TSMC the sort of crown jewel of Taiwan's technology industry having success early in the U.S. and the support of the U.S. to do it in the context of China.

臺積電是臺灣科技產業皇冠上的明珠，很早就在美國取得了成功，並在美國的支持下在中國取得了成功。

That's a difficult one.

這是一個難題。

That's right.

這就對了。

This is really very good news.

這真是一個非常好的消息。

And it means that the Biden policy of both having some tough export controls on certain very small critical technologies but also these subsidies.

這意味著拜登的政策既要對某些非常小的關鍵技術進行嚴格的出口管制，又要提供這些補貼。

I think TSMC got six billion in in subsidies five billion in loans.

我認為臺積電獲得了 60 億美元的補貼和 50 億美元的貸款。

Other companies are getting similar.

其他公司也有類似情況。

That.

這。

Project of pushing our semiconductor industry forward is actually working.

推動我們半導體產業發展的項目實際上正在發揮作用。

We come to you because of your rich experience when it comes to foreign policy the work that you do with the Aspen Strategy Group the work you've done with the U.S. government thus far.

我們來找您，是因為您在外交政策方面有著豐富的經驗，您在阿斯彭戰略集團所做的工作，以及迄今為止您在美國政府所做的工作。

Do you.

你

What do you grade this focus of the United States on on ensuring of chip supply from an A to a D.

您如何給美國確保芯片供應的這一重點打分，從 A 到 D。

Are they surpassing expectations.

它們是否超出預期。

It's a good question.

這是個好問題。

I would give it about an A minus.

我給它打 A 負分。

So the important thing is to keep our eye on the long term ball.

是以，重要的是我們要著眼於長遠。

There are certain key technologies where the U.S. and our competitors are more and more competitors in that space.

在某些關鍵技術領域，美國和我們的競爭對手越來越多。

We do that in two ways by slowing them down.

我們通過兩種方式來實現這一目標，一是減緩它們的速度。

That's the export controls and by speeding ourselves up.

這就是出口管制和加快速度。

My personal view is that we've done pretty close to what we can do to slow the Chinese down.

我個人的觀點是，我們已經盡了最大努力來減緩中國人的腳步。

They're great entrepreneurs themselves.

他們本身就是偉大的企業家。

We've had some very tough export controls on the most advanced chips and also on the tools that makes the U.S. side won't slow China down.

我們對最先進的芯片和工具實施了非常嚴厲的出口管制，這使得美方不會拖中國的後腿。

It just means our companies won't have the revenue that they need to fund the research and development to keep ourselves in the lead.

這隻意味著我們的公司將沒有必要的收入來資助研發，以保持我們的領先地位。

Let's just set the context of this week as well because there was some hiccups shall we say to the U.S. focus on containing semiconductor expertise limiting it from going into Chinese hands in particular.

讓我們先來了解一下本週的背景，因為我們可以說，美國對半導體專業技術的控制出現了一些小插曲，尤其是限制其流入中國手中。

We hear that TSMC has had to admit that somehow its chips are working its way into Huawei's products even though Huawei has been cut off in theory since 2020.

我們聽說，臺積電不得不承認，儘管華為從 2020 年起理論上就被切斷了與臺積電的合作，但不知何故，臺積電的芯片正在進入華為的產品。

News today that Al chip technology said it has no direct or indirect business dealings with Huawei.

今天有消息稱，Al 芯片技術公司表示與華為沒有直接或間接的業務往來。

Of course many trying to work out how and which client of TSMC is allowed the chips to get into the hand of Huawei.

當然，很多人都在試圖弄清檯積電是如何以及是哪家客戶允許這些芯片落入華為之手的。

But how effective can these limitations really be on you.

但是，這些限制對你的影響到底有多大。

That's a perfect question.

這是一個完美的問題。

And this example shows exactly how difficult it is.

而這個例子恰恰說明了它的難度。

You know there are lots of well-meaning people in the U.S. government in European governments trying to get this right and trying to make the controls narrowly focused and effective.

你知道，在美國政府和歐洲各國政府中，有很多善意的人都在努力做好這件事，並試圖使控制措施具有針對性和有效性。

Very very hard to do.

非常非常難做到。

I think they're doing quite a good job.

我認為他們做得很好。

I worry however that for example you see some folks in the might go into a Trump administration very tough on China.

不過，我擔心的是，比如說，你會看到特朗普政府中的一些人可能會對中國採取非常強硬的態度。

China hawks saying well we're just going to control more.

中國鷹派說，好吧，我們只是要控制更多。

We're going to put more companies on the entity list.

