Name: 北約與俄羅斯如何準備全面開戰？ (How NATO & Russia are Preparing to Fight Total War)
Uploaded: 2026-03-18T17:17:06.000Z
Duration: 48 min 25 s

分詞構句

As the war in Ukraine has entered into its third year, the conflict continues to appear, having no immediate end in sight.

烏克蘭戰爭已經進入第三年，戰事仍持續不斷，看不見立即的結束。

While Ukraine has largely defeated the Russian Navy at sea, the war on the land appears to be slowly shifting against Kyiv, while Moscow appears to be increasingly emboldened.

雖然烏克蘭在海上已經大致擊敗了俄羅斯海軍，但陸地上的戰事似乎正緩慢地對基輔不利，而莫斯科似乎越來越大膽。

情態副詞

In February of 2024, the Russians finally capture the city of Avdiivka, a major suburb of the city of Donetsk that had a pre war population of more than 31,000 people.

在2024年2月，俄羅斯人終於攻下了阿夫迪夫卡，這是頓內茨克一個重要的郊區城市，戰前人口超過31,000人。

And Russian forces have been making a slow creeping advance beyond Avdiivka ever since.

從那之後，俄羅斯軍隊一直在阿夫迪夫卡之外緩慢推進。

An American foreign aid package for Ukraine worth $61 billion continues to be held up in the US Congress, while in March Vladimir Putin secured his re election in Russia for a fifth term as the nation's president, meaning that he will continue ruling in the Kremlin at least until 2030, with the possibility of getting extended even further for a sixth term until 2036, by which point he will be 83 years old, not too much older than Joe Biden is today.

美國價值610億美元的烏克蘭外援方案仍在美國國會受阻，而在3月，弗拉基米爾·普丁在俄羅斯贏得連任，將是他擔任總統的第五個任期，這意味著他至少會統治克里姆林宮到2030年，甚至有可能延長到2036年的第六個任期，屆時他將83歲，年齡與今天的喬·拜登相差不大。

Putin is already the longest serving head of state in Russian or Soviet history since Joseph Stalin.

普丁已經是約瑟夫·史達林以來，在俄羅斯或蘇聯歷史上任期最長的國家元首。

And by the end of his current term in 2030, he will surpass Stalin.

到他目前任期結束的2030年，他將超越史達林。

And if he serves out through 2036, he will even surpass the reign of Catherine the Great to become the longest serving head of state in Russian history since Peter the Great himself, the founder of the Russian empire.

如果他任滿到2036年，他甚至將超越凱薩琳大帝的統治，成為自俄羅斯帝國創始人彼得大帝以來，在俄羅斯歷史上任期最長的國家元首。

With his political position as Russia's leader now secured for the rest of the decade.

他作為俄羅斯領導人的政治地位，現在已經穩固了整個十年。

His greatest political opponent, Alexei Navalny, dead and silenced, and

他最大的政治對手阿列克謝·納瓦尼已經去世並被噤聲，而

with a major terrorist attack in Moscow that his government is attempting to pin on the Ukrainians, there are whispers that the Kremlin is already preparing to roll out a second round of military mobilization in the that will seek to call up an additional 300,000 men for the war in Ukraine.

莫斯科發生了一場重大的恐攻，俄羅斯政府試圖將責任歸咎於烏克蘭人，有傳言說克里姆林宮已經準備好要進行第二波的軍事動員，目標是徵召另外30萬人投入烏克蘭的戰爭。

Even without the mobilization, the Russian armed forces have been able to offer up attractively high enough salaries to poor Russians in the country and to even poorer foreigners enlisted as mercenaries that they're still seeing a fairly consistent stream of around 30,000 newly recruited soldiers a month to the front line in Ukraine.

即使沒有動員，俄羅斯武裝部隊已經能夠提供足夠優渥的薪資給國內貧窮的俄羅斯人，以及更貧窮的外國僱傭兵，他們仍然每個月能吸引約3萬名新兵持續投入烏克蘭前線。

According to the website Ukraine Conflict Monitor.

