Name: 為什麼美國的下一場戰爭會打到墨西哥？ (Why America’s Next War is Heading to Mexico)
Uploaded: 2025-06-18T17:22:19.000Z
Duration: 39 min 7 s

For years, the most violent armed conflict taking place in the Western Hemisphere has been raging like an inferno across Mexico.

多年來，西半球最激烈的武裝衝突像地獄一樣在墨西哥各地肆虐。

Consisting of various different cartel factions all vying against one another for power, influence, and the control of lucrative narcotics trade routes and markets in the United States.

由各種不同的卡特爾派系組成，它們相互爭奪權力、影響力以及對美國境內利潤豐厚的毒品貿易路線和市場的控制權。

This war within Mexico between the cartels and against the Mexican government has claimed the lives of around 400,000 people through violent crime-related homicides and disappearances since it began in 2006.

自 2006 年開始以來，這場墨西哥國內卡特爾之間以及卡特爾與墨西哥政府之間的戰爭已經通過與暴力犯罪相關的殺人和失蹤事件奪走了約 40 萬人的生命。

While the fentanyl and methamphetamine that they've been smuggling across the border have been ravaging America's streets and fueling the US opioid epidemic.

他們越境走私的芬太尼和甲基苯丙胺肆虐美國街頭，助長了美國阿片類藥物的流行。

Where more than 250,000 other people have died from fentanyl overdoses alone just since 2018.

其中，僅 2018 年以來，就有超過 25 萬人死於芬太尼過量。

The numbers of fentanyl overdose deaths in the US have been rising almost every single year since 2012.

自 2012 年以來，美國死於芬太尼過量的人數幾乎每年都在上升。

To the point where they were 27 times higher in 2022 than a decade previously in 2012.

到 2022 年，這一數字是十年前 2012 年的 27 倍。

And despite the vast majority of illicit fentanyl originating from labs outside of the country and entering the US by being smuggled by cartels across the border.

儘管絕大多數非法芬太尼都來自境外實驗室，並由卡特爾越境走私進入美國。

And despite the fact that the Mexican government has already been officially at war with the cartels ever since 2006.

儘管自 2006 年以來，墨西哥政府已經正式與販毒集團開戰。

The prospect of the US military stepping in and taking direct action against the cartels in Mexico themselves, always seemed like a fringe idea or something out of a movie for years.

多年來，美國軍方介入並親自採取直接行動打擊墨西哥卡特爾的前景似乎一直是個邊緣想法，或者是電影裡的情節。

But over the past few months with Donald Trump back in office again, that once fringe idea of sending the US military off to its next war with the Mexican cartels across the border, has been becoming increasingly more mainstream and plausible.

但在過去的幾個月裡，隨著唐納德-特朗普再次上臺，這種曾經是邊緣的想法，即派遣美軍與墨西哥卡特爾越境開戰，正變得越來越主流和可信。

According to a memoir that was written by Mark Esper, Trump's Secretary of Defense during his first term,

根據特朗普第一任國防部長馬克-埃斯佩爾（Mark Esper）撰寫的回憶錄、

Trump allegedly asked him privately in 2020 if it would have been possible for the US military to fire missiles at cartel-run drug labs in Mexico, and then deny all US responsibility for the attacks afterwards.

據稱，特朗普曾在 2020 年私下問他，美軍是否有可能向墨西哥販毒集團經營的毒品實驗室發射飛彈，並在事後否認美國對襲擊事件負有全部責任。

Trump himself has denied that this interaction ever took place at all.

特朗普本人完全否認有過這種互動。

But the rhetoric from him and other Republicans since then on going after the cartels and crushing their fentanyl operations, has only grown in fervor.

但從那時起，他和其他共和黨人關於打擊販毒集團、粉碎其芬太尼業務的言論卻愈發狂熱。

In March of 2023, a group of four American tourists who were mistaken for Haitian smugglers by Mexico's Gulf cartel in the border town of Matamoros, were kidnapped and two of them were murdered.

