In the 1980s, it produced over 50% of the world's semiconductors, surpassing even the

20 世紀 80 年代，它生產的半導體佔世界總量的 50%以上，甚至超過了美國。

United States.

美國。

But only a few decades later, everybody has forgotten how Japan was the global leader in one of the most important industries in the entire world.

但僅僅幾十年後，所有人都忘記了日本是如何在全世界最重要的行業之一中佔據全球領先地位的。

How did Japan, a prosperous and economic might, go from a semiconductor powerhouse to a forgotten leader?

作為一個繁榮的經濟大國，日本是如何從一個半導體強國變成一個被遺忘的領導者的？

Let's first start from the very beginning.

讓我們先從頭開始。

Japan's dominance in the global semiconductor industry in the 1980s didn't happen overnight.

20 世紀 80 年代，日本在全球半導體行業的主導地位並非一蹴而就。

It was the result of deliberate government intervention, strategic planning by corporate giants, and a focus on technological innovation.

這是政府有意干預、企業巨頭戰略規劃和注重技術創新的結果。

The journey began after Japan's defeat in World War II.

旅程始於日本在第二次世界大戰中戰敗之後。

The country had a massive task in rebuilding its economy, and with significant help from the United States under the Marshall Plan, they were able to immediately build everything back up.

美國根據馬歇爾計劃提供了大量幫助，使該國能夠立即重建經濟。

The Japanese government at that time had set up a ministry called the Ministry of International

當時，日本政府設立了一個名為 "國際省 "的部委

Trade and Industry.

貿易與工業。

MITI had prioritized industrial development as a source of economic development in the 1950s, and eventually, as decades passed, the agency saw the importance of the electronic sector as key to Japan's technological advancement.

20 世紀 50 年代，工業和信息化部將工業發展作為經濟發展的優先事項，幾十年過去了，該機構最終認識到電子部門的重要性，認為它是日本技術進步的關鍵。

But during that decade, Japan still had a lot of catching up to do.

但在這十年間，日本仍有許多工作要做。

What little they had was heavily reliant on technology licensing from Western companies, particularly American firms.

他們僅有的一點技術在很大程度上依賴於西方公司，特別是美國公司的技術許可。

For instance, NEC, Nippon Electric Company, and Toshiba, two of Japan's early tech pioneers, licensed transistor technology from American companies such as RCA and Western Electric.

例如，NEC、日本電氣公司（Nippon Electric Company）和東芝公司（Toshiba）這兩家日本早期的科技先驅，都從 RCA 和西電公司（Western Electric）等美國公司獲得了半導體技術的許可。

This, however, allowed Japanese firms to begin manufacturing transistors, laying the groundwork for future semiconductor production.

然而，這使得日本公司開始生產半導體，為未來的半導體生產奠定了基礎。

An important business would rise up, which would set the stone for Japan's semiconductor industry.

一個重要的企業將崛起，為日本的半導體產業奠定基石。

In 1957, Sony had made headlines by producing the first all-transistor radio.

1957 年，索尼公司生產出第一臺全半導體收音機，成為當時的頭條新聞。

This was a key milestone, as it marked Japan's entry into the global electronics market.

這是一個重要的里程碑，因為它標誌著日本進入了全球電子市場。

As the 1960s decade came, MITI had started to support the industry's development through subsidies, tax incentives, and research collaboration.

隨著 20 世紀 60 年代的到來，工信部開始通過補貼、稅收優惠和研究合作來支持該行業的發展。

By the mid of the decade, the Japanese government launched the Integrated Circuit Project, or

十年中期，日本政府啟動了集成電路項目，即

IC Project, which aimed to develop homegrown semiconductor technology.

集成電路項目，旨在開發本土半導體技術。

Many Japanese companies, including NEC, Toshiba, and Hitachi, became key participants in this government-backed initiative.

許多日本公司，包括 NEC、東芝和日立，都成為這項由政府支持的計劃的主要參與者。

The IC Project allowed these firms to leapfrog from transistor production to integrated circuits, which were becoming increasingly important in electronics.

集成電路項目使這些公司得以從半導體生產跨越到集成電路生產，而集成電路在電子產品中的重要性正與日俱增。

Thus, by the late 1960s, Japanese semiconductor firms became globally competitive overnight.

是以，到 20 世紀 60 年代末，日本半導體公司一夜之間成為具有全球競爭力的企業。

NEC and Fujitsu in particular began investing heavily in R&D to develop their own semiconductor technologies.