我們將把更多的公司列入實體名單。

And as you're seeing with this TSMC example even when people are well-meaning it's just very very difficult to do things with controls alone.

正如你在臺積電的例子中所看到的，即使人們都是出於好意，但僅靠控制是非常非常困難的。

You've got to run faster.

你必須跑得更快。

Which is more powerful then.

那麼哪個更強大呢？

We've covered the export controls part of this story deeply on this program.

我們已經在本節目中深入報道了這一事件的出口管制部分。

But they almost work in parallel.

但它們幾乎是並行工作的。

You sort of can't have one way out the other if your end goal is to make your own nation more competitive in any given field or domain.

如果你的最終目標是讓自己的國家在任何特定領域或領域更有競爭力，那麼你就不能一意孤行。

That's absolutely right.

完全正確。

I'm firmly on the side of running faster is better.

我堅定地認為，跑得越快越好。

We have an amazing innovation engine.

我們擁有令人驚歎的創新引擎。

I live out here in fast.

我住在快。

One of the things that's underappreciated everyone always talks about the chip sack the subsidies to semiconductor fabs.

每個人都在談論芯片袋對半導體工廠的補貼，但其中有一件事卻被忽視了。

What they don't talk about so much is that there was supposed to be one hundred and seventy billion dollars for going into basic science R&D funding.

他們不常提及的是，原本應該有 1700 億美元用於基礎科學研發資金。

This is really important.

這一點非常重要。

This creates all of the technologies of the future.

這創造了未來的所有技術。

You know OK Siri GPS.

OK Siri GPS。

And so those are the questions.

這些就是問題所在。

How closely do you follow and assess their response to the TSMC situation.

您如何密切關注和評估他們對臺積電情況的反應？

China is great.

中國是偉大的。

They're doing a lot of innovating.

他們正在進行大量創新。

Their companies are excellent.

他們的公司非常出色。

If you look at for example what they're doing on artificial intelligence they're large language models.

舉例來說，如果你看看他們在人工智能方面所做的工作，他們正在建立大型語言模型。

The biggest models in A.I. are depending who you ask three six nine months behind because of our chips controls.

由於我們的芯片控制，人工智能領域最大的模型落後了三到六個月。

But on certain other parts of artificial intelligence computer vision surveillance drones they're really first rate.

但在人工智能計算機視覺監控無人機的某些其他方面，它們確實是一流的。

So the Chinese are going to keep running fast.

是以，中國人將繼續快速奔跑。

And I would just say one thing.

我只想說一件事。

This policy needs to be nuanced.

這項政策需要細緻入微。

It's not like we are competing with China on absolutely every technology.

我們又不是在每項技術上都要與中國競爭。

There are certain areas where we should still be really sensitive.

在某些領域，我們仍然應該非常敏感。

That can be dual use where we need to be more careful.

這可能是我們需要更加小心的雙重用途。

Push us forward then.

那就推動我們前進吧。

No matter what the administration after November 5th 6th will there forever be this idea of tension and ultimately opposing nations between China and U.S. when it comes to A.I.

無論 11 月 5 日和 6 日之後的政府如何，在人工智能方面，中美之間是否會永遠存在緊張關係，並最終成為對立的國家。

Do you see any grounds for a more dovish approach.

您認為是否有理由採取更加鴿派的態度？

Yeah I do think we are entering a phase where the Chinese government led by Xi Jinping specifically has said they want to advance in certain technologies A.I. semiconductors 5G 6G certain others.

是的，我認為我們正在進入這樣一個階段：以習近平為首的中國政府特別表示，他們希望在某些技術領域取得進步，如人工智能、半導體、5G、6G 等。

They've set this out in the plan and they want to have a very dominant military.

他們已經在計劃中確定了這一點，他們希望擁有一支非常強大的軍隊。

And those two things are quite worrying.

這兩點令人擔憂。

Understandably so to the U.S.

對美國來說，這是可以理解的。

Europe our friends and allies.

歐洲，我們的朋友和盟友

And so I do think no matter who wins our election this part of the technology race and I don't call it a war I call it a tech race is going to continue.

是以，我認為無論誰贏得大選，這場科技競賽都將繼續下去，我不把它稱為戰爭，而稱之為科技競賽。

This is a big long term push that's going to continue.

這將是一項長期的重大舉措，並將持續下去。

That and lots of other areas when I see companies in the consumer sector and agriculture and other places still doing a lot of work with China.

當我看到消費行業、農業和其他領域的公司仍在與中國開展大量合作時，我就會想到這一點以及很多其他領域。

It doesn't mean that there has to be a complete decoupling.

這並不意味著必須完全脫鉤。