Name: 以色列與土耳其為何關係緊張，可能因敘利亞開戰？🇸🇾🇹🇷 (Why Israel & Turkey Are Heading To War Over Syria)
Uploaded: 2025-11-18T17:32:06.000Z
Duration: 40 min 47 s

關係子句

Near the end of the year in 2024, after more than 13 years of continuous warfare and more than 650,000 deaths, the Assad regime in Syria finally collapsed following a major renewed offensive that was launched by the Turkish backed HTS faction.

到了 2024 年底，經過十多年持續的戰火和超過 65 萬人喪生後，敘利亞的阿薩德政權在土耳其支持的 HTS 派系發動重大攻勢後終於垮臺。

For Turkey, it was the culmination of more than a decade of careful strategy to remove Assad from power and to shift Syria to being within their own sphere of influence.

對土耳其來說，這是他們十多年來精心策劃、試圖推翻阿薩德並將敘利亞納入自身勢力範圍的戰略的頂峰。

Ever since the civil war next door first erupted in 2011, Syria became a maw of chaos that had saddled Turkey with a litany of problems that it could never easily solve.

自從隔壁的內戰在 2011 年爆發以來，敘利亞就成了混亂的淵藪，給土耳其帶來了一連串難以解決的問題。

More than 3 million Syrian refugees fled the war and crossed the border over into Turkey, straining Turkish resources and inflaming anti Arab, anti refugee sentiments among the Turkish public who grew increasingly resentful toward their presence.

超過 300 萬敘利亞難民逃離戰火，越過邊境進入土耳其，耗盡了土耳其的資源，並在土耳其民眾中煽動了反阿拉伯、反難民的情緒，他們對難民的存在越來越不滿。

The US military came to support the Syrian Kurdish factions in their drive for autonomy within Syria, since they proved willing and capable of defeating ISIS in the country.

美軍為了支持敘利亞庫德族派系爭取自治，因為他們證明瞭有能力且願意擊敗 ISIS。

But in the process, they essentially created a de facto independent US backed Kurdish statelet out of Syria's northeast, immediately on Turkey's southern border, inflaming the cause of Kurdish nationalism and separatism from southeastern Turkey as well, and

但在這個過程中，他們實際上在敘利亞東北部建立了一個實際獨立的美國支持的庫德族小邦國，就在土耳其南部邊境，這也激化了土耳其東南部庫德族民族主義和分離主義的訴求，

providing the PKK Kurdish militant group with a safe base of operations to coordinate attacks in Turkey from and as the war in Syria progressed, the Assad regime grew increasingly dependent upon the influence and support of Russia and Iran, two of Turkey's major regional and historical geopolitical rivals that it was loath to see gain the upper hand on their southern border.

並為庫德工人黨（PKK）準軍事組織提供了一個安全的行動基地，用於協調在土耳其的襲擊。隨著敘利亞戰事推進，阿薩德政權越來越依賴俄羅斯和伊朗的影響力與支持，這兩個國家是土耳其主要的地區性和歷史性地緣政治競爭對手，土耳其不願看到他們在南部邊境佔據上風。

So all of a sudden, at the end of 2024, when rebels in Syria that had been backed by Turkey for years managed to overthrow the Assad regime and seize power for themselves, Turkey suddenly found themselves to be the primary power broker in the country and the new leading source of outside influence.

是以，在 2024 年底，土耳其多年來一直支持的敘利亞反對派成功推翻了阿薩德政權並奪取了權力，土耳其突然發現自己成為了該國主要的權力掮客和新的外部影響力主導者。

Almost overnight, all of the problems that Syria had been causing Turkey over the past 13 years seemed like they would final Russian and Iranian influence in the country was crippled and replaced with their own influence in the halls of government.

幾乎在一夜之間，敘利亞過去 13 年來給土耳其造成的種種問題似乎都將得到解決，俄羅斯和伊朗在該國的影響力被削弱，取而代之的是他們在政府中的影響力。

The millions of Syrian refugees still present in Turkey could finally be relocated back home in a major political victory.

仍然滯留在土耳其的數百萬敘利亞難民終於可以大規模政治勝利地遷回家園。

And most importantly of all, Turkey gained the leverage it had been seeking for years over the Kurdish PKK, whom it had been fighting a bloody insurgency against for decades.