2023 年 3 月，四名美國遊客在邊境小鎮馬塔莫羅斯被墨西哥海灣卡特爾誤認為是海地走私犯而遭到綁架，其中兩人被殺害。

Even after the cartel apprehended the men who were allegedly responsible and turned them over to authorities and apologized profusely, the incident sparked an uproar in the United States, and led to Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, saying that he would introduce legislation to lay the groundwork for the Biden administration to deploy US military force against the Mexican cartels.

即使在販毒集團逮捕了被指控的責任人並將他們移交給當局並深表歉意之後，這一事件還是在美國引發了軒然大波，並導致共和黨參議員林賽-格雷厄姆（Lindsey Graham）表示，他將提出立法，為拜登政府部署美國軍事力量打擊墨西哥販毒集團奠定基礎。

Something that Mexico's then president, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, better known by his initials as AMLO, rejected on the basis that it would have been a violation of Mexico's sovereignty.

墨西哥時任總統安德烈斯-曼努埃爾-洛佩斯-奧夫拉多爾（Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador，英文縮寫為 AMLO）拒絕了這一建議，理由是這將侵犯墨西哥的主權。

But since AMLO left office in Mexico in late 2024, and his political successor Claudia Scheinbaum assumed office, the US has been steadily moving the pieces into place to confront the cartels more directly anyway.

但自從阿姆洛於 2024 年底離開墨西哥，其政治繼任者克勞迪婭-謝因鮑姆（Claudia Scheinbaum）上任以來，美國一直在穩步推進各項工作，以更直接地對抗卡特爾。

Shortly after taking office in October of 2024,

President Scheinbaum secretly began allowing the CIA for the first time to start running covert surveillance drone flights over Mexican airspace and territory.

謝因鮑姆總統首次祕密允許中央情報局開始在墨西哥領空和領土上進行祕密無人機偵察飛行。

The extent of this secret CIA surveillance drone program over Mexico wasn't revealed for several more months, until an article was released about the program by the New York Times in February of 2025.

直到 2025 年 2 月《紐約時報》發表了一篇關於該計劃的文章，中情局在墨西哥上空實施的這一祕密無人機監視計劃的範圍才被披露出來。

While not given any authorization to use lethal force, at least for now, the CIA drones have been busy hunting for cartel-run fentanyl labs across Mexican territory instead, whose intelligence is then passed on to Mexican authorities and likely kept by the US for potential future operations.

雖然沒有獲得使用致命武力的授權，但至少目前，中情局的無人機一直忙於在墨西哥境內追捕販毒集團經營的芬太尼實驗室，其情報隨後被傳遞給墨西哥當局，並很可能由美國保存，以備未來可能的行動之用。

Since returning back to office again, Trump has ordered an increase in the numbers of these CIA reconnaissance drone flights that are taking place over Mexico, while he's also ordered the US military to step up its own separate surveillance flights along the southern border and along Mexico's Pacific coast.

自再次復出以來，特朗普已下令增加在墨西哥上空進行的這些中情局無人機偵察飛行的次數，同時他還命令美國軍方加強自己在南部邊境和墨西哥太平洋沿岸的單獨監視飛行。

Unlike the CIA, the US military does not yet have formal permission to utilize Mexican airspace, but that hasn't stopped the Trump administration from using the military to acquire intelligence on the cartels anyway.

與中央情報局不同，美國軍方尚未獲得使用墨西哥領空的正式許可，但無論如何，這並沒有阻止特朗普政府利用軍方獲取有關販毒集團的情報。

Since Trump returned to office, the US military has conducted more than two dozen known surveillance flights along the southern border, using a variety of spy planes and drones.

自特朗普上任以來，美國軍方已使用各種間諜飛機和無人機在南部邊境進行了二十多次已知的監視飛行。

Well, in early February, a US Air Force RC-135V Rivet Joint Reconnaissance Aircraft carefully threaded the needle of international waters and airspace to fly deep within the Gulf of California, directly by the Mexican state of Sinaloa, home to one of Mexico's largest and most influential cartels, the Sinaloa Cartel.

