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  • >> I. LAYING PLANS

  • 1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance

  • to the State.

  • 2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either

  • to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry

  • which can on no account be neglected.

  • 3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant

  • factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations,

  • when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.

  • 4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth;

  • (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.

  • 5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete

  • accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him

  • regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.

  • 7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat,

  • times and seasons.

  • 8. Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow

  • passes; the chances of life and death.

  • 9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom,

  • sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness.

  • 10. By method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions,

  • the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance

  • of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the

  • control of military expenditure.

  • 11. These five heads should be familiar to every general:

  • he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them

  • not will fail.

  • 12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking

  • to determine the military conditions, let them be made

  • the basis of a comparison, in this wise:--

  • 13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?

  • (2) Which of the two generals has most ability? (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from

  • Heaven and Earth?

  • (4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?

  • (5) Which army is stronger? (6) On which side are officers and men more

  • highly trained? (7) In which army is there the greater constancy

  • both in reward and punishment?

  • 14. By means of these seven considerations I can

  • forecast victory or defeat.

  • 15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts

  • upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in command!

  • The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it,

  • will suffer defeat:--let such a one be dismissed!

  • 16. While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances

  • over and beyond the ordinary rules.

  • 17. According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's plans.

  • 18. All warfare is based on deception.

  • 19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable;

  • when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we

  • are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away;

  • when far away, we must make him believe we are near.

  • 20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder,

  • and crush him.

  • 21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him.

  • If he is in superior strength, evade him.

  • 22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to

  • irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.

  • 23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.

  • If his forces are united, separate them.

  • 24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where

  • you are not expected.

  • 25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.

  • 26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many

  • calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.

  • The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations

  • lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is

  • by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely

  • to win or lose.

  • II. WAGING WAR

  • 1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift

  • chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand

  • mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them

  • a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front,

  • including entertainment of guests, small items such as

  • glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor,

  • will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day.

  • Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.

  • 2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory

  • is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and

  • their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town,

  • you will exhaust your strength.

  • 3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources

  • of the State will not be equal to the strain.

  • 4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped,

  • your strength exhausted and your treasure spent,

  • other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise,

  • will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.

  • 5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war,

  • cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

  • 6. There is no instance of a country having benefited

  • from prolonged warfare.

  • 7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly

  • understand the profitable way of carrying it on.

  • 8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy,

  • neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.

  • 9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage

  • on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough

  • for its needs.

  • 10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army

  • to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance

  • causes the people to be impoverished.

  • 11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes

  • prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's

  • substance to be drained away.

  • 12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry

  • will be afflicted by heavy exactions.

  • 13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will

  • be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated;

  • while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses,

  • breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields,

  • protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons,

  • will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.

  • 15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging

  • on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions

  • is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise

  • a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty

  • from one's own store.

  • 16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must

  • be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from

  • defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.

  • 17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots

  • have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first.

  • Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy,

  • and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours.

  • The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.

  • 18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment

  • one's own strength.

  • 19. In war, then, let your great object be victory,

  • not lengthy campaigns.

  • 20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies

  • is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it

  • depends whether the nation shall be in peace or

  • in peril.

  • III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM

  • 1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best

  • thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact;

  • to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is

  • better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it,

  • to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire

  • than to destroy them.

  • 2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles

  • is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists

  • in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.

  • 3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to

  • balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent

  • the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in

  • order is to attack the enemy's army in the field;

  • and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

  • 4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it

  • can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets,

  • movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take

  • up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over

  • against the walls will take three months more.

  • 5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming

  • ants, with the result that one-third of his men

  • are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such

  • are the disastrous effects of a siege.

  • 6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's

  • troops without any fighting; he captures their cities

  • without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom

  • without lengthy operations in the field.

  • 7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery

  • of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph

  • will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

  • 8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten

  • to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one,

  • to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army

  • into two.

