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  • THE BOEING 787.

  • SOLD AS A "DREAMLINER".

  • Jim McNerney: A once in a decade if not once in a generation achievement of human ingenuity.

  • FOR AIRLINES IT'S CHEAP TO FLY.

  • FOR PASSENGERS IT OFFERS UNPARALLELED COMFORT.

  • "wow"

  • FOR BOEING IT PROMISED WINDFALL PROFITS. PRESIDENT OBAMA: The Dreamliner is the plane

  • of the future. BUT AL JAZEERA DISCOVERS A DARK SIDE TO THE

  • DREAMLINER: STAN SORSCHER: unimaginable that we could

  • be three years late, have a fleet grounding, have fires on the airplane.

  • OUR INVESTIGATION FINDS BOEING ALTERED ITS OWN QUALITY STANDARDS

  • COLE: They're shortchanging the engineering process to meet a schedule.

  • WE UNCOVER A WHISTLEBLOWER FIRED AS HE FOUGHT FOR SAFETY:

  • WOODS: There's no doubt there are bad repairs going out the door on the 787 aircraft.

  • WE GO BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, ONTO THE FACTORY FLOOR, TO REVEAL A WORLD BOEING KEEPS SECRET.

  • UC WORKER VIDEO: I wouldn't fly on one of these planesBecause I see the quality

  • of the fu**ing sh*t going down

  • around here.

  • TITLE: "BROKEN DREAMS: THE BOEING 787" JANUARY 16TH, 2013. TAKAMATSU, JAPAN - A BRAND-NEW

  • BOEING 787 DREAMLINER MAKES AN EMERGENCY LANDING. PASSENGERS KNEW THE PLANE WAS IN TROUBLE:

  • AOYA KAZUNORI/passenger: I looked outside and saw white smoke. That's when I realised

  • the danger. KEN'ICHI KAWAMURA/passenger: The burning plastic

  • smell got worse. / I thought we were going to crash.

  • TAKEUCHI KOJI/Fireman: On closer inspection, we observed a blue box that had expanded in

  • size. THE BLUE BOX WAS ONE OF THE DREAMLINER'S TWO

  • LITHIUM ION BATTERIESTHE MOST POWERFUL - AND RISKY - EVER PERMITTED

  • ON A COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT. Newsreader: It's just the latest in a string

  • of embarrassments for Boeing's state of the art aircraft.

  • NINE DAYS EARLIER A DREAMLINER BATTERY HAD CAUGHT FIRE IN BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS.

  • TWO BATTERY FAILURES IN LESS THAN TWO WEEKS. NEWS BITE: Japanese carrier All Nippon Airways

  • and Japan Airlines have grounded their fleets of Boeing 787

  • Dreamliners. JAPAN AIRLINES AND ANA HAD BEEN THE FIRST

  • TO FLY THE DREAMLINER - NOW THEY BECAME THE FIRST TO CANCEL ALL FLIGHTS.

  • NEWS BITE: Breaking news. The United States Federal Aviation

  • WITHIN 24 HOURS, THE U.S. SAFETY REGULATOR, THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, GROUNDED

  • THE 787. NEWS BITE: All 50 of the new Boeing 787 Dreamliners

  • have now been groundedTHE REST OF THE WORLD FOLLOWED.

  • NO BOEING FLEET HAD EVER BEEN FORCED FROM SERVICE.

  • BUT ON JANUARY 17, 2013, THE DREAM WAS OVER. I'M WILL JORDAN.

  • FOR A YEAR, MY TEAM AND I HAVE BEEN INVESTIGATING THE DREAMLINER.

  • IT'S THE BOEING COMPANY'S BIG BET ON THE FUTURE… A PLANE CREATED TO SAVE FUEL, IMPROVE COMFORT,

  • AND BOOST PROFITS. AND ONE BUILT IN A NEW WAY - DESIGNED AND

  • MANUFACTURED BY SCORES OF COMPANIES AROUND THE GLOBE.

  • THE COMPANY THAT MAKES THE BATTERY IS GS YUASA, BASED IN KYOTO.

  • WE WANTED THEM TO TELL US WHAT HAD GONE SO WRONG.

  • SOUND: Security Guard in Japanese. Will: Al Jazeera. Guard: Al Jazeera. We wonder whether

  • you might be able to do

  • an interview? THEY REFUSED.

  • SPOKESWOMAN: We have a contract with Boeing so we can't, we can't tell any comments to

  • you. THE BATTERY IS ONLY ONE PART OF THE DREAMLINER'S

  • COMPLEX ELECTRICAL SYSTEM. THERE'S ALSO A CHARGER, MADE AT A FACTORY

  • THOUSANDS OF KILOMETRES AWAY. WHAT HAPPENED THERE, SHOWS BOEING LEARNT YEARS

  • AGO JUST HOW DANGEROUS A LITHIUM ION BATTERY COULD BE.

  • IN TUCSON, ARIZONA, WE TRACKED DOWN MICHAEL LEONAN ELECTRICAL TECHNICIAN.

  • MICHAEL LEON / Former Securaplane technician: I've been working electronics since I was

  • 17 years old, and I joined

  • the paratroopers and I was assigned to an electronics battalion of the 82nd airborne.

  • LEON: this is the first time I've been here since, since 2007. It's hard to believe that

  • this is what's left of a

  • three story engineering structure. ON A NOVEMBER MORNING IN 2006, LEON AND DOZENS

  • OF OTHER WORKERS CLOCKED IN AT SECURAPLANE - THE COMPANY THAT MAKES

  • THE BATTERY CHARGER. LEON: I started a pot of coffee then I went

  • into my lab and started working on my battery charging unit.