二月初，一架美國空軍 RC-135V "鉚釘 "聯合偵察機小心翼翼地穿過國際水域和空域，飛到加利福尼亞灣深處，直接飛過墨西哥錫那羅亞州，這裡是墨西哥最大、最有影響力的卡特爾之一--錫那羅亞卡特爾的所在地。

These increased surveillance flights under the Trump administration appear to be gathering intelligence and acquiring targets for potential future attacks, while the Trump administration has also been further laying groundwork for attacks in other ways as well.

特朗普政府增加的這些監視飛行似乎是為了收集情報和獲取未來潛在襲擊的目標，同時特朗普政府還通過其他方式進一步為襲擊打下基礎。

Trump's pick for the US ambassador to Mexico during this administration is a man named Ronald Johnson, a former Green Beret and a veteran CIA officer with more than 20 years of prior experience leading sensitive paramilitary operations.

特朗普在本屆政府中挑選的美國駐墨西哥大使名叫羅納德-約翰遜（Ronald Johnson），他曾是一名綠色貝雷帽，也是一名資深的中央情報局官員，擁有 20 多年上司敏感準軍事行動的經驗。

A pick that suggests the Trump administration's coming posture towards Mexico and the cartels.

這一選擇表明了特朗普政府對墨西哥和販毒集團的態度。

Between February and March of 2025, the Trump administration sent a detachment of the Green Berets to the Luis Carpizo Naval Facility in the Mexican state of Campeche to conduct joint training exercises with Mexico's elite Naval Marine Corps.

2025 年 2 月至 3 月間，特朗普政府向墨西哥坎佩切州的路易斯-卡皮佐海軍設施派遣了一支綠色貝雷帽分遣隊，與墨西哥海軍陸戰隊精英進行聯合訓練演習。

While on the 20th of February, the Trump administration took the unprecedented step of formally designating the six largest Mexican cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, or FTOs.

2 月 20 日，特朗普政府史無前例地正式指定墨西哥六大卡特爾為外國恐怖組織。

The Sinaloa Cartel, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, the Northeast Cartel, La Nueva Familia, the Gulf Cartel, and the United Cartels.

錫那羅亞卡特爾、哈利斯科新一代卡特爾、東北卡特爾、La Nueva Familia、海灣卡特爾和聯合卡特爾。

Now, historically and practically speaking, the Mexican cartels were never designated by the US government as terrorist organizations in the past, because there's a pretty clear difference between cartels, who are basically businesses, whose ultimate goal is making money, and groups like Al-Qaeda or ISIS, whose ultimate goals are political change and who are ideologically or religiously motivated instead.

現在，從歷史和實際情況來看，墨西哥卡特爾過去從未被美國政府認定為恐怖組織，因為卡特爾和基地組織或伊斯蘭國這樣的組織有非常明顯的區別，前者基本上是企業，其最終目標是賺錢，而後者的最終目標是政治變革，是出於意識形態或宗教動機。

Nonetheless, the designation of the Mexican cartels as terrorist organizations by the Trump administration does not immediately open up the door to US air power raining down on them in Mexico.

儘管如此，特朗普政府將墨西哥卡特爾指定為恐怖組織，並沒有立即開啟美國空中力量在墨西哥對其進行空襲的大門。

It actually offers up no additional military tools against them all on its own.

實際上，它本身並沒有提供更多的軍事手段來對付他們。

What it does do, though, is it enables US financial authorities to go after the cartels' finances much more aggressively than they used to be able to do.

不過，它的作用是使美國金融當局能夠比以往更積極地打擊卡特爾的財務。

All organizations designated as terrorist groups by the US government get all of their assets frozen that are under the control of American financial institutions, while their known members are banned from entering the country and it immediately enables their deportation.

所有被美國政府認定為恐怖組織的組織都會被凍結其在美國金融機構控制下的所有資產，同時禁止其已知成員入境，並立即將其驅逐出境。

However, the most significant thing that happens when a group is designated as an FTO is that it becomes illegal for US citizens and even others to knowingly provide what's called material support for the group.