  • 9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid

  • the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee

  • from him.

  • 10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made

  • by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.

  • 11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State;

  • if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will

  • be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will

  • be weak.

  • 12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring

  • misfortune upon his army:--

  • 13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat,

  • being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey.

  • This is called hobbling the army.

  • 14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the

  • same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant

  • of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes

  • restlessness in the soldier's minds.

  • 15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance

  • of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances.

  • This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.

  • 16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal

  • princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army,

  • and flinging victory away.

  • 17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:

  • (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when

  • not to fight. (2) He will win who knows how to handle both

  • superior and inferior forces.

  • (3) He will win whose army is animated by the same

  • spirit throughout all its ranks. (4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits

  • to take the enemy unprepared.

  • (5) He will win who has military capacity and is

  • not interfered with by the sovereign.

  • 18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result

  • of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but

  • not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer

  • a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself,

  • you will succumb in every battle.

  • IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS

  • 1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put

  • themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then

  • waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.

  • 2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our

  • own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy

  • is provided by the enemy himself. 3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure

  • himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.

  • 4. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.

  • 5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics;

  • ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.

  • 6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.

  • 7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the

  • most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in

  • attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven.

  • Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves;

  • on the other, a victory that is complete.

  • 8. To see victory only when it is within the ken

  • of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.

  • 9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight

  • and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"

  • 10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;

  • to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight;

  • to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.

  • 11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is

  • one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.

  • 12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation

  • for wisdom nor credit for courage.

  • 13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the

  • certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy

  • that is already defeated.

  • 14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into

  • a position which makes defeat impossible, and does

  • not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.

  • 15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist

  • only seeks battle after the victory has been won,

  • whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights

  • and afterwards looks for victory.

  • 16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law,

  • and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is

  • in his power to control success.

  • 17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation

  • of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing

  • of chances; fifthly, Victory.

  • 18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation

  • to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances

  • to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.

  • 19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as

  • a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.

  • 20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting

  • of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

  • V. ENERGY

  • 1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a

  • few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their

  • numbers.

  • 2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small

  • one: it is merely a question of instituting signs

  • and signals.

  • 3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain

  • unshaken-- this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect.

  • 4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone

  • dashed against an egg--this is effected by the science

  • of weak points and strong.

  • 5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used

  • for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed

  • in order to secure victory.

  • 6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible

  • as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams;

  • like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew;

  • like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more.

  • 7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise

  • to more melodies than can ever be heard.

  • 8. There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet

  • in combination they produce more hues than can ever been

  • seen.

  • 9. There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations

  • of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.

  • 10. In battle, there are not more than two methods

  • of attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two

  • in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers.

  • 11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn.

  • It is like moving in a circle--you never come to an end.

  • Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?

  • 12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent

  • which will even roll stones along in its course.

  • 13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike

  • and destroy its victim.

  • 14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.

  • 15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow;

  • decision, to the releasing of a trigger.

  • 16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may

  • be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all;

  • amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head

  • or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.

  • 17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline,

  • simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness

  • postulates strength.

  • 18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is

  • simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under

  • a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy;

  • masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions.

  • 19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy

  • on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to

  • which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.

  • 20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march;

  • then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.

  • 21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined

  • energy, and does not require too much from individuals.

  • Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize

  • combined energy.

  • 22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting

  • men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones.

  • For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain

  • motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope;

  • if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if

  • round-shaped, to go rolling down.

  • 23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men

  • is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain

  • thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject

  • of energy.

  • VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG

  • 1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and

  • awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight;

  • whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle

  • will arrive exhausted.

  • 2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on

  • the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him.

  • 3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy

  • to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage,

  • he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.

  • 4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;

  • if well supplied with food, he can starve him out;

  • if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.

  • 5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend;

  • march swiftly to places where you are not expected.

  • 6. An army may march great distances without distress,

  • if it marches through country where the enemy is not.