最重要的是，土耳其終於獲得了多年來一直尋求對庫德工人黨（PKK）的影響力，而土耳其與該組織的血腥衝突已持續數十年。

The PKK began its armed insurgency against the Turkish state in the late 1970s, initially seeking the full independence of the Kurdish areas of southeastern Turkey and later modifying their demands for autonomy.

庫德工人黨（PKK）於 1970 年代後期開始對土耳其國家發動武裝叛亂，最初尋求土耳其東南部庫德族地區的完全獨立，後來修改了對自治的要求。

Instead, Turkey always refused and fought them in a long drawn out bloody war that cost tens of thousands of lives over decades and morphed into Turkey's number one geopolitical security threat.

但土耳其始終拒絕，並與他們進行了曠日持久的血腥戰爭，數十年來造成數萬人死亡，並演變成土耳其頭號地緣政治安全威脅。

By the time the Syrian Kurds established their US backed proto state across the border in Syria during the 2010s, the Turks considered the Syrian Kurdish government and the PKK to be essentially indistinguishable, meaning that they felt that they were dealing with a PKK run statelet directly on their southern border that was coordinating and orchestrating the insurgency raging across the border within Turkey.

到了 2010 年代，敘利亞庫德族在邊境對面建立了美國支持的準國家後，土耳其人認為敘利亞庫德族政府與庫德工人黨（PKK）基本上沒有區別，這意味著他們覺得自己直接面對一個由庫德工人黨（PKK）控制的小邦國，該邦國正在協調並策劃邊境內土耳其的叛亂活動。

So with the fall of Assad at the end of 2024 and the installment of a Turkish backed militia into power, Turkey believed that they had finally gained the leverage in Syria that they needed to pressure the Syrian Kurds into surrendering their autonomy and removing the PKK threat from their border for good.

是以，隨著阿薩德政權在 2024 年底垮臺，以及一個由土耳其支持的民兵組織上臺，土耳其相信他們終於在敘利亞獲得了所需的影響力，可以迫使敘利亞庫德族放棄自治，並永遠消除邊境的庫德工人黨（PKK）威脅。

Merely months afterward, In May of 2025, the PKK announced that it would be fully dissolving and ending its armed struggle against Turkey in favor of political means, instead ending the long Kurdish insurgency in Turkey's favor and dramatically boosting the popularity for Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as he seeks an unprecedented fourth term in office ahead of the next Turkish presidential election in 2028.

僅僅幾個月後，也就是 2025 年 5 月，庫德工人黨（PKK）宣佈將全面解散，並以政治手段取代武裝鬥爭，結束了土耳其境內長期的庫德族叛亂，並極大地提升了土耳其總統雷傑普·塔伊普·艾爾段（Recep Tayyip Erdogan）的聲望，他正在尋求在 2028 年土耳其總統大選前，史無前例地第四次連任。

But as fate would have it, the removal of Assad from power in Syria was not just a major geopolitical bonanza for Turkey, but

但命運弄人，阿薩德政權在敘利亞的垮臺不僅是土耳其的地緣政治一大喜訊，

Assad had closely aligned the Syrian state with Israel's greatest geopolitical enemy, Iran, and

阿薩德政權與以色列最大的地緣政治敵人伊朗緊密結盟，而

he had granted Syria's territory to the Iranians to use as a critical logistics corridor to funnel weapons and supplies through to Hezbollah and Lebanon.

他把敘利亞的領土給了伊朗，讓伊朗能利用這條關鍵的後勤通道，將武器和物資輸送到真主黨和黎巴嫩。

The toppling of Assad from power and the crippling of Iranian influence in the country eliminated this critical land bridge for Hezbollah, which on its own would have already been geopolitical victory for Israel.

阿薩德政權垮臺以及伊朗在敘利亞影響力的削弱，終結了真主黨的這條關鍵陸路通道，這本身就足以讓以色列獲得地緣政治上的勝利。

But Israel also didn't trust the rise to power in Syria of the Turkish backed militant faction HTS and its leader Ahmad Alshara either.

