sotheChinesetelecomsgiantissafeenoughtobegiven a roleinthenewfive G network.
Butnotsafeenoughtobeallowednearsensitivelocationssuchasnuclearsitesandmilitarybaseistheannouncementofwhoalwayscontinuedroleinfive G wasmadeafter a meetingwithCabinetministersandsecuritychiefs.
Sowilltherebe a diplomaticclashwiththeUnitedStatesoncouldToryMPsrebeloverthematter?
Well, ifhepulledawaycompletelyoutoftheequationonfive G theresoembeddedinthere, itwouldhavequiteseriousimplicationsforthatentireprogramcostsdelays, therestrictionshasdecidedtogowithontheirinvolvement.
Thatprobablybringsassomesignificantcostand a littlebitofdelay, butnothinglikewhat a completebanwouldbring.
SothatleaveshimdealingwiththeUnitedStates.
WeheardbloodcurdlinglanguagefromsomesupportersofDonaldTrumptodaywho, alongwiththepresidenthimself, havebeensayingthatthereshouldbenoinvolvementofwhywewhatsoeverinfive G inthiscountry.
Wehaven't actuallyheardfromDonaldTrumphimselfyet, butbatedbreath, wemightyet, and, asyousaid, ToryMPs, someofthemnotallofthem, butsomeofthempoliticalbedfoesfromtheBrexitcrisiswithalongsideBorisJohnsonbackthenhavebeenraisingtheirvoiceswiththeirconcernsaboutwhilewayhavinganythingtodowithfive g.
Orattheveryleast, theywanttosee a pastwayforittoberemovedcompletely.
They'renotconfidentthey'veseenthathehas a massivemajority, ofcourse, butheneedstopass a lawtogetthisrestrictiononthemarketintostatute.
Andrightnowyouhavetosayamazinglywiththatwhoppingmajority, a fewofhisparliamentarynumbercrunchesor a bitedgy, theUnitedStatessaidBritainshouldn't letWeiweianywherenearitsfive g network.
It's alreadywellembedded.
We'vegonetoodeeptoturnbackonewhiteallsourcesaid.
Andthey'retoogood.
TheNationalSecurityCouncilagreedtoletgoawaybepartofthe U.
K's five G development, reineditinat 35% marketshare.
Doyouthinkwhyweshouldallowedtobuildourfive g network, Mr.
Wallace, at a meetingoftheNationalSecurityCouncilthismorning, criticslikethedefensesecretarysigneduptothepolicy.
Doyouthinkit's dangeroustoletwhilewebuildourfive G network?
Mr.
Wallace, right?
DecisioncollectivelyintheCommonsforthefirsttimesincetheelection, thepeoplewhousedtocausetroublealongsideBorisJohnsonwerecausingtroubleforhimandsay, Yes, I dothinkwhatweshouldbebannedfromournetworks.
I thinkmyrightonthefriendinDuncan, SmithheckledhisoldBrexitally, theforeignsecretary.
Criticsofthedecisionworrythat a companythatcantakeordersfromtheChinesegovernmentcouldconstructbackdoorsintofive G technologyitcoulddisruptorcrashsystems.
Five G meansfasterdownloadsonequipmentlikephonesorcomputers.
Itspeedsupresponsetimeandreliability.
Youcangetmorestoragecapacityandaccessitquicker.
Butfive G alsogivesthescopeformuchmorerealtimedataexchangesbetween, say, driverlesscars, fridges, monitoringtheircontentsandsmartfactoriesthatcouldstartrunningthemselves.
Thegovernment's decidedtorestrict y awayfromsensitivepartsofthefive g networkandfromsensitiveareaslikenuclearweaponsorenergysites.
Restrictingmarketsharemeanssomecompaniesalreadyexceedingthatwiththeirfarawayequipmentwillhavetostripitoutiftheywanttobuynew a kit.
K issacrificingnationalsecurityandinvitingtheChineseCommunistPartysurveillancestateinspoon.
Somearguethe U.
S issuffering a Sputnikmoment, anechoof 1957 whenUnitedStatesdiscoveredthecommunistSovietUnionbeatingitinthespacerace.
Anymail, ouroutechoesofthatfeartoday, asUnitedStatesfallsbehindChina's leadincyberspace, somethingwhiteallthinkit's thatworry, nothardevidenceofChina's darkintentthatisdrivingthe U.
S.
TheydoubtUnitedStatesthreatstorestrictintelligencesharingoftheUK I don't thinkthatthevoicesthatwe'veheardintheBritishdebatefromWashingtonrepresenttheAmericanintelligencecommunity.
