的臨時便攜式港口帶到諾曼底海岸。盟軍在 D-Day 兩棲攻擊之後，在諾曼底建立了灘頭陣地，僅僅幾個小時之後，桑葚港的多個部分就從英國拖過英吉利海峽，在兩個不同的灘頭陣地--桑葚 A 和桑葚 B--就位

The Mulberry Harbors basically consisted of a series of floating breakwaters, pontoons, piers, and floating roadways that the Allies were then able to stitch together and use to rapidly offload reinforcements and supplies through onto the beachheads, which enabled them to become sustainable and to be able to expand deeper into the interior without the need to spend crucial time and effort capturing any of the sabotaged German-occupied ports in northern France instead. Nonetheless, even during this operation, Mulberry Harbor A was destroyed by a violent storm just a few days after it had been established, limiting the Allies to the use of only Mulberry

桑葚港基本上由一系列浮動防波堤、浮橋、碼頭和浮動道路組成，盟軍可以將它們拼接在一起，用於向灘頭快速卸載增援部隊和補給品，從而使盟軍能夠持久地向內陸縱深擴張，而無需花費關鍵的時間和精力去佔領法國北部被德軍破壞的港口。然而，即使在這次行動中，桑葚港 A 區也在建立幾天後就被狂風暴雨摧毀，盟軍只能使用桑葚港 B 區。

Harbor B for the next several months. Now, for China's modern considerations for a 21st century amphibious invasion of Taiwan, there are many geographic facts about this part of the world that will make it even harder to pull off than the Allied invasion of Normandy was.

在接下來的幾個月裡，中國將在B港駐紮軍隊。現在，就中國在 21 世紀兩棲入侵臺灣的現代考慮而言，世界上這一地區的許多地理事實將使其比盟軍入侵諾曼底更加難以成功。

The distance that the Chinese invasion fleet will have to travel across the Taiwan Strait will be roughly similar to the distance that the Allied invasion fleet had to travel across the English Channel. And just like the Allies experienced in Normandy in 1944, the Chinese can also expect that Taiwan's defenders today would likely sabotage their own ports rather than risk them falling into Chinese hands intact. Which means that the

中國入侵艦隊穿越臺灣海峽的距離將與盟軍入侵艦隊穿越英吉利海峽的距離大致相同。就像盟軍 1944 年在諾曼底所經歷的一樣，中國人也可以預料到，今天的臺灣守軍很可能會破壞自己的港口，而不是冒著港口完好無損地落入中國人手中的風險。這意味著

Chinese will have to bring their own ports with them in order to sustain their initial beachheads.

中國人必須帶上自己的港口，才能維持最初的灘頭陣地。

However, a significant amount of the Taiwanese coast is ringed by extensive coral reefs that in some locations can stretch for hundreds of meters off the beaches, severely complicating the ability for an invasion force to bring their own Mulberry Harbor style portable ports to bear.

然而，臺灣海岸的大部分地區都被大面積的珊瑚礁環繞，有些地方的珊瑚礁可以延伸到海灘外數百米的地方，這使得入侵部隊將自己的 "桑樹港 "式便攜式港口投入使用的能力變得非常複雜。

Moreover, the island of Taiwan just also has very few suitable beaches that a traditional amphibious invasion force can choose from to attack with any good odds of success.

此外，臺灣島上也只有極少數合適的海灘可供傳統的兩棲入侵部隊選擇進攻，而且成功機率很小。

The island only has a total of 14 so-called red beaches dotted around the island where conditions are considered optimal for an amphibious assault. Where the coral reefs extending from the shoreline are either small or non-existent, where the terrain is relatively flat and easier to assault than the rugged towering cliffs that are seen across most of the island's east coast, and where the beaches themselves are also located nearby to strategically crucial targets for the Chinese to capture. Such as Taiwan's capital and the largest city in the north, Taipei, and Taiwan's principal and largest maritime port down in the south, Kaohsiung.

該島總共只有 14 個所謂的紅海灘，分佈在島上條件最適合兩棲攻擊的地方。從海岸線延伸出來的珊瑚礁要麼很小，要麼根本不存在；地形相對平坦，比島上東海岸大部分地區的崎嶇高聳的懸崖峭壁更容易進攻；海灘本身也位於中國人要攻佔的重要戰略目標附近。比如臺灣的首都和北部最大的城市臺北，以及臺灣南部主要和最大的海港高雄。

However, the vulnerability of all 14 of these red beaches are very well understood by Taiwan, and so they're consequently the most heavily fortified and well-defended beaches on the entire island, making any traditional amphibious assault on them a difficult task.

然而，臺灣方面非常清楚這 14 個紅色海灘的脆弱性，是以它們也是全島防禦最嚴密的海灘，任何傳統的兩棲攻擊都難以奏效。

All of these problems though can potentially be solved by China's new invasion barges that have been spreading around the internet these past few months, which western intelligence sources have nicknamed the Shui Kao class of vessels, literally Mandarin Chinese for water bridge.

但所有這些問題都有可能通過中國的新型入侵駁船來解決，這些駁船在過去幾個月裡在互聯網上廣為流傳，西方情報人員將其暱稱為 "水橋 "級船隻，中文直譯為 "水橋"。

When hypothetically approaching the Taiwanese coast, these Shui Kao barges, which will probably always operate in pairs of three, will carefully position themselves one after the other in a row. With the smaller barge of the trio in the front, the medium-sized barge in the center, and the largest sized barge back in the rear. Each of the barges carries a set of super heavy retractable legs with them on board. When the barges are still in transport, these legs will be retracted and stowed above the ship. But once they're in position near the beachhead, the legs will be lowered to pin them down to the seabed beneath them, and to lift their hulls out of the water, giving them increased stability in the choppy coastal waters almost like miniature offshore oil platforms. Each of the barges also has a tower in their front and a long bridge stored on their decks while in transport. Once the legs have stabilized the barges in place, the towers at the front will telescope out their bridges to create a giant portable causeway extending out from the rear barge to the center barge to the front barge to the shore, extending out nearly 825 meters from the rear barge. It's also been suggested by several other analysts that these heavy-duty bridges will be capable of supporting and fitting heavy vehicles such as armored personnel carriers and even main battle tanks. Together, the Shui Kao barges effectively function as both a movable port and a movable bridge at the same time.