根據烏克蘭衝突監測網站的說法。

Despite suffering massive casualties in Ukraine, the Russian ground forces numbers present on the front line have been continually increasing with time.

儘管在烏克蘭遭受了慘重的傷亡，俄羅斯前線的地面部隊人數隨著時間不斷增加。

According to the Royal United Services Institute, a major UK think tank, the Russians have greatly grown their troop numbers in Ukraine up from only around 360,000 soldiers at the beginning of 2023 to around 470,000 soldiers only a year later at the beginning of 2024.

根據英國一家主要智庫英國皇家聯合軍事研究所的說法，俄羅斯在烏克蘭的部隊人數大幅增加，從2023年初的約36萬人，到2024年初的約47萬人。

Putin himself has openly stated earlier this year that his plan is to raise the Russian troop levels in Ukraine up to approximately 600,000 strong, which will be more troops in Ukraine than the United States had present in Vietnam during the peak of the war in April of 1969.

普丁本人今年稍早曾公開表示，他的計畫是將俄羅斯在烏克蘭的部隊人數提升到約60萬人，這將比美國在1969年4月越戰高峰時期在越南的駐軍人數還多。

And in addition to raising its manpower for the war, Russia has also radically transformed its entire economy into a wartime economy, relentlessly refocusing most of its entire economic output on the war effort.

除了增加戰爭人力，俄羅斯也徹底將整個經濟轉變為戰時經濟，將大部分的經濟產出毫不留情地集中用於戰爭。

Now, for the first time in its modern history, Russia's new updated military budget for 2024 has soared upwards to a whopping 7.1% of the nation's total GDP, coming out to roughly 12.8 trillion Russian rubles, or approximately US$140 billion in nominal terms.

現在，俄羅斯2024年更新後的軍事預算，創下近代歷史新高，飆升至國家GDP的7.1%，約為12.8兆盧布，或以名目計算約1400億美元。

This places military spending at roughly 35% of the entire Russian government's budget now.

這使得軍事支出約佔整個俄羅斯政府預算的35%。

And this massive new annual military spending has been signed into Russian law to last at least through 2024, 2025 and 2026.

這項龐大的年度軍事支出已經簽署成為俄羅斯法律，至少將持續到2024年、2025年和2026年。

This is a huge 29% increase in Russian military spending from the year before in 2023.

這比2023年俄羅斯的軍事支出增加了29%，幅度相當驚人。

And it shows that Russia is deadly serious about shifting its economy to a wartime footing and pursuing all of its military objectives in Ukraine to the bitter end.

這顯示俄羅斯正全力以赴地將經濟轉向戰時模式，並決心將在烏克蘭的所有軍事目標貫徹到底。

In purely nominal terms, the Russians are now spending nearly as much on their military as Germany, France and Italy all are combined.

單純從名目上看，俄羅斯目前的軍事開銷幾乎等同於德國、法國和義大利三國的總和。

But adjusted to purchasing power parity, or PPP terms, the gap between Russian and European military spending is vastly closer together this year, with the Russians spending approximately $372.3 billion on their military and every single European member state of NATO combined spending about $380 billion on theirs, placing Russian and European NATO defense spending on about an equivalent scale for 2024 in PPP terms.

但若以購買力平價（PPP）來衡量，今年俄羅斯與歐洲的軍事支出差距大幅縮小，俄羅斯在軍事上的開銷約為3723億美元，而所有歐洲北約成員國的總開銷約為3800億美元，這使得2024年以PPP計算，俄羅斯和歐洲北約的國防開支規模大致相當。

As a result, Russia's military production levels are soaring.

是以，俄羅斯的軍事生產水準正在飆升。

According to the Royal United Services Institute, the Russians are now on track to produce about 1,500 tanks for their army this year alone, about half of the total number they're estimated to have lost in Ukraine since the invasion began.

根據英國皇家聯合軍事研究所的說法，俄羅斯今年預計將為其軍隊生產約1500輛坦克，這大約是自入侵以來他們在烏克蘭損失總數的一半。

And more tanks than are within the armed forces of the uk France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden all combined.