  • AND THEN IT HAPPENED. LEON: …and there was a very loud explosion

  • and all of a sudden I was lying on the floor and there it was coming out

  • the side of this battery. It was about that big, and it wasn't like fire. It looked like

  • a jet afterburner, like

  • jet exhaust. THE PROTOTYPE BATTERY SECURAPLANE WAS USING

  • TO TEST ITS CHARGER HAD EXPLODED. KIRK WINES / Former Securaplane technician:

  • I heard a very loud series of metallic rattling bangs. A kind of

  • shhhhhh. And just this jet of steam. LEON: The fire was literally rolling up the

  • walls around me and, and on the ceiling, I could just see it eating up

  • all around meWINES: I know if that had happened on board

  • an aircraft, there, there would be no chance of survival.

  • IT WAS THE BIGGEST CHEMICAL FIRE IN TUCSON'S HISTORY.

  • A TEN THOUSAND SQUARE FOOT, THREE-STOREY STRUCTURE, BURNT TO THE GROUND.

  • RICHARD LUKSO / Securaplane founder: …after my building burned down, after that they realized

  • very emphatically

  • the danger of this chemistry. RICHARD LUKSO KNOWS WELL THE CHEMISTRY OF

  • THE DREAMLINER BATTERY. BOEING CHOSE THE MOST POWERFUL THERE IS

  • BUT ALSO THE MOST VOLATILE. LUKSO:

  • they went to lithium cobalt which is way up here as far as danger.

  • LUKSO STEPPED DOWN AS SECURAPLANE PRESIDENT JUST BEFORE THE FIRE.

  • HE STARTED A NEW COMPANY TO MAKE LITHIUM ION BATTERIES FOR BUSINESS JETS.

  • LUKSO WAS A TRUE BELIEVER IN THE TECHNOLOGY. THEN HE BEGAN TESTING.

  • BULLET TEST VIDEO: Two, 3.3 amp hour series battery pack bullet test.

  • LUKSO WENT BEYOND EVEN THE LATEST INDUSTRY GUIDELINES - GOING SO FAR AS TO FIRE BULLETS

  • INTO BATTERIES, TO SEE IF

  • THEY COULD BE MADE SAFE FOR MILITARY APPLICATIONS. (BATTERY WALK/TALK) LUKSO: Yeah. You could

  • run the test that you feel that you need to meet the requirements to

  • be safe, but you also need to have a conscience that's going to tell you I want to do the

  • extreme." IN THE END, TESTING WITH A CONSCIENCE, LUKSO

  • COULDN'T MAKE THE BATTERIES MEET THE REQUIREMENTS. HIS NEW COMPANY FAILED.

  • LUKSO: …we became proficient in destroying batteries. And, and the more we learned about

  • it, the worst it got. I

  • mean, oh, my God, we kept digging and digging. We were saying I wonder what the rest of the

  • guys are doing. Well,

  • I guess we knew. BY REST OF THE GUYS HE MEANS BOEING.

  • AND THEY WERE TESTING TO A WEAKER STANDARDONE WRITTEN BY THE FAA SPECIFICALLY FOR THE

  • DREAMLINER.

  • IT'S THE FAA'S JOB TO REGULATE AIR SAFETY. BUT WHEN IT COMES TO BUILDING AIRPLANES, THE

  • FAA DELEGATES OVERSIGHT ALMOST COMPLETELY TO THE AIRCRAFT

  • MANUFACTURERS. WHEN IT COMES TO THE BATTERY AND BEYOND, BOEING

  • LARGELY POLICES ITSELF. THE BATTERIES PASSED BOEING'S TESTS.

  • IN LINE WITH THE FAA RULES, BOEING SAID THE 787 BATTERIES WOULD VIRTUALLY NEVER CATCH

  • FIRE ON BOARD AN AIRCRAFT. THEN, THEY FAILED TWICE IN JUST NINE DAYS.

  • BOEING HAS NOT UNCOVERED THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE FAILURES.

  • IT FOUND A WORK AROUND: A STRONG STEEL CASE, MORE INSULATION, AND AN EXHAUST FOR NOXIOUS

  • FUMES. SINNETT: …any fire will be impossible because

  • there's not enough oxygen to support combustion. BUT SEVERAL LEADING SCIENTISTS HAVE THEIR

  • DOUBTS. DONALD SADOWAY / MIT: I don't think it's a

  • sufficient fix / Even inside that steel box with all of its

  • fortifications, all of the elements are still there for fire.

  • DESPITE NOT KNOWING THE ROOT CAUSE, AMERICA'S SAFETY REGULATOR, THE FAA, WAS SATISFIED.

  • AND IN APRIL 2013, THE DREAMLINER WAS BACK.

  • BUT THIS STORY GOES FAR BEYOND A BURNING BATTERY.

  • IT BEGINS AT BOEING ITSELF.

  • "This is it. The first American commercial jet capable of economical transatlantic service.

  • The Boeing 707 jet

  • clipper.

  • SINCE ITS CREATION IN SEATTLE NEARLY A CENTURY AGO, BOEING HAD DEVELOPED A REPUTATION AS

  • A WORLD-CLASS ENGINEERING

  • COMPANY.

  • BUT IN 1997 BOEING CHANGED. IT MERGED WITH COMPETITOR, MCDONNELL DOUGLAS.

  • TWO COMPANIES WITH TWO VERY DIFFERENT BUSINESS MODELS.

  • STAN SORSCHER / Former Boeing engineer: the merger was all about transforming our successful

  • culture and business

  • model into the same business model that McDonnell Douglas had used unsuccessfully.

