Name: 川普關稅威脅：危險的惡性循環？ | 直說了當 (Trumps tariff threats: A dangerous downward spiral? | To the Point)
Uploaded: 2026-01-22T17:04:10.000Z
Duration: 26 min 5 s

Europe's allies are feeling the impact of President Donald Trump's growing global ambitions.

歐洲盟友們正感受到美國總統唐納·川普日益增長的全球野心帶來的影響。

程度副詞

Even after the latest agreements on Greenland and tariffs for Europe, open pressure from the very nation that has long been its main protector marks a historic breach of trust.

即使在關於格陵蘭和歐洲關稅的最新協議達成後，長期以來作為其主要保護者的國家所施加的公開壓力，也標誌著信任的歷史性破裂。

The EU tried to push back, countering with its owned trade bazooka.

歐盟試圖反擊，動用了自己的貿易大砲。

But Europe's search for new trade partners isn't going smoothly either.

但歐洲尋找新貿易夥伴的過程也並不順利。

The Mercosur deal, celebrated just weeks ago, is now tied up in court after fierce resistance stalled for the foreseeable future.

幾週前還備受讚譽的南方共同市場協議，在強烈阻力下陷入僵局，目前被法院擱置，短期內難以預見。

So what are the right answers to Trump's strategy?

那麼，面對川普的策略，正確的答案是什麼？

Or is Europe simply too weak and too dependent on the United States?

還是歐洲根本就太軟弱，太依賴美國了？

And to the Point, we ask tariffs as a weapon, who holds the better cards?

接著進入「直擊要點」，我們來問，以關稅為武器，誰的牌更好？

歡迎收看本週的「直擊要點」。

接下來，我們來介紹今天的來賓。

Ulrike Hermann is a business editor at Germany's daily Tatz here in Berlin and author of several books on economic topics.

Ulrike Hermann 是德國日報 Tatz 的商業編輯，也是多本經濟主題書籍的作者。

Annika Miltner is an economist and the director of the Aspen Institute in Germany.

Annika Miltner 是經濟學家，也是德國 Aspen Institute 的總監。

Before that, she oversaw international trade policy at the Federation of German Industries, the bdi.

在此之前，她曾負責德國工業聯合會（bdi）的國際貿易政策。

Melissa Eddy is the Berlin correspondent for the New York Times, where she focuses primarily on economic, economic and business reporting.

Melissa Eddy 是紐約時報駐柏林記者，主要關注經濟、商業報導。

And joining us from Kiel is Professor Rolf Langhammer.

還有從基爾加入我們的 Rolf Langhammer 教授。

He spent many years researching international trade and globalization at the Institute for the World Economy.

他在世界經濟研究所（Institute for the World Economy）研究國際貿易和全球化多年。

We just heard about this apparent deal between NATO and the US to put an end to tensions over Greenland.

我們剛剛聽到一份北約和美國之間，據說要結束格陵蘭緊張局勢的協議。

妳怎麼看我們目前已知的部分？

At this point, there's a lot we don't know.

到目前為止，還有很多事情我們不知道。

What we do know is that tariffs at the moment appear to be off the table.

我們所知道的是，關稅目前似乎已經不在討論範圍內了。

Military intervention has been taken off the table, so it is a step down.

軍事介入已經不在考慮範圍內了，所以算是緩和了一步。

It looks like the United States could get some territorial independence of certain military bases in Greenland.

看起來美國可能會在格陵蘭獲得一些軍事基地的領土獨立。

There's talk of it being similar to what we see in Cyprus, and

有說法認為這跟我們在賽普勒斯看到的情況很像，而且

But there's a lot at this point that we don't know.

但目前還有很多事情我們不知道。

Bruno and the Europeans will be meeting tonight to discuss what they think their next best move is.

Bruno 和歐洲人今晚會開會討論他們認為下一步最好的做法是什麼。

Donald Trump says consistently and constantly that America's allies need the US More than the US Needs them.

Donald Trump 一貫且持續地表示，美國的盟友比美國更需要美國。

Do you think there's a limit, at least economically, to exert that Power.