  • 7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended.You

  • can ensure the safety of your defense if you only

  • hold positions that cannot be attacked.

  • 8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose

  • opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful

  • in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.

  • 9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you

  • we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in

  • our hands.

  • 10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy's weak points; you

  • may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements

  • are more rapid than those of the enemy.

  • 11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced

  • to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high

  • rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack

  • some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.

  • 12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the

  • lines of our encampment be merely traced out on

  • the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and

  • unaccountable in his way.

  • 13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining

  • invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated,

  • while the enemy's must be divided.

  • 14. We can form a single united body, while the

  • enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will

  • be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole,

  • which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few.

  • 15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force

  • with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.

  • 16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be

  • made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare

  • against a possible attack at several different points;

  • and his forces being thus distributed in many directions,

  • the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will

  • be proportionately few.

  • 17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen

  • his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen

  • his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen

  • his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements

  • everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.

  • 18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare

  • against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling

  • our adversary to make these preparations against us.

  • 19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle,

  • we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order

  • to fight.

  • 20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succor

  • the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left,

  • the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to

  • support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions

  • of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and even

  • the nearest are separated by several LI!

  • 21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall

  • advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say

  • then that victory can be achieved.

  • 22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may

  • prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover

  • his plans and the likelihood of their success.

  • 23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his

  • activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself,

  • so as to find out his vulnerable spots.

  • 24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own,

  • so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient.

  • 25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch

  • you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions,

  • and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies,

  • from the machinations of the wisest brains.

  • 26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's

  • own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.

  • 27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer,

  • but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory

  • is evolved.

  • 28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated

  • by the infinite variety of circumstances.

  • 29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its

  • natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.

  • 30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong

  • and to strike at what is weak.

  • 31. Water shapes its course according to the nature

  • of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works

  • out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.

  • 32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape,

  • so in warfare there are no constant conditions.

  • 33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his

  • opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called

  • a heaven-born captain.

  • 34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth)

  • are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make

  • way for each other in turn. There are short days and long;

  • the moon has its periods of waning and waxing.

  • VII. MANEUVERING

  • 1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his

  • commands from the sovereign.

  • 2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces,

  • he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof

  • before pitching his camp.

  • 3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult.

  • The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and

  • misfortune into gain.

  • 4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of the way, and

  • though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before

  • him, shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION.

  • 5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.

  • 6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order

  • to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be

  • too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column

  • for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage

  • and stores.

  • 7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their

  • buff-coats, and make forced marches without halting day

  • or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch,

  • doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will

  • fall into the hands of the enemy.

  • 8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded

  • ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth

  • of your army will reach its destination.

  • 9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of your

  • first division, and only half your force will reach the goal.

  • 10. If you march thirty LI with the same object, two-thirds of your army will arrive.

  • 11. We may take it then that an army without its

  • baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost;

  • without bases of supply it is lost.

  • 12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are

  • acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.

  • 13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march

  • unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its

  • mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.

  • 14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use of local guides.

  • 15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.

  • 16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops,

  • must be decided by circumstances.

  • 17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that of the forest.

  • 18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, in immovability like a mountain.

  • 19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night,

  • and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.

  • 20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be

  • divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory,

  • cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery.

  • 21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.

  • 22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. Such is the art of maneuvering.

  • 23. The Book of Army Management says: On the field

  • of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough:

  • hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary

  • objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution

  • of banners and flags.

  • 24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means

  • whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused

  • on one particular point.

  • 25. The host thus forming a single united body,

  • is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone,

  • or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art

  • of handling large masses of men.

  • 26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires

  • and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners,

  • as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.

  • 27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his

  • presence of mind.

  • 28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning;

  • by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening,

  • his mind is bent only on returning to camp.

  • 29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when

  • its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish

  • and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.

  • 30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this

  • is the art of retaining self-possession.