  • ABW-002 / 1:05 ABOULAFIA: you basically shortchange engineering,

  • you stop doing aggressive new product developments; you run the

  • business for cash.

  • THE NEW BOEING MOVED ITS HEADQUARTERS FROM SEATTLE, THE ONLY HOME THE COMPANY HAD EVER

  • KNOWN, TO CHICAGO. IT BEGAN SLASHING INVESTMENT IN RESEARCH,

  • IN ORDER TO CUT COSTS AND MAXIMISE WALL STREET RETURNS.

  • CYNTHIA COLE / Former Boeing engineer: I felt it was wrong, I felt it was going to take

  • the company in the wrong

  • direction and I thought that quality would suffer and the integrity of the product would

  • suffer. KEVIN SANDERS / Former Boeing manager: I feel

  • that that legacy and that history and that competence has been

  • hijacked by a bunch of corporate thugs. BY 2003, IT WAS TIME TO LAUNCH A NEW PLANE.

  • BUT BOEING'S NEW BOARD WAS RELUCTANT TO INVEST THE BILLIONS NEEDED.

  • DOMINIC GATES / Seattle Times: The board made it clear that they wanted this plane made

  • for less money. They

  • wanted it made for $5 billion and they wanted partners to come in and pay the rest.

  • ABW-002/ 9:35 Richard Aboulafia: It's expensive. So how

  • do you make that happen? Well, you promise them that you can do it for

  • less / and then worry about the consequences later.

  • BOEING CAME UP WITH A PLAN TO SAVE ITSELF MONEY.

  • IT WOULD PUSH THE COSTS ONTO ITS MAJOR SUPPLIERS. BOEING WOULD CALL THEM PARTNERSAND THEY

  • WOULD DESIGN AND PAY FOR THE PARTS THEY BUILT. BOEING'S JOB WOULD BE TO ASSEMBLE THE PLANE.

  • GATES: It was almost as if at times you thought Boeing executives believed, well, maybe they

  • could sit in Chicago

  • and have / other companies / do things, and they would just rake in the money somehow

  • by putting it all together

  • and putting a Boeing sticker on it at the end.

  • RIGHT ON SCHEDULE, BOEING ROLLED OUT THE DREAMLINER ON SUNDAY JULY THE 8TH 2007, 7-8-7.

  • Tom Brokaw: Airlines with us today have made a big commitment to Boeing and to this airplane.

  • So far they have

  • ordered 677 of them. ABOULAFIA: I think in a lot of ways, July

  • 8, 2007 was one of the more magical moments I've seen in the industry

  • Brokaw: Watching us live around the world, broadcasting I'm told in 45 countries in 9

  • languages for the premier of

  • this very exciting Boeing 787 Dreamliner. GATES: We were all inside the factory with

  • artificial lighting, big stage, Tom Brokaw, huge screensThen they

  • opened the doors of this giant assembly bayABOULAFIA: And in rolls this beautiful, beautiful

  • aircraft. GATES: And there it is, sitting in the sun

  • and we all stream outside and we all touch it and none of us noticed.

  • Smile! ABOULAFIA: And I'm reassured by the executives

  • involved that it's going to fly within two months.

  • One, two, three. JON OSTROWER / Wall Street Journal

  • What I realized walking around it is that you could look up in the wheel well and you

  • could see daylight. GATES: We learned that the whole thing was

  • a sham. MIKE BAIR / 787 Program Manager: Beautiful

  • isn't it? Absolutely beautifulGATES: They rolled out this fake airplane.

  • OSTROWER: I realized the doors were made of plywood.

  • GATES: This plane that we were admiring was completely a shell inside

  • JAMES MCNERNEY / BOEING CEO: None of this would be possible, of course, without exceptional

  • leadership. ABOULAFIA: There's only two conclusions you

  • can draw: You have executives there who are either lying, in which

  • case they are completely clueless because they are going to get caught in two months,

  • or you have a complete

  • disconnect between the people who are working on the plane, the engineers, and the executives

  • who are saying this. MCNERNEY: And so to each and every member

  • of the 787 global team, I say, 'Thank you, congratulations, and keep up

  • the great work.' SANDERS: More than any other single event

  • it was the big lie, and it was a statement that the Boeing Company is

  • now all about the big lie. THE DAY AFTER THE ROLLOUT, WALL STREET PUSHED

  • BOEING STOCK TO A TEN YEAR HIGH. BUT IT WAS ALL ABOUT TO UNRAVEL, AS REVEALED

  • IN BOEING'S INVESTOR CALLS. Hello and welcome to our quarterly update

  • on the 787 program. SEPTEMBER 2007: BOEING ANNOUNCES ITS FIRST

  • DELAY. MIKE BAIR: It's not a failure in how the airplane

  • goes together. It's just a really complicated puzzle."

  • OCTOBER 2007: THE THREE-MONTH DELAY BECOMES SIX MONTHS.

  • JIM MCNERNEY: We wish we didn't have to do this. New kinds of innovation present challenges

  • and we're doing our

  • best to meet them. OCTOBER 2009: SIX MONTHS BECOMES TWO YEARS

  • OF DELAYS. JIM MCNERNEY: We know that we can and must

  • do better. And I'm confident that despite our setbacks we will get the

  • 787 through the flight test program and into the hands of our customers.

  • GATES: It just kept getting worse and worse and it seemed unbelievable. You have to understand,

  • this was

  • unprecedented. There had never been a Boeing delay in a Boeing program.

  • ABOULAFIA: The sequence of events looked an awful lot like a catastrophe rather than just

  • a manageable series of

  • delays.

  • THE DREAMLINER BUSINESS STRATEGY WAS BACKFIRING. DESIGNED TO SAVE SO MUCH MONEY, IT WAS COSTING

  • BOEING BILLIONS.