然而，當一個組織被認定為 FTO 時，最重要的一點是，美國公民甚至其他人在知情的情況下為該組織提供所謂的物質支持將成為非法行為。

If there's a restaurant somewhere in Mexico that pays protection money to one of the cartels, for example, this would enable the restaurant to get targeted by financial freezes or seizures due to the financial transfers with the cartel.

例如，如果墨西哥某地有一家餐館向某個卡特爾支付保護費，那麼這家餐館就會因為與卡特爾的資金轉移而成為資金凍結或扣押的目標。

The designation can also come with great unintended financial and economic consequences as well, though.

不過，這一稱號也可能帶來巨大的意外財務和經濟後果。

Because of how deeply embedded many of the cartels are within Mexican society, there are countless Mexican businesses that are connected to one in some way or another.

由於許多販毒集團在墨西哥社會中根深蒂固，是以有無數的墨西哥企業都以某種方式與這些集團有關聯。

For example, for years even before Hamas' attack on Israel on October 7th, 2023,

例如，甚至在哈馬斯於 2023 年 10 月 7 日襲擊以色列之前的數年裡、

American financial companies like PayPal simply refused to conduct any business in the West Bank at all, out of fear that since Hamas was a designated foreign terrorist organization, and since Hamas was so embedded in the West Bank, that their services might have ended up getting used by someone linked to Hamas, and then they would get come after by US financial authorities.

貝寶（PayPal）等美國金融公司乾脆拒絕在約旦河西岸開展任何業務，因為他們擔心，既然哈馬斯是一個被指定的外國恐怖組織，而且哈馬斯在約旦河西岸根深蒂固，他們的服務最終可能會被與哈馬斯有關聯的人使用，然後他們就會被美國金融當局追捕。

A similar dilemma can now arise in Mexico, with the six major cartels in the country now designated as foreign terrorist organizations, making US-based banks, payment processors, and other financial companies operating in Mexico potentially susceptible to federal prosecution.

墨西哥現在也可能出現類似的困境，該國的六大卡特爾現已被指定為外國恐怖組織，這使得在墨西哥營運的美國銀行、支付處理商和其他金融公司可能受到聯邦起訴。

Formally designating the six cartels as terrorist organizations also lays the groundwork in America for justifying an intervention against the declared terrorists later.

正式指定這六個卡特爾為恐怖組織，也為美國日後對已宣佈的恐怖分子進行干預奠定了基礎。

Very shortly after their designation was made, Elon Musk, one of Trump's top advisors, took to X and said that meant they're eligible for drone strikes.

在他們被指定後不久，特朗普的頂級顧問之一埃隆-馬斯克（Elon Musk）就在 X 上說，這意味著他們有資格遭到無人機襲擊。

Back in November of 2024, Trump's border czar, Tom Homan, said that the president was committed to calling the cartels terrorist organizations, and using the full might of the US special operations to take them out.

早在 2024 年 11 月，特朗普的邊境事務沙皇湯姆-霍曼（Tom Homan）就曾表示，總統致力於將販毒集團稱為恐怖組織，並動用美國特種作戰部隊的全部力量將其一網打盡。

While this new Trump administration's Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, has also repeatedly refused to rule out the option of drone strikes and other US military actions against the Mexican cartels when pressed about it, even without the express consent of the Mexican government.

而特朗普新政府的國防部長皮特-黑格塞斯在被問及此事時，也一再拒絕排除美國對墨西哥販毒集團採取無人機襲擊和其他軍事行動的可能性，甚至在沒有得到墨西哥政府明確同意的情況下也是如此。

During a visit to the southwestern border in February,

Hegseth publicly refused to rule out launching cross-border raids into Mexico to pursue the cartels, and said that all options remained on the table.

黑格塞斯公開拒絕排除向墨西哥發動跨境襲擊以追捕販毒集團的可能性，並表示所有方案都在考慮之中。

But there also appears to be some degree of division within Trump's inner circle on how aggressively to go after the cartels.