在假設接近臺灣海岸時，這些 "水閣號 "駁船可能總是三人一組，小心翼翼地排成一排。三艘駁船中較小的一艘在前，中等大小的一艘在中間，最大的一艘在後。每艘駁船上都裝有一套超重型可伸縮支腿。當駁船還在運輸途中時，這些支腿會縮回並存放在船的上方。但是，一旦駁船在灘頭附近就位，這些支腿就會放下，將駁船固定在腳下的海床上，並將船體抬出水面，使駁船在波濤洶湧的沿岸水域中更加穩定，幾乎就像一個微型海上石油平臺。在運輸過程中，每艘駁船的前部都有一個塔架，甲板上還有一座長橋。一旦支腿將駁船穩固到位，前部的大廈就會將橋伸縮出來

Working in unison with Chinese civilian roll-on roll-off or row-row ferries commandeered for military service, the People's Liberation Army can then rapidly dock these row-row ferries carrying vehicles with the larger rear barge and disgorge their heavy vehicles and equipment into it. They can then rapidly storm ahead across the causeway and directly onto the beachhead.

與徵用為軍用的中國民用滾裝船或行列式渡船配合使用，中國人民解放軍就可以將這些運載車輛的行列式渡船與較大的後駁船迅速對接，並將重型車輛和裝備卸入其中。然後，他們就可以迅速衝過堤道，直接進入灘頭。

Two analysts affiliated with the China Maritime Studies Institute, J. Michael Damm and Thomas

中國海事研究所的兩位分析師 J. Michael Damm 和托馬斯

Shugart, argued in a paper they wrote in March 2025 about these Shui Kao barges that they would likely be capable of offloading onto the beach an entire heavy combined arms battalion, including roughly 150 vehicles in only about 40 to 60 minutes after they had extended their causeway.

舒加特在他們於 2025 年 3 月撰寫的一篇關於這些水閣駁船的論文中指出，這些駁船在延伸堤道後，很可能只需 40 到 60 分鐘就能在海灘上卸下整個重型聯合武器營，包括大約 150 輛汽車。

Over the course of a full day, they could theoretically unload several hundred armored vehicles, all brought to them by any number of China's dozens of civilian row-row ferries commandeered for military service, which have all been intentionally designed for dual-use purposes with the capability to handle unloading and offloading heavy-duty military vehicles like tanks.

理論上，在一整天的時間裡，他們可以卸下幾百輛裝甲車，這些裝甲車都是由中國徵用的幾十艘民用軍用行列渡船運來的，這些渡船都是為軍民兩用而特意設計的，具有裝卸坦克等重型軍用車輛的能力。

With their long length far out from the beach, the row-row ferries will be able to safely offload all of their vehicles onto the rear Shui Kao barge without any fear of them running aground in the shallower waters closer to the beach. With their very shallow draft and distance out from the shoreline, the Shui Kao barges also appear to be designed to overcome Taiwan's coastal coral reefs that ring most of the island, opening up more potential beaches beyond the 14 well-known and well-defended red beaches that the Chinese invasion force could potentially assault.

由於其長度遠遠超出海灘，排排渡輪將能夠安全地把所有車輛卸載到後部的水膠駁船上，而不必擔心在靠近海灘的較淺水域擱淺。水澳駁船吃水很淺，離海岸線也很遠，其設計似乎還能克服環繞全島的臺灣沿海珊瑚礁，從而在 14 個眾所周知且防禦嚴密的紅海灘之外開闢出更多潛在海灘，讓中國入侵部隊有可能發起攻擊。

Going even further, the Shui Kao barges could also theoretically extend their causeway to connect directly to one of Taiwan's coastal highways, disgorging their vehicles directly to the island's highway system and ignoring the beaches altogether. This is potentially the biggest threat that the new Shui Kao barges pose to Taiwan's defense. They've been estimated by some analysts to potentially expand the number of beaches that the PLA could land at on Taiwan by around 40, on top of the original 14 red beaches, greatly expanding the number of potential beaches that the Taiwanese will now have to consider preparing for their defense and risking them spreading out their limited resources too thin and leaving behind weaker vulnerable defenses at some beaches that the PLA could find and exploit during an invasion scenario. The PLA would likely only utilize the

更有甚者，理論上，"水膠 "駁船還可以將其便道直接延伸到臺灣的一條沿海高速公路，將車輛直接卸載到島內的高速公路系統，而完全忽略海灘。這可能是新型水閣駁船對臺灣防務構成的最大威脅。據一些分析家估計，除了原有的 14 個紅海灘外，解放軍可以在臺灣登陸的海灘數量可能會增加約 40 個，這大大增加了臺灣人現在不得不考慮準備防禦的潛在海灘數量，並有可能使他們有限的資源過於分散，在一些海灘上留下較弱的薄弱防禦，解放軍在入侵時可能會發現並利用這些薄弱防禦。解放軍可能只會利用

Shui Kao barges after their navy and air force had already achieved maritime and aerial supremacy and after the initial beachheads on the shore have already been established by the first wave of D-Day style amphibious assaults, granting the PLA the ability to then rapidly offload their heavy equipment and supplies onto the island to press on the assault deeper into the island's interior. If the Shui Kao barges arrive too early without PLA maritime or aerial supremacy established first, they'll just be sitting ducks while trying to offload their equipment and will be easy targets to defending missiles, drones, and artillery. Moreover, the satellite images that have captured the Shui Kao barges practicing have so far only shown them operating within calm waters, which might mean that they could struggle in rougher weather conditions that commonly happen within the Taiwan Strait, just like what the Mulberry harbors experienced during the Normandy landings when one of them was destroyed by inclement weather within only a matter of days.

在海軍和空軍已經取得海上和空中優勢之後，在第一波 D-Day 式兩棲攻擊已經在海岸上建立起初步灘頭之後，水閣駁船才會抵達，這樣解放軍就有能力迅速將重型裝備和補給卸載到島上，向島嶼內部縱深推進攻擊。如果水閣駁船過早抵達，而解放軍的海上或空中優勢尚未確立，那麼他們在卸載裝備時就會成為坐以待斃的甕中之鱉，很容易成為防禦飛彈、無人機和火炮的目標。此外，迄今為止拍攝到的 "水考號 "駁船練習的衛星影像僅顯示它們在平靜的水域中作業，這可能意味著它們在臺灣海峽常見的惡劣天氣條件下會陷入困境，就像諾曼底登陸時桑葚港所經歷

A second set of Shui Kao barges have already been observed by satellites to be under construction in the same Guangzhou shipyard in China right now, and if China ends up building enough of them, it's conceivable that they could help China overcome one of their greatest challenges of all when it comes to an invasion of Taiwan, seizing control of the island before anyone from the outside world can intervene against them and stop them, like the United States, Japan, and Australia. If the initial PLA amphibious assaults are successful at establishing their beachheads on Taiwan like the Normandy landings were, and then if the Chinese can bring in their Shui Kao barges and their commandeered civilian Roro ferries, within hours of that happening like the allies were able to do with their Mulberry harbors and Normandy, Thomas Shugart wrote in his paper that I mentioned earlier that it would be conceivable that the PLA could unload up to eight heavy brigades complete with all of their vehicles, supplies, and around 60,000 troops on a Taiwan during just the first wave of the attack within just the first 24 hours, with significant reinforcements being delivered over the following few days. If the PLA could achieve a rapid takeover of Taiwan before the outside world even had the time to react to it, then would they? Some other analysts argue that in this light, the

