When people learn about the history of the Quad, they find that there's a lot of surprises in there.

當人們瞭解了四合院的歷史後，他們發現裡面有很多驚喜。

The Quad has had, essentially, a set of activities around building a favorable balance of power

四方會談基本上有一套圍繞建立有利的權力平衡的活動

that can deter bad behavior in the region.

這可以阻止該地區的不良行為。

At the Shangri-La Dialogue, senior defense officials have gathered to talk about the

在香格里拉對話中，高級國防官員聚集在一起，討論了

Asia Pacific region's most pressing security challenges.

亞太地區最緊迫的安全挑戰。

The world has changed since the last Shangri-La Dialogue in 2019.

自2019年的上一次香格里拉對話以來，世界已經發生了變化。

Geopolitical tensions in the South China Sea remain, while a global pandemic and Russia's

南中國海的地緣政治緊張局勢依然存在，而全球大流行病和俄羅斯的

invasion of Ukraine have added fuel to the fire.

入侵烏克蘭的行為更是火上澆油。

China isn't pleased with some of the developments in the region,

中國對該地區的一些發展並不滿意。

such as the multinational group called the Quad.

如稱為 "四方 "的多國集團。

The real goal of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy is to establish an Indo-Pacific version of NATO.

美國印太戰略的真正目標是建立一個印太版的北約。

So, what is the Quad, and what does it mean for countries in the region?

那麼，什麼是四方，它對該地區各國意味著什麼？

The Quad, or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, comprises four big economies,

四方，即四方安全對話，由四個大經濟體組成。

the United States, India, Australia and Japan.

美國、印度、澳洲和日本。

Over the years, it's been imprecisely dubbed as the 'Asian NATO,' or 'a security alliance,'

多年來，它被不準確地稱為 "亞洲北約"，或 "安全聯盟"。

terms which the Quad partners have denied or dismissed as 'misleading.'

四方集團合夥人否認或認為是 "誤導 "的條款。

CNBC managing editor Ted Kemp is the author of a project

CNBC的管理編輯泰德-坎普是一個項目的作者。

focusing on the future of the Quad in Asia-Pacific.

專注於亞太地區四方的未來。

There is definitely a perception that the Quad is some sort of Indo-Pacific parallel to NATO,

肯定有一種看法，即四國集團是某種與北約平行的印度-太平洋地區。

but that's really not the case. Because it has no specific mandate, they can make economic issues,

但事實並非如此。因為它沒有具體的任務，他們可以製造經濟問題。

issues around Covid or even global warming part of the mandate of the Quad, and in fact, they are doing that.

圍繞Covid或甚至全球變暖的問題是四方的任務之一，事實上，他們正在這樣做。

The four countries first came together after the 2004 Indian ocean tsunami

這四個國家在2004年印度洋海嘯後首次走到一起。

to help with rescue and reconstruction assistance.

以幫助進行救援和重建援助。

As recovery efforts tapered down, the group was disbanded.

隨著恢復工作的減弱，該小組被解散了。

In 2007, Shinzo Abe, who was then Japan's Prime Minister,

2007年，時任日本首相的安倍晉三。

called for an “arc of freedom and prosperity” around the Pacific and the Indian Oceans.

他呼籲在太平洋和印度洋周圍建立一個 "自由和繁榮的弧形"。

Shinzo Abe proved very far-sighted in the way that he made use of the Quad framework

事實證明，安倍晉三在利用 "四國 "框架方面非常有遠見。

to begin to build something more permanent.

開始建立更持久的東西。

If there is one individual who brought the Quad to life, it's him.

如果說有一個人把《四方》帶入了生活，那就是他。

As China got wind of their first joint meeting that year, it became concerned about their intentions.

當中國得知他們當年的第一次聯席會議後，開始擔心他們的意圖。

Beijing subsequently lodged formal protests against the four countries.

北京隨後對這四個國家提出了正式抗議。

China saw the writing on the wall.

中國看到了牆上的文字。

Individual Quad members were not talking about this being a response to China, but Beijing knew.