但在如何積極打擊販毒集團的問題上，特朗普內部似乎也存在一定程度的分歧。

Based on insider reports, one of the camps in the Trump administration is being led by Sebastian Gorka,

根據內部消息，特朗普政府中的一個陣營正由塞巴斯蒂安-高爾卡（Sebastian Gorka）上司、

Trump's appointed Senior Director for Counterterrorism on the White House National Security Council.

特朗普任命的白宮國家安全委員會反恐高級主任。

Gorka's camp is apparently pushing towards using the US military to aggressively pursue the cartels within Mexico, and to destroy their fenon operations as quickly as possible, with or without the prior consent of the Mexican government.

高爾卡的陣營顯然正在推動使用美國軍隊在墨西哥境內積極追捕販毒集團，並儘快摧毀他們的芬農行動，無論事先是否徵得墨西哥政府的同意。

This camp argues that the urgency of the fenon crisis in America demands rapid and decisive action against the cartels, while the other more cautious camp is apparently being led by Trump's Homeland Security Advisor, Stephen Miller, who is allegedly concerned that going too hard on the cartels without the Mexican government's approval could jeopardize the cooperation between the US and Mexican governments on migration and border issues, which could greatly exacerbate the numbers of migrants who are reaching the US border.

這一陣營認為，美國非農危機的緊迫性要求對販毒集團採取迅速果斷的行動，而另一個更為謹慎的陣營顯然是由特朗普的國土安全顧問斯蒂芬-米勒（Stephen Miller）上司的，據稱他擔心在未經墨西哥政府準許的情況下對販毒集團下手過重可能會危及美墨兩國政府在移民和邊境問題上的合作，這可能會大大加劇抵達美國邊境的移民數量。

Mexico's relatively new president herself, Claudia Sheinbaum, has repeatedly asserted that Mexico will never accept unilateral US military actions or drone strikes on Mexican territory.

墨西哥相對較新的總統克勞迪婭-謝因鮑姆本人曾多次聲稱，墨西哥絕不會接受美國在墨西哥領土上的單方面軍事行動或無人機襲擊。

She has insisted that any US military actions taken on Mexican territory without her government's consent would be a gross violation of Mexico's sovereignty, and that Mexico seeks cooperation or coordination with the US, not invasion or subordination.

她堅持認為，美國在未經墨西哥政府同意的情況下在墨西哥領土上採取的任何軍事行動都是對墨西哥主權的嚴重侵犯，墨西哥尋求的是與美國的合作或協調，而不是入侵或屈從。

She has allowed the CIA to begin conducting those reconnaissance flights over Mexican airspace.

她允許中央情報局開始在墨西哥領空進行這些偵察飛行。

She has deployed 10,000 Mexican troops to the northern border to patrol for fenon smuggling.

她在北部邊境部署了 10,000 名墨西哥阿兵哥，以巡邏芬農走私。

She has sent more soldiers and police into the Sinaloa state, where her government has reported nearly 900 arrests just since last October.

她向錫那羅亞州派遣了更多的阿兵哥和警察，據她的政府報告，自去年 10 月以來，該州已逮捕了近 900 人。

And she's already begun extraditing more than two dozen cartel operatives to the US to stand trial.

她已經開始將二十多名販毒集團成員引渡到美國接受審判。

Nonetheless, in early April, NBC News reported that several unnamed high-level Trump administration officials were still considering launching drone strikes in Mexico against cartel targets soon, even without the Mexican government's approval.

儘管如此，4 月初，美國全國廣播公司（NBC）新聞報道稱，幾位不願透露姓名的特朗普政府高級官員仍在考慮不久後在墨西哥對販毒集團目標發動無人機襲擊，即使沒有得到墨西哥政府的準許。

And to understand what's happening right now between the US and Mexico and the cartels, it helps to understand a bit of the context behind the drug war's history, and how bad the problem has gotten over time.