I thinktheyaremostlypoliticalpeoplearoundtheadministration, theWhiteHouse.
Butthatrelationshipbetweenthetwointelligencecommunitiesissodeepondhesotrusting, soimportanttobothsides, I don't thinkthatthatisgoingtobethreatened.
G C H q ofcategoricallyconfirmedthathowweconstructourfive G infullfiberpublictelecomsnetworkhasnothingtodowithhowweshareclassifieddataandthe U K's technicalsecurityexpertshaveagreedthatthenewcontrolsonhiringvendorsarecompletelyconsistentwiththeUKsecurityneeds.
WhenthesecurityService's andformernationalsecurityadvisersaresurethatthisisallfine, whyareyousosurethatit's a mistake?
Well, I thinkthat's a realproblemwithwell, waythatisnothingtodowiththeUnitedStatesornothingtodowithAustralia, butiseverythingtodowiththewaythisChinesecompanyisstructuredon.
Indeed, thegovernmentitselfrecognizesthatafterall, that's whythegovernmentdescribeditas a highriskvendorthere's noreasontodescribeitis a highriskvendorifyoudon't thinkitisone.
Butitfailsalleightteststhatthegovernmentsetout.
Andsothegovernmentclearlyisconcerned.
Andthat's why I supportverymuchthegovernment's effortsthatit's madeinordertoidentifyhighriskvendorsinrecentmonths.
But I'm very, verykeenthattheplanoutlinedtodayisnot a targetof 35% butmerely a waypointof 35% onthewayto a targetofzero.
KevinJones.
Ifthereis a highriskfromwhoarewaylimitingitto 35% isnotreallygoingtoeliminatethatrisk, isit?
Well, no.
Becauseifyoulookattheevidence, whichproducedby G.
C H Q andwasprovidedtotheInternalSecurityCommittee, whatriskthereiscanbemitigated.
Thefactsareisthatscootsservice's havedone a verydetailed, intensiveinvestigationintothis, and I thinktheassurancethat, givenourrobustTomSignal, well, I'm sureKevinisabsolutelyrightthattheabilitytogetintooursecurecommunicationssystemsiszero.
Butthatisn't thepointforthissystem.
Thissystemisbasedonthefive G system.
Figuremeisbasedontheideathatmanydifferentitemswillcommunicatetogether, creatingmuchmoredatathanisavailablenowfrom, youknow, autonomousvehiclestocrackanyanynumberofdifferentitemsthatsortofcommunicatetogetherthroughthefive G network.
There's twoissuesliketheexamplesthatTomgave, youknow, comparedlikewithlikeinthe U.
K.
It's notjust a securityserviceisthatcouldinterceptanyintercepts, butalsothevendors, theBt's, theVodafone's thisworldaswell.
Buttherialstarkcontrasthereis, isthatwehave a systemwhichhasbeandescribethisafternoonthemarketfailureit's not.
It's actually a countrywhichismadeofaggressiveattempttodominatethistechnologyonwherewe'relackingintheWest.
I knowcertaininthiscountryisthetechnologyoninvestmentthat's neededinthisthis'llareaoftechnologythatismarketfailing.
It's notmarketfailure.
It's sayingthatwe'veactuallyturned a blindeyetothefactthattheChinesehaveinvestedbillionsofdollarsinresearchondevelopmentonandactuallyquitetechnologiesfromtheWest.
Onwhat I askedthisafternoonwithwhatpercentageofmoniesthegovernmentgonnaputinto R and D Andalso, aretheygoingtostop, forexample, ChinesecompaniesacquiringUKbasedtechnologiesthattheydon't dothosetwothings?
Theideaofproviding a newsystemisnotgonnahappen.
I'm taking a lotofyourcolleaguesareveryconcernedabout.
I mean, doyouthinkthelegislationthatneedstobeputthroughcouldbeamended.
Well, look, I thinkKevin's absolutelyrightthattheinvestmentthatneedstogointothefive d technologythishasbeen a failureofregulationoffailure, investmentssince 2003 andperhapsevenlonger.
SothisisThisisnot a partisanissue.
Andindeed, inlikeintheUnitedStates, thisisnot a partisanissue.
But I thinkthere's a There's a lotfurthertogobecausetherealityisifyouhavehighriskvendors, asthegovernmentcallstheminyoursystem, thenyou'vereallygottobelookingatwaystogetthemout.
sotheChinesetelecomsgiantissafeenoughtobegiven a roleinthenewfive G network.