四國集團個別成員沒有談論這是對中國的迴應，但北京知道。

The problem for China is that the more it has protested, and especially the more aggressively

中國的問題是，它越是抗議，尤其是越是積極地抗議

it protested, the more it strengthens the Quad.

它抗議，就越能加強四方的力量。

Australia, Japan and Singapore were invited to join India and the U.S. for Exercise Malabar

澳洲、日本和新加坡被邀請加入印度和美國的馬拉巴爾演習。

in the later part of 2007 – naval wargames that would later become

在2007年下半年--海軍戰爭遊戲，後來變成了

a permanent feature for the Quad countries.

這是四國的一個永久特徵。

In the years that followed, the future of the group was tied

在隨後的幾年裡，該組織的未來被捆綁在一起

to the fortunes of politicians in the four countries.

對這四個國家的政治家的命運。

And then Shinzo Abe left office, and the Quad effectively fell off the map.

然後安倍晉三離開了辦公室，四國集團實際上從地圖上消失了。

By then, the political appetite to continue with the Quad was waning.

到那時，繼續推進四方會談的政治意願正在減弱。

Two months after Abe's resignation, Australia had a new Prime Minister in Kevin Rudd,

安倍晉三辭職兩個月後，澳洲迎來了新總理陸克文。

who withdrew the country from the security dialogue.

他使該國退出了安全對話。

The U.S. also had more pressing concerns then, such as Iran and North Korea.

美國當時也有更緊迫的關切，如伊朗和北韓。

This coincided with a state visit by India's then-Prime Minister to Hu Jintao's China.

這恰好是印度當時的總理對胡錦濤的中國進行國事訪問。

It's very important to note in that respect that India really sets the pace when it comes

在這方面，非常重要的是要注意到，印度真正設定的步伐，當它涉及到

to considering the explicit mention of China as a security item on the agenda of the Quad.

考慮將中國作為一個安全項目明確提到四方會議的議程上。

Of the four countries in the Quad, India is the only one which shares,

在四方的四個國家中，印度是唯一一個分享的國家。

really, a land border with China and a long one and contested one at that.

實際上，與中國有一條陸地邊界，而且是一條很長的、有爭議的邊界。

This leads India to have a particularly cautious and nuanced approach.

這導致印度採取了特別謹慎和細微的做法。

We are definitely a part of the Quad.

我們絕對是四合院的一部分。

It is certainly not a military alliance as far as the Indian Navy is concerned

就印度海軍而言，這當然不是一個軍事聯盟。

and as far as India is concerned.

而就印度而言。

We would like to cooperate in any sort of eventuality where our common interests are

我們願意在任何有共同利益的情況下進行合作。

addressed, mostly, I would say, below the conflict threshold.

我想說的是，大部分是在衝突門檻以下解決的。

Despite inactivity on the political front, the Quad nations continued with their military exercises.

儘管在政治方面無所作為，但四方國家繼續進行軍事演習。

During that period, the U.S. was also pursuing a “pivot to Asia.”

在這一時期，美國也在追求 "向亞洲轉移"。

Then, Xi Jinping's era begins in 2012, and quickly the world's democracies learn that

然後，習近平的時代在2012年開始，世界上的民主國家很快了解到

there isn't going to be some sort of democratic reformation that occurs over time within China.

在中國，不會有某種隨著時間推移而發生的民主改革。

Shinzo Abe then comes back into office right behind Xi and kicks it right back up again.

安倍晉三隨後緊隨習近平之後重新上任，並將其再次踢回。

And that's how we basically evolved to the Quad that we have today.

就這樣，我們基本上演變成了今天的四方。

As China under President Xi Jinping pursued a more aggressive foreign policy,

由於習近平主席上司下的中國奉行更積極的外交政策。

tensions were brewing in the South China Sea and its borders.

南中國海及其邊境地區正在醞釀緊張局勢。

Japan's Abe was also bent on reviving his idea of an “arc of freedom and prosperity,”

日本的安倍晉三也一心想要恢復他的 "自由和繁榮之弧 "的想法。

this time called the “Asia's Democratic Security Diamond.”

這次被稱為 "亞洲的民主安全鑽石"。

What the Quad countries individually and collectively have been concerned about is about China's behavior.