要想了解美國、墨西哥和販毒集團之間現在發生的事情，就需要了解一下毒品戰爭的歷史背景，以及隨著時間的推移，問題變得有多嚴重。

Drug traffickers and criminal groups in Mexico began growing more organized and advanced in the 1980s, after the historical cocaine smuggling route from Colombia to Miami by sea grew more difficult to pull off, which led to the cocaine smuggling route shifting overland to the US southern border through Mexico instead.

20 世紀 80 年代，從哥倫比亞經海路走私可卡因到邁阿密的歷史路線越來越難走，導致可卡因走私路線從陸路轉向經墨西哥到美國南部邊境，此後墨西哥的販毒者和幫派開始變得更加有組織和先進。

Criminal drug cartels in Mexico began coalescing in regionally defined areas, and they began fighting against one another and the government for the control of these narcotics trade routes and markets in the US.

墨西哥的毒品犯罪集團開始在區域範圍內聚集，並開始為控制這些毒品貿易路線和美國市場而相互爭鬥。

Under President Felipe Calderón, the Mexican government officially declared war on the drug cartels in 2006, and engaged with the US government on a joint campaign to decapitate cartel leadership, something that they called the Kingpin Strategy.

在費利佩-卡爾德龍總統的上司下，墨西哥政府於 2006 年正式向毒品卡特爾宣戰，並與美國政府聯合開展了一項旨在斬首卡特爾領導層的行動，他們稱之為 "頭目戰略"（Kingpin Strategy）。

For the next six years until 2012, American intelligence agencies passed on information about the cartels to the Mexican government.

在接下來的六年裡，直到 2012 年，美國情報機構一直在向墨西哥政府傳遞有關卡特爾的情報。

US law enforcement agents cooperated with Mexican law enforcement, and US special forces trained up elite Mexican commandos to go after the cartels themselves.

美國執法人員與墨西哥執法部門合作，美國特種部隊訓練了墨西哥精英突擊隊，以便親自追捕販毒集團。

But this initial strategy had its shortcomings.

但這一初始戰略也有不足之處。

Some of the Mexican special forces that were trained by the American special forces later defected and took their training and expertise with them to form one of the most fearsome Mexican drug cartels,

一些接受過美國特種部隊訓練的墨西哥特種部隊後來叛逃，並帶走了他們的訓練成果和專業知識，組建了最可怕的墨西哥販毒集團之一、

Los Zetas, which later became the Northeast Cartel, which is one of the cartels that is now designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the US.

Los Zetas，後來成為東北卡特爾，是目前被美國定為外國恐怖組織的卡特爾之一。

Targeting cartel leadership also often created power vacuums and triggered fierce succession crises and civil wars within the cartels, which exacerbated the levels of violence further.

針對卡特爾領導層的行動還經常造成權力真空，引發卡特爾內部激烈的繼任危機和內戰，進一步加劇了暴力程度。

After Calderón's party was voted out of office in 2012, and Enrique Peña Nieto took over as Mexico's president next, he shifted the strategy away from using the Mexican military to confront the cartels back towards law enforcement agencies, and the joint military operations with the US against the cartels were ended.

2012 年，卡爾德龍的政黨被淘汰下臺，恩裡克-培尼亞-涅託接任墨西哥總統，他將策略從使用墨西哥軍隊對抗卡特爾轉回執法機構，並結束了與美國聯合打擊卡特爾的軍事行動。

Nonetheless, despite a brief decrease in homicides in Mexico following President Nieto's reforms, corruption and crime-related violence continued to be serious issues in the country.

然而，儘管在涅託總統進行改革後，墨西哥的凶殺案出現了短暫的下降，但腐敗和與犯罪有關的暴力仍是該國的嚴重問題。

Near the end of his term in 2016, drug-related homicides in Mexico increased by a staggering 22%, with more than 20,000 people killed that year alone.

在 2016 年他的任期即將結束時，墨西哥與毒品有關的凶殺案增加了驚人的 22%，僅在那一年就有 2 萬多人喪生。

In 2017, a mass grave that contained the remains of more than 250 victims of drug-related violence was discovered in the country's Veracruz state, and then the violence continued escalating to an all-time high peak of 33,341 reported homicides in 2018, which has remained fairly consistent at levels nearly that high every year since.