但以色列也不信任土耳其支持的武裝派系 HTS 及其領導人 Ahmad Alshara 在敘利亞掌權。

Both HTS and Alshara have radical Sunni Islamist and jihadist pasts.

HTS 和 Alshara 都曾有激進的遜尼派伊斯蘭主義和聖戰主義的過去。

Alshara used to be a member of Al Qaeda, while HTS was initially founded as Al Qaeda's branch of operations in Syria before it split off into its own separate entity in 2017.

Alshara 曾是蓋達組織的成員，而 HTS 最初是作為蓋達組織在敘利亞的行動分支成立的，直到 2017 年才分裂成一個獨立的實體。

Alshara himself has since publicly renounced jihadism and extremism since, stating that he seeks no quarrel with anyone beyond Syria's own borders and that he especially seeks no confrontation with Israel.

Alshara 本人自那時起已公開放棄聖戰主義和極端主義，表示他不想與敘利亞邊界以外的任何人發生爭執，尤其不想與以色列發生衝突。

He has even repeatedly suggested that he is open to extending Syria's formal recognition of Israel under certain conditions.

他甚至一再表示，在某些條件下，他願意延長敘利亞對以色列的正式承認。

And yet many within Israel security establishment do not trust him or HTS anyway.

然而，以色列安全部門的許多人仍然不信任他或 HTS。

Many of them believe that Alshara will say and promise anything right now in order to receive legitimacy and recognition and sanctions relief to improve the dire straits of the Syrian economy.

他們中的許多人認為，Alshara 現在什麼都願意說、什麼都願意承諾，以獲得合法性、承認以及解除制裁，來改善敘利亞經濟的嚴峻困境。

Following more than 13 years of devastating total war and more than a half century of totalitarian and corrupt rule under the Assad family, they fear that after serious economic conditions improve over time, Alshara and HTS could revert back to their jihadist pasts and come to threaten Israel once again.

經過十多年毀滅性的全面戰爭，以及阿薩德家族統治下的半個多世紀的極權和腐敗統治，他們擔心在嚴峻的經濟狀況隨著時間推移而改善後，Alshara 和 HTS 可能會重拾他們過去的聖戰主義，再次威脅以色列。

And in the post October 7 security environment, Israel is deeply mistrustful of anything that even remotely resembles jihadism on any of their borders.

而且在十月七日之後的安全環境下，以色列對任何靠近邊境的聖戰主義都極度不信任。

For many years leading up to the October 7 attack, the Israeli government generally regarded Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar to be somewhat of a pragmatist whom they could work with.

在十月七日襲擊發生前的許多年裡，以色列政府普遍認為哈瑪斯領導人辛瓦爾是個比較務實的人，認為可以跟他合作。

Sinwar had allowed Palestinians from Gaza to work across the border in Israel.

辛瓦爾允許加薩的巴勒斯坦人到以色列工作。

He kept his distance from more radical Palestinian militant factions like Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and

他與巴勒斯坦伊斯蘭聖戰組織等更激進的巴勒斯坦武裝派系保持距離，並且

he showed a willingness to negotiate and make compromises in the short term.

他表現出短期內願意談判和做出妥協的態度。

And nonetheless, Senwar still planned and executed the deadliest surprise attack on Israel that the country has ever, ever experienced on October 7th of 2023.

然而，辛瓦爾仍然策劃並執行了以色列有史以來，在二零二三年十月七日所經歷過最致命的突襲。

Since then, the Israeli government has become obsessed with establishing buffer zones around all of their borders in order to keep any other potential jihadist groups that would attack them away, even if it means blatantly violating international law and occupying more territory in foreign countries.

自那以來，以色列政府一直致力於在其所有邊境周圍建立緩衝區，以阻止任何其他可能攻擊他們的聖戰組織，即使這意味著公然違反國際法並佔領外國更多領土。

It is why the Israelis invaded southern Lebanon in late 2024 and continued to occupy what they call five key strategic areas in the country to maintain a buffer against Hezbollah.

這就是為什麼以色列在二零二四年晚些時候入侵黎巴嫩南部，並繼續佔領該國所謂的五個關鍵戰略區域，以維持對真主黨的緩衝。

And it's why they seized on the opportunity that the chaos in Syria gave them after Assad's fall with another invasion into Syria.