  • 31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still

  • far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is

  • toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy

  • is famished:--this is the art of husbanding one's strength.

  • 32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose

  • banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking

  • an army drawn up in calm and confident array:--this is the art of studying circumstances.

  • 33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill

  • against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.

  • 34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.

  • 35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. Do not interfere with an army that is returning

  • home.

  • 36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free.

  • Do not press a desperate foe too hard.

  • 37. Such is the art of warfare.

  • VIII. VARIATION IN TACTICS

  • 1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, collects

  • his army and concentrates his forces

  • 2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country

  • where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies.

  • Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions. In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to

  • stratagem. In desperate position, you must fight.

  • 3. There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must be not attacked, towns which

  • must not be besieged, positions which must not

  • be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not be

  • obeyed.

  • 4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages

  • that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle

  • his troops.

  • 5. The general who does not understand these, may be well

  • acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he

  • will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account.

  • 6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art

  • of war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted

  • with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use

  • of his men.

  • 7. Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of

  • advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together.

  • 8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in

  • this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential

  • part of our schemes.

  • 9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties

  • we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate

  • ourselves from misfortune.

  • 10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage

  • on them; and make trouble for them, and keep them

  • constantly engaged; hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.

  • 11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the

  • likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness

  • to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking,

  • but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.

  • 12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect

  • a general: (1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction;

  • (2) cowardice, which leads to capture; (3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked

  • by insults; (4) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive

  • to shame; (5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes

  • him to worry and trouble.

  • 13. These are the five besetting sins of a general,

  • ruinous to the conduct of war.

  • 14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain,

  • the cause will surely be found among these five

  • dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.

  • IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH

  • 1. Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of

  • encamping the army, and observing signs of the enemy.

  • Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the neighborhood

  • of valleys.

  • 2. Camp in high places, facing the sun. Do not climb

  • heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare.

  • 3. After crossing a river, you should get far away

  • from it.

  • 4. When an invading force crosses a river in its

  • onward march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream.

  • It will be best to let half the army get across, and then deliver your attack.

  • 5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go

  • to meet the invader near a river which he has to cross.

  • 6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing

  • the sun. Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.

  • So much for river warfare.

  • 7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them quickly, without

  • any delay.

  • 8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should

  • have water and grass near you, and get your back

  • to a clump of trees. So much for operations in salt-marches.

  • 9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible

  • position with rising ground to your right and on your rear,

  • so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind.

  • So much for campaigning in flat country.

  • 10. These are the four useful branches of military

  • knowledge which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish

  • four several sovereigns.

  • 11. All armies prefer high ground to low and sunny

  • places to dark.

  • 12. If you are careful of your men, and camp on hard

  • ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind,

  • and this will spell victory.

  • 13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the

  • sunny side, with the slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit

  • of your soldiers and utilize the natural advantages of the

  • ground.

  • 14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish to ford is swollen

  • and flecked with foam, you must wait until it subsides.

  • 15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs

  • with torrents running between, deep natural hollows,

  • confined places, tangled thickets, quagmires and crevasses,

  • should be left with all possible speed and not approached.

  • 16. While we keep away from such places, we should

  • get the enemy to approach them; while we face them,

  • we should let the enemy have them on his rear.

  • 17. If in the neighborhood of your camp there should

  • be any hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass,

  • hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick

  • undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and searched;

  • for these are places where men in ambush or insidious

  • spies are likely to be lurking.

  • 18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet,

  • he is relying on the natural strength of his position.

  • 19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle,

  • he is anxious for the other side to advance.

  • 20. If his place of encampment is easy of access,

  • he is tendering a bait.

  • 21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the

  • enemy is advancing. The appearance of a number of screens

  • in the midst of thick grass means that the enemy wants to

  • make us suspicious.

  • 22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign

  • of an ambuscade. Startled beasts indicate that a sudden

  • attack is coming.