而且，這比英國、法國、德國、義大利、西班牙、葡萄牙、荷蘭、丹麥、挪威和瑞典所有武裝部隊的坦克總數加起來還要多。

According to the Estonian Ministry of Defense, Russia is currently projected to produce roughly 4.5 million rounds of artillery in 2024 alone, and

根據愛沙尼亞國防部的說法，俄羅斯預計僅在2024年就將生產約450萬發砲彈，

is also producing about 100 long range missiles every month.

並且每月還生產約100枚長程飛彈。

On 11 March, CNN reported that the Russians were on track to produce three times more artillery munitions in 2024 than the United States and European NATO allies combined.

3月11日，CNN報導指出，俄羅斯預計在2024年生產的砲彈數量將是美國和歐洲北約盟國總和的三倍。

And in addition to rapidly ramping up their own domestic production of munitions, The Russians are believed to have imported millions of additional rounds of artillery from North Korea and thousands of explosive Kamik Kazi drones from Iran, with hundreds more being produced every month.

而且，俄羅斯除了快速增加國內彈藥產量之外，據信還從北韓進口了數百萬發額外的砲彈，並從伊朗進口了數千架自殺式無人機，而且每個月還在生產數百架。

Which is how, according to Estonian military intelligence, the Russians have begun to out fire the Ukrainians and artillery along the front line by a ratio of 7 to 1.

這就是為什麼，根據愛沙尼亞軍事情報，俄羅斯在前線的砲擊量已經開始以七比一的比例超越烏克蘭。

Ukraine is currently struggling with acute shortages of both ammunition and manpower, a fact represented by the average age of the Ukrainian soldier on the front line being 43 years old right now.

烏克蘭目前正經歷彈藥和兵力嚴重短缺的困境，前線烏克蘭阿兵哥的平均年齡高達43歲，就是這個情況的寫照。

Historically, the Ukrainian government has only drafted men for the war between the ages of 27 at a minimum and 60 at the oldest in an attempt to conserve their smaller, younger generation as much as possible for the sake of the country's future and economy.

歷史上，烏克蘭政府只徵召年齡介於27歲到60歲之間的男性參戰，目的是盡可能地為國家未來和經濟保留較年輕的世代。

But as a result, Ukraine's draftable manpower pool has been made artificially smaller by effectively exempting men between 18 and 26 from conscription.

但結果是，烏克蘭的徵兵人力池因為實際上豁免了18到26歲的男性服兵役，而變得人為地縮小了。

And according to the AP, there's only around 300,000 heavily experienced but tired Ukrainian soldiers currently manning the front lines up against potentially twice as many Russian soldiers who have significantly more ammunition available to fire.

根據美聯社報導，目前在前線的僅有約30萬名經驗豐富但疲憊的烏克蘭阿兵哥，對抗的可能是兩倍數量的俄羅斯阿兵哥，而俄軍擁有的彈藥量也遠多於烏軍。

In order to prepare for a widely expected renewed Russian offensive on the front lines in the summer, the Ukrainians recently amended their conscription law to lower the draft age for men from 27 down to 25, which will hypothetically open up a pool of an additional 400,000 new 25 and 26 year old men for the war who can be conscripted from.

為了準備應對俄羅斯預計在夏季發動的新一波攻勢，烏克蘭最近修改了徵兵法，將男性徵兵年齡從27歲下調到25歲，這理論上將為戰爭開闢一個額外40萬名25歲和26歲的男性徵兵人力池。

But as Ukraine struggles to acquire more ammunition and manpower, and

但隨著烏克蘭努力爭取更多彈藥和兵力，

as Russia surges their own munitions and manpower onto the frontline to potentially overwhelm them, there is increasingly an amount of concern building that the summer of 2024 could end up becoming decisive and potentially disastrous for the Ukrainians, Putin and Russia's ultimate objectives in Ukraine.