  • GATES: The outsourcing plan failed very badly. / All these different suppliers who were going

  • to / build these

  • major sections couldn't actually do it. TO FIX THE DREAMLINER, BOEING DISPATCHED HUNDREDS

  • OF QUALITY INSPECTORS TO STRUGGLING SUPPLIERS AROUND THE GLOBE

  • INCLUDING TO ITS PARTNER ALENIA - IN SOUTHERN ITALY.

  • Riccardo Busca / Alenia plant manager: We are just working through the final part of

  • the process. ALENIA WOULD TAKE ON THE TASK OF CONSTRUCTING

  • THE BODY OF THE PLANE - NOT WITH ALUMINIUM PANELSBUT WITH COMPOSITE

  • PLASTIC BARRELS. THE MAIN OBJECTIVE: TO LOSE WEIGHT, SAVING

  • FUEL AND MAKING THE 787 CHEAPER TO RUN. BUT NO ONE HAD EVER MADE ANYTHING LIKE THIS

  • BEFORE, NOT BOEING, AND ESPECIALLY NOT ALENIA. Busca: There is nothing comparable with that

  • on the market. Will: there's nothing built like this.

  • BOEING'S QUALITY INSPECTORS HAVE ONE OVERRIDING PRIORITY, TO MAKE SURE THE JOB IS DONE CORRECTLY.

  • IN 2009, WHEN INSPECTORS FOUND FLAWS IN PARTS MADE IN THIS ALENIA PLANT, THEY ORDERED WORK

  • TO STOP. A YEAR LATER, IN ALENIA'S OTHER FACTORY THEY

  • AGAIN FOUND SERIOUS PROBLEMS AND AGAIN THEY ORDERED WORK TO STOP.

  • BUT THIS TIME, MANAGERS OVERRULED THE QUALITY INSPECTORS.

  • THIS INTERNAL BOEING DOCUMENT, FROM 2010, REVEALS EXECUTIVES ORDERED ALENIA TO "CONTINUE

  • WITH FABRICATIONWITHOUT

  • DELAY." DONATO AMOROSO / ALENIA COO: We followed at

  • the time the procedure to stop but with the help of a Boeing specialist

  • at the time and while we were in the disapproved condition they took responsibility for approving

  • the quality and

  • we will continue to work in engineering at the time the product.

  • IN THIS SEPARATE MEMO, OBTAINED BY AL JAZEERA, BOEING STATES THAT "SCHEDULE MAY REQUIRE DEVIATIONS

  • TO THE PREFERRED

  • QUALITY PROCESS". WE RECEIVED THE MEMOS FROM AN ENGINEER WHO,

  • LIKE MANY WE SPOKE WITH, WAS AFRAID TO APPEAR ON CAMERA.

  • SO HE ANSWERED MY QUESTIONS BY EMAIL.

  • SOURCE: They changed basic engineering principles to meet schedule

  • We all protested.

  • Would you fly on a plane that you knew was built with major flaws?

  • THE QUALITY ENGINEER TOLD US DEVIATING FROM THE PROCESS COMPROMISED SAFETY.

  • ALENIA AND BOEING SAID IT DID NOT. CYNTHIA COLE: 6,7,8,9,10…

  • SO I BROUGHT THE MEMO TO THE FORMER PRESIDENT OF BOEING'S ENGINEERS UNION.

  • Cynthia Cole: So My name is Cynthia Cole, C-y-n-t-h-i-a. Last name is C-o-l-e.

  • CYNTHIA COLE SPENT 32 YEARS AT THE COMPANY BUT NEVER ON THE DREAMLINER PROGRAMME, SO

  • SHE HAD NEVER SEEN THIS MEMO

  • BEFORE. COLE: The program schedule may require deviation

  • to the preferred process. See? That one sentence right there,

  • that one fragment of the sentence / You know, you don't change your quality process for

  • schedule. You make quality

  • happen in the schedule. // They're shortchanging the engineering process to meet a schedule

  • and they're not even

  • allowing quality control to do their job and their telling them this is how it's going

  • to be. // I don't see how

  • these people who write these things and agree to these things, you know, and the signatures

  • down here, how they

  • sleep at night. I just don't get it. How can you do that? // As an engineer I find that

  • reprehensible.

  • Male Voice: How does it make you feel as a flyer?

  • Oh, yeah. I'm not flying on a 787. That just makes, you knowBecause I've been kind

  • of avoiding flying on a 787

  • and seeing this, I would definitely avoid flying on a 787.

  • TEASE: IN PART TWOINSIDE A BOEING 787 PLANT, WORKERS REVEAL THEY FEAR TO FLY THE

  • PLANE THEY BUILD. IF THE DREAMLINER REPRESENTS BOEING'S FUTURE,

  • THEN I'VE COME TO THE PLACE WHERE THAT FUTURE WILL BE BUILT.

  • IN THIS ASSEMBLY PLANT IN CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA.

  • I'VE BEEN CALLED TO A MEETING WITH A MAN WHO WORKS INSIDE THE PLANT.

  • HE'S TAKING A HUGE RISK EVEN TALKING TO ME. SOURCE: It's been eating me alive to know

  • what I know, and have no avenue, no venue to say anything.

  • AT HIS REQUEST, WE USED A DIFFERENT VOICE. SOURCE: 300 souls on the plane / their lives

  • / it's bigger than me. WE HAD SEEN REPORTS OF BAD WORKMANSHIP IN

  • THE PLANT.