  • 23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots advancing; when

  • the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it betokens the

  • approach of infantry. When it branches out in different

  • directions, it shows that parties have been sent to collect

  • firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify

  • that the army is encamping.

  • 24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs

  • that the enemy is about to advance. Violent language

  • and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he

  • will retreat.

  • 25. When the light chariots come out first and take

  • up a position on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy

  • is forming for battle.

  • 26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant

  • indicate a plot.

  • 27. When there is much running about and the soldiers

  • fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has come.

  • 28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating,

  • it is a lure.

  • 29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears,

  • they are faint from want of food.

  • 30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the army is suffering

  • from thirst.

  • 31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and

  • makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted.

  • 32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. Clamor by night betokens nervousness.

  • 33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general's

  • authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted

  • about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry,

  • it means that the men are weary.

  • 34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills

  • its cattle for food, and when the men do not hang their

  • cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing that they

  • will not return to their tents, you may know that they

  • are determined to fight to the death.

  • 35. The sight of men whispering together in small

  • knots or speaking in subdued tones points to disaffection

  • amongst the rank and file.

  • 36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is

  • at the end of his resources; too many punishments betray

  • a condition of dire distress.

  • 37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright

  • at the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence.

  • 38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths,

  • it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce.

  • 39. If the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain

  • facing ours for a long time without either joining

  • battle or taking themselves off again, the situation

  • is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection.

  • 40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy,

  • that is amply sufficient; it only means that no direct attack

  • can be made. What we can do is simply to concentrate all

  • our available strength, keep a close watch on the enemy,

  • and obtain reinforcements.

  • 41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light

  • of his opponents is sure to be captured by them.

  • 42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown

  • attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and,

  • unless submissive, then will be practically useless.

  • If, when the soldiers have become attached to you,

  • punishments are not enforced, they will still be useless.

  • 43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first

  • instance with humanity, but kept under control by means

  • of iron discipline. This is a certain road to victory.

  • 44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army will be well-disciplined;

  • if not, its discipline will be bad.

  • 45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always

  • insists on his orders being obeyed, the gain will be mutual.

  • X. TERRAIN

  • 1. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain,

  • to wit: (1) Accessible ground; (2) entangling ground;

  • (3) temporizing ground; (4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous

  • heights; (6) positions at a great distance from the enemy.

  • 2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides

  • is called accessible.

  • 3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before

  • the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots,

  • and carefully guard your line of supplies. Then you

  • will be able to fight with advantage.

  • 4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called entangling.

  • 5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat

  • him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming,

  • and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible,

  • disaster will ensue.

  • 6. When the position is such that neither side will gain

  • by making the first move, it is called temporizing ground.

  • 7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy

  • should offer us an attractive bait, it will be advisable

  • not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing

  • the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has

  • come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage.

  • 8. With regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy

  • them first, let them be strongly garrisoned and await

  • the advent of the enemy.

  • 9. Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass,

  • do not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned.

  • 10. With regard to precipitous heights, if you are

  • beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the

  • raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up.

  • 11. If the enemy has occupied them before you,

  • do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.

  • 12. If you are situated at a great distance from

  • the enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal,

  • it is not easy to provoke a battle, and fighting will be

  • to your disadvantage.

  • 13. These six are the principles connected with Earth.

  • The general who has attained a responsible post must be

  • careful to study them.

  • 14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities,

  • not arising from natural causes, but from faults

  • for which the general is responsible. These are:

  • (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin;

  • (5) disorganization; (6) rout.

  • 15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is

  • hurled against another ten times its size, the result

  • will be the flight of the former.

  • 16. When the common soldiers are too strong and

  • their officers too weak, the result is insubordination. When the officers are too strong and the common

  • soldiers too weak, the result is collapse.

  • 17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate,

  • and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account

  • from a feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or not he is in a position

  • to fight, the result is ruin.

  • 18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not clear and distinct;

  • when there are no fixes duties assigned to officers and

  • men, and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard

  • manner, the result is utter disorganization.