以及俄羅斯將更多彈藥和兵力投入前線以期壓倒烏克蘭，越來越多人擔心2024年夏天可能會成為烏克蘭的決定性時刻，甚至可能是一場災難，這也關係到普丁和俄羅斯在烏克蘭的最終目標。

And strategies to pursue those objectives remain uncertain.

而追求這些目標的策略仍然不明朗。

In the dense fog of war, nobody in the world, least of all myself, really knows what's going to happen next in Ukraine, and

在戰爭的濃霧中，世界上沒有人，尤其是我自己，真的知道接下來在烏克蘭會發生什麼，

anything could end up potentially happening.

But as it stands now, it seems fairly clear that Russia's priorities have changed very little since the opening days of the invasion more than two years ago.

但就目前來看，俄羅斯的優先事項似乎與兩年前入侵初期幾乎沒有改變。

As a minimum goal, the Russians will almost certainly seek to expand their territorial control in Ukraine over all four of the Ukrainian provinces that they unilaterally declared to annex into Russia back in 2022, encompassing the entirety of the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson provinces, Putin signed into Russian law recognizing all of these provinces as core integral territories of the Russian Federation, meaning that according to Russian law, and

作為最低目標，俄羅斯幾乎肯定會尋求擴大在烏克蘭的領土控制，佔領他們在2022年單方面宣佈併入俄羅斯的四個烏克蘭省份，包括盧甘斯克、頓內茨克、札波羅熱和赫爾松全境，普丁已簽署成為俄羅斯法律，承認所有這些省份為俄羅斯聯邦的核心組成領土，這意味著根據俄羅斯法律，

the Russian perspective, as baseless as it seems to everyone else, the continued Ukrainian presence in these provinces is perversely viewed as a hostile occupation of Russia.

以及俄羅斯的觀點，儘管這對其他人來說似乎毫無根據，但烏克蘭繼續佔領這些省份被扭曲地視為對俄羅斯的敵意佔領。

And so the Russians will continue to try and drive them out as much as possible and force the Ukrainians into recognizing their total loss.

是以，俄羅斯將盡可能繼續試圖將他們趕出去，並迫使烏克蘭人承認他們的徹底失敗。

In addition to demanding that the Ukrainians recognize accession of these four provinces, the Russians will also want Ukraine to accept the previous laws of Crimea and Sevastopol as well.

除了要求烏克蘭人承認這四個省份的加入外，俄羅斯也希望烏克蘭接受克里米亞和塞凡堡先前的法律。

While it also even further appears that Russia will likely try and demand through military force or threats the additional annexations of the Ukrainian cities of Kharkiv and Odesa, Russian missile and drone attacks on both have sharply escalated in 2024, while Putin himself has frequently claimed them each to be supposedly rightfully Russian cities and labeled them both as priority war aims, as of the most recent 2001 census in Ukraine, both cities had majority of Russian speaking populations and significant ethnic Russian minorities that Putin's Russia now appears bent on directly incorporating.

此外，俄羅斯似乎很可能會通過軍事武力或威脅，要求額外吞併烏克蘭的哈爾科夫和敖德薩城市，這兩座城市在2024年俄羅斯的飛彈和無人機襲擊急劇升級，而普丁本人也經常聲稱它們是俄羅斯的城市，並將它們標記為優先戰爭目標，根據烏克蘭最近的2001年人口普查，這兩座城市都有俄語人口佔多數，以及顯著的俄羅斯少數民族，普丁的俄羅斯現在似乎決心直接將他們納入。

It therefore follows that in order to secure control over Kharkiv and Odesa, Ukraine's second and third largest cities no less, the Russians will probably also try and demand the further annexations of the Kharkiv, Mykolaiv and Odesa provinces as a condition for peace as well, and

是以，為了確保對烏克蘭第二大和第三大城市哈爾科夫和敖德薩的控制，俄羅斯也可能會要求進一步吞併哈爾科夫、尼古拉耶夫和敖德薩省份，作為和平的條件，

all of them will probably see increased Russian military assaults eventually.