你認為在至少經濟上，施加這種權力會有極限嗎？

I would say that there is an asymmetry in our relationship.

我會說我們的關係有點不對稱。

Europe certainly is very dependent on international trade.

Germany is extremely dependent with a trade to GDP ratio of around 90%.

德國的依賴性極高，貿易佔 GDP 的比例約為 90%。

So our export markets are extremely important to us.

所以我們的出口市場對我們來說非常重要。

We are also extremely invested in the United States.

Lots of German companies are producing in the United States.

很多德國公司都在美國設廠生產。

Also the financial markets are interconnected.

So yes, I would say there's an interdependency, but

所以是的，我會說存在互相依賴，但是

the dependency of Europe on the US Market is very high.

歐洲對美國市場的依賴性非常高。

this also is one of the explanation why the EU agreed to a very asymmetric trade deal last summer.

這也是為什麼歐盟去年夏天同意了一項非常不對稱的貿易協議的原因之一。

And we should also always not forget our huge dependency still with regard to security issues on the, on the United States.

而且我們也應該永遠不要忘記，在安全議題上，我們仍然非常依賴美國。

So whenever we talk about our trade bazooka, the anti coercion instrument or tariffs, this is, this also comes with costs for us because we are so dependent.

所以，當我們談論我們的貿易大砲、反脅迫工具或關稅時，這對我們來說也是有代價的，因為我們太依賴了。

And that reduces a little bit our power in exerting, I mean, or threatening countermeasures.

這也稍微降低了我們在施加、或者說威脅反制措施上的籌碼。

Certainly that's what the euro countries or the European Union countries are still trying to do at least.

當然，這也是歐元國家或歐盟國家至少仍在努力做的事情。

Ulrike, do you think this new development with the de escalation has anything to do with that threat by the European Union to impose the so called trade bazooka?

Ulrike，妳認為這種緩和局勢的新發展，跟歐盟威脅要實施所謂的貿易大砲有關嗎？

I think that this threat was not really important, but

我認為這個威脅其實不太重要，但是

it was also not non important because what somehow loomed at the horizon was a trade war.

它也不是完全不重要，因為在地平線上似乎籠罩著貿易戰的陰影。

And that is what the financial markets reacted to.

And for that reason the finance, the share value of the firms in the United States started to fall.

出於這個原因，美國公司的金融、股價開始下跌。

And that is something Trump reacted to immediately because he always watches Bloomberg's and once, you know, he sees the shares falling, he gets nervous.

川普立刻就對此做出了反應，因為他一直關注彭博社，一旦看到股價下跌，他就會感到緊張。

So in a way, indirectly, I think that this looming trade war was very important for his decision to somehow back down.

所以，間接來說，我認為這場迫在眉睫的貿易戰對他選擇退縮有很大的影響。

Your institute has studied the impact of Trump's tariffs and concluded that they are mostly being paid by American consumers.

妳們的研究機構研究了川普關稅的影響，並得出結論，這些關稅大部分是由美國消費者支付的。

Do they really work then as a political instrument to exert pressure on other countries?

那麼，這些關稅作為向其他國家施壓的政治工具真的有效嗎？

I think for the time being not because the American consumers and the American companies will see the long term effects of tariffs later, maybe even later this year.

我認為目前還沒有，因為美國消費者和美國公司會在稍晚，甚至今年稍晚才會看到關稅的長期影響。

So the Peterson Institute for International Economics, for instance, forecasts an inflation rate of about 4% by the end of this year.

是以，例如，彼得森國際經濟研究所預計，到今年年底的通膨率約為 4%。

We also of course have estimates from Yale University telling us that the normal U.S.

我們當然也有來自耶魯大學的估計，告訴我們一般的美國

So it's a loss of real income in vist direction.

所以這是在兩個方向上實質所得的損失。

They charge the poorer more than the richer.

它們對窮人的收費比對富人還高。

And that of course, is a major burden to the US Economy, not only in terms of competitiveness, but

這當然對美國經濟是個沉重的負擔，不只在競爭力方面，

But the effects will take some time to really come to the surface.