  • BUT THE MAN CLAIMED THE PROBLEMS GO FAR DEEPER. SOURCE: With all the problems reported on

  • the 787 / there's 90 percent that's getting swept awayhushed up. / It's

  • an iceberg. SOURCE: The people that actually work on it

  • are the biggest problem. // there is / an uneducated, under-skilled

  • and uncaring staff that are building these planes and I'm not the only one that feels

  • that way. AND HE WAS PREPARED TO PROVE IT, WEARING A

  • CAMERA INSIDE THE PLANT TO RECORD WHAT SOME WORKERS SAID ABOUT THE

  • DREAMLINER. UC PLANT WORKER 1: … They hire these people

  • off the street dude. Working, fucking flipping burgers for a living or

  • making sandwiches at subway

  • SOURCE: You can't have somebody from McDonald's do heart surgery. / That's trusting somebody

  • with your life.

  • That's what we're doing here. UC PLANT WORKER 2: The thing about it is,

  • they don't realize the seriousness of putting something together and

  • putting it together right. Because if this fucker breaks, it can't come over to the curb,

  • it's gonna come down.

  • SOURCE: I've seen a lot of things that should not go on at an airplane plant… / people

  • talking about doing drugs,

  • looking for drugsUC PLANT WORKER 3: It's all coke and, um,

  • painkillers and, what's the other oneYou can get weed here, you can get

  • some really good weed here. SOURCE: Really, like in the plant?

  • WORKER 3: Yeah. SOURCE: Like there's somebody who has it right

  • now? I could walk up to them and justWORKER 3: No, I don't know if they have it

  • right here. You've got to place your order. SOURCE: You gotta place your order.

  • SOURCE: I have never seen anybody or heard of anybody having to take a random urinalysis.

  • As far as I know random

  • drugs tests just don't happen. UC PLANT WORKER 2: they don't drug test nobody.

  • SOURCE: I know they don't. WORKER 2: There's people that go out there

  • on lunch and smoke one up. SOURCE: Do they?

  • WORKER 2: Hell yea. SOURCE: You know for a fact.

  • WORKER 2: Hell yeah. WHEN BOEING FIRST ANNOUNCED THE 787, BACK

  • IN 2003, NOBODY EVER DREAMT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ASSEMBLED ANYWHERE BUT

  • WASHINGTON STATE. THE ONE PLACE BOEING HAD ALWAYS MADE ITS COMMERCIAL

  • AIRCRAFT. BUT NEW BOEING WAS PLAYING BY NEW RULES.

  • SO IT DID SOMETHING IT HAD NEVER DONE BEFORE - AUCTIONED OFF FINAL ASSEMBLY TO THE HIGHEST

  • BIDDER. DOMINIC GATES: They were going to hold a competition

  • for it. / A state against state, nationwide competition,

  • where to build this plane. I ran to my editor after I put the phone down, I think it was

  • 5:00, and I said, "You're

  • not going to believe this. They're not necessarily going to build it here."

  • WASHINGTON STATE WON, BUT ONLY BY GIVING BOEING WHAT WAS THEN A RECORD THREE BILLION DOLLARS

  • IN TAX BREAKS. "Power! Union Power! Union Power! Union Power!"

  • FIVE YEARS LATER, BOEING'S MACHINISTS WALKED OFF THE JOB AFTER CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS STALLED.

  • THE STRIKE COST BOEING BILLIONS AND ADDED TO THE DREAMLINER'S DELAYS.

  • BOEING STOCK WAS IN A FREEFALL, AMID A GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS.

  • GATES: … that strike / really enraged the top executives at Boeing. And so / early in

  • 2009 they made it very

  • clear that they wanted a second assembly line somewhere else.

  • THAT TURNED OUT TO BE SOUTH CAROLINA. THE STATE OFFERED CHEAP LAND AND LABORCLOSE

  • TO ONE BILLION DOLLARS IN SUPPORTAND NO UNIONS.

  • GATES: The decision to build the second 787 assembly line in Charleston, South Carolina/

  • was made because of the

  • strike in 2008. / They wanted to do it there because they wanted to weaken the union, and

  • they did. SORSCHER: It kind of has a shameless feel

  • to it, right? It's very manipulative and not very hometown. That's not

  • the way you treat your people in your community, unless they're not in your community, unless

  • you see them as a

  • source of gains to be extracted. BUT FOR BOEING, LEAVING BEHIND A WORLD-CLASS

  • UNION WORKFORCE FOR THE GREENER PASTURES OF NON-UNION CHARLESTON WOULD

  • COME AT A PRICE.

  • WORK IN THE PLANT IS SIGNIFICANTLY BEHIND SCHEDULE AND PLAGUED BY PRODUCTION ERRORS.

  • Repair worker: I seen some crazy stuff, ya know, putting fasteners and just beatin' the

  • shit out of em to get em

  • to go in the hole.

  • SOURCE: I know of one customer / They'll no longer accept planes from Charleston due to

  • quality issues. They will

  • only accept final assembly done in Everett, Washington.

  • SOURCE: Everyday when you go to work, not only are you doing your job, but you are looking

  • at the previous job to

  • see if someone has messed something else up on that and chose not to tell anyone.

  • UC PLANT WORKER 4: That machine malfunctioned in there. Fucked those holes up. And they

  • just went ahead and filled

  • them. And I've gone ahead and told managers about that and nothing has been done. Nothing.

  • TO BE SURE EVERYTHING IS DONE CORRECTLY AND THE PLANE IS SAFE, BOEING HAS QUALITY ASSURANCE

  • INSPECTORS

  • PAINSTAKINGLY CHECK EVERY STEP OF THE WORK. BUT IN SOUTH CAROLINA, THIS INSPECTOR SAYS

  • HE ONLY SIGNS OFF ON FINISHED JOBS. UC PLANT WORKER 5: Here you will do the whole

  • job and we just final it. You know and I'm supposed to verify that

  • oh, you checked the hole, you did the sealant, you put in the fastener. I never saw all that.