而且所有這些地方最終都可能會面臨俄羅斯軍事襲擊的增加。

It also stands to reason that if Russian advances on the battlefield are particularly successful, they will also likely attempt to demand the annexation of parts or all of the Dnipropetrovsk province as well, the final province of eastern Ukraine that has a large Russian speaking and ethnic Russian minority that Putin would likely attempt to claim as being supposedly rightfully Russian territory.

所以，如果俄羅斯在戰場上的進展特別順利，他們也很可能會試圖要求吞併部分或全部第聶伯羅彼得羅夫斯克州，這是烏克蘭東部最後一個擁有大量俄語人口和俄羅斯族少數民族的省份，普丁可能會試圖聲稱這是俄羅斯應有的領土。

Assuming that Putin is successful in his apparently maximalist objective of directly conquering, occupying and annexing the eastern half of Ukraine with large Russian speaking minorities, Russia's likely demands for whatever remains of the landlocked Ukrainian rump state state will be no less neutering.

假設普丁成功實現他顯然是極端的目標，直接征服、佔領並吞併擁有大量俄語少數民族的烏克蘭東半部，那麼俄羅斯對剩下的內陸烏克蘭殘餘國提出的要求，也不會比較溫和。

The Wall Street Journal recently released an analysis of a 2022 proposed peace agreement that the Russians came up to enforce on Ukraine two years earlier that went nowhere, but

《華爾街日報》最近發表了一份分析，內容是關於俄羅斯兩年前提出的、但最終不了了之的和平協議提案，

its main points will likely still come up in the future.

但其主要內容很可能在未來仍會被提出。

If Russia manages to force a peace on its own terms, they will likely demand now, as they did two years ago, that whatever remains of Ukraine will be a permanently neutral state when it comes to military alliances, meaning that it will never be allowed to join NATO.

如果俄羅斯能夠強迫達成他們自己條件下的和平，他們很可能會像兩年前一樣，要求烏克蘭殘餘國家成為一個永久中立的國家，在軍事聯盟方面，意味著它將永遠不被允許加入北約。

The current administration of Volodymyr Zelenskyy would almost certainly be removed, and

現任的澤倫斯基政府幾乎肯定會被撤換，

all new governments in Kyiv would have to be expressly approved by the Kremlin, essentially turning the remnant of Ukraine into another Belarus style puppet or client state, highly dependent on Moscow for support.

所有基輔的新政府都必須得到克里姆林宮的明確準許，基本上將烏克蘭的殘餘變成另一個白俄羅斯式的傀儡或附庸國，高度依賴莫斯科的支持。

The original 2022 Russian proposed peace offer would cap Ukraine's postwar numbers of troops to only 85,000, while further limiting their tanks to just 342 and their artillery pieces to just 519, while outright banning Ukraine from importing any foreign made weapons from abroad.

最初的2022年俄羅斯提出的和平提議將烏克蘭戰後軍隊人數限制在僅85,000人，同時將其坦克限制在僅342輛，火砲限制在僅519門，同時完全禁止烏克蘭從國外進口任何外國製造的武器。

The only notable concession that Russia has appeared willing to give the remnant of post war Ukraine is allowing them to join the European Union, but

俄羅斯似乎唯一願意給予戰後烏克蘭殘餘國的顯著讓步是允許他們加入歐洲聯盟，

None of this is at all a guarantee of what will end up happening in Ukraine, but

不過，這一切都不能保證烏克蘭的最終命運，

it is what Russia likely wants to ultimately accomplish.

但這正是俄羅斯最終想要達成的目標。

And with the momentum of the war currently on Russia's side, it is likely what the Kremlin is attempting to push for.

而且隨著戰事目前對俄羅斯有利，這很可能是克里姆林宮正在推動的目標。

With their massive new military budget approved through 2026, the economy shifted to wartime, and

隨著他們在2026年前準許了龐大的新軍事預算，經濟轉向戰時，

a potential new round of mobilization coming, it appears that the Kremlin is setting a target date for victory in this war, with most or all of these objectives accomplished in Ukraine by the end of 2026 and about two and a half years from now.

