Name: 哲學殭屍：揭示意識本質的關鍵線索？（Philosophical Zombies (P-Zombies): Are They the Key to Understanding Consciousness?）
Uploaded: 2024-05-20T22:32:57.000Z
Duration: 15 min 20 s

關係子句

Imagine you are on a distant planet, interacting  with an alien species that mirrors human behavior  

想像一下，你在一個遙遠的星球上，與一個完美反映人類行為的

perfectly, yet the species lacks any  subjective experience or awareness. 

外星物種互動，但該物種缺乏任何主觀經驗或意識。

This alien species moves and talks like  humans do, displaying a rich variety of  

這種外星物種像人類一樣行動和說話，表現出豐富多樣的

emotional and social responses. They shake hands, laugh at jokes,  

情感和社會反應。他們握手、講笑話

and show genuine excitement when discussing  their latest achievements. Their world is  

並在討論自己的最新成就時表現出真正的興奮。他們的世界

filled with art, music, and literature, and  they participate in social structures that  

充滿了藝術、音樂和文學，他們參與了與

parallel human families and communities. Their behavior is impeccably human-like.  

人類家庭和社區相似的社會結構。他們的行為無可挑剔地像人類。

However, they lack any inner world of  subjective experience or consciousness. 

然而，他們缺乏任何主觀經驗或意識的內在世界。

These aliens are what philosophers  might call "philosophical zombies" or  

這些外星人可能被哲學家稱為“哲學殭屍”或

"p-zombies," entities that outwardly appear  fully sentient but internally are devoid  

“p-殭屍”，這些實體表面上看起來完全有知覺，但內部卻缺乏

of awareness or subjective feeling. Despite their advanced behaviors and  

意識或主觀感覺。儘管它們具有先進的行為和

complex interactions, they are hollow vessels,  mere automata going through the motions. 

複雜的相互作用，但它們是空心的容器，只是走過場的自動機。

This concept highlights a haunting question about  the nature of consciousness: how can we ever truly  

這個概念凸顯了一個關於意識本質的令人困擾的問題：我們如何才能真正

know what lies within another being, and what is  it that gives rise to our own rich inner lives? 

知道另一個存在的內心是什麼，以及是什麼產生了我們自己豐富的內在生活？

So let's talk about it To delve into the implications  

所以讓我們來談談為了深入研究

of p-zombies, it will be helpful to talk  about the hard problem of consciousness. 

p-殭屍的意義，談論意識這個難題將會有所幫助。

So What is the hard problem of consciousness? 

The "hard problem of consciousness" is a  term coined by philosopher David Chalmers.  

「意識難題」是哲學家大衛·查爾默斯創造的術語。

It addresses the challenge of explaining why and  how subjective experiences, or qualia, arise from  

它解決了解釋主觀經驗或感受性為何以及如何從

neural processes. This contrasts with the "easy  problems" of consciousness, which deal with  

神經過程中產生的挑戰。這與意識的「簡單問題」形成鮮明對比，意識問題涉及

understanding the brain's functional aspects, like  information processing and behavioral responses. 

理解大腦的功能方面，例如訊息處理和行為反應。

While the term "easy problems" is used  somewhat tongue-in-cheek, Chalmers emphasizes  

雖然「簡單問題」這個詞的使用有些半開玩笑，但查爾默斯強調

that these issues are still quite challenging.  As cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker notes,  

這些問題仍然相當具有挑戰性。正如認知心理學家史蒂文·平克（Steven Pinker）指出的那樣，

they are "easy" only in comparison to the  hard problem. At least For the “easy problem”  

只有與困難問題相比，它們才「容易」。至少對於“簡單的問題”，

scientists know what to look for, and with  sufficient resources and intellectual effort,  

科學家們知道要尋找什麼，並且只要有足夠的資源和智力努力，

solutions might be found within this century. The hard problem, on the other hand, seeks to  

可能會在本世紀內找到解決方案。另一方面，難題試圖揭示

uncover why these processes are associated with  personal, internal experiences, such as the  

為什麼這些過程與個人的內在經驗相關，例如

redness of red or the pain of a headache. While science can map brain activity and  

紅色或頭痛。雖然科學可以繪製大腦活動圖並

understand its functions, this problem questions  why these processes give rise to a conscious state  

理解其功能，但這個問題質疑為什麼這些過程會產生意識狀態

rather than operating in darkness. It's  a philosophical issue that continues to  

而不是在黑暗中運作。這是一個持續

puzzle researchers in neuroscience,  cognitive science, and philosophy.

困擾神經科學、認知科學和哲學研究人員的哲學問題。

This leads us to two predominant theories  in the philosophy of mind,Physicalism and  

這將我們引向心靈哲學中的兩個主要理論：物理主義和

What are the differences between  Physicalism and Mind-Body Dualism? 