這也是為什麼他們抓住阿薩德垮臺後敘利亞的混亂機會，再次入侵敘利亞。

Rather than wait around to see what would happen, the Israelis ultimately decided that they would prepare themselves for a hostile new government in Syria by preemptively carving out a sphere of influence in the south of the country while they had the chance to do so.

以色列沒有坐等觀望，最終決定他們將為敘利亞出現一個敵對的新政府做好準備，趁著還有機會時，先發制人地在該國南部劃定勢力範圍。

The day after Assad fled the country, the Israeli military launched a limited ground invasion from the occupied Golan Heights and seized control over most of the UN established buffer zone in the area between the Golan Heights and the rest of Syria.

在阿薩德逃離該國的隔天，以色列軍隊從被佔領的戈蘭高地發動有限度的地面入侵，並控制了戈蘭高地與敘利亞其他地區之間聯合國設立的緩衝區的大部分區域。

After the Syrian army had fled from the area, the Israeli air force then carried out a relentless bombing campaign all across Syria that hit hundreds of targets and crippled the new government's military capabilities, destroying its naval and air assets, eliminating their anti air and heavy equipment and wiping out whatever remained of the Assad regime's chemical weapons stockpiles and then the Israelis demanded the establishment of a new demilitarized zone in southern Syria, Syria south of Damascus, that would be enforced by the Israeli Air Force, with or without the consent of the new Syrian government, warning that any Syrian military assets that entered the south of the country would be interpreted as a threat and would be immediately attacked.

在敘利亞軍隊撤離該地區後，以色列空軍隨即在敘利亞各地展開無情的轟炸行動，擊中數百個目標，削弱了新政府的軍事能力，摧毀了其海空資產，消滅了他們的防空和重型裝備，並清除了阿薩德政權殘存的化學武器庫，接著以色列要求在敘利亞南部、大馬士革以南地區建立一個由以色列空軍強制執行的非軍事區，無論新敘利亞政府是否同意，並警告任何進入該國南部的敘利亞軍事資產都將被視為威脅並立即遭到攻擊。

Now, while Israel has attempted to present all of these moves that they made into Syria as being purely defensive, they seem anything but to both the new Syrian government and Turkey.

現在，儘管以色列試圖將他們在敘利亞的所有行動都描繪成純粹的防禦性舉動，但對新敘利亞政府和土耳其來說，這些行動絕非如此。

Turkey especially fears Israel's increasingly unrestrained attacks that they've been launching across the Middle east since October 7, and

土耳其尤其擔心以色列自10月7日以來在中東地區日益不受約束的攻擊，並且

also fears that Israel's ultimate objective in Syria is to shatter the country and undermine all of the gains they thought they had made with the PKK and the Kurdish insurgency issue.

也擔心以色列在敘利亞的最終目標是摧毀該國，並破壞他們以為在PKK和庫德族叛亂問題上取得的所有進展。

Since the October 7th attack in 2023, Israel has launched ground invasions into Lebanon and Syria and repeatedly bombed both countries.

自2023年10月7日襲擊以來，以色列已入侵黎巴嫩和敘利亞，並一再轟炸這兩個國家。

They've conducted large scale bombing raids into both Yemen and Iran.

他們對葉門和伊朗都進行了大規模轟炸。

And most importantly for Turkey's geopolitical calculations, they recently bombed Qatar as well, which shocked Turkey down to its very core.

對土耳其的地緣政治考量而言最重要的是，他們最近也轟炸了卡達，這讓土耳其感到極度震驚。

In early September of 2025, the Israeli Air Force carried out an airstrike on a Qatari government residential complex in the suburbs of the country's capital city, Doha.

在2025年9月初，以色列空軍對位於該國首都杜哈郊區的卡達政府住宅區進行了空襲。

Israel said that the attack targeted senior Hamas leadership who were present in the building and who were actively taking part in negotiations for a ceasefire with the United States in the Gaza War.

以色列表示，此次襲擊針對的是當時身處該建築物內並積極參與美國在加薩戰爭停火談判的高級哈瑪斯領導人。

The attack failed in Israel's objective of killing the most senior Hamas leadership who were present and instead reportedly resulted in the deaths of at least six six people, five lower ranking Hamas officials and one Qatari security officer, along with four others who were wounded.