衛星已經觀測到第二批水考駁船正在中國廣州的同一造船廠建造，如果中國最終建造出足夠多的水考駁船，可以想象它們將幫助中國克服入侵臺灣時面臨的最大挑戰之一，即在外界任何人（如美國、日本和澳洲）對其進行干預和阻止之前奪取臺灣島的控制權。如果解放軍最初的兩棲攻擊能像諾曼底登陸那樣成功地在臺灣建立灘頭陣地，然後中國人又能像盟軍在桑葚港和諾曼底登陸那樣，在數小時內將他們的 "水閣 "駁船和徵用的民用 "羅羅 "渡輪運入臺灣、托馬斯-舒加特（Thomas Shugart）在我之前提到的論文中寫道，可以想象，解放軍在第一波

Shui Kao barges are designed as a psychological weapon just as much as a real weapon. They serve as a major symbol that China is very serious about investing resources into establishing their ability to actually invade Taiwan, and they add a degree of plausibility to Xi Jinping's frequent threats of invasion. China, naturally, would rather that Taiwan surrender without a fight at all, and convincing Taiwan's leadership that the invasion will be both inevitable and successful is the best way to do that, and these new Shui Kao barges certainly send a message that the odds of an invasion are at least more plausible than they were before. Regardless, in order to even use the barges in the first place, the PLA will have to face fierce resistance from determined

水閣號 "駁船既是一種心理武器，也是一種現實武器。它們是一個重要的象徵，表明中國非常認真地投入資源，以建立實際入侵臺灣的能力，也為習近平頻繁發出的入侵威脅增添了一定程度的可信度。自然，中國更希望臺灣不戰而降，而讓臺灣領導人相信入侵將不可避免並取得成功是實現這一目標的最佳途徑，而這些新的水閣駁船無疑傳達了這樣一個資訊：入侵的可能性至少比以前更可信了。不管怎麼說，要想首先使用這些駁船，解放軍將不得不面對來自堅決反對者的激烈抵抗。

Taiwanese defenders while crossing the Taiwan Strait and while assaulting the beaches to establish the initial preliminary beachheads, and they could potentially face determined American,

臺灣守軍在穿越臺灣海峽和攻擊海灘以建立初步灘頭陣地時，有可能會面臨美軍的堅決打擊、

Japanese, Filipino, and Australian auxiliary defenses as well that could all work to deny them the ability to even accomplish this first phase of the amphibious assault altogether, and render the Shui Kao barges a rather moot point. So in order to reinforce both the psychological and real potential of the Shui Kao barges, China has to be able to credibly threaten the destruction of any allied intervention on Taiwan's behalf as well. In order to try and deter any allied intervention from happening in the first place that could slow their invasion down and potentially defeat them, and in order to understand how the PLA is doing that, we actually have to travel very far away from Taiwan and the seas around the island to a very unlikely location, the remote and sparsely populated deserts of far northern and northwestern China, thousands of kilometers away. This is the

日本、菲律賓和澳洲的輔助防禦系統也會發揮作用，使他們甚至無法完成第一階段的兩棲攻擊，從而使水閣駁船變得毫無意義。是以，為了加強 "水閣 "號駁船的心理和現實潛力，中國必須能夠以任何盟國對臺灣的干預為藉口，威脅摧毀 "水閣 "號駁船。為了從一開始就阻止任何盟國的干預，從而延緩他們的入侵，並有可能打敗他們，為了瞭解解放軍是如何做到這一點的，我們實際上必須遠離臺灣和臺灣島周圍的海域，到一個非常不可能的地方，即中國遙遠的北部和西北部數千公里外的偏遠和人煙稀少的沙漠。這就是

Dingxin Test and Training Base located in China's section of the Gobi Desert, a massive facility used by the People's Liberation Army Air Force for weapons integration testing, training, and tactics development. It is an ideal location for them to do all of this because it's in a very remote sparsely populated location with huge amounts of wide open airspace, leading some analysts to compare the importance of Dingxin to China to Nellis Air Force Base in the deserts of Nevada to the United States.

鼎新試驗訓練基地位於中國的戈壁沙漠地帶，是中國人民解放軍空軍用於武器集成試驗、訓練和戰術發展的大型設施。該基地地處偏遠，人煙稀少，空域廣闊，是進行上述活動的理想場所，是以一些分析家將鼎新基地對中國的重要性比作內華達沙漠中的內利斯空軍基地對美國的重要性。

And relatively nearby to the Dingxin Test and Training Base out in another one of China's remote deserts known as the Taclomacan, satellite imagery has recently captured a lot of things that kind of seem to indicate what the People's Liberation Army Air Force is actively training for. On the 1st of January of 2024, Planet Labs released an image that one of their satellites had captured in China's remote Taclomacan desert, showing what looks like a mock-up of an aircraft carrier, and not just any aircraft carrier, but a nearly perfect one-to-one identical mock-up of one of

在中國另一個偏遠的沙漠--塔克拉瑪干沙漠中的鼎新試驗訓練基地附近，最近的衛星影像拍攝到了很多東西，這些東西似乎表明了中國人民解放軍空軍正在積極地進行訓練。2024 年 1 月 1 日，Planet Labs 發佈了他們的一顆衛星在中國偏遠的塔克拉瑪干沙漠拍攝到的一張圖片，圖片顯示的是一艘航空母艦的模型，而且不是普通的航空母艦，而是一艘幾乎一模一樣的航空母艦模型。

America's most advanced current nuclear-powered supercarriers, the Gerald R. Ford Class. There is a structure in the mock-up that's almost precisely in the same location as the Ford Class' island, and there are exactly four mocked-up catapult launcher tracks on the deck that are located exactly where they appear on the real Ford Class carrier. Based on Planet Labs data, it appears that the PLA began constructing this mock-up US carrier in the desert sometime in

美國目前最先進的核動力超級航母--傑拉爾德-R-福特級。模擬航母上有一個幾乎與福特級航母艦島位置完全相同的建築，甲板上有四條模擬彈射器發射軌道，與福特級航母上的位置完全一致。根據 Planet Labs 提供的數據，解放軍似乎是在 2010 年的某個時候開始在沙漠中建造這艘模擬美軍航母的。

November of 2023, fairly recently. However, going further back in time, there's been a general outline of an aircraft carrier here in this exact location for a while, since at least 2021.

2023 年 11 月，也就是最近。不過，從更久遠的時間來看，至少從 2021 年開始，這裡就已經有了一艘航母的大致輪廓。

And before it was completely filled in with a full aircraft carrier that we can see now, the PLA had built two smaller aircraft carriers within the overall silhouette.