  • 19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy's

  • strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one,

  • or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one,

  • and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank,

  • the result must be rout.

  • 20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must

  • be carefully noted by the general who has attained

  • a responsible post.

  • 21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier's

  • best ally; but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of victory, and

  • of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances,

  • constitutes the test of a great general.

  • 22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts

  • his knowledge into practice, will win his battles.

  • He who knows them not, nor practices them, will surely

  • be defeated.

  • 23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though the ruler

  • forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then

  • you must not fight even at the ruler's bidding.

  • 24. The general who advances without coveting fame

  • and retreats without fearing disgrace, whose only

  • thought is to protect his country and do good service

  • for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.

  • 25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they

  • will follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them

  • as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you

  • even unto death.

  • 26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make

  • your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce

  • your commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder:

  • then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children;

  • they are useless for any practical purpose.

  • 27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the enemy

  • is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards

  • victory.

  • 28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our own men are not in

  • a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards

  • victory.

  • 29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are in a condition

  • to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground

  • makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone

  • only halfway towards victory.

  • 30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion,

  • is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never

  • at a loss.

  • 31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and

  • know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt;

  • if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your

  • victory complete.

  • XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS

  • 1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground:

  • (1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground;

  • (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways;

  • (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground;

  • (9) desperate ground.

  • 2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory,

  • it is dispersive ground.

  • 3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it is facile ground.

  • 4. Ground the possession of which imports great

  • advantage to either side, is contentious ground.

  • 5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement

  • is open ground.

  • 6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states,

  • so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire

  • at his command, is a ground of intersecting highways.

  • 7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a

  • hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities

  • in its rear, it is serious ground.

  • 8. Mountain forests, rugged steeps, marshes and fens--all

  • country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground.

  • 9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges,

  • and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths,

  • so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush

  • a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground.

  • 10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without delay, is

  • desperate ground.

  • 11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not.

  • On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground,

  • attack not.

  • 12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way.

  • On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands

  • with your allies.

  • 13. On serious ground, gather in plunder. In difficult ground, keep steadily on the

  • march.

  • 14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. On desperate ground, fight.

  • 15. Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew

  • how to drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear;

  • to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions;

  • to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad,

  • the officers from rallying their men.

  • 16. When the enemy's men were united, they managed

  • to keep them in disorder.

  • 17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped

  • still.

  • 18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy

  • in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack,

  • I should say: "Begin by seizing something which your

  • opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will."

  • 19. Rapidity is the essence of war: take advantage of

  • the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes,

  • and attack unguarded spots.

  • 20. The following are the principles to be observed

  • by an invading force: The further you penetrate into

  • a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops,

  • and thus the defenders will not prevail against you.

  • 21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply

  • your army with food.

  • 22. Carefully study the well-being of your men,

  • and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard

  • your strength. Keep your army continually on the move,

  • and devise unfathomable plans.

  • 23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there

  • is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight.

  • If they will face death, there is nothing they may

  • not achieve. Officers and men alike will put forth

  • their uttermost strength.

  • 24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no place of

  • refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in hostile

  • country, they will show a stubborn front. If there

  • is no help for it, they will fight hard.

  • 25. Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers

  • will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to

  • be asked, they will do your will; without restrictions,

  • they will be faithful; without giving orders, they can

  • be trusted.

  • 26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with

  • superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes,

  • no calamity need be feared.

  • 27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money,

  • it is not because they have a distaste for riches;

  • if their lives are not unduly long, it is not because they

  • are disinclined to longevity.

  • 28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, those sitting up bedewing

  • their garments, and those lying down letting the tears run

  • down their cheeks. But let them once be brought to bay,

  • and they will display the courage of a Chu or a Kuei.

  • 29. The skillful tactician may be likened to the

  • shuai-jan. Now the shuai-jan is a snake that is found

  • in the ChUng mountains. Strike at its head, and you

  • will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, and you

  • will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle,

  • and you will be attacked by head and tail both.