2017 年，在該國韋拉克魯斯州發現了一個亂葬坑，裡面埋有 250 多名毒品相關暴力事件受害者的遺體，隨後暴力事件不斷升級，2018 年報告的凶殺案達到了 33 341 起的歷史最高峰，此後每年幾乎都保持在這個水準上。

The murder rate in Mexico continues to remain among the highest in the world, and is more than three times as high as it is in the US next door, while between 2017 and 2020, one journalist was killed in Mexico roughly every week on average.

墨西哥的謀殺率仍然是世界上最高的國家之一，是隔壁美國的三倍多，而在 2017 年至 2020 年期間，墨西哥大約平均每週就有一名記者遇害。

Then, after AMLO assumed the Mexican presidency next in 2018, he began pursuing a radically different approach towards the cartels than any of his predecessors.

隨後，阿姆洛在 2018 年接任墨西哥總統後，開始對卡特爾採取與其前任截然不同的做法。

He adopted a new policy that he called Hugs Not Bullets, in which he sought to address the cartel violence problem by legalizing marijuana, implementing poverty alleviation programs, and rolling out new sentencing guidelines for convicted drug traffickers.

他採取了一項名為 "擁抱而非子彈"（Hugs Not Bullets）的新政策，試圖通過大麻合法化、實施扶貧計劃以及推出針對被定罪的販毒者的新量刑準則來解決卡特爾暴力問題。

He also created a new Mexican National Guard, a sort of hybrid civilian police and military force to fight against the cartels on the ground.

他還成立了一支新的墨西哥國民警衛隊，這是一支民警和軍隊的混合部隊，負責在當地打擊販毒集團。

Overall, AMLO took a very hands-off approach towards the cartels in Mexico, which effectively enabled them to flourish like they had never before.

總體而言，阿姆洛對墨西哥的卡特爾採取了非常放手的態度，這實際上使卡特爾得到了前所未有的蓬勃發展。

AMLO claimed, falsely, on multiple occasions, that no fentanyl was even produced in Mexico at all.

阿姆洛多次謊稱墨西哥根本不生產芬太尼。

AMLO formally withdrew Mexico from a security cooperation agreement with the US in 2021, while the numbers of disappeared people in Mexico skyrocketed under his lax administration.

阿姆魯於 2021 年正式退出了墨西哥與美國的安全合作協議，而在他鬆懈的執政期間，墨西哥的失蹤人數卻急劇上升。

More people disappeared in Mexico under AMLO's presidency than during both of his predecessors combined.

在阿姆魯擔任總統期間，墨西哥失蹤的人數超過了他的兩位前任的總和。

During the final year of his administration in 2024, an average of 37 people in Mexico disappeared every single day, while more than 120,000 people in Mexico are now listed as officially missing.

在 2024 年他執政的最後一年，墨西哥平均每天有 37 人失蹤，目前墨西哥有超過 12 萬人被列為正式失蹤人員。

So while the official homicide rate declined slightly under AMLO's leadership, the disappearance rate also skyrocketed at the same time.

是以，雖然在阿馬魯的上司下，官方公佈的凶殺案發生率略有下降，但失蹤案的發生率也同時飆升。

And since missing people are not counted by the Mexican government's statistics as homicides, the true homicide rate when counting the dramatic increases in missing people since 2018 is likely far higher than the official Mexican data suggests it is.

而由於墨西哥政府統計的失蹤人口並不計入凶殺案，是以，如果算上 2018 年以來失蹤人口的急劇增加，真實的凶殺案發生率很可能遠高於墨西哥官方數據所顯示的數字。

And the problems of violence and smuggling both got much worse under AMLO's watch, while the cartels grew increasingly more powerful.