而在我們現在看到的這艘完整的航空母艦完全填滿之前，中國人民解放軍已經在整個輪廓內建造了兩艘較小的航空母艦。

And interestingly, this aircraft carrier is far from the only American ship that the Chinese have built a one-to-one replica of out here in the desert. In fact, the area is almost littered with them. Just four and a half kilometers away to the northwest is another full-scale replica of another US Ford Class aircraft carrier. And dotted all around nearby are multiple one-to-one mock-ups of what appear to be Arleigh Burke Class guided missile destroyers.

有趣的是，這艘航空母艦並不是中國人在沙漠中建造的唯一一艘美國艦船。事實上，這裡幾乎到處都是。就在西北方向四公里半的地方，還有另一艘美國福特級航空母艦的全尺寸複製品。附近還有多艘一比一的仿製品，似乎是阿利-伯克級飛彈驅逐艦。

One of the US Navy's most modern and capable class of destroyers at the present that are typically used to escort carriers in a strike group formation. But most interestingly of all, is this line that snakes across the desert in between all of these mock-ups of US warships.

這是美國海軍目前最現代化、能力最強的驅逐艦之一，通常用於以攻擊群編隊為航母護航。但最有趣的是，在所有這些美國軍艦模型之間，有一條線蜿蜒穿過沙漠。

This line appears to be a very large railroad, roughly six meters in width, approaching four to five times as wide as a usual railroad is. Interestingly, this super wide railroad begins at what appears to be a storage facility of some sort, and then extends for several kilometers in a straight line before curving rapidly through the desert and then curving again to simply end in the middle of nowhere. The railroad doesn't curve to avoid any obstacles in the flat desert. And the reason why it curves this way starts to become apparent when you see other photos of the railroad and understand what its true purpose is.

這條線路似乎是一條非常大的鐵路，大約有六米寬，接近普通鐵路的四到五倍。有趣的是，這條超寬鐵路的起點似乎是一個倉庫，然後直線延伸了幾公里，然後在沙漠中急速彎曲，然後再次彎曲，最後乾脆在荒無人煙的地方結束。在平坦的沙漠中，鐵路並不是為了避開任何障礙物而彎曲的。當你看到這條鐵路的其他照片並瞭解到它的真正目的時，你就會明白它這樣彎曲的原因了。

Yeah, the PLA is using the railroad to load up one-to-one models of US warships like the Ford

是的，解放軍正在利用鐵路裝載一比一的美國戰艦模型，比如福特號

Class aircraft carrier, and then sends them down the railroad to simulate a moving target for the

級航空母艦，然後將它們送下鐵路，模擬移動目標，供

Air Force and Rocket Force to fire at. That curve through the desert appears designed to simulate the carrier's evasive maneuvers through the ocean that it would take to avoid an incoming missile.

空軍和火箭軍開火。這條穿越沙漠的曲線似乎是為了模擬航母為躲避來襲飛彈而在海洋中進行的規避機動。

There's other satellite photos of mocked-up carriers on this exact railroad blown to bits after being targeted by missiles and rockets. And there are satellite photos of the stationary aircraft targets blown to pieces as well. It's pretty clear what the PLA is preparing for here, but if it wasn't any more clear, the location of all of these ship mock-ups in the

還有其他衛星照片顯示，這條鐵路上的模擬航空母艦在被飛彈和火箭擊中後被炸成碎片。還有固定飛機目標被炸成碎片的衛星照片。很明顯，解放軍在這裡準備做什麼。

Taklamakan Desert isn't just for the remoteness and clear open skies. The location is also about 2,600 kilometers away from known People's Liberation Army Rocket Force launch sites that are located in China's Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Which is just about the same distance to simulate long-range missile strikes from the interior of Central China into the South China Sea. A region that China claims almost in its entirety against the competing claims of the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Far away in the similarly remote deserts of Inner

塔克拉瑪干沙漠不僅地處偏遠，而且天空晴朗。這裡距離已知的中國人民解放軍火箭軍發射場（位於中國內蒙古自治區）也有大約 2,600 公里。這與模擬從中國中部內陸向南海發射遠程飛彈的距離差不多。中國幾乎聲稱擁有整個南海地區，而菲律賓、越南和馬來西亞則提出了相互競爭的主張。遠在同樣偏遠的內蒙古沙漠中

Mongolia near to those PLA rocket force launch sites is another curious creation that the PLA built here around the end of the year in 2022. Which might not look like very much at first until you see this other satellite image below it with the same roads highlighted in red. This is an almost exact one-to-one mock-up of the area around the presidential office in downtown Taipei. The capital city of Taiwan that is similar to the National Mall in Washington DC. That's the site of most of Taiwan's most critical and sensitive government offices and buildings. Conveniently located nearby to a PLA Air Force aerial bombing and gunnery practice range. This mock-up is likely being used by the PLA Air Force to simulate aerial strikes on the most sensitive part of the Taiwanese capital. China's testing of aerial attacks here and their testing of anti-ship missiles at the site in the Taklamakan desert on one-to-one mock-ups of US warships that sometime even move and take simulated evasive maneuvers is a clear indication of China's evolving military capabilities and their ability to target US warships and to attack the US's ability to project power into the western pacific. And they're clearly not even really trying to hide any of it. Like the Shuikou invasion barges, the targeting of one-to-one mock-ups of US warships in the Taklamakan desert sends a clear message from Beijing to Washington that America's warships will be vulnerable and potentially sunk if they choose to intervene militarily on behalf of Taiwan the day the invasion eventually comes. And so they serve both a psychological as well as a real purpose. Over the past several years, China has embarked on the largest military build-up ever witnessed in human history. And it's been a build-up that has largely been designed to counter

靠近解放軍火箭部隊發射場的蒙古是解放軍於 2022 年年底在此建造的另一個奇特建築。起初看起來可能沒什麼，直到你看到下面這張衛星圖片，上面用紅色標出了同樣的道路。這幾乎是臺北市中心總統府周邊地區一模一樣的模擬圖。臺灣的首都，類似於華盛頓特區的國家廣場。臺灣最重要、最敏感的政府辦公室和建築大多位於此地。附近還有解放軍空軍的空中轟炸和炮擊練習場。解放軍空軍很可能正在用這個模擬靶場模擬對臺灣首都最敏感地區的空襲。中國在這裡進行空襲試驗，並在塔克拉瑪干沙漠的試驗場對一比一的美國軍艦模擬進行反艦導彈試驗，這些軍艦有

US strengths in the pacific theater. China has poured resources into the People's Liberation

美國在太平洋戰場的優勢。中國向中國人民解放軍投入了大量資源。

Army Rocket Force to make it the largest land-based missile force in the world today, giving them somewhere in the ballpark of 3,100 conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles of all different kinds of ranges to work with during a conflict over Taiwan. These missiles give China the ability to launch enormous salvos of attacks against military targets on Taiwan before launching the main amphibious invasion. And they also give China the ability, if they so choose, to attack US and allied military targets throughout the western pacific from the relative safety of the Chinese mainland as well, with hundreds of their longer-range conventional missiles capable of striking targets accurately as far away as Guam. The fear on the American side is that China is equipped with enough of these anti-ship missiles to attack virtually every US warship in the South China Sea and nearby Taiwan with enough firepower to overwhelm each individual ship's own onboard missile defense systems. The US, of course, is well aware of the Chinese missile threat to their surface warships, which is a major part of why the US military has shifted so much to a strategy of countering China by positioning air, missile, and rapid amphibious response assets of their own nearby to Taiwan on land bases in Japan and the Philippines instead.