  • 30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the shuai-jan,

  • I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men

  • of Yueh are enemies; yet if they are crossing a river

  • in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come

  • to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right.

  • 31. Hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the tethering of horses, and the burying

  • of chariot wheels in the ground

  • 32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set

  • up one standard of courage which all must reach.

  • 33. How to make the best of both strong and weak--that

  • is a question involving the proper use of ground.

  • 34. Thus the skillful general conducts his army just

  • as though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by

  • the hand.

  • 35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus

  • ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order.

  • 36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men

  • by false reports and appearances, and thus keep them

  • in total ignorance.

  • 37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, he keeps the enemy without definite

  • knowledge. By shifting his camp and taking circuitous

  • routes, he prevents the enemy from anticipating his

  • purpose.

  • 38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army

  • acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks

  • away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep

  • into hostile territory before he shows his hand.

  • 39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep,

  • he drives his men this way and that, and nothing knows

  • whither he is going.

  • 40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:--this may be termed the business of the general.

  • 41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; the expediency of aggressive

  • or defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws

  • of human nature: these are things that must most certainly

  • be studied.

  • 42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating deeply brings

  • cohesion; penetrating but a short way means dispersion.

  • 43. When you leave your own country behind, and take

  • your army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself

  • on critical ground. When there are means of communication

  • on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways.

  • 44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is

  • serious ground. When you penetrate but a little way,

  • it is facile ground.

  • 45. When you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear,

  • and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground.

  • When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground.

  • 46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire

  • my men with unity of purpose. On facile ground, I would

  • see that there is close connection between all parts

  • of my army.

  • 47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.

  • 48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye

  • on my defenses. On ground of intersecting highways,

  • I would consolidate my alliances.

  • 49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies. On difficult

  • ground, I would keep pushing on along the road.

  • 50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way

  • of retreat. On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving

  • their lives.

  • 51. For it is the soldier's disposition to offer

  • an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard

  • when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he

  • has fallen into danger.

  • 52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes until we are acquainted with their

  • designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless

  • we are familiar with the face of the country--its mountains

  • and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and

  • swamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages

  • to account unless we make use of local guides.

  • 53. To be ignored of any one of the following four

  • or five principles does not befit a warlike prince.

  • 54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state,

  • his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration

  • of the enemy's forces. He overawes his opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining

  • against him.

  • 55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all

  • and sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states.

  • He carries out his own secret designs, keeping his

  • antagonists in awe. Thus he is able to capture their

  • cities and overthrow their kingdoms.

  • 56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule, issue orders without regard to previous arrangements;

  • and you will be able to handle a whole army as though

  • you had to do with but a single man.

  • 57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know your design. When the

  • outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them

  • nothing when the situation is gloomy.

  • 58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive;

  • plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off

  • in safety.

  • 59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into

  • harm's way that is capable of striking a blow for victory.

  • 60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to the enemy's purpose.

  • 61. By persistently hanging on the enemy's flank, we shall

  • succeed in the long run in killing the commander-in-chief.

  • 62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing

  • by sheer cunning.

  • 63. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier passes, destroy the official

  • tallies, and stop the passage of all emissaries.

  • 64. Be stern in the council-chamber, so that you

  • may control the situation.

  • 65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in.

  • 66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear,

  • and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground.

  • 67. Walk in the path defined by rule, and accommodate

  • yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle.

  • 68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden,

  • until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate

  • the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late

  • for the enemy to oppose you.

  • XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE

  • 1. Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in

  • their camp; the second is to burn stores; the third is

  • to burn baggage trains; the fourth is to burn arsenals

  • and magazines; the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst

  • the enemy.

  • 2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have

  • means available. The material for raising fire should

  • always be kept in readiness.

  • 3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire,

  • and special days for starting a conflagration.

  • 4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry;

  • the special days are those when the moon is in the

  • constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing

  • or the Cross-bar; for these four are all days of rising wind.