特別是 NEC 和富士通開始投入巨資進行研發，開發自己的半導體技術。

As Japan entered the 1970s, and only a little less than two decades from where it started, the semiconductor industry had started to blossom.

進入 20 世紀 70 年代後，日本的半導體產業開始蓬勃發展，距其起步僅有不到 20 年的時間。

It was also at this time that Japan's economy was booming.

也正是在這個時候，日本經濟蓬勃發展。

Demand for consumer electronics such as radios, televisions, and calculators was growing rapidly.

收音機、電視機和計算器等消費電子產品的需求迅速增長。

This pushed Japanese firms like NEC, Toshiba, and Fujitsu to seize the opportunity and focus on mass-producing integrated circuits for these products.

這促使 NEC、東芝和富士通等日本公司抓住機遇，專注於為這些產品大規模生產集成電路。

During this period, Japanese firms also benefited from the close-knit industrial structure known as kiretsu, which fostered collaboration between manufacturers, suppliers, and banks.

在此期間，日本企業還受益於被稱為 "kiretsu "的緊密型產業結構，這種結構促進了製造商、供應商和銀行之間的合作。

The kiretsu system enabled companies to access capital and resources more easily, which was crucial for financing expensive semiconductor R&D and production.

該制度使公司能夠更容易地獲得資本和資源，這對於資助昂貴的半導體研發和生產至關重要。

By 1978, Japan's semiconductor industry received a major boost with the launch of

到 1978 年，日本的半導體工業隨著 "MEMS "的推出而得到了極大的發展。

Very Large-Scale Integration Project, or VLSI.

超大規模集成項目（VLSI）。

Spearheaded by MITI, this project aimed to develop cutting-edge semiconductor technologies such as dynamic random-access memory chips.

該項目由 MITI 牽頭，旨在開發動態隨機存取存儲芯片等尖端半導體技術。

The VLSI project was a government-led R&D initiative that involved collaboration between

超大規模集成電路項目是一項由政府主導的研發計劃，涉及以下方面的合作

Japan's leading tech firms, including NEC, Toshiba, Hitachi, and Fujitsu.

日本領先的科技公司，包括 NEC、東芝、日立和富士通。

The VLSI project provided Japanese firms with the tools and resources needed to develop advanced manufacturing processes and chip designs.

超大規模集成電路項目為日本公司提供了開發先進製造工藝和芯片設計所需的工具和資源。

By pooling knowledge and resources through government-backed projects, Japanese companies gained a competitive edge over their American rivals, which were more fragmented and operated independently.

通過政府支持的項目彙集知識和資源，日本公司獲得了比美國競爭對手更強的競爭優勢，因為美國競爭對手更加分散和獨立營運。

By the early 1980s, Japan was rapidly gaining ground on the United States in semiconductor manufacturing.

到 20 世紀 80 年代初，日本在半導體制造領域迅速趕超美國。

Japanese companies had mastered the art of mass production, focusing on high yields and low defect rates.

日本公司掌握了大規模生產的藝術，注重高產量和低缺陷率。

Their DRAM chips, in particular, became highly competitive on the global market.

尤其是他們的 DRAM 芯片，在全球市場上極具競爭力。

During this time, NEC, Toshiba, and Hitachi emerged as the top players in Japan's semiconductor industry.

在此期間，NEC、東芝和日立成為日本半導體行業的佼佼者。

These companies were able to produce DRAM chips more efficiently than their American counterparts, largely due to Japan's superior manufacturing processes and quality control systems.

這些公司能夠比美國同行更高效地生產 DRAM 芯片，這主要歸功於日本卓越的製造工藝和品質控制系統。

Japanese firms also adopted a long-term investment strategy focusing on improving production yields and reducing costs.

日本企業還採取了以提高產量和降低成本為重點的長期投資戰略。

By 1983, Japan overtook the United States in DRAM production, marking a significant milestone.

到 1983 年，日本的 DRAM 產量超過了美國，成為一個重要的里程碑。

Japanese companies held nearly 50% of the global semiconductor market share, with their dominance particularly pronounced in memory chips.

日本公司佔據了全球半導體市場近 50% 的份額，在存儲芯片領域的優勢尤為明顯。

Then, in 1986, Japan reached the peak of its semiconductor dominance.

1986 年，日本在半導體領域的主導地位達到頂峰。

That year, Japan controlled over 50% of the global semiconductor market, with NEC, Toshiba, and Fujitsu leading the charge.