在臺灣衝突期間，中國將擁有大約 3100 枚不同射程的常規彈道導彈和巡航導彈，成為當今世界上最大的陸基導彈部隊。這些飛彈使中國有能力在發動主要的兩棲入侵之前，對臺灣的軍事目標發動大規模的攻擊。如果中國願意，它們還能從相對安全的中國大陸攻擊整個西太平洋的美國和盟國軍事目標，數百枚遠程常規飛彈能夠精確打擊遠在關島的目標。美國方面擔心的是，中國裝備的這些反艦導彈足以攻擊南中國海和臺灣附近的幾乎每一艘美國軍艦，其火力足以壓垮每艘軍艦自身的艦載飛彈防禦系統。當然，美國非常清楚中國飛彈對其水面戰艦的威脅，這也是為什麼

But China has been hard at work developing other counters as well. China has a vastly, vastly larger capacity to construct new ships than the US or any other country in the world has. The US currently only possesses four state-owned shipyards, while China possesses dozens of them. China possesses a whopping 230 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States right now. And to put it in a perspective for you, just one single state-owned shipbuilder in China built more vessels by tonnage last year in 2024 alone than the United States has collectively built since the end of World War II to the present. A fact that has helped China seize the title of the world's largest navy today.

但中國也一直在努力開發其他計數器。中國擁有比美國或世界上任何其他國家都要大得多、多得多的建造新船的能力。美國目前只有四家國有造船廠，而中國擁有數十家。中國目前擁有的造船能力是美國的230倍之多。從這個角度來看，僅中國一家國有造船廠去年（2024 年）建造的船舶噸位，就超過了美國自二戰結束至今建造的船舶噸位總和。這一事實幫助中國攫取了當今世界最大海軍的稱號。

And the types of ships that China is building are not only designed to carry out an invasion of

而中國正在建造的艦船類型不僅是為了入侵

Taiwan, like the Shuikou barges and the countless dual-use civilian and military Rourou ferries, but some of them are also designed specifically to counter some of the US Navy's few remaining strengths in this theater. While the PLA rocket force has been carefully calibrated to counter

中國人民解放軍的火箭炮部隊在臺灣也有部署，如 "水口 "駁船和無數軍民兩用的 "魯魯 "號渡輪，但其中一些也是專為對抗美國海軍在這一戰場上為數不多的優勢而設計的。雖然中國人民解放軍的火箭部隊經過精心調整，以對抗

US surface warships, that still leaves behind the incredibly advanced and capable US nuclear submarine fleet that operates beneath the surface that the rocket force's missiles will not be able to reach. The US has by far the largest and the most competent nuclear submarine fleet in the world that could be brought to bear on China's Taiwan invasion fleet as it crosses the Taiwan

美國的水面戰艦，但仍無法抵擋在水面下活動的美國核潛艇艦隊的驚人的先進和能力，火箭軍的飛彈將無法到達。迄今為止，美國擁有世界上規模最大、能力最強的核潛艇艦隊，可以在中國侵臺艦隊穿越臺灣海峽時對其實施打擊。

Strait. But China is working on counters to this advantage as well. One of the ways that the geography of the Taiwan Strait actually benefits China in this way is how relatively shallow it is.

海峽。但中國也在努力應對這一優勢。臺灣海峽的地理位置對中國有利的方式之一就是它相對較淺。

The average depth throughout it is only about 60 meters, making it much easier to find and attack submarines operating there than in deeper waters. China's newest class of guided missile stealth frigate, the Type 054B, was just recently commissioned into the People's Liberation Army

整個海域的平均水深只有 60 米左右，是以發現和攻擊在那裡活動的潛艇要比在更深的海域容易得多。中國最新型的 054B 型飛彈隱形護衛艦最近剛剛服役於中國人民解放軍。

Navy in January of 2025, and it is purpose-built to be an anti-submarine warship. China has the huge shipbuilding capacity to begin rapidly churning out a ton of these anti-submarine stealth frigates over the coming years, and if they can concentrate enough of them in the Taiwan

該艦將於 2025 年 1 月服役於中國海軍，是專門建造的反潛戰艦。中國擁有巨大的造船能力，可以在未來幾年內開始快速生產成噸的這種反潛隱形護衛艦，如果他們能將足夠多的這種護衛艦集中到臺灣地區，那麼他們就能在未來幾年內建造出更多的反潛隱形護衛艦。

Strait to escort the invasion fleet by the time it happens, they can pose a major threat to the operation of any U.S. nuclear submarine operating beneath the Taiwan Strait, while the rocket force on the Chinese mainland can pose a similarly major threat to the operation of any U.S. service warships operating nearby to Taiwan as well, greatly raising the stakes for the U.S. to decide on intervening or not. And China is attempting to use their massive military buildup to make the potential cost of intervention clear for other U.S. allies in the Pacific as well, most notably Australia. Earlier this year on the 11th of February of 2025, a Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy frigate appeared off of the northern coast of Australia, and then sailed through the Torres Strait between Australia and Papua New Guinea.

同時，中國大陸的火箭軍也會對在臺灣附近活動的美國現役軍艦構成類似的威脅，從而大大增加了美國決定是否干預的風險。中國正試圖利用其大規模的軍事集結讓美國在太平洋地區的其他盟國（尤其是澳洲）清楚地認識到干預的潛在代價。今年早些時候，即 2025 年 2 月 11 日，一艘中國人民解放軍海軍護衛艦出現在澳洲北部沿海，隨後駛過澳洲和巴巴新幾內亞之間的託雷斯海峽。

This attracted only minor attention until later on while off of Australia's east coast, the initial frigate was joined by two additional PLAN warships, a cruiser and a replenishment tanker, as they collectively transited through the Coral Sea and continued moving further south before briefly entering into Australia's exclusive economic zone near Sydney.