四方國家單獨和集體所關注的是中國的行為。

Whether that is in the South China Sea, the militarization of the islands there.

無論是在南中國海，還是在那裡的島嶼軍事化。

The harassment of claimants in that region, or it is in the East China Sea.

騷擾該地區的索賠者，或者說是在東中國海。

Or, for instance, at the China-India border.

或者，例如，在中國-印度邊境。

They believe that these spaces, China has taken unilateral moves to change the status quo,

他們認為，這些空間，中國採取了單邊行動來改變現狀。

sometimes with the use or the threat of the use of force.

有時會使用或威脅使用武力。

They also think that Beijing has been using its economic influence for coercion, for instance, against Australia.

他們還認為，北京一直在利用其經濟影響力進行脅迫，例如，對澳洲進行脅迫。

The wheels were set in motion once again in 2017 when senior officials from the Quad nations

2017年，四方國家的高級官員再次啟動了車輪。

met on the sidelines of the ASEAN and East Asia Summits.

在東盟和東亞峰會期間進行了會晤。

Since then, officials from the four countries have met regularly,

從那時起，四國的官員定期舉行會議。

culminating in the first Leaders Summit in 2021, held virtually due to the pandemic.

最終在2021年舉行第一次領導人峰會，但由於大流行病的原因，這次峰會幾乎沒有舉行。

The Quad leaders then met in-person later that year in Washington.

四國領導人隨後於當年晚些時候在華盛頓舉行了面對面的會晤。

So how can the Quad be an effective counterbalance to China's dominance in the region?

那麼，四方如何才能有效制衡中國在該地區的主導地位？

The Quad is essentially a group of like-minded countries who share a vision of the region,

四國集團本質上是一個由志同道合的國家組成的集團，他們對該地區有著共同的願景。

of the Indo-Pacific, that they'd like to see, a free, open, inclusive, secure, prosperous region,

他們希望看到一個自由、開放、包容、安全、繁榮的印度洋-太平洋地區。

where countries are free to choose and where rules-based order prevails.

在這裡，各國可以自由選擇，基於規則的秩序占主導地位。

The difference between a rules-based order and a coercive one, is one where the rules

基於規則的秩序和強制的秩序之間的區別，是一個規則

are actually followed by the bigger powers and the smaller powers alike.

實際上，大國和小國都在遵循這些原則。

Whereas a coercive one is where some countries get to dictate terms and get to use their

而脅迫性的則是一些國家可以支配條件，可以使用他們的權利。

power and influence to set the terms alone and for their own needs.

權力和影響力，單獨為自己的需要制定條款。

They also have a view that this vision is being challenged through various means,

他們還認為，這一願景正通過各種方式受到挑戰。

for example, to put it very bluntly, by coercive steps from China.

例如，非常直截了當地說，是通過中國的脅迫性步驟。

And they have decided that they alone cannot tackle these challenges.

而且他們已經決定，僅靠他們自己無法應對這些挑戰。

They cannot offer alternatives all by themselves.

他們不能單獨提供替代方案。

We will be steady and consistent, looking for avenues of cooperation where they exist

我們將保持穩定和一致，在有合作的地方尋找合作的途徑

while recognizing China's growing power and the manner in which that is reshaping our region.

同時認識到中國日益增長的力量以及它正在重塑我們的地區的方式。

We will also stand by our friends as they uphold their rights, and that's especially

當我們的朋友維護他們的權利時，我們也會站在他們身邊，這一點尤其重要。

important as the PRC adopts a more coercive and aggressive approach to its territorial claims.

由於中國對其領土要求採取了更具強制性和侵略性的方法，這一點非常重要。

So, I think it's not China's power per se or its rise.

所以，我認為這不是中國的力量本身或它的崛起。

After all, the four Quad countries, if China is not their largest trading partner,

畢竟，這四個四方國家，如果中國不是他們最大的貿易伙伴。

it's pretty close up there.

那裡很近。

They have their own ties with China.

他們與中國有自己的聯繫。

The idea is to provide choice, to provide stability, and to bring resources to the region

這個想法是為了提供選擇，提供穩定，並將資源帶到該地區。

that otherwise might not have been available.