在阿姆洛的上司下，暴力和走私問題都變得更加嚴重，而販毒集團的勢力也日益壯大。

As it currently stands now in 2025, it's been estimated by the US military that the various competing cartels in Mexico now de facto control around one-third of the entire country's territory, putting the Mexican government on a level of de facto control within their country that's about on a par with a recognized failed state like the Syrian government.

據美國軍方估計，在 2025 年的當前情況下，墨西哥境內各種相互競爭的販毒集團現在實際控制著整個國家約三分之一的領土，這使得墨西哥政府在國內的實際控制水準與敘利亞政府這樣一個公認的失敗國家不相上下。

Between all of the cartels combined today are an estimated 160,000 to 185,000 armed fighters and mercenaries, almost half the size of the standing Mexican armed forces themselves.

目前，所有卡特爾加在一起估計有 16 萬到 18.5 萬名武裝戰鬥人員和僱傭兵，幾乎相當於墨西哥常備武裝力量本身規模的一半。

Large swaths of the country in Mexico that are under cartel influence are more controlled by the cartels than by the actual government, which is why the US State Department currently still maintains a level 4 do not travel advisory to the Mexican states of Colima, Guerrero, Mijoacán, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, and Zacatecas, where cartel activities and influence are particularly well pronounced.

是以，美國國務院目前仍對墨西哥的科利馬州、格雷羅州、米霍阿坎州、錫那羅亞州、塔毛利帕斯州和薩卡特卡斯州發佈四級 "請勿旅行警告"，因為這些州的卡特爾活動和影響尤為明顯。

In addition, corruption and cartel influence across the Mexican government also runs extremely deeply.

此外，腐敗和卡特爾對墨西哥政府的影響也極為深遠。

A report by the American DEA found evidence that the cartels had funneled millions of dollars into the 2006 presidential campaign of AMLO, for example.

例如，美國緝毒署的一份報告發現，有證據表明卡特爾向阿姆洛 2006 年的總統競選活動輸送了數百萬美元。

In 2020, US law enforcement arrested the former Mexican defense secretary while he was visiting Los Angeles, on a sprawling indictment that accused him of accepting bribes from one of the cartels and of using his position to assist with drug smuggling.

2020 年，美國執法部門在墨西哥前國防部長訪問洛杉磯時將其逮捕，起訴書指控他收受其中一個販毒集團的賄賂，並利用職務之便協助走私毒品。

Well, in 2024, the former Mexican secretary of public security was also sentenced to 38 years in prison for his role in accepting bribes from the Sinaloa cartel.

2024 年，前墨西哥公安部長也因收受錫那羅亞販毒集團的賄賂而被判處 38 年監禁。

Facts that now present significant challenges to the prospect of the US military cooperating with the Mexican government against the cartels.

這些事實對美國軍方與墨西哥政府合作打擊販毒集團的前景構成了重大挑戰。

If the cartels influence extends high enough up through the government to the Mexican president's own cabinet positions, to what extent can the Mexican government be trusted to not leak information about impending US military plans to the cartels?

如果販毒集團對政府的影響力足以延伸到墨西哥總統自己的內閣職位，那麼在多大程度上可以相信墨西哥政府不會向販毒集團洩露有關美國即將實施的軍事計劃的資訊呢？

It's for this reason why the more hawkish members of the Trump administration advocate for more heavy-handed unilateral military action against the cartels, even without the support of the Mexican government, which they view as being too corrupt and compromised by the cartels themselves.

正因如此，特朗普政府中的鷹派成員主張對販毒集團採取更嚴厲的單邊軍事行動，即使沒有墨西哥政府的支持也在所不惜，因為他們認為墨西哥政府過於腐敗，受到販毒集團本身的損害。

Now, while there are multiple cartels operating within Mexico today, the biggest and most fearsome two right now are the Sinaloa and the Jalisco New Generation cartels.

現在，雖然墨西哥境內有多個卡特爾在活動，但目前最大、最可怕的兩個卡特爾是錫那羅亞和哈利斯科新一代卡特爾。

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為什麼美國的下一場戰爭會打到墨西哥？ (Why America’s Next War is Heading to Mexico)

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