這隻引起了很小的注意，直到後來在澳洲東海岸附近，解放軍海軍的另外兩艘軍艦、一艘巡洋艦和一艘補給油輪加入了最初的護衛艦的行列，它們集體穿過珊瑚海，繼續向南移動，然後短暫進入雪梨附近的澳洲專屬經濟區。

But the attention the PLAN ships were receiving in the Australian media reached an almost full-on panic only a few days later, when the vessels began issuing radio broadcasts to airlines warning them that they were conducting a series of live fire exercises in between Australia and New

幾天後，澳洲媒體對解放軍軍艦的關注幾乎達到了全面恐慌的程度，因為解放軍軍艦開始向航空公司發佈無線電廣播，警告他們正在澳洲和紐西蘭之間進行一系列實彈演習。

Zealand. The Australian Civil Aviation Service was forced into issuing an emergency alert that caused almost 50 planes to divert their course to avoid the area. From there, the PLAN ships continued travelling south of Tasmania, entering into and out of Australia's exclusive economic zone again, then travelled west to within only 170 nautical miles of Perth, just days after a

紐西蘭。澳洲民航局被迫發出緊急警報，導致近 50 架飛機改道避開該區域。解放軍艦艇從那裡繼續向塔斯馬尼亞南部航行，再次進出澳洲專屬經濟區，然後向西航行到距離珀斯僅 170 海里的地方。

U.S. nuclear submarine had visited a nearby base, before then heading up north back towards China again after having nearly spent a month completely circumnavigating Australia, in a new and never before seen show of force that has left the Australians feeling particularly vulnerable ever since. The PLAN's trip around Australia came at a rather unique time in Australia's history, when the country's own navy has been languishing away for years, and as Australia's traditional alliance with the United States is coming under increasing strain, with Donald Trump back in the

美國核潛艇訪問了附近的一個基地，然後在花了近一個月的時間環繞澳洲一週之後，再次向北駛向中國，這是前所未見的一次新的武力展示，讓澳大利亞人從此感到特別脆弱。解放軍海軍的環澳之旅是在澳洲歷史上一個相當特殊的時刻進行的，因為澳洲自己的海軍多年來一直徘徊不前，而且澳洲與美國的傳統盟友關係正面臨越來越大的壓力，唐納德-特朗普（Donald Trump）又回到了澳洲。

White House again. Australia's modern navy is currently in a dismal state, and it's the smallest and most outdated it's been since the Second World War. The PLAN frigate and cruiser that circumnavigated the Australian continent carried with them a combined total of 144 vertical launch missile cells, interestingly pretty close to the entire Australian Navy's 10 warships combined total of just 200 vertical launch missile cells. It was also the furthest south that the PLAN has so far ever sailed, and the message it sent to Australia was crystal clear. Even though Beijing said that the warships were constantly operating within international waters, and they had every legal right to do so as every other navy does all the time, the message that the Australian homeland was vulnerable to Chinese military action in the event of Australia or U.S. military bases in

又是白宮澳洲現代海軍目前的狀況令人沮喪，它是自二戰以來規模最小、最落後的一支海軍。環繞澳洲大陸航行的解放軍護衛艦和巡洋艦總共攜帶了 144 個垂直髮射飛彈單元，有趣的是，這與澳洲海軍 10 艘戰艦總共攜帶的 200 個垂直髮射飛彈單元相當接近。這也是中國人民解放軍海軍迄今為止向南航行的最遠距離，它向澳洲發出的資訊非常明確。儘管中國政府表示，這些軍艦一直在國際水域內活動，他們完全有合法權利這樣做，其他國家的海軍也一直在這樣做。

Australia intervening to defend Taiwan during an invasion scenario was clear as day. And it came as

澳洲在臺灣遭受入侵時進行干預以保衛臺灣的意圖昭然若揭。而且是在

China's navy has continued expanding its reach in other areas as well. The same month as the PLAN flotilla was busy circumnavigating Australia, the Japanese defense minister stated that PLAN warships had passed through the waters around the country's southern Ryukyu islands between the

中國海軍還繼續在其他地區擴張勢力範圍。就在中國人民解放軍海軍艦隊忙於環繞澳洲航行的同一個月，日本防衛大臣稱，中國人民解放軍海軍戰艦已經通過了日本南部琉球群島附近的水域。

Japanese mainland and Taiwan a total of 68 times throughout 2024, a massive increase in frequency from the only 21 reported times that they did so back in 2021. A few months later in June of 2025, the same Japanese defense minister said that one of the PLAN's aircraft carriers, the Liaoning, was spawned out in waters to the east of the island of Iwo Jima, marking the first known time that a

在整個 2024 年，解放軍在日本大陸和臺灣共出動 68 次，比 2021 年的 21 次大幅增加。幾個月後的 2025 年 6 月，同一位日本防衛大臣說，解放軍海軍的一艘航空母艦遼寧號在硫磺島以東海域出動，這是已知的第一次有航空母艦在硫磺島以東海域出動。

Chinese aircraft carrier has ever sailed beyond the so-called second island chain. The rear line of defense the U.S. employs against China that is centered on Guam, and perhaps most notably of all, there's the enormous construction project that satellites have recently captured going on just to the southwest of China's capital city, Beijing. Taking a closer look at the site, this was what it looked like when taken by satellite imagery on the 5th of February 2022, just a little over three years ago before this video's production. It doesn't really look like very much of notice happening yet, but then simply fast forward the clock by a year to the 25th of February of 2023, and you'll see that the entire area has been completely cleared out of everything that used to exist there, with all of the previously existing residential buildings flattened and erased.

中國的航空母艦從未駛出所謂的第二島鏈。美國針對中國的後方防線以關島為中心，而最值得注意的可能是衛星最近拍攝到的正在中國首都北京西南方進行的巨大建設項目。仔細觀察一下這個工地，這是 2022 年 2 月 5 日衛星影像拍攝到的樣子，也就是這段視頻製作前三年多一點的時間。現在看起來還沒有什麼大的動靜，但只要把時間快進一年，到 2023 年 2 月 25 日，你就會看到整個地區已經被徹底清除乾淨，所有以前存在的居民樓都被夷為平地。

Then fast forward the clock by a little over another year to the 26th of June of 2024, and you'll see another huge change with a massive new monumental construction project taking shape in the area, with the whole place now looking basically nothing like it used to back in early 2022. Fast forward just about another year later to March of 2025, and you'll notice a complex of buildings taking shape in the center, and with dozens of construction cranes still active, making this appear to be a truly enormous construction effort. Chinese government websites have not publicly commented on any of this construction to date, and the Chinese government has refused to answer any questions pertaining to the construction site by journalists.

時間再往前推一年多，到 2024 年 6 月 26 日，你會發現這裡又發生了巨大的變化，一個巨大的新建築項目正在成形，整個地方現在看起來與 2022 年初時完全不同。大約再過一年，也就是 2025 年 3 月，你會發現中心地帶的建築群已初具雛形，數十臺塔吊仍在作業，看起來這確實是一項巨大的建設工程。迄今為止，中國政府網站尚未對該建築發表任何公開評論，中國政府也拒絕回答記者有關該建築工地的任何問題。

That has left a lot of speculation online as to what exactly this huge construction project going on actually is, and to most outsiders it certainly appears to be something military related.