  • 5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible developments:

  • 6. (1) When fire breaks out inside to enemy's camp,

  • respond at once with an attack from without.

  • 7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy's

  • soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack.

  • 8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height,

  • follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are.

  • 9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire

  • from without, do not wait for it to break out within,

  • but deliver your attack at a favorable moment.

  • 10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it.

  • Do not attack from the leeward.

  • 11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long,

  • but a night breeze soon falls.

  • 12. In every army, the five developments connected with

  • fire must be known, the movements of the stars calculated,

  • and a watch kept for the proper days.

  • 13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence;

  • those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength.

  • 14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of all his belongings.

  • 15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his

  • battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating

  • the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of time

  • and general stagnation.

  • 16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his

  • plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources.

  • 17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not

  • your troops unless there is something to be gained;

  • fight not unless the position is critical.

  • 18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely

  • to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight

  • a battle simply out of pique.

  • 19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move;

  • if not, stay where you are.

  • 20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may

  • be succeeded by content.

  • 21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can

  • never come again into being; nor can the dead ever

  • be brought back to life.

  • 22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of caution. This

  • is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact.

  • XIII. THE USE OF SPIES

  • 1. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand

  • men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss

  • on the people and a drain on the resources of the State.

  • The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces

  • of silver. There will be commotion at home and abroad,

  • and men will drop down exhausted on the highways. As many as seven hundred thousand families

  • will be impeded in their labor.

  • 2. Hostile armies may face each other for years,

  • striving for the victory which is decided in a single day.

  • This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's

  • condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred

  • ounces of silver in honors and emoluments, is the height

  • of inhumanity.

  • 3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present

  • help to his sovereign, no master of victory.

  • 4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good

  • general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond

  • the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge.

  • 5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits;

  • it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation.

  • 6. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only

  • be obtained from other men.

  • 7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes:

  • (1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies;

  • (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies.

  • 8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work,

  • none can discover the secret system. This is called "divine

  • manipulation of the threads." It is the sovereign's most precious faculty.

  • 9. Having local spies means employing the services

  • of the inhabitants of a district.

  • 10. Having inward spies, making use of officials of the enemy.

  • 11. Having converted spies, getting hold of the enemy's

  • spies and using them for our own purposes.

  • 12. Having doomed spies, doing certain things openly

  • for purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know

  • of them and report them to the enemy.

  • 13. Surviving spies, finally, are those who bring

  • back news from the enemy's camp.

  • 14. Hence it is that which none in the whole army are

  • more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies.

  • None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other

  • business should greater secrecy be preserved.

  • 15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain

  • intuitive sagacity.

  • 16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence

  • and straightforwardness.

  • 17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make

  • certain of the truth of their reports.

  • 18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every

  • kind of business.

  • 19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy

  • before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together

  • with the man to whom the secret was told.

  • 20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm

  • a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always

  • necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants,

  • the aides-de-camp, and door-keepers and sentries of the general

  • in command. Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these.

  • 21. The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us

  • must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and

  • comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted

  • spies and available for our service.

  • 22. It is through the information brought by the

  • converted spy that we are able to acquire and employ

  • local and inward spies.

  • 23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can

  • cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy.

  • 24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving

  • spy can be used on appointed occasions.

  • 25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties

  • is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only

  • be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy.

  • Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated

  • with the utmost liberality.

  • 26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty was due to I

  • Chih who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise

  • of the Chou dynasty was due to Lu Ya who had served

  • under the Yin.

  • 27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the

  • wise general who will use the highest intelligence of

  • the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve

  • great results. Spies are a most important element in water,

  • because on them depends an army's ability to move.

>> I. LAYING PLANS

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孫子兵法 (THE ART OF WAR - FULL Audio Book by Sun Tzu - Business & Strategy Audiobook | Audiobooks)

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    Jean Hsieh 發佈於 2015 年 12 月 08 日
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