  • But I'm supposed to

  • final it and say that it's good. That's one of the problems I have.

  • SOURCE: you think Everett's better? UC PLANT WORKER 2: I think Everett will do

  • what's right, to make the plane right because of the union, they have

  • to. / Here everybody is being pushed to meet this fucking schedule regardless of quality.

  • Will: which do you think is the priority then, schedule or quality?

  • SOURCE: Schedule. IF IT'S A CONSTANT BATTLE BETWEEN QUALITY

  • AND SCHEDULE, WE FOUND ONE CASUALTY - 100'S OF KILOMETERS FROM SOUTH

  • CAROLINA -- IN MISSISSIPPI. JOHN WOODS / Former Boeing engineer: My name

  • is John Woods, I'm an aerospace engineer. I worked for General

  • Electric, Lockheed, Boeing. JOHN WOODS SPENT A CAREER IN THE HIGHLY SPECIALIZED

  • FIELD OF AEROSPACE COMPOSITES. BOEING HIRED WOODS KNOWING HE HAD QUALIFIED

  • PSCHIATRIC CONDITIONS - ATTENTION DEFICIT DISORDER, OBSESSIVE

  • COMPULSIVE DISORDER, AND MILD DEPRESSION. HIS JOB WAS TO WRITE INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO

  • REPAIR PARTS DAMAGED DURING THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS.

  • WOODS: It's my job to make sure that that aircraft is safe.

  • WOODS SAYS WHEN HE TRIED TO ENFORCE QUALITY STANDARDS IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA PLANT HE WAS

  • BERATED BY HIS BOSSES.

  • WOODS: In a couple of meetings, there were several, a group of managers screaming at

  • me to dumb down my work

  • instruction. // saying, you have to remove requirements from your work instructions.

  • It's going to take too much

  • time. WOODS SAYS HE WITNESSED DAMAGED PARTS BEING

  • IGNORED, PAPERED OVER AND HIDDEN FROM VIEW. WOODS: There's no doubt there are bad repairs

  • going out the door on the 787 aircraft.// I am worried that sooner

  • or later, there's going to be a structural failure on the fuselage.

  • WOODS APPEALED TO BOEING'S HUMAN RESOURCES DEPARTMENT CLAIMING HE WAS BEING HARASSED

  • FOR DOING HIS JOB. INSTEAD OF COMING TO HIS DEFENSE, BOEING MANAGERS

  • PUT WOODS UNDER REVIEW. WEEKS LATER, THEY FIRED HIM.

  • WOODS: I'll never forget this. The day before I was terminated, I was telling my brother

  • how proud I was to be

  • working at Boeing. It's true. WOODS: So instead of saying thanks for doing

  • a good job, because I thought I was doing what I was supposed to be

  • doing. / I had to leave in shame really. I was embarrassed for my own family.

  • HE STILL HAD NOT LOST FAITH IN THE SYSTEM. HE TURNED TO THE FAA - FILING A WHISTLEBLOWER

  • COMPLAINT. THE DOCUMENT ALLEGED SEVEN SERIOUS VIOLATIONS

  • IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA PLANT.

  • MARY SCHIAVO / Former Inspector General, USDOT: So I've gotten to the page where they reached

  • their conclusions

  • and their discussion and what they found is, of all the allegations, all but one of them

  • they could not

  • substantiate and the one that they could substantiate, they asked Boeing to fix it. Boeing said,

  • "Okay, we fixed

  • it." And then they closed the investigation. That's pretty much how they all go. I've seen

  • this so many times. Woods in coffee shop: "thank you"

  • SCHIAVO: I always tell people, when they call me, they call me up with information and they

  • say, "Well, I have all

  • this information about this dangerous situation. Should I blow the whistle?" I said, "Well,

  • you know, not unless

  • you have a private trust fund or another job to go to because you'll have a problem earning

  • a living." WOODS: I had to maximize all my credit cards

  • to survive, to support the family. There was a lot less money for the

  • kids, for college and everything else. / It shouldn't be this hard to do the right thing.

  • WHEN WE LOOKED AT WOODS' FAA COMPLAINT, WE NOTICED A FAMILIAR NAME -- ALI BAHRAMI.

  • HE WAS THE FAA'S MAN IN CHARGE OF THE DREAMLINER. IN 2011, THREE YEARS BEHIND SCHEDULE, BOEING

  • CELEBRATED FINAL APPROVAL FOR THE 787 TO FLY. AND IT WAS BAHRAMI WHO SIGNED THE ORDER.

  • Fancher at Certification Party: "Thanks also in recognition for Ali Bahrami, manager of

  • the FAA's transport

  • airplane directive. Ali …" IT WAS BAHRAMI WHO SIGNED OFF ON THE DREAMLINER

  • BATTERIES. AND AFTER TWO FAILED AND THE FAA GROUNDED

  • THE DREAMLINERIT WAS BAHRAMI WHO SIGNED IT BACK INTO THE AIR.

  • SHORTLY AFTER THAT HE RETIRED FROM THE FAA. TWO WEEKS LATER BAHRAMI WAS HIRED AS VICE-PRESIDENT

  • OF THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION, WHICH LOBBIES ON

  • BEHALF OF BOEING. ONE OF THE FIRST THINGS HE DID WAS TO APPEAR

  • BEFORE CONGRESS TO CALL FOR GREATER SELF-REGULATION FOR COMPANIES LIKE

  • BOEING. Ali Bahrami / Congressional hearing: ‘We

  • urge the FAA to allow greater use of delegation, not only to take full

  • advantage of industry expertise, but to increase the collaboration that improves aviation safety."