這一年，日本控制了全球半導體市場 50% 以上的份額，NEC、東芝和富士通在其中處於領先地位。

Japanese companies had successfully outmaneuvered their American rivals in the DRAM market, where they enjoyed a significant cost advantage.

日本公司在 DRAM 市場上成功地擊敗了美國競爭對手，在成本方面享有顯著優勢。

However, this success also attracted scrutiny and concern from the United States, which feared losing its technological edge.

然而，這一成功也引起了美國的關注和擔憂，因為美國擔心失去技術優勢。

This led to increased tensions between Japan and the U.S., culminating in the 1986 U.S.-Japan

這導致日本和美國之間的緊張關係加劇，最終導致了 1986 年的美日

Semiconductor Agreement.

半導體協議。

The agreement forced Japan to open its domestic market to foreign semiconductors and imposed export restrictions, which ultimately slowed Japan's growth.

該協議迫使日本向外國半導體開放國內市場，並實施出口限制，最終導致日本經濟增長放緩。

This occurred because as Japan came to dominate that semiconductor industry, the United States government had accused Japan of unfair trade practices, claiming that Japanese companies were receiving government subsidies and other forms of protectionism that gave them an unfair advantage.

出現這種情況的原因是，隨著日本在半導體行業佔據主導地位，美國政府指責日本採取了不公平的貿易做法，聲稱日本公司接受了政府補貼和其他形式的保護主義，從而獲得了不公平的優勢。

Thus, the very 1986 agreement was signed, which was a primary catalyst for Japan's semiconductor downfall.

就這樣，1986 年的協議簽署了，它是日本半導體衰落的主要催化劑。

Allowing American companies to gain a foothold in the Japanese market eroded the dominance of domestic firms.

允許美國公司在日本市場站穩腳跟，削弱了國內公司的主導地位。

It had also created uncertainty for Japanese semiconductor manufacturers, limiting their ability to export chips at the scale they had previously achieved.

這也給日本半導體制造商帶來了不確定性，限制了他們像以前那樣大規模出口芯片的能力。

This hampered growth and weakened Japan's competitive edge.

這阻礙了經濟增長，削弱了日本的競爭優勢。

From this point onward, Japan's semiconductor industry had started to slow down, and by the 1990s marked the beginning of Japan's decline in the semiconductor industry.

從這時起，日本的半導體產業開始放緩，到 20 世紀 90 年代，標誌著日本半導體產業開始走下坡路。

While Japanese firms remained competitive in DRAM production, they failed to capitalize on the emerging microprocessor market, which was quickly dominated by American companies like Intel.

雖然日本公司在 DRAM 生產方面仍具有競爭力，但它們未能利用新興的微處理器市場，該市場很快就被英特爾等美國公司佔據。

On top of that, the 1990s also saw the rise of South Korea and Taiwan.

除此之外，20 世紀 90 年代還見證了韓國和臺灣的崛起。

The two nations had quickly emerged as new semiconductor powerhouses.

這兩個國家迅速成為新的半導體強國。

South Korean companies, particularly Samsung, aggressively entered the DRAM market in the 1990s, leveraging advanced yield management techniques and significant government support.

20 世紀 90 年代，韓國公司，尤其是三星，利用先進的產量管理技術和政府的大力支持，積極進入 DRAM 市場。

Samsung's ability to produce semiconductors at lower costs and with higher efficiency began to erode Japan's market share.

三星以更低的成本和更高的效率生產半導體的能力開始侵蝕日本的市場份額。

Similarly, Taiwan's TSMC, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, revolutionized the semiconductor industry with its Fabless model.

同樣，臺灣的臺灣積體電路製造公司（TSMC）以其無晶圓廠模式徹底改變了半導體行業。

Rather than producing its own chips, TSMC focused on manufacturing semiconductors for other companies, which allowed it to scale quickly and become a leader in the foundry business.

臺積電沒有生產自己的芯片，而是專注於為其他公司製造半導體，這使它能夠迅速擴大規模，併成為代工業務的領導者。

Japanese companies, by contrast, clung to their vertically integrated business models, which made them less flexible and less competitive in the rapidly evolving global market.

相比之下，日本公司則固守其垂直整合的業務模式，這使得它們在快速發展的全球市場中靈活性和競爭力大打折扣。

However, we should not simply blame the American government for their decline.