否則可能無法獲得。

Now, it is incumbent upon the Quad to show that they can deliver.

現在，四國集團有責任表明，他們能夠提供服務。

But is there room for the Quad to expand, to become the Quint, perhaps?

但是，"四方 "是否有擴展的空間，也許可以成為 "昆特"？

I think a year ago, there was still some question, but I think that debate has now ebbed.

我認為一年前，仍有一些問題，但我認為這種爭論現在已經消退了。

At the start of 2020 when the Covid-19 pandemic was raging worldwide, Vietnam, South Korea

2020年初，當Covid-19大流行病在全世界肆虐時，越南、韓國

and New Zealand joined the Quad members for a discussion on controlling the pandemic.

糧農組織和紐西蘭與四方成員一起討論了控制大流行病的問題。

Countries like South Korea, for example, can plug in and say we want to work,

例如，像韓國這樣的國家，可以插入並說我們想工作。

not on all the Quad issues, but certain agenda items.

不是在所有的四方問題上，而是在某些議程項目上。

Or Vietnam, for example, working on the public health side.

或者越南，例如，在公共衛生方面工作。

Other countries might be interested in working with the Quad in maritime security.

其他國家可能有興趣在海上安全方面與四方合作。

And so, I think the flexibility, both in terms of agenda, as well as who you partner with,

是以，我認為靈活性，無論是在議程方面，還是在與誰合作方面。

how you partner, is, I think, something that the Quad should maintain because I think that

我認為，四方應該保持這種合作關係，因為我認為

will make it more responsive and adaptive to the region's needs.

將使其對該地區的需求作出更多的反應和適應。

If you look at Southeast Asia, if you look at the Southeast Asian nations,

如果你看一下東南亞，如果你看一下東南亞國家。

there's a broad spectrum of willingness to work with the Quad or seeing an advantage to working

願意與四方集團合作的人很多，或者認為與四方集團合作有好處的人也很多。

with the Quad versus not seeing an advantage.

與四合院相比，沒有看到優勢。

There is no single Southeast Asian take on the Quad.

沒有單一的東南亞人對四方的看法。

We're looking a lot more at like-minded associations, and there's nothing preventing

我們正在尋找更多志同道合的協會，而且沒有什麼可以阻止

the Quad from doing Quad Plus arrangements with single countries like France, like the UK.

四國集團與法國、英國這樣的單一國家進行四國加碼安排。

It's fitting within a new order, which is emerging, which includes the AUKUS Pact.

它適合於一個正在出現的新秩序，其中包括《奧庫斯條約》。

AUKUS is a nuclear submarine and security deal between Australia, the U.S. and the U.K., signed in 2021.

AUKUS是澳洲、美國和英國之間的一項核潛艇和安全協議，於2021年簽署。

The AUKUS Pact is a straight up military deal designed to strengthen Australia's naval deterrent.

奧庫斯條約》是一項直接的軍事交易，旨在加強澳洲的海軍威懾力。

It's not one-off, but it feels more one-off than the Quad,

它不是一次性的，但感覺比Quad更一次性。

which is a more open framework and one with greater staying power.

這是一個更加開放的框架，也是一個具有更大持久力的框架。

It may perhaps be a little ironic that |the strength of the Quad lies in its informal nature.

四方會談的優勢在於其非正式的性質，這也許有點諷刺。

Because the Quad is not an alliance, its four diverse members

由於四方不是一個聯盟，其四個不同的成員

have the flexibility to pick and choose what they'll work on together.

可以靈活地選擇他們一起工作的內容。

The Quad is one of many coalitions and mini-laterals in the region.

四方會談是該地區許多聯盟和小型會談之一。

We're moving from the hub-and-spoke model in Asia to a spiderweb model,

我們正在從亞洲的樞紐和輻條模式轉向蜘蛛網模式。

where it's not just all roads lead to Washington or all roads lead to Beijing.

在這裡，不僅僅是所有的路都通向華盛頓，或者所有的路都通向北京。

It is a spiderweb where the various nodes are connected in different ways to each other.