以及可能的新一輪動員，克里姆林宮似乎設定了一個在這場戰爭中獲勝的目標日期，希望在2026年底，也就是現在的兩年半後，在烏克蘭實現這些目標中的大部分或全部。

Over these next two and a half years, the Russians will continue trying to grind the Ukrainians down in a brutal, demoralizing and costly war of attrition in the hope that they will either steadily advance their own front lines militarily, or that the Ukrainian government will eventually concede for peace or overthrown when the costs of the war become too great to bear.

在接下來的兩年半裡，俄羅斯人將繼續試圖在一場殘酷、士氣低落且代價高昂的消耗戰中耗盡烏克蘭人的力量，希望他們能穩步推進自己的戰線，或者最終因為戰爭的代價過於沉重而被迫求和或被推翻。

At the same time, Russia's special services will continue attempting to erode support for Ukraine in the west, so that the Ukrainian armed forces continue struggling with sources of ammunition and equipment as the Russians dump more and more of their own ammunition and equipment onto their own side.

同時，俄羅斯的情報部門將繼續試圖削弱西方對烏克蘭的支持，讓烏克蘭武裝部隊在彈藥和裝備來源上持續掙扎，而俄羅斯則將越來越多的彈藥和裝備傾瀉到自己的戰線上。

And of course, even if this kind of a harsh peace was forced upon Ukraine by 2026, there is no guarantee that Russia would not seek to invade or further incorporate the rest of Ukraine into the Russian state in the future at a later time after it is rearmed, recovered.

當然，即使到2026年烏克蘭被迫接受這種嚴酷的和平，也不能保證俄羅斯將來不會在重新武裝、恢復後尋求入侵或進一步將烏克蘭的剩餘地區併入俄羅斯國家。

There is also no guarantee that Putin or Russia's territorial ambitions would suddenly just end with the total subjugation of Ukraine, just like how they didn't stop with the previous seizure of Crimea in 2014, or with the previous invasion of Georgia in 2008, or with the previous subjugation of Chechnya in 1999.

也不能保證普丁或俄羅斯的領土野心會隨著烏克蘭的徹底屈服而突然停止，就像他們在2014年吞併克里米亞、2008年入侵喬治亞，或1999年征服車臣後並沒有停止一樣。

Vladimir Putin now rather infamously said back in 2005 that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.

弗拉基米爾·普丁在2005年曾臭名昭著地說過，蘇聯的解體是20世紀最偉大的地緣政治災難。

At the time when he said it, there were very few people who actually believed that he would ever do anything about it.

當時說這話的人，其實很少有人相信他真的會這麼做。

But here we are, nearly 20 years later, with Putin still in power in the Kremlin and with his regime spearheading Russia's fourth war in the former Soviet world since he took over control.

但我們看看現在，將近20年過去了，普丁還在克里姆林宮掌權，他的政權更是俄羅斯在他接管後，於前蘇聯地區發動的第四場戰爭的領頭羊。

There is a clear, established pattern that Putin's ambitions in the former Soviet world will likely not end, even if Ukraine is completely subdued in its entirety.

很明顯，普丁在前蘇聯地區的野心不太可能就此結束，即使烏克蘭完全屈服了，也一樣。

And with the Russian economy now fully shifted to a wartime economy, the Russians will be economically incentivized to continue the wars after Ukraine, too.

而且，隨著俄羅斯經濟已經完全轉向戰時經濟，俄羅斯在烏克蘭之後，也會有經濟上的動機繼續發動戰爭。

If Russia were to eventually manage taking over full control of the Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odessa provinces in Ukraine's south, it would establish a continuous land bridge from the Russian mainland to Transnistria, a deeply pro Russian separatist region of Moldova that controls a narrow strip of land between the Ukraine border and the Dniester river that has a population of around 365,000 people, about 30% of whom are ethnically Russian.

