When Putin invaded Ukraine, many commentators immediately assumed that Russia's subsequent decoupling from the West would push it closer to China.

當普京入侵烏克蘭時，許多評論家立即認為，俄羅斯隨後與西方脫鉤將使其更接近中國。

But while that has obviously happened to some extent, the actual depth of this new Russia-China alliance has always been a bit ambiguous.

不過，雖然這在某種程度上顯然已經發生，但中俄這一新聯盟的實際深度卻始終有些模糊不清。

However, in the past few months, there have been a number of reports suggesting that China-Russia relations are more strained than Xi and Putin sometimes make out, and that the relationship is perhaps more transactional than more pessimistic Western commentators might assume.

然而，在過去的幾個月裡，有許多報道表明，中俄關系比習近平和普京有時所說的更加緊張，中俄關系也許比西方悲觀評論家所認為的更多是交易關係。

So in this video, we're going to take a look at how Sino-Russian relations have changed over time, the recent points of tension, and what this tells us about the nature of relations more generally.

是以，在這段視頻中，我們將看看中俄關系隨著時間的推移發生了怎樣的變化，最近的緊張局勢，以及這對兩國關係性質的總體啟示。

Before we start, if you haven't already, please consider subscribing and ringing the bell to stay in the loop and be notified when we release new videos.

在我們開始之前，如果您還沒有訂閱，請考慮訂閱並按鈴，以便在我們發佈新視頻時及時收到通知。

So let's start with a bit of context.

我們先來了解一下背景情況。

From basically the 60s until the collapse of the Soviet Union, China and Russia, or rather the Soviet Union, didn't really get on.

基本上從上世紀 60 年代到蘇聯解體，中國和俄羅斯，或者說蘇聯，並沒有真正走到一起。

There were a whole load of reasons for this, including differing interpretations of Marxism – the PRC actually accused the Soviet Union of being revisionist traitors in 1961 – and an ongoing border dispute which escalated into a war in 1969.

造成這種情況的原因有很多，包括對馬克思主義的不同理解--1961 年，中華人民共和國實際上指責蘇聯是修正主義叛徒--以及持續的邊界爭端，並在 1969 年升級為戰爭。

But one of the recurring issues was foreign policy.

但其中一個反覆出現的問題是外交政策。

In the 50s and 60s, Mao disagreed with Khrushchev's notion of peaceful coexistence between East and West, and resented the Soviet Union's growing ties with India.

上世紀五六十年代，毛澤東不同意赫魯曉夫提出的東西方和平共處的理念，並對蘇聯與印度日益密切的關係感到不滿。

Then in the 70s, when Cold War tensions were at their peak, Mao pursued a policy of rapprochement with the US, culminating in Nixon's visit to China in 1972.

上世紀 70 年代，當冷戰的緊張局勢達到頂峰時，毛澤東推行了與美國和解的政策，1972 年尼克松訪華更是將這一政策推向高潮。

Tensions were permanently high until the collapse of the Soviet Union, when its diminished geopolitical status forced Russia to pursue a more conciliatory foreign policy.

緊張局勢一直持續到蘇聯解體，蘇聯地緣政治地位的下降迫使俄羅斯奉行更加和解的外交政策。

In 1991, the two sides resolved their long-standing border dispute with the Sino-Soviet Border

1991 年，雙方通過中蘇邊界協定解決了長期存在的邊界爭端。

Agreement.

協議。

In 1992, they declared they were pursuing a constructive partnership.

1992 年，雙方宣佈建立建設性夥伴關係。

In 1996, they said it had become a strategic partnership.

1996 年，雙方表示已成為戰略合作伙伴關係。

And in 2001, they signed the Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation, which is maybe the most chummily named treaty in the history of international affairs.

2001 年，兩國簽署了《睦鄰友好合作條約》，這也許是國際事務史上名稱最友好的條約了。

The treaty lasted 20 years, and was recently renewed for another five.

該條約持續了 20 年，最近又延長了 5 年。

The relationship has been buoyed by a good personal relationship between Putin and Xi, and complementary economies.

普京和習近平之間良好的個人關係以及互補的經濟為兩國關係注入了活力。

During China's rapid industrial development, it needed lots of energy, and specifically oil.

在中國工業快速發展的過程中，需要大量能源，特別是石油。

In 2007, Russia exported about $15 billion worth of goods to China, mostly oil.

2007 年，俄羅斯向中國出口了價值約 150 億美元的商品，其中大部分是石油。

In 2019, that figure had nearly quadrupled to $57 billion.

到 2019 年，這一數字幾乎翻了兩番，達到 570 億美元。

Russia overtook Saudi Arabia to become China's largest oil supplier, and China overtook Germany to become Russia's largest trading partner.

俄羅斯超過沙特阿拉伯成為中國最大的石油供應國，中國超過德國成為俄羅斯最大的貿易伙伴。

When the war in Ukraine kicked off, most analysts expected it to push Russia and China closer together.