物理主義和身心二元論之間有什麼區別？

Physicalism posits that everything is physical or  at least supervenes on the physical. Under this  

物理主義認為一切都是物理的，或至少是物理上的。根據這種

view, mental states, including consciousness,  are the result of physical interactions within  

觀點，包括意識在內的精神狀態是 大腦 內物理互動的結果

the brain. If true, the exact replication of  a human's physical brain state should yield  

。 如果這是真的，那麼人類物理大腦狀態的精確複製應該會產生

identical conscious experiences, leaving  no room for p-zombies—they simply cannot  

相同的意識體驗，不給p殭屍留下任何空間——它們根本不可能

exist because their physical equivalence  to humans necessitates consciousness. 

存在，因為它們與人類的物理等同性需要意識。

Mind-Body Dualism, on the other hand, argues  that mental phenomena are non-physical and thus,  

另一方面，身心二元論認為精神現像是非物理的，因此

not bound by physical laws. This perspective  allows for the possibility of p-zombies as  

不受物理定律的約束。這種觀點允許p-殭屍的可能性，因為

it suggests that physical replication  alone might not replicate consciousness.  

它表明單獨的物理複製可能無法複製意識。

The mental and physical are distinct,  and one can exist without the other. 

精神和身體是截然不同的，兩者可以互相獨立而存在。

These theories bring us to the  concept of the philosophical zombie. 

這些理論為我們帶來了哲學殭屍的概念。

The Philosophical Zombie Argument is a  thought experiment in the philosophy of mind,  

哲學殭屍論證是心靈哲學的思想實驗，

particularly in discussions about  consciousness and physicalism.

特別是在意識和物理主義的討論中。

Proposed by philosopher David Chalmers,  the argument presents the concept of a  

該論證由哲學家大衛·查爾默斯提出，提出了「哲學殭屍」的概念

"philosophical zombie," which is an entity  that is indistinguishable from a normal  

human being in every way except that it lacks  conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.

在各方面都與正常人沒有區別的實體，除了缺乏意識經驗、感受性或感知力。

The zombie behaves and appears  exactly like any other human;  

殭屍的行為和外表與任何其他人類完全相同；

it can speak about its emotions, respond to pain,  

它可以表達自己的情緒，對疼痛做出反應，

and behave as if it is conscious, but it does  not actually have any subjective experience.

表現得好像它是有意識的，但實際上它沒有任何主觀經驗。

The core of the zombie argument  is to challenge physicalism,  

殭屍論證的核心是挑戰物理主義，

the doctrine that everything is physical or that  the real world consists only of physical entities.

即一切都是物理的或現實世界僅由物理實體組成的理論。

Chalmers uses this argument to suggest that  

conscious experience cannot be fully  explained by physical processes alone.

意識體驗不能只用物理過程來完全解釋。

If it is conceivable that there could be  a physical duplicate of a person without  

如果可以想像，可能存在一個沒有

consciousness, then consciousness  must involve something non-physical.

意識的人的物理複製品，那麼意識一定涉及某種非物質的東西。

This leads to the conclusion that physicalism  is false, as the existence of such zombies  

這導致了這樣的結論：物理主義是錯誤的，因為這種殭屍的存在

would mean that physical facts do not  exhaustively account for mental facts. 

意味著物理事實不能詳盡地解釋心理事實。

Chalmers argues that the mere logical possibility  of p-zombies suggests that physicalism is  

查爾默斯認為，p-殭屍的純粹邏輯可能性顯示物理主義不足以

insufficient to explain consciousness. If we  can coherently conceive of a human devoid of  

解釋意識。如果我們能夠連貫地設想一個沒有

consciousness, then consciousness and the  physical brain state cannot be identical. 

意識的人類，那麼意識和大腦的物理狀態就不可能是相同的。

A related thought experiment, known as  Mary's Room, further supports this notion. 

一個相關的思想實驗，稱為瑪麗的房間，進一步支持了這個觀點。

Mary's room thought experiment? The Mary's Room thought experiment,  

瑪莉的房間思想實驗 是什麼 呢？ 瑪麗的房間思想實驗

a thought experiment proposed by philosopher  Frank Jackson, provides an intriguing insight  

是哲學家法蘭克傑克森提出的思想實驗，它

into the nature of subjective experience. In this scenario, he imagines a scientist  

為主觀經驗的本質提供了有趣的見解。在這個場景中，他想像了一位名叫瑪麗的科學家

named Mary who lives her entire life in a  black-and-white room. Despite her confinement,  

，她一生都住在黑白房間裡。儘管被禁閉，

Mary becomes an expert on the science  of color vision and understands all the  

瑪麗還是成為了色覺科學的專家，並了解

physical and neurological facts  about how humans perceive color.