這次襲擊並未達成以色列擊殺在場最高級哈瑪斯領導人的目標，反而據報造成至少六人死亡，包括五名哈瑪斯低階官員和一名卡達安全官員，另有四人受傷。

The attack was unprecedented and shocking for multiple reasons.

這次襲擊在多個層面上都是前所未有且令人震驚的。

For one, Qatar has long served as a sort of neutral mediator in the many disputes of the Middle east and has hosted negotiators from Hamas, Israel and the United States for years, giving them all a place to meet and discuss in an environment that was considered to be safe and neutral for all parties present.

首先，卡達長期以來一直是中東地區許多爭端的「中立調解者」，多年來接待過哈瑪斯、以色列和美國的談判代表，為各方提供了一個被認為安全且中立的會談場所。

But Israel's attack on the Hamas negotiators in Qatar has now permanently shattered that carefully cultivated image.

但以色列在卡達襲擊哈瑪斯談判代表的行為，已經永久地粉碎了這種精心建立的形象。

On top of Iran's previous airstrikes that they attempted a launch at Qatar as well only a few months previously.

更別提伊朗幾個月前也曾試圖對卡達發動空襲。

It marked the first time that Israel has directly attacked the territory of a Gulf Cooperation Council member.

這標誌著以色列首次直接攻擊海灣合作委員會成員國的領土。

And perhaps most importantly, it marked the first time that Israel has directly attacked the territory of another country that is a close ally of the United States.

而或許最重要的是，這標誌著以色列首次直接攻擊另一個與美國關係密切的盟友國家的領土。

Qatar is a major non NATO ally of the US and hosts America's biggest airbase in the entire Middle east at Al U Daid.

卡達是美國主要的非北約盟友，並且是美國在中東地區最大的空軍基地——烏代德空軍基地——的所在地。

Nonetheless, the US did little if anything to prevent Israel from attacking Qatari territory anyway, and

儘管如此，美國卻幾乎沒有採取任何行動來阻止以色列攻擊卡達領土，

made no attempt to give Israel any real solid pushback afterwards outside of just condemning the attack.

並且在事後除了譴責襲擊之外，也沒有試圖給予以色列任何實質性的反擊。

Qatar is also Turkey's greatest regional ally in the Middle east too, and

卡達同時也是土耳其在中東地區最重要的區域盟友，

Turkey fears that if Israel was bold enough to strike Qatar's territory, they might be bold enough to strike their own territory as well.

土耳其擔心，如果以色列膽敢攻擊卡達領土，他們也可能膽敢攻擊自己的領土。

Israel has repeatedly accused Turkey of providing material assistance to Hamas for more than a decade now, and

以色列一再指控土耳其十多年來向哈瑪斯提供實質援助，

of providing their leadership with a safe space to operate.

並為其領導層提供安全的運營空間。

Turkey has also never recognized Hamas as a terrorist organization, which the Israelis expected Turkey to do after they took the step of recognizing the PKK as a terrorist organization, but

土耳其也從未承認哈瑪斯為恐怖組織，以色列曾期望土耳其在承認庫德工人黨（PKK）為恐怖組織後，也會跟進承認哈瑪斯，但

President Erdogan of Turkey has repeatedly praised Hamas and has repeatedly hosted senior Hamas officials on Turkish territory for diplomacy, despite Israel's accusations that Hamas has plotted and coordinated attacks on Israel from there.

土耳其總統艾爾段一再讚揚哈瑪斯，並多次在土耳其境內接待哈瑪斯高官進行外交活動，儘管以色列指控哈瑪斯從當地策劃並協調對以色列的襲擊。

So after Israel's attack on Hamas members in Qatar, Turkey now fears that Israel might attack Hamas members on Turkish soil at some point in the future as well, and

是以，在以色列襲擊卡達境內的哈瑪斯成員後，土耳其現在擔心以色列未來也可能攻擊土耳其境內的哈瑪斯成員，而且

they also fear that their close relationship with the United States might not prevent it from happening either.

他們也擔心與美國的密切關係可能無法阻止這種情況發生。

Turkey is a member of the NATO military alliance, and

土耳其是北約軍事聯盟的成員國，

so an Israeli attack on Turkish territory targeting Hamas members could lead Turkey to attempting to trigger an Article 5 violation, bringing the rest of the alliance to bear on Israel.