它是一個蜘蛛網，各個節點以不同方式相互連接。

Even as the Quad nations have intensified their cooperation, it hasn't been entirely smooth sailing.

即使四方國家加強了合作，也並非完全一帆風順。

India's refusal to condemn Russia for its invasion of Ukraine has put it at odds with its Quad partners.

印度拒絕譴責俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭，這使其與四方夥伴產生了分歧。

Preserving unity within the group may be a delicate balancing act.

維護團體內部的團結可能是一種微妙的平衡行為。

In April 2022, India refused to allow Japanese military planes transporting

2022年4月，印度拒絕允許日本軍用飛機運輸

aid supplies to displaced Ukrainians to land in the country.

向流離失所的烏克蘭人提供的援助物資在該國登陸。

How have they been able to get around these disagreements within the Quad countries?

他們是如何繞過四方國家內部的這些分歧的？

One thing the differences over Russia have highlighted is that the Quad is like-minded,

在俄羅斯問題上的分歧所凸顯的一點是，四國集團是志同道合的。

but it's not same-minded on everything.

但並不是什麼事都是同一種心態。

While India hasn't condemned Russia by name,

雖然印度並沒有指名道姓地譴責俄羅斯。

it has condemned actions that violate those principles and rules.

它譴責了違反這些原則和規則的行為。

The disagreement, I think, comes in, how do you tackle those violations?

我認為，分歧在於，你如何處理這些違規行為？

The way they talk about it is we respect that we are not the same country,

他們談論的方式是，我們尊重我們不是同一個國家。

and that one country will not dictate terms to others.

而且，一個國家不會對其他國家的條件發號施令。

That a diversity of views is possible.

觀點的多樣性是可能的。

I think we very much saw a grouping which was capable of mutually sidestepping that difference

我認為我們看到了一個能夠相互迴避這種差異的集團。

and focusing on practical points of convergence and, indeed, practical cooperation.

並把重點放在實際的匯合點上，實際上是實際的合作。

These areas of cooperation include infrastructure development, climate initiatives

這些合作領域包括基礎設施發展、氣候倡議

and a working group on vaccines.

和一個關於疫苗的工作組。

Japan comes in with a wealth – quite literally – of financing, which does help a country

日本擁有豐富的--從字面上看--融資，這的確有助於一個國家

like India, which is a leading producer of vaccines, be able to come together with Australia

像印度，它是一個主要的疫苗生產國，能夠與澳洲一起

and the U.S. to distribute vaccines for relief from the pandemic, as a common good.

和美國分發疫苗，以緩解大流行病的影響，這是一種共同的利益。

So I think the Quad has found its legitimacy, validity, and its purpose in the broader re-composition

是以，我認為四方在更廣泛的重新組合中找到了它的合法性、有效性和目的。

of the strategic landscape in the Indo-Pacific.

在印度洋-太平洋地區的戰略格局中。

At the recent Quad leaders' meeting in Tokyo, we confirmed that the Quad will seek to extend

在最近於東京舉行的四方領導人會議上，我們確認，四方將尋求擴大

more than US$50 billion of further infrastructure assistance

提供超過500億美元的進一步基礎設施援助

and investment in the Indo-Pacific over the next five years.

在未來五年內，在印度-太平洋地區的投資。

The future of the Quad, to a very large extent, is going to depend on the

四方集團的未來，在很大程度上，將取決於

domestic political environment in the United States.

美國的國內政治環境。

Because if there's one threat to the Quad that's existential, it's the U.S. withdrawing from it.

因為如果有一個對四方的威脅是存在的，那就是美國退出四方。

Like all institutions, and like all bureaucracies, the Quad, the longer it continues to thrive,

像所有的機構一樣，也像所有的官僚機構一樣，四合院，繼續繁榮的時間越長。

does it get to escape velocity and get to a point where it can survive any of this stuff

它是否達到了逃逸速度，並達到了可以在這些東西中生存的地步？

that might arise domestically and in these countries' politics?

在國內和這些國家的政治中可能出現的問題？

I don't know, we'll see.

我不知道，我們會看到的。