有關人類如何感知顏色的所有物理和神經學事實。

However, she herself has never actually seen  any colors firsthand. The experiment raises the  

然而，她本人從未親眼見過任何顏色。實驗提出了一個

question: what happens when Mary finally steps  out of her monochromatic environment and sees a  

問題：當瑪麗最終走出單色環境並

vibrant color, such as red, for the first time? According to Jackson, when Mary finally sees  

第一次看到鮮豔的顏色（例如紅色）時，會發生什麼？根據傑克森的說法，當瑪麗最終看到

the color red, she gains new knowledge, that  is- what red truly looks like. This suggests  

紅色時，她獲得了新的知識，那就是紅色真正的樣子。這表明

that the subjective experience of seeing red  provides a distinct kind of information that  

看到紅色的主觀體驗提供了一種獨特的訊息，

cannot be fully captured by objective, physical  descriptions alone. The thought experiment is  

無法僅透過客觀的物理描述來完全捕捉。這個思想實驗旨在

designed to demonstrate that there is an aspect of  consciousness, often referred to as "qualia," that  

證明意識的一個方面，通常被稱為“感受性”，它

goes beyond physical explanations, challenging  purely physicalist accounts of the mind.

超越了物理解釋，挑戰了純粹物理主義對心靈的解釋。

However, some argue that the philosophical zombie  actually cannot prove physicalism is wrong. 

然而，有些人認為哲學殭屍其實不能證明物理主義是錯的。

against philosophical zombie argument : Inconceivability: Critics like Daniel Dennett  

反對哲學殭屍論點的 反駁 ：不可想像性：像丹尼爾·丹尼特這樣的批評家

argue that if a being acts indistinguishably  from a conscious being, it must, by necessity,  

認為，如果一個存在的行為與有意識的存在沒有區別，那麼它必然是

be conscious. Thus, p-zombies are not genuinely  conceivable—they are a contradiction in terms. 

有意識的。因此，p-殭屍並不是真正可以想像的——它們在術語上是矛盾的。

Dennett, a prominent philosopher and  cognitive scientist, suggests that  

著名哲學家和認知科學家丹尼特認為，

if a being behaves indistinguishably from a  conscious being, it must be conscious itself  

如果一個存在的行為與有意識的存在沒有區別，那麼它本身一定是有意識的，

because the behavior is a manifestation of  the processes we associate with consciousness. 

因為這種行為是我們與意識相關的過程的表現。

This reasoning challenges the concept  of p-zombies, which as we mentioned were  

這種推理挑戰了 p-殭屍的概念，正如我們所提到的，p-殭屍是

introduced by philosopher David Chalmers  as hypothetical beings who act exactly  

由哲學家 David Chalmers 引入的，作為假設的生物，其行為

like conscious beings but lack inner experiences.  They would hypothetically react to stimuli, hold  

與有意識的生物完全相同，但缺乏內在體驗。假設他們會

conversations, and express emotions like conscious  humans, but without any subjective experience. 

像有意識的人類一樣對刺激做出反應、進行對話並表達情感，但沒有任何主觀經驗。

Dennett argues that p-zombies are  not genuinely conceivable because  

丹尼特認為，p-殭屍並不是真正可以想像的，因為

if a being behaves exactly like a conscious  person, they must also possess consciousness. 

如果一個生物的行為完全像一個有意識的人，那麼他們也必須擁有意識。

According to Dennett, the concept of a p-zombie  implies that consciousness is a distinct,  

根據丹尼特的說法，p-殭屍的概念意味著意識是一種獨特的

non-physical property. He rejects this, arguing  that consciousness is not separate from the  

非物理屬性。他拒絕了這一點，認為意識與

physical processes occurring in the brain. This  view is rooted in functionalism and the idea  

大腦中發生的物理過程並不是分開的。這種觀點植根於功能主義和

that mental states can be fully explained by the  physical and functional processes of the brain. 

精神狀態可以透過大腦的物理和功能過程完全解釋的觀點。

For example, imagine a robot programmed to act  exactly like a human: it could hold conversations,  

例如，想像一個機器人被編程為與人類完全相同：它可以進行對話，

detect and respond to emotions, and even write  poetry. Dennett would argue that if such a robot  

檢測和回應情緒，甚至寫詩。丹尼特認為，如果這樣的機器人

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哲學殭屍：揭示意識本質的關鍵線索？（Philosophical Zombies (P-Zombies): Are They the Key to Understanding Consciousness?）

specific

cognitive

essentially

conscious