如果俄羅斯最終能完全控制烏克蘭南部的赫爾松、尼古拉耶夫和敖德薩省，就能建立一條從俄羅斯本土到德涅斯特河沿岸地區的陸地橋樑。德涅斯特河沿岸是摩爾多瓦一個極度親俄的分裂地區，控制著烏克蘭邊境和德涅斯特河之間的一小塊狹長地帶，人口約36.5萬，其中約30%是俄羅斯族。

Transnistria has requested direct annexation into Russia on multiple occasions since it secured its de facto independence throughout force and with the help of Russian troops that killed hundreds of people back in 1992.

自1992年透過武力並在俄羅斯軍隊的幫助下獲得事實上的獨立以來，德涅斯特河沿岸地區曾多次請求直接併入俄羅斯。

Around 1,500 Russian soldiers remain in Transnistria to this day as occupiers or peacekeepers, depending on your point of view.

至今仍有約1500名俄羅斯阿兵哥留在德涅斯特河沿岸地區，他們是佔領者還是維和部隊，就看你怎麼看了。

And the Russians even went so far as to set up polling stations in Transnistria in March of 2024 that allowed Transnistrian residents to vote in the Russian presidential election for Putin, which sparked outrage in Moldova.

俄羅斯甚至在2024年3月在德涅斯特河沿岸地區設立了投票站，讓當地居民能夠投票給普丁參加俄羅斯總統大選，這在摩爾多瓦引發了強烈憤慨。

As Moldova is neither a member state of the EU or NATO and was itself a former Soviet republic for decades during the 20th cent.

由於摩爾多瓦既不是歐盟也不是北約成員國，而且本身在20世紀曾是蘇聯的加盟共和國數十年。

Nova is a highly vulnerable next target for Russia in the event that Ukraine collapses.

一旦烏克蘭崩潰，新俄羅斯將成為俄羅斯下一個極易受攻擊的目標。

The country has a very small population of only about 2.5 million people, that is majority Romanian, and

這個國家人口非常少，只有大約兩百五十萬人，

a tiny standing army of only 6,500 personnel.

Russia could end up repeating the same playbook that they've done previously in both Ukraine and Georgia by recognizing the independence of Transnistria and then sending in the army with the excuse of protecting the ethnic Russians in Transnistria.

俄羅斯可能會重蹈在烏克蘭和喬治亞的覆轍，承認德涅斯特河沿岸地區獨立，然後以保護當地俄羅斯族為藉口派兵進入。

That ends up with a complete Russian occupation of the whole of Moldova, again, like back during the Soviet era.

這將導致摩爾多瓦被俄羅斯完全佔領，就像蘇聯時期一樣。

And in the process, the Kremlin will have restored its geographic frontier to the Carpathian Mountain range in the south, securing its southern flank against NATO, who it perceives to be hostile.

如此一來，克里姆林宮就能將其地理邊界擴展到南部的喀爾巴阡山脈，鞏固其南部邊緣免受被視為敵對的北約威脅。

Moldova's current president is so alarmed by this possibility that she has openly stated that the Ukrainians are not just fighting for the future of Ukraine, but

摩爾多瓦現任總統對這種可能性感到非常擔憂，她公開表示，烏克蘭人不僅是為了烏克蘭的未來而戰，

也是為了摩爾多瓦的未來而戰。

Anticipating the risk, the United States has upped their defense assistance to Moldova by more than tenfold from pre Ukraine war levels from only $3 million a year in 2022 to more than $30 million a year in the U.S.

美國預見到這個風險，已將對摩爾多瓦的國防援助提高十倍以上，從烏克蘭戰爭前的每年僅三百萬美元，增加到每年超過三千萬美元。

and France have also invested hundreds of millions of dollars into Moldova since the Ukraine invasion began to shift the country's energy connection westward away from Russia to be more integrated with the EU instead, while France took things a step even further in March of 2024 when they signed a separate Defense Cooperation agreement with Moldova, which will establish a French defense mission in the Moldovan capital this summer and provides the framework for French military training of the Moldovan armed forces and intelligence sharing related to Russia.