所以，以色列攻擊土耳其境內哈瑪斯成員的行動，可能會讓土耳其試圖觸發《第五條》的違反，讓聯盟中的其他國家一同對抗以色列。

But after the US seemingly stepped aside and just allowed the Israelis to freely attack the territory of Qatar, a major non NATO ally, Turkey now doubts the real resolve of America's willingness to keep Israel in check.

但美國似乎退居一旁，任由以色列自由攻擊卡達這個重要的非北約盟友的領土後，土耳其現在懷疑美國是否有真正的意願約束以色列。

And they fear that the US and NATO security guarantee matters less now when it comes to Israel than it ever has before.

而且他們擔心，在約束以色列這件事上，美國和北約的安全保證現在的重要性，比以往任何時候都來得低。

Basically, the Qatar attack and all of the previous Israeli attacks on Iran, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon have all shown to Turkey that they cannot rule out an Israeli attack attack on their territory happening at some point as well, especially if they continue hosting members of Hamas's senior leadership on their territory, which under Erdogan's presidency is likely.

基本上，卡達遇襲以及之前以色列對伊朗、葉門、敘利亞和黎巴嫩的所有攻擊，都向土耳其表明，他們不能排除以色列未來某個時候也會攻擊他們領土的可能性，特別是如果他們繼續接待哈瑪斯高層成員，這在艾爾段總統任內很可能會發生。

Turkey and Israel have a complicated historical relationship that used to be far friendlier than it is today.

土耳其和以色列有著複雜的歷史關係，過去比現在友善得多。

Turkey was the very first Muslim country in the world to recognize the Israeli state shortly after its founding in 1948.

土耳其是世界上第一個在1948年建國後不久就承認以色列國的穆斯林國家。

And both remained firm allies of the United States against the Soviet bloc throughout the entire Cold War era.

在整個冷戰時期，兩國都一直是美國對抗蘇聯集團的堅定盟友。

Up until the 2000 and twenties, Turkey was one of only a handful of Muslim countries in the world to maintain its formal recognition of Israel, which gave the Israelis what was for a While a rare case of legitimacy within the Muslim world.

直到2000年代，土耳其一直是世界上少數幾個正式承認以色列的穆斯林國家之一，這在穆斯林世界為以色列贏得了難得的合法性。

In exchange, Israel greatly assisted the Turkish military by agreeing to share intelligence to help out with their missile program and to assist with modernizing the Turkish Air Force.

作為交換，以色列同意分享情報，協助他們的飛彈計畫，並協助土耳其空軍現代化，從而大力協助了土耳其軍隊。

Israel helped Turkey combat the PKK insurgency and the Israelis helped arm and train Turkey's ally Azerbaijan in their successful wars against Armenia.

以色列協助土耳其打擊庫德工人黨（PKK）的叛亂，並協助武裝和訓練土耳其盟友亞塞拜然，在他們對抗亞美尼亞的戰爭中取得勝利。

Both Israel and Turkey maintained common enemies even after the end of the Cold War in Iran and Assadist Syria, which kept their cooperation steady.

冷戰結束後，以色列和土耳其在伊朗和阿薩德政權統治下的敘利亞都面臨共同的敵人，這使得兩國的合作得以穩定。

But then, across the 2000s and 2010s, as both Israel and Turkey grew more religious and less secular, the relations began to deteriorate.

然而，隨著2000年代和2010年代，以色列和土耳其的宗教色彩都日益濃厚，世俗化程度降低，兩國關係開始惡化。

They rapidly plummeted after 2010, when the Israeli military raided and opened fire on a Turkish civilian vessel called the Mavi Marmara that was attempting to break through the Israelian force blockade of Gaza to deliver humanitarian aid.

到了2010年，關係急轉直下，當時以色列軍隊突襲並向一艘土耳其民用船隻「馬爾馬拉號」開火，該船試圖突破以色列對加薩的封鎖以運送人道援助。

Ten Turkish civilians were killed by the Israeli fire and dozens of others were wounded, which resulted in Turkey sharply downgrading its diplomatic relations with Israel.