當烏克蘭戰爭爆發時，大多數分析家都預計這場戰爭會使俄羅斯和中國走得更近。

The subsequent severing of Russia's economic relations with most of the West made it increasingly dependent on China for international trade, and the CCP were at least sympathetic to Russia's invasion.

隨後，俄羅斯與大多數西方國家斷絕了經濟關係，使其在國際貿易中越來越依賴中國，而中國共產黨至少對俄羅斯的入侵持同情態度。

While the CCP were wary of endorsing any violation of internationally recognised borders because of Taiwan, which is recognised by most of the international community as part of China,

雖然中國共產黨對任何違反國際公認邊界的行為都持謹慎態度，因為臺灣被國際社會大多數國家承認為中國的一部分、

China has always been pretty anti-NATO, both because they see it as a vehicle for American hegemony and because of NATO's bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999.

中國一直非常反感北約，因為他們認為北約是美國霸權的工具，也因為 1999 年北約轟炸了中國駐貝爾格萊德大使館。

For context, during the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, five guided bombs from a US plane hit the embassy, killing three Chinese journalists.

在北約轟炸南斯拉夫期間，一架美國飛機上的五枚制導炸彈擊中了大使館，造成三名中國記者死亡。

President Clinton apologised for the bombing, stating that it was an accident, but the CCP weren't entirely convinced.

克林頓總統為爆炸事件道歉，稱這是一次意外，但中國共產黨並不完全相信。

The CIA would later admit that it was the only bombing during the entire campaign organised by the agency, and a report in the Observer published five months after the bombing claimed that it had been deliberately targeted because the CIA had evidence it was being used to transmit Yugoslav army communications.

中情局後來承認，這是中情局在整個行動中組織的唯一一次轟炸，而《觀察家報》在轟炸發生五個月後發表的一篇報道則聲稱，中情局之所以蓄意將其作為轟炸目標，是因為中情局有證據表明它被用來傳輸南斯拉夫軍隊的通信。

This is something largely forgotten in the West, but it sparked enormous public outrage in China, which still simmers today.

這件事在西方已被遺忘，但在中國卻引發了巨大的公憤，至今仍餘波未平。

Anyway, this has happened to some extent.

總之，這種情況在某種程度上已經發生了。

China has continued to trade with Russia, and has indeed become by far and away its largest trading partner.

中國繼續與俄羅斯進行貿易往來，並已成為其最大的貿易伙伴。

Its continued exports of so-called dual-use goods, things that could be used for either military or civilian purposes like drones or machine parts, has provoked serious irritation in the West, although the CCP have at least nominally complied with US requests to not supply arms to Russia directly.

儘管中國共產黨至少在名義上遵守了美國不直接向俄羅斯供應武器的要求，但它繼續出口所謂的軍民兩用產品（如無人機或機械零件等可用於軍事或民用目的的物品），這引起了西方國家的嚴重不滿。

China and Russia have also continued to perform joint military drills, including in the seas around Taiwan.

中國和俄羅斯還繼續進行聯合軍事演習，包括在臺灣周邊海域的演習。

However, in the past few months, the limits of this friendship have become increasingly apparent.

然而，在過去幾個月裡，這種友誼的侷限性日益明顯。

As we see it, there are at least three things today that suggest that Sino-Russia relations aren't quite as solid as they're sometimes made out to be.

在我們看來，今天至少有三件事表明，中俄關系並不像人們有時所說的那樣穩固。

The first is the ongoing dispute over gas pricing.

首先是關於天然氣定價的持續爭議。

When Europe stopped importing Russian pipeline gas, there was a hope in Moscow that Russia would be able to redirect some of these exports to China via a new pipeline called the Power of Siberia 2.

當歐洲停止進口俄羅斯管道天然氣時，莫斯科曾希望俄羅斯能夠通過一條名為 "西伯利亞力量 2 號 "的新管道，將部分出口天然氣轉運到中國。

China already received some Russian gas via the first Power of Siberia pipeline, which began operating in 2019 and has a maximum annual capacity of 38 billion cubic metres.

中國已經通過第一條 "西伯利亞力量 "管道接收了部分俄羅斯天然氣，該管道於 2019 年開始營運，最大年輸送能力為 380 億立方米。

But this is a far cry from the 200 billion cubic metres Russia used to export to Europe.

但這與俄羅斯過去向歐洲出口 2 000 億立方米的數量相去甚遠。

The Power of Siberia 2 was supposed to have a capacity of 50 billion cubic metres, but two years in and construction hasn't even started yet.

西伯利亞電力 2 號 "原計劃產能為 500 億立方米，但兩年過去了，工程甚至還沒有開工。

According to a report from the Financial Times, this is because China is demanding unpalatably low prices from Gazprom, Russia's majority state-owned energy company, which suffered a 600 billion ruble loss last year, its worst performance in at least 25 years.

據英國《金融時報》報道，這是因為中國要求俄羅斯天然氣工業股份公司（Gazprom）提供難以接受的低價，該公司是俄羅斯佔多數的國有能源公司，去年虧損 6000 億盧布，創下至少 25 年來的最差業績。

This is presumably because China knows that Russia needs China as a reliable export market, and would also explain why Russia already receives less for its gas than other suppliers.