在大多數局外人看來，這肯定是與軍事有關的項目。

The final image of the construction site taken in March of 2025 appears to show around a hundred construction cranes active at the site that are busy building deep subterranean tunnels, facilities, and passageways that all seem to be being reinforced by thick layers of concrete, making whatever is going on here appearing to be an extremely sensitive military PLA site.

2025 年 3 月拍攝的建築工地最終影像顯示，大約有 100 臺建築起重機正在工地上忙碌地建造深埋地下的隧道、設施和通道，這些設施和通道似乎都被厚厚的混凝土層加固，使得這裡看起來像是一個極其敏感的解放軍軍事基地。

The area is truly huge, coming in at around 1,500 acres or 5 square kilometers in total, or in other words roughly 10 times the size of the pentagon near Washington DC.

該區域確實非常大，總面積約為 1 500 英畝或 5 平方公里，換句話說，大約是華盛頓特區附近五角大樓面積的 10 倍。

The building that is usually regarded as the world's largest office building currently. Some high-ranking U.S. defense officials have voiced their belief that the site is being constructed to offer greater security for high-level Chinese officials from advanced U.S. bunker buster munitions during a time of war, or even from U.S. nuclear weapons, as evidenced by all of the extensive and deep subterranean construction going on at the site and all of the secrecy surrounding it. It's probable that with the site being built so close by to Beijing, this new complex captured in satellite imagery could become the PLA's new top military headquarters and serve as China's wartime command center during an invasion of

這座大樓通常被認為是目前世界上最大的辦公樓。美國國防部的一些高級官員表示，他們相信建造這座建築的目的是為了在戰爭時期為中國高級官員提供更高的安全保障，使其免受美國先進的掩體炸彈的攻擊，甚至免受美國核武器的攻擊。由於該地點離北京如此之近，衛星影像拍攝到的這座新建築群很有可能成為解放軍新的最高軍事總部，並在入侵中國時充當中國的戰時指揮中心。

Taiwan scenario, serving a highly similar role as the pentagon does for the United States military, but on a vastly larger physical scale. As often concerns the People's Republic of China, however, matters of such importance as massive subterranean military fortresses, barges designed for huge armored amphibious invasions, and remote airfields designed for target practicing of U.S. warships in the Taiwanese capital are rarely ever mentioned or discussed publicly by the country's government.

臺灣的情況與五角大樓對美國軍隊的作用極為相似，但實際規模要大得多。然而，對於中華人民共和國來說，大規模的地下軍事要塞、為大型裝甲兩棲入侵設計的駁船、為美國軍艦在臺灣首都進行目標演習而設計的遠程機場等重要事項卻很少被該國政府提及或公開討論。

While China has spent the past several decades gradually opening itself up to the world,

過去幾十年來，中國逐步向世界開放、

China has also continued growing even more authoritarian and centralized around the leadership and vision of Xi Jinping. China is currently ranked as the third least free country in the world in terms of freedom of the press, just barely behind the blatantly totalitarian states of North Korea and Eritrea. There are still many elements about China that remain closely guarded and highly sensitive subjects of the state, and perhaps none of them are as controversial, muddied by propaganda, and misunderstood as the events that took place 36 years ago at Tiananmen Square in Beijing in June of 1989. You're probably already pretty familiar with this event, and you've probably heard of it by any number of different names that people with all kinds of different agendas have attempted to label it as. The Tiananmen Square Massacre, as it is often referred to in the West, the June 4th incident, as it is usually referred to in China, or the more vague Tiananmen Square Incident or Uprising. Many of the images taken from the events that took place around Tiananmen Square in 1989 have become some of the most famous photographs ever taken in history. Like the tank man photo that shows a lone, never identified, unknown man standing in front of a column of People's Liberation Army tanks leaving from the square, merely hours after the army had just violently cleared the square out of tens of thousands of student-led protesters. The details of what exactly happened over the 48 hours before this photograph was taken, while the PLA cleared Tiananmen Square out, is one of the most contentious subjects of the entire 21st century. The official Chinese government story is that only 241 people were killed during the army's two-day operation to clear out the square of protesters. But multiple outside Western sources at the time reported much higher figures. The U.S. ambassador to China at the time who was present in Beijing reported that a minimum of several hundred people had been killed.

圍繞習近平的上司和願景，中國還在繼續變得更加專制和集權。就新聞自由而言，中國目前是世界上排名第三的最不自由國家，僅勉強排在北韓和厄立特里亞這兩個明目張膽的極權國家之後。關於中國，還有許多內容仍然是國家嚴防死守的高度敏感話題，其中最具爭議性、最被宣傳所玷汙、最被誤解的也許莫過於 36 年前 1989 年 6 月在北京天安門廣場發生的事件。你可能對這一事件已經相當熟悉了，你可能聽說過它的各種不同名稱，懷有各種不同目的的人們試圖給它貼上各種標籤。西方通常稱之為 "天安門廣場大屠殺"，中國通常稱之為 "六四事件"

Hospital records from Beijing that were compiled shortly afterwards recorded at least 478 deaths that were likely caused by the events. Amnesty International initially put their estimate for the dead at between several hundred and close to a thousand, while the Chinese Red Cross initially gave a figure for around 2,600 deaths during the incident before withdrawing their claim under

事後不久，北京的醫院記錄顯示，至少有 478 人可能死於此次事件。國際特赦組織最初估計死亡人數在幾百人到近千人之間，而中國紅十字會最初給出的數字是在事件中死亡約 2,600 人，後來根據《世界人權宣言》撤回了他們的說法。

Chinese government pressure. And the Swiss ambassador to China at the time gave a similar figure of around 2,700 deaths, while there were also less credible estimates from the British ambassador to China at the time who initially gave a dramatically higher minimum figure of 10,000 deaths, but who then later revised his estimate down to between 2,700 and 3,400 deaths instead.