不過這些影響要真正浮現還需要一些時間。

And we'll see when the US Consumers will of course see disappointed and maybe give Donald Trump a yellow or even a red card when it comes to be interim elections in November.

我們到時候就會看到美國消費者在 11 月期中選舉時，可能會對唐納·川普出示黃牌甚至紅牌。

If I may, in there, what's interesting to see is if you look at polling data, then you can see tariffs are pretty unpopular among the Democratic voting base.

如果可以的話，有趣的是，如果你看看民意調查數據，你會發現關稅在民主黨的投票基礎中相當不受歡迎。

But they are still, there's still a lot of support among his own base, among the Republicans, surprisingly so, because that should be traditionally, historically the base being against protectionist measures.

但在他自己的基本盤，也就是共和黨人中，仍然有很大的支持，這很令人意外，因為傳統上、歷史上，這個基本盤應該是反對保護主義措施的。

But of course there has been a lot of movement in the basis of Republican, who votes for Republicans, who votes for Democrats.

不過當然，共和黨和民主黨的投票基礎，也就是支持共和黨和民主黨的人，有很大的變動。

We see that among Republicans there's a bigger support for protectionist measures.

我們看到共和黨人對保護主義措施的支持度比較高。

It's still more than 70% of the Republican base who are for it.

仍然有超過七成的共和黨基本盤支持這個政策。

As I said, Democrats are in their majority against it.

就像我說的，民主黨人大多反對這個政策。

And what's really interesting is how the independents currently view the trade policies and protectionism.

而真正有趣的是，獨立選民目前如何看待貿易政策和保護主義。

And there we see that they become less popular.

在那裡，我們看到它們變得比較不受歡迎。

And that's also an interesting, I mean, voting bloc for the upcoming midterm elections.

這也是一個有趣的、我指的是，對於即將到來的中期選舉來說，一個重要的投票群體。

And I also think that apart from the financial markets that Trump also had a look at what's happening internally in the United States.

而且我認為，除了金融市場之外，川普也關注美國國內發生的事情。

The Greenland issue was not very popular.

So I think that also motivated him to maybe he was losing some support within senators in his party and there was growing talk that Congress perhaps would actually take some action.

所以我想這也激勵了他，也許他在黨內參議員的支持度正在流失，而且越來越多人談論國會可能會採取行動。

Also, I think it was very unpopular, or we've seen from polling, it was very unpopular, popular amongst most Americans, even amongst some in his MAGA base.

而且，我認為這非常不受歡迎，或者我們從民調中看到，這在大多數美國人中，甚至在他的一些 MAGA 支持者中，都非常不受歡迎。

So the risks for him internally were extremely high.

Maybe he was listening, but we're not entirely sure.

也許他有在聽，但我們不太確定。

Anyway, the tariffs feel like a punishment to other countries.

總之，關稅感覺就像是對其他國家的懲罰。

And the European Union certainly is also following the same strategy, preparing its own response.

歐洲聯盟當然也在採取同樣的策略，準備自己的應對措施。

Let's take a closer look at the tools the European Union has set to push back against pressure from President Donald Trump and what real leverage Europe can bring to the table when the transatlantic relationship gets tough.

讓我們仔細看看歐盟已經準備好哪些工具來反擊川普總統的壓力，以及當跨大西洋關係變得艱難時，歐洲能帶來什麼真正的籌碼。

Europe is the most important international market for US Tech giants like Google and Meta.

歐洲是 Google 和 Meta 等美國科技巨頭最重要的國際市場。

But these companies could be most heavily affected.

但這些公司可能會受到最嚴重的影響。

Along with online payment service PayPal, the EU has a so called anti coercion instrument at its disposal, what some refer to as a trade policy bazooka.

連同線上支付服務 PayPal，歐盟也擁有所謂的反脅迫工具，有些人稱之為貿易政策的巴祖卡。

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川普關稅威脅：危險的惡性循環？ | 直說了當 (Trumps tariff threats: A dangerous downward spiral? | To the Point)

extremely

strategy

impact

effective