以色列的槍擊造成十名土耳其平民死亡，數十人受傷，導致土耳其大幅降低了與以色列的外交關係。

Turkey demanded an apology and compensation from Israel over the incident, which the Israelis refused, which led to Turkey suspending all of their military ties and cooperation with Israel.

土耳其要求以色列就此事件道歉並賠償，但以色列拒絕，這使得土耳其暫停了與以色列的所有軍事聯繫與合作。

After that, Israel sought to recalibrate its geopolitical standing in the region to balance out the loss of Turkey as an ally.

此後，以色列試圖重新調整其在地緣政治上的地位，以平衡失去土耳其這個盟友的影響。

So Israel greatly expanded its military and diplomatic ties with Cyprus and Greece instead.

是以，以色列轉而大幅擴大了與賽普勒斯和希臘的軍事及外交聯繫。

Over the years that followed, two of Turkey's most significant and bitter rivals who remain at odds over the contested division of Cyprus and their competing maritime claims in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean seas.

在接下來的幾年裡，土耳其的兩個最重要且關係惡劣的競爭對手，在賽普勒斯問題和愛琴海及東地中海的海洋權益爭奪上一直處於對立狀態。

Israel, Cyprus and Greece all began conducting joint naval and air exercises with each other across the eastern Mediterranean.

以色列、賽普勒斯和希臘開始在地中海東部地區進行聯合海空演習。

And very recently, In September of 2025, it was even reported that the Israelis had delivered advanced anti air defense systems to Cyprus, as in tandem with Israel's advances in Assyria and its attack on Turkey's ally Qatar.

而在最近，也就是2025年9月，據報導以色列已向賽普勒斯交付了先進的防空系統，這與以色列在亞述的進展以及其對土耳其盟友卡達的攻擊同時發生。

It's not hard to see how Turkey interprets Israel's recent moves not as being defensive, but

我們不難看出土耳其如何解讀以色列的這些最新舉動，認為這不是防禦性的，

as an explicitly offensive encirclement strategy aimed at containing Turkey's freedom of navigation.

而是明確的包圍攻擊策略，旨在限制土耳其的航行自由。

And on top of everything else, Turkey knows that Israel is also less dependent upon them for recognition and legitimacy in the Muslim world than they used to be.

更別提，土耳其知道以色列在穆斯林世界獲得認可和合法性方面，已經不像過去那樣依賴他們了。

As recently as 2020, only a handful of Muslim majority still recognized Israel's legitimacy, including Turkey, Albania, Azerbaijan, the former Soviet Central Asian states and Egypt and Jordan.

在2020年時，只有少數穆斯林佔多數的國家承認以色列的合法性，包括土耳其、阿爾巴尼亞、亞塞拜然、前蘇聯中亞國家以及埃及和約旦。

But since then, the uae, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco have all extended their formal recognitions of Israel as well, reducing Israel's need to continue relying on Turkey's recognition as a source for its legitimacy within the Muslim world and further fraying what used to be the strong bonds holding them together.

但從那之後，阿聯酋、巴林、蘇丹和摩洛哥也都正式承認了以色列，這減少了以色列繼續依賴土耳其認可作為其在穆斯林世界合法性來源的需求，也進一步削弱了過去曾緊密聯繫他們的強大紐帶。

And the recent rhetoric between them hasn't been helping perceptions either.

而近期他們之間的言論往來也無助於改善觀感。

President Erdogan has repeatedly accused Israel of committing genocide against the Palestinians in Gaza since the current war began and has led Turkey into joining South Africa's genocide case against Israel too.

自從本輪戰爭開始以來，厄多安總統一再指控以色列在加薩對巴勒斯坦人犯下種族滅絕罪，並帶領土耳其加入了南非針對以色列的種族滅絕訴訟。

In March of 2025, during his Eid holiday address, Erdogan publicly asked God to destroy what he called Zionist Israel.

在2025年3月，厄多安在開齋節假期演講中，公開祈求上帝摧毀他所謂的「猶太復國主義以色列」。

And before that, in 2024, he announced a full ban on all Turkish trade with Israel.

在那之前，也就是2024年，他宣佈全面禁止土耳其與以色列的所有貿易往來。