這大概是因為中國知道俄羅斯需要中國這個可靠的出口市場，同時也可以解釋為什麼俄羅斯的天然氣價格已經低於其他供應國。

The second thing worth noting is that, in the past few months, Chinese banks have become increasingly unwilling to help Russia evade Western sanctions.

第二點值得注意的是，在過去幾個月裡，中國的銀行越來越不願意幫助俄羅斯逃避西方制裁。

According to Business Insider, nearly all Chinese banks are now refusing to process

據《商業內幕》報道，現在幾乎所有的中國銀行都拒絕處理......

Russian payments, and a separate report from the Financial Times claims that the Kremlin are disappointed by Beijing's unwillingness to use state banks to evade sanctions and maximise trade.

金融時報》的另一篇報道稱，克里姆林宮對北京不願利用國有銀行逃避制裁和最大限度地擴大貿易感到失望。

This is in part because Western sanctions have been deliberately recalibrated to deter

部分原因是西方國家有意重新調整制裁措施，以阻止

Chinese entities.

中國實體。

In October, for instance, the US added 42 Chinese companies to its sanction list, and the Biden administration has continued to threaten secondary sanctions aimed at Chinese entities if they continue supporting Russia.

例如，今年 10 月，美國將 42 家中國公司列入制裁名單，拜登政府繼續威脅說，如果中國實體繼續支持俄羅斯，將對其實施二級制裁。

The third thing is that, since May of this year, there have been numerous reports suggesting that Chinese state-backed hackers have been targeting systems used by the Russian government, allegedly to spy on the Russian state.

第三件事是，自今年 5 月以來，有大量報道稱，中國國家支持的黑客一直在攻擊俄羅斯政府使用的系統，據稱是為了監視俄羅斯國家。

Now, to be clear, none of these examples imply, nor are we trying to suggest, that Russia and China are enemies in any way.

現在，要明確的是，這些例子都不意味著，我們也無意暗示，俄羅斯和中國在任何方面都是敵人。

It's not uncommon for superpowers to spy on their allies, and China's harsh bargaining and reluctance to help Russia evade sanctions is just Beijing following its economic self-interest.

超級大國對盟友進行間諜活動並不罕見，而中國苛刻的討價還價和不願幫助俄羅斯逃避制裁的態度只是北京出於自身經濟利益的考慮。

Nonetheless, it's always been a bit of an open question as to whether the blooming Russia-China bromance was a real alliance, or more of a marriage of convenience, and these examples suggest it's the latter.

儘管如此，中俄之間的 "兄弟情 "究竟是真正的聯盟，還是權宜之計，一直是個懸而未決的問題。

If you want to keep learning, the best way is through Imprint.

如果你想繼續學習，最好的辦法就是通過 "版本說明"。

That's the brand new way to learn built from the ground up.

這就是從頭開始的全新學習方式。

And seriously, unless you've used the app before, you likely haven't experienced something like this.

說真的，除非你以前用過這個應用程序，否則你很可能沒有經歷過這樣的事情。

That's because Imprint is beautifully illustrated and animated, creating a highly visual, effective, and interactive learning experience built for bite-sized learning.

這是因為《Imprint》配有精美的插圖和動畫，創造了一種高度可視化、高效和互動的學習體驗，適合一口式學習。

You can take advantage of their expansive library of courses, book summaries, and articles to learn about psychology, philosophy, leadership, the science of happiness, productivity systems, finance, science, technology, health, and wellness, history, and more.

您可以利用其龐大的課程、書摘和文章庫，學習心理學、哲學、領導力、幸福科學、生產力系統、金融、科學、技術、健康和保健、歷史等方面的知識。

Plus, you can learn about these things quickly, with most individual lessons taking a few minutes to complete.

此外，您還可以快速瞭解這些知識，大多數單個課程只需幾分鐘即可完成。

That speed doesn't mean it's light on information either.

速度快並不意味著信息量少。

Imprint is built around the science of learning, so it helps to build habits around learning, utilises high-quality visuals to boost understanding, as well as letting users learn at their own pace.

Imprint 以學習科學為基礎，是以有助於培養學習習慣，利用高質量的視覺效果加深理解，並讓用戶按照自己的節奏學習。

Ultimately, Imprint is a way to feel good about your screen time and learn something new, rather than just mindlessly scrolling on social media.

歸根結底，Imprint 是一種讓你對螢幕時間感覺良好並學習新知識的方式，而不僅僅是在社交媒體上無意識地滾動。

Stop doom-scrolling, start learning.

停止厄運滾動，開始學習。

So join the millions of users learning with Imprint by clicking the link in the description.

請點擊說明中的鏈接，加入數百萬用戶的學習行列。

That way you'll get 20% off an annual plan, plus they'll know you came from us.

這樣，您就可以享受年度計劃 20% 的折扣，而且他們會知道您是從我們這裡購買的。