  • MR. BAHRAMI DECLINED OUR INTERVIEW REQUEST. SCHIAVO: One day you're regulating the airline

  • and the next day you're working for it. // You can't possibly be tough on the industry

  • that you're regulating because you'll never get that plum job after you

  • leave. The regulators at the FAA will rarely cross Boeing. They simply won't.

  • IT'S THE WASHINGTON INFLUENCE GAME - AND BOEING IS A MASTER.

  • LAST YEAR, THE COMPANY HAD OVER 100 REGISTERED LOBBYISTS, 78 OF THEM WERE FORMER GOVERNMENT

  • WORKERS.

  • THREE WERE FORMER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. BOEING CHIEF EXECUTIVE JIM MCNERNEY IS CHAIRMAN

  • OF PRESIDENT OBAMA'S EXPORT COUNCIL. THE PRESIDENT'S FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF CAME

  • FROM BOEING'S BOARD, AS DID HIS SECOND COMMERCE SECRETARY.

  • AS SECRETARY OF STATE, HILLARY CLINTON HELPED BROKER A 3.7 BILLION DOLLAR SALE OF BOEING

  • PLANES TO A RUSSIAN

  • AIRLINE. EVEN PRESIDENT OBAMA BOASTS THAT HE WORKS

  • FOR BOEING. OBAMA AT BOEING EVENT: "So I tease 'J' ever

  • time I see him. I say, "I deserve a gold watch because I'm selling your

  • stuff all the time." "J" IS JIM MCNERNEY.

  • IT'S CLEAR WHAT BOEING GETS FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

  • WHAT'S NOT SO CLEAR IS WHAT IT GIVES BACK. SCOTT KLINGER / Think tank analyst: Boeing

  • paid no taxes in 2013, no federal income taxes. / That's not a unique

  • year. Over the last 12 years, they claimed over $1.6 billion in federal tax refunds even

  • though they reported $43

  • billion in U.S. profits. 43 BILLION DOLLARS IN PROFIT.

  • BUT NONE OF THAT COMES FROM THE DREAMLINER, WHICH HAS COST BILLIONS AND IS YEARS AWAY

  • FROM MAKING MONEY. ALL OF BOEING'S COMMERCIAL PROFIT COMES FROM

  • OLDER AIRCRAFTTHOSE CREATED PRIOR TO THE DREAMLINER, PRIOR TO JIM

  • MCNERNEY, AND PRIOR TO THE MERGER. IT HAS BEEN THE TOP EXECUTIVES AND LARGEST

  • STOCK HOLDERS WHO HAVE BENEFITTED MOST. KLINGER: Boeing's CEO, Jim McNerney, made

  • $27.5 million in 2012. That was enough to pay the salaries of the

  • president of the United States, the vice president, the 15 cabinet secretaries, the nine Supreme

  • Court justices,

  • the seven joint chiefs of staff, and all 100 U.S. senators.

  • MCNERNEY IS SET TO RETIRE WITH A PENSION OF CLOSE TO 250 THOUSAND DOLLARS A MONTH.

  • JUST BEFORE CHRISTMAS 2013, BOEING DEMANDED PENSION CUTS FROM ITS UNION MACHINISTS.

  • SHANNON RYKER / Boeing machinist: For Jim McNerney to be earning a pension at approximately

  • a quarter of a

  • million dollars per month and think that it's okay for him to take my $2200 a month pension

  • is outrageous. It's

  • absolutely outrageous. BACK IN SOUTH CAROLINA, OUR UNAUTHORIZED TOUR

  • WITH BOEING'S NEW WORKFORCE IS COMING TO A CLOSE.

  • THERE'S ONLY ONE QUESTION LEFT TO ASK. SOURCE: Would you fly on one?

  • WORKER: umno. SOURCE: You won't fly on one?

  • WORKER: Noooooo SOURCE: Would you fly on one of these planes?

  • WORKER: I've thought about it? I thought about itno not really

  • SOURCE: Would you fly on one of these mother f**kers?

  • WORKER: Probably not. SOURCE: Would you fly on one of these?

  • WORKER: Yeah it's sketchy. SOURCE: Sketchy?

  • Yeah I probably would, but I kind of have a death wish too.

  • (laugh) OUR SOURCE ASKED FIFTEEN OF HIS CO-WORKERS

  • IF THEY'D FLY ON THE DREAMLINER. TEN SAID NO.

  • UC WORKER 2: I wouldn't fly on one of these planes (shaking his head).

  • SOURCE: You wouldn't? Why wouldn't you? WORKER 2: Huh?

  • SOURCE: Why wouldn't ya? WORKER 2: Because I see the quality of the

  • fucking shit going down around here.

  • "Hi Mr. Loftis, Will Jordan" "I'm sorry, Will?"

  • "Will Jordan" WORKERS WHO FEAR TO FLY THE PLANE THEY BUILD

  • QUALITY PROCESS APPARENTLY LOOSENED TO SPEED UP SCHEDULE

  • WORKERS FIRED AFTER MAKING SAFETY ALLEGATIONSWE NEEDED ANSWERS FROM BOEING.

  • Larry Loftis: Right now we're at a very exciting point in time, we have brought our production

  • rate up to 10

  • airplanes a month, faster than any airplane in aviation history and to the highest level

  • of any wide-body airplane

  • in aviation history. Will Jordan: There's a couple of documents

  • I want to show you here. I SHOWED HIM THE DOCUMENTS SUGGESTING BOEING

  • HAD CHANGED QUALITY PROCEDURES AND OVERRULED INSPECTORS TO SPEED UP

  • PRODUCTION. MR LOFTIS WAS NOT MANAGER OF THE 787 PROGRAMME

  • IN 2010, WHEN THE MEMOS WERE WRITTEN.