然而，我們不應該簡單地將他們的衰落歸咎於美國政府。

Another major factor in Japan's decline was also its inability to adapt to emerging markets within the semiconductor industry.

日本衰落的另一個主要因素是無法適應半導體行業的新興市場。

During the 1980s, Japan excelled in memory chips, particularly DRAM, but it failed to capitalize on the growing importance of microprocessors.

20 世紀 80 年代，日本在存儲芯片，尤其是 DRAM 方面表現出色，但卻未能抓住微處理器日益重要的機遇。

Microprocessors were becoming increasingly vital to industries such as personal computing and consumer electronics, and American companies like Intel quickly seized control of this market.

微處理器對個人電腦和消費電子產品等行業越來越重要，英特爾等美國公司迅速控制了這一市場。

Japanese companies, however, remained heavily invested in memory chips and did not prioritize diversification into microprocessors or other more advanced types of semiconductors.

然而，日本公司仍然大量投資於存儲芯片，並沒有優先考慮向微處理器或其他更先進的半導體類型進行多元化發展。

This focus on a single segment of the market made Japanese firms vulnerable when demand for DRAM began to stagnate and when American companies began to dominate the more lucrative microprocessor market.

當對 DRAM 的需求開始停滯不前時，當美國公司開始主導利潤更豐厚的微處理器市場時，這種專注於單一細分市場的做法使日本公司不堪一擊。

Additionally, Japanese companies were slow to embrace the Fabless model, which had gained traction globally.

此外，日本公司對無工廠模式的接受速度較慢，而這種模式已在全球範圍內得到推廣。

In the Fabless model, companies focus on semiconductor design and innovation while outsourcing manufacturing to specialized foundries.

在無晶圓廠模式中，公司專注於半導體設計和創新，同時將製造外包給專業代工廠。

Companies like Qualcomm and Broadcom flourished under this model, but Japanese firms, which had historically emphasized vertical integration, were hesitant to adopt it.

高通和博通等公司在這種模式下蓬勃發展，但歷來強調縱向一體化的日本公司卻對採用這種模式猶豫不決。

This left them behind in terms of innovation and market responsiveness.

這使它們在創新和市場反應能力方面落後了。

Then, as everyone knows, in the 1990s, Japan had faced broader economic struggles, which also contributed to the downfall of its semiconductor industry.

然後，眾所周知，在 20 世紀 90 年代，日本面臨著更廣泛的經濟困境，這也導致了日本半導體產業的衰落。

In the late 1980s, Japan experienced a massive asset bubble, fueled by speculative investments in real estate and the stock market.

20 世紀 80 年代末，在房地產和股票市場投機性投資的推動下，日本出現了大規模的資產保麗龍。

When the bubble burst in the early 1990s, Japan entered a period of economic stagnation known as the Lost Decade.

20 世紀 90 年代初保麗龍破滅後，日本進入了被稱為 "失去的十年 "的經濟停滯期。

During this time, the country experienced slow economic growth, high levels of corporate debt, and widespread bankruptcies.

在此期間，該國經濟增長緩慢，公司債務高企，破產現象普遍。

The economic downturn hit the semiconductor industry particularly hard.

經濟衰退對半導體行業的打擊尤為嚴重。

Companies like NEC, Toshiba, and Hitachi were forced to cut back on research and development spending just as global competitors were ramping up investments in next-generation semiconductor technologies.

正當全球競爭對手紛紛加大對新一代半導體技術的投資時，NEC、東芝和日立等公司卻被迫削減研發支出。

The lack of sufficient R&D spending prevented Japanese firms from keeping pace with technological advancements, such as the development of smaller, more efficient chips.

由於缺乏足夠的研發支出，日本公司無法跟上技術進步的步伐，如開發更小、更高效的芯片。

As the 21st century arrived, Japan's semiconductor industry continued to struggle.

進入 21 世紀後，日本的半導體產業繼續陷入困境。

While Japanese firms remained strong in certain segments, such as semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials, they were no longer the dominant force they once were in chip production.

雖然日本公司在某些領域（如半導體制造設備和材料）依然強大，但在芯片生產領域已不再是過去的主導力量。

The rise and fall of Japan's semiconductor industry is indeed one of history's greatest stories.

日本半導體產業的興衰的確是歷史上最偉大的故事之一。

But anyway, do let us know what you think!

無論如何，請告訴我們您的想法！

Thanks for watching!

感謝觀看！