自烏克蘭戰爭爆發以來，美國和法國也向摩爾多瓦投資了數億美元，將該國的能源連結從俄羅斯轉向西方，以便與歐盟更緊密地整合。法國在2024年3月更是採取了進一步行動，與摩爾多瓦簽署了單獨的國防合作協議，將於今年夏天在摩爾多瓦首都設立法國國防代表團，並為法國軍隊訓練摩爾多瓦武裝部隊以及分享與俄羅斯相關情報提供框架。

France's President Emmanuel Macron has even recently threatened to send French troops themselves to Ukraine in the event that the Russians appear to be imminently about to take over major Ukrainian cities again like Kyiv or Odesa.

法國總統馬克宏甚至最近威脅說，如果俄羅斯似乎即將再次佔領基輔或敖德薩等烏克蘭主要城市，法國將派遣法軍部隊前往烏克蘭。

And Russia's probable ultimate ambitions extend beyond Georgia, Ukraine, Transnistria and Moldova as well.

而且俄羅斯最終的野心，可能不只侷限於喬治亞、烏克蘭、德涅斯特河沿岸地區和摩爾多瓦。

In early 2023, a 17 page internal strategy paper related to Belarus, allegedly produced by Putin's presidential administration, was leaked by an international team of journalists.

2023年初，一份關於白俄羅斯的17頁內部戰略文件，據稱是由普丁的總統辦公室擬定，被一個國際記者團隊洩漏。

The paper details Russia's various strategies to essentially absorb and fully integrate Belarus into a so called union state of Russia and Belarus by no later than 2030, at the end of Putin's fifth term in office.

該文件詳細說明瞭俄羅斯各種策略，目標是在普丁的第五個任期結束、也就是不晚於2030年，將白俄羅斯完全併入所謂的「俄羅斯—白俄羅斯聯盟國」。

The paper details out the increasing Russification of Belarusian society which has long been underway for decades now under the dictatorial regime of Alexander Lukashenko, who has continually remained in power in Belarus for 30 years now, ever since 1994.

文件中詳述了白俄羅斯社會日益俄羅斯化的過程，這在獨裁者盧卡申科的統治下已經持續了數十年，他自1994年以來一直掌權，至今已長達30年。

In the decade between 2009 and 2019, the most commonly spoken language by district in Belarus dramatically shifted from Belarusian to Russian, while Russian has emerged as the country's most dominantly spoken language over Belarusian, with fewer than 20% of Belarusians today citing the Belarusian language as their primary language spoken at home.

在2009年至2019年的十年之間，白俄羅斯各區最常使用的語言從白俄羅斯語急劇轉變為俄語，俄語已成為該國最主要的語言，如今只有不到20%的白俄羅斯人表示白俄羅斯語是他們在家裡最常說的語言。

While both Russian and Belarusian remain as the co official languages of the Belarusian state, about 95% of the Belarusian government operates in Russian today, while the Belarusian language is almost totally absent in the state's education and media.

雖然俄語和白俄羅斯語仍然是白俄羅斯國家的官方語言，但目前約有95%的白俄羅斯政府機構以俄語運作，而白俄羅斯語在國家教育和媒體中幾乎完全消失。

Since the Russians helped to crush anti regime protests that erupted In Belarus in 2020, Lukashenko's regime there has found itself heavily isolated and increasingly dependent on Russia for its very survival.

自從俄羅斯協助鎮壓2020年在白俄羅斯爆發的反政府抗議活動以來，盧卡申科政權發現自己處於嚴重孤立的境地，並且越來越依賴俄羅斯來維持生存。

Belarus already effectively functions as a Kremlin satellite state with Russian military bases on their territory, and

白俄羅斯實際上已經像克里姆林宮的衛星國一樣運作，境內設有俄羅斯軍事基地，

since 2022 they've allowed the Russians to move their troops through the country to attack Ukraine from the north.

而且自2022年以來，他們允許俄羅斯軍隊穿越該國，從北方攻擊烏克蘭。

And they've allowed the Russians to station tactical nuclear weapons in their territory as well.

他們也允許俄羅斯在其境內部署戰術核武器。

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