  • Larry Loftis: OK I am not familiar with this document.

  • Will Jordan: Former Boeing engineers have told us that these represent Boeing essentially

  • putting schedule ahead of

  • quality. Short-changing the engineering process to meet a schedule. Is that something you

  • recognize? Larry Loftis: The number one focus that we

  • have at Boeing is ensuring the continued safe airworthiness of an

  • airplane, the integrity of the airplane and the quality of the airplane going out.

  • Will Jordan: We've also heard directly from workers inside your South Carolina plant.

  • They paint a grim picture

  • really of things there. They say the workforce isn't up to the job.

  • Larry Loftis: I'm extremely confident in the quality of the workforce in Boeing South Carolina.

  • Will Jordan: The Boeing workers at South Carolina don't share that confidence. Here's what some

  • of them said. … Paul Lewis: Guys, Guys, Guys. I'm gonna just

  • call a halt here for a second. Can you turn the camera off for a

  • secon? Cameraman: Why would we need to turn the camera

  • off? What's the problem? AND THEN, BOEING'S COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTOR

  • STOPPED THE INTERVIEW. Paul Lewis: So who are these employees that

  • you're speaking to in South Carolina that are making these points?

  • Will Jordan: I can't, Obviously I can't tell you who these employees are, but they are

  • Boeing workers who assemble

  • the planes that you build. Paul Lewis: Well I'm not sure it's appropriate

  • here and now. Will Jordan: Well I'm assuming the buck stops

  • with the Boeing Commercial Airplanes management and so the most

  • senior managers are the ones to answer this. We're here with the head of the 787 programme.

  • / And we have these

  • things that you need to hear and you need to provide a response to.

  • Paul Lewis: We have not had a chance to review this or craft a proper response.

  • Paul Lewis: Larry, Larry, can you step out for a second?

  • Larry: OK but, as I do. I have the highest degree of confidence in the production system

  • we have, with the

  • employees we have at the Boeing company and our supply chain. Thanks.

  • BOEING ANSWERED OUR QUESTIONS IN WRITING, DENYING IT COMPROMISES SAFETY OR QUALITY.

  • IT SAID OUR INTERVIEW WAS HOSTILE, UNPROFESSIONAL AND IN THE WORST TRADITIONS OF TABLOID-STYLE

  • TELEVISION NEWS. THE COMPANY SAID IT WAS CONFIDENT THAT ITS

  • BATTERY FIX PREVENTS FAILURES. BOEING SAYS IT USES ONE, COMMON, FAA-APPROVED

  • QUALITY SYSTEM FOR THE 787 IN EVERETT AND CHARLESTON.

  • BOEING NOTED ITS MEMO STATED IT DID NOT SIGNIFY AUTHORISATION TO SHIP PARTS THAT DON'T MEET

  • QUALITY REQUIREMENTS. BOEING SAID IT DRUG TESTS IN LINE WITH COMPANY

  • POLICY AND APPLICABLE LAW. THE COMPANY DENIES ANY CUSTOMER HAS SAID THEY

  • WILL ONLY TAKE PLANES FROM EVERETT. AS FOR JOHN WOODS, BOEING SAYS HIS SAFETY

  • CLAIMS HAVE "NO MERIT". TORONTO. MAY 18, 2014.

  • AIR CANADA CELEBRATES THE DELIVERY OF ITS FIRST 787.

  • THIS IS THE MODERN MARKETING REALITY OF THE DREAMLINER.

  • AIR CANADA EXEC: Today represents a huge milestone for Air Canada. We've been waiting a long

  • time for this

  • airplane. It's going to allow us to grow in unprecedented ways.

  • PASSENGER: Because when you were eating before where did you put your iPad?

  • FLIGHT ATTENDANT: Well I think our passengers are going to be very receptive of some of

  • the new amenities. PASSENGER: I just wanna see how for it goes

  • back. PASSENGER: The windows are huge.

  • FLIGHT ATTENDANT: We are just excited because we really genuinely love this aircraft.

  • REPORTER: Is there anything else you wanna add?

  • AIR CANADA PILOT: Uh, no we're very, very happy.

  • REPORTER: From a seating point of view how is it different?

  • REPORTER: Are there more restrooms? BUT IS THERE ANOTHER REALITY?

  • ONE REVEALED BY A BURNING BATTERY. BY THE WORDS OF THE WORKERS WHO BUILD THE

  • PLANES.

  • UC WORKER: We're not building them to fly, We're building them to sell. You know what

  • I'm saying? BY BOEING'S APPARENT CHANGES TO ITS OWN QUALITY

  • PROTOCOL. BOEING SAYS THE 787 HAS NO MORE PROBLEMS THAN

  • PREVIOUS MODELS. THE FAA SAYS THERE'S NEVER BEEN A SAFER TIME

  • TO FLY. THE DREAMLINER IS THE FASTEST-SELLING PLANE

  • IN THE WORLD. ONE DAY WE MAY ALL FIND OURSELVES ON BOARD.

  • WHEN WE DO, WE WILL TRUST BOEING HAS PUT QUALITY FIRST;

  • WE WILL TRUST THE REGULATORS HAVE BEEN RIGOROUS; ULTIMATELY, WE WILL TRUST THE PLANE IS SAFE.

THE BOEING 787.

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半島電視臺調查--破碎的夢。波音787 (Al Jazeera Investigates - Broken Dreams: The Boeing 787)

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