中國政府的壓力。當時的瑞士駐華大使也給出了大約 2700 人死亡的類似數字，而當時的英國駐華大使也給出了一個不太可信的估計數字，他最初給出的最低死亡人數是 10000 人，大大高於這個數字，但後來他又將自己的估計數字下調到 2700 到 3400 人之間。

Finding out the true scale of the violence that happened at Tiananmen Square in June of 1989 is difficult, if not even outright impossible, because A. China goes to extreme lengths to enormously censor the event in an attempt to bury any memory and discussion about it, and B. Western sources were and still are heavily incentivized to embellish or over-exaggerate the brutality of it. Searches for Tiananmen Square massacre, June 4th, Tank Man, and sensitive numbers like 6-4 for June 4th or 89-6-4 are all blocked or returned no results on Chinese search engines like Baidu to this day, while posts about the events on Chinese social media apps like

要了解 1989 年 6 月發生在天安門廣場的暴力事件的真實規模非常困難，甚至根本不可能，因為：A. 中國不遺餘力地對該事件進行嚴格審查，試圖掩蓋任何有關該事件的記憶和討論；B. 西方消息來源過去和現在都被嚴重鼓勵美化或過度誇大該事件的殘酷性。時至今日，在百度等中國搜索引擎上搜索天安門大屠殺、六四、坦克俠，以及六四的 6-4 或 89-6-4 等敏感數字，都會被屏蔽或無結果。

WeChat and Douyin, China's native version of TikTok, remain auto-deleted by algorithms or shadow-banned. The events are entirely omitted from all history textbooks in mainland China, and even foreign scholars who have published work about the Tiananmen Square events will often be denied visas or access to the Chinese archives, collectively making the Tiananmen Square events the most heavily censored event in modern history, and probably the most difficult modern historical subject to properly research. Nonetheless, I still made an entire video about my own investigation into the Tiananmen Square June 1989 events in my Modern Conflict series, which I create new videos in every single month, taking deeper dives into more recent, controversial, and darker subject material surrounding modern wars, operations, and conflicts. Over the past four years of doing this,

微信和豆瓣（中國原生版 TikTok）仍然被算法自動刪除或影子封禁。在中國大陸的所有歷史教科書中，天安門事件都被完全省略，即使是發表了有關天安門事件作品的外國學者，也經常被拒發籤證或無法進入中國檔案館，這一切使得天安門事件成為現代史上審查最嚴格的事件，也可能是最難正確研究的現代歷史課題。儘管如此，我還是將自己對 1989 年 6 月天安門廣場事件的調查製作成了一個完整的視頻，納入了我的 "現代衝突 "系列。我每個月都會製作新的視頻，深入挖掘與現代戰爭、行動和衝突有關的更近期、更具爭議性和更黑暗的主題材料。

I've created around 50 total episodes in Modern Conflicts covering other topics as diverse as the undeclared war and skirmishes between North and South Korea since 2000, China's policies of repression against its Muslim Uyghur population in Xinjiang, the Myanmar civil war and that regime's modern genocide against its minority Rohingya people, the border fights between China and

我在《現代衝突》中總共製作了約 50 集節目，涉及的其他主題包括：北韓和韓國自 2000 年以來的不宣而戰和小規模衝突、中國對新疆維吾爾族穆斯林人口的鎮壓政策、緬甸內戰以及緬甸政權對少數民族羅興亞人的現代種族滅絕、中國和緬甸之間的邊境爭鬥、中國對緬甸的內戰以及緬甸政權對緬甸少數民族羅興亞人的現代種族滅絕。

India across 2020 and 2021, and dozens of other episodes with brand new ones like this Tiananmen

2020 年和 2021 年的印度，以及其他幾十集全新的劇集，如《天安門》。

Square 1989 episode coming out every single month, all exclusively on Nebula. Because of the inherently violent and controversial details surrounding the discussion of all of this, my episode investigating what actually took place around Tiananmen Square in June of 1989 would never work on YouTube, because it would instantly become demonetized and age-restricted, which means the

1989年天安門廣場》一集每個月都會在星雲網上獨家播出。由於討論這一切的細節本身具有暴力性和爭議性，我調查 1989 年 6 月在天安門廣場周圍實際發生的事件的這一集永遠無法在 YouTube 上播放，因為它會立即成為非公開內容，並受到年齡限制，這意味著

YouTube's algorithm, which is based around showing you ads, would never be incentivized to actually show the video to you or to promote it. I deal with very large numbers of my videos on YouTube getting demonetized and age-restricted as they are, and that's why I upload all of my episodes in Modern Conflicts exclusively to Nebula, and why signing up to Nebula is the absolute best thing that you can do to support me and my channel, and you'll also get access to way more content than just my own exclusive Modern Conflicts series there as well. Because the best part about

YouTube 的算法是以向你展示廣告為基礎的，它永遠不會有動力真正向你展示視頻或推廣視頻。我在YouTube上製作的大量視頻都被刪除了，而且年齡也受到了限制，這就是為什麼我把《現代衝突》的所有劇集都獨家上傳到了星雲，也是為什麼註冊星雲絕對是你支持我和我的頻道的最好方式，而且你還能在那裡獲得比我獨家制作的《現代衝突》系列更多的內容。因為

Nebula is that it's jointly co-owned by myself and hundreds of other independent creators to make the projects that we're all actually deeply excited about without any fear of being censored or demonetized like we are on YouTube. And that's why there's tons of other new unique content on Nebula that's coming up all the time too that you'll also love, like Neo's Under Exposure series,

星雲是由我和其他數百名獨立創作者共同擁有的，他們可以製作我們都非常感興趣的項目，而不用像在YouTube上那樣擔心被審查或被妖魔化。這也是為什麼星雲上還有大量新的獨特內容不斷湧現的原因，比如尼歐的 "暴露之下"（Under Exposure）系列，你也會喜歡的、

Wendover Productions' The Logistics of X series, TLDR News' What to Follow USA series, and so, so many others. I also know that there's a lot of streaming platforms out there right now and you don't really want to get stuck with another monthly cost to keep track of, but I also know that if you've watched this all the way through to the end, there is so much content on Nebula that you'll love as well, and so much more coming out with every new month that you could consider a lifetime membership to Nebula as well. You just pay once and then you'll get lifetime access to everything that I and hundreds of other creators will ever produce on Nebula for as long as we both last. And then you'll never have to worry about a recurring subscription or ads ever again. That's the best way possible to support what I'm doing here on Real Life Lore. But even if you'd rather not make that large of an upfront commitment, you can still greatly help support me by signing up for a yearly or a monthly subscription to Nebula as well, which you can get for a fantastic deal with 40% off by scanning the QR code or clicking the button here on your screen right now, or by following the link that's down below in the description. Any of which will also give you access to everything that's on Nebula for the very low price of just $3 a month or $36 a year. I hope that you'll consider signing up. And as always, thank you so much for watching!

Wendover Productions 的 The Logistics of X 系列、TLDR News 的 What to Follow USA 系列，還有很多很多其他的節目。我也知道，現在有很多流媒體平臺，你並不想每個月再多花一筆錢，但我也知道，如果你一直看到最後，星雲上有很多你也會喜歡的內容，而且每個月都會有更多內容推出，你也可以考慮成為星雲的終身會員。你只需支付一次費用，就可以終身訪問我和其他數百位創作者在星雲上製作的所有內容，只要我們還在。然後，你就再也不用擔心經常性訂閱或廣告的問題了。這是