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  • Good afternoon.

  • Today's speaker is Peter Thiel.

  • Peter, was the founder of PayPal, and

  • Palantir, and Founders Fund, and has invested in most of

  • the tech companies in Silicon Valley.

  • And he's going to talk about strategy and competition.

  • Thank you for coming, Peter. >> Awesome.

  • Thanks, Sam.

  • Thanks for inviting me.

  • Thanks for having me.

  • I sorta, I have a single a day

  • fixed that I'm completely obsessed with in.

  • On the business side which is that, if you're starting

  • a company, if you're the founder,

  • entrepreneur starting a company,

  • you always want to aim for

  • monopoly, and that you want to always avoid competition.

  • Hence, competition is for losers.

  • Something we'll be talking about today.

  • I'd like to start by saying something

  • about the basic idea of when you start one

  • of these companies how you go about, creating value?

  • And this question, what makes a business valuable?

  • And I wanna, suggest that there's basically,

  • a very simple very simple formula that

  • you, have a valuable company two things are true.

  • Number one, that it creates X dollars of value for

  • the world.

  • And number two, that you capture Y% of X.

  • And the critical thing that I think people always miss

  • in the sort of analysis is that X and y are completely

  • independent variables, and so X can be very big.

  • Y can be very small.

  • X can be of intermediate size.

  • And if Y is, is reasonably big you can still get

  • a very big business.

  • So, to create a valuable company you have to

  • basically, both create something of value and

  • capture some fraction of

  • the value of what you've created.

  • And sort of,

  • just to illustrate this is a contrast.

  • If you sorta, compare the US airline industry with

  • a company like Google on search.

  • If you sorta, measure by

  • the size of these industries you could, you could say

  • that airlines are still more important than search.

  • If you just measure it say by revenues.

  • There's 195 billion.

  • In domestic revenues in 2012.

  • Google had just north of 50 billion.

  • And certainly, sort of on some intuitive level,

  • if you said, if you were given a choice and

  • said well do you want to get rid of all air travel.

  • Or do you want to get rid of your ability to

  • use search engines?

  • The intuition would be that air travel is

  • something that's more important than search.

  • And this is, of course, just the domestic numbers.

  • If you had looked at this globally, airlines are much,

  • much bigger than search, or Google, is But

  • the profit margins are quite a bit less.

  • You know,

  • they were marginally profitable in 2012.

  • Think entire hundred year history of

  • the airline industry.

  • The cumulative profits in the U.S.

  • have been approximately zero.

  • The companies make money.

  • They episodically go bankrupt.

  • They get re-capitalized and

  • you sort of cycle and repeat.

  • And this is reflected in you know the combined market

  • capitalization of the airline industries maybe

  • something of the U.S. airline industry.

  • Something like a quarter that of Google.

  • So, you have a search engine much,

  • much smaller than air travel but much more valuable and

  • I think this reflects these very different valuations on

  • X and Y.

  • So, you know, if we look at perfect competition.

  • You know there are, sort of, there's some pros and

  • cons to the world of perfect competition.

  • On a high level it's always,

  • this is what you study in Econ One.

  • It's always, it's easy to model, which I think is why

  • Econ professors like talking about perfect competition.

  • It somehow is efficient, especially,

  • in a world where things are static because you have all

  • the consumer surplus gets captured by everybody.

  • And politically, it's what we're told is good in

  • our society, that you want to have competition and

  • this is somehow a good thing.

  • Of course, there are a lot of negatives.

  • It's generally not that good if you're.

  • You're involvement in anything that's

  • hyper-competitive because you often don't

  • make money off, come back to this a little bit later.

  • So, I think at one end of the spectrum you have

  • industries that are perfectly competitive.

  • And at the other end of the spectrum you have

  • things that, I would say, are monopolies.

  • And they're much stable, longer term businesses,

  • you have more capital.

  • And if you get a creative monopoly for

  • inventing something new, I think it's symptomatic of

  • having created something really valuable.

  • And so I do think this, the extreme binary view of

  • the world I always articulate is that

  • there are exactly two kinds of businesses in this world.

  • There are businesses that are perfectly competitive

  • and there are businesses that are monopolies.

  • And, there's shockingly little that is in between.

  • And this dichotomy is not understood very

  • well because people are constantly lying

  • about the nature of the businesses they're in.

  • And this is why,

  • this is in my mind, this is the most important.

  • It's not necessarily the most important thing in

  • business, but I think it's the most

  • important business idea that people don't understand.

  • That there are just these two kinds of businesses.

  • And so let me

  • say a little bit about the lies that people tell.

  • And so you basically, the basic, if you sort of

  • imagine that there was a spectrum of companies from

  • perfect competition to monopoly.

  • The apparent differences are quite small.

  • Because the people who have monopolies pretend not to.

  • They will basically say, and it's because you

  • don't want to get regulated by the government, you

  • don't want the government to come after you.

  • So you will never say that you have a monopoly.

  • So, anyone who has a monopoly will pretend that

  • they're in incredible competition.

  • And on the other end of the spectrum, if you

  • are incredibly competitive, and if you're in some sort

  • of business will you will never make any money.

  • You will be tempted to tell a lie that goes in

  • the other direction.

  • Where you will say that you're doing something

  • unique that is somehow less competitive than it looks.

  • Because you will want to differentiate, you

  • will want to track capital or something like that.

  • So, if the monopolists pretend not to have

  • a monopolies the non-monopolists pretend to

  • have monopolies.

  • The apparent difference is very small.

  • Where as the real difference I would submit is

  • actually quite big.

  • And so there's this distortion that happens

  • because of the lies people tell about their businesses.

  • And the lies are sort of in these opposite directions.

  • Let me, drill a little bit down further on the way

  • these lies work.

  • And so

  • the basic lie you tell as

  • a non-monopoly is that we're in a very small market.

  • The basic lie you tell as a monopoly is

  • that the market you're in is much bigger than it looks.

  • And so typically,

  • if you want to think this in sort of set theoretic terms.

  • You could say that a monopoly tells a why,

  • where you describe your business as the union of

  • these vastly different markets, and

  • the non-monopolies describes it as the intersection.

  • So, that in effect, if you're non-monopolist, you

  • will rhetorically describe your market as super small.

  • You're the only person in that market.

  • If you have monopoly, you'll describe it as super big,

  • and there's lots of competition in it.

  • So some examples of how this works in practice.

  • So I always use restaurants as the example of

  • a terrible business.

  • And there's always, sort of, ideas that,

  • you know, capitalism and competition are antonyms.

  • Capital, someone who accumulates capital.

  • World of perfect competition is

  • a world where all the capital gets competed away.

  • So, you're opening a restaurant business.

  • No one wants to invest because you just lose money.

  • So you have to tell some idiosyncratic narrative.

  • And you will say something like, well,

  • we're the only British food restaurant in Paolo Alto.

  • So, it's British, Paolo Alto.

  • And of course,

  • that's too small a market because people may be able

  • to drive all the way to Mountain View or even Park.

  • And there probably no people who eat nothing but

  • British food.

  • At least, no people are still alive.

  • And so that is sort of a fictitiously narrow market.

  • There's sort of a Hollywood version of this where.

  • The way movies always get pitched is, it's like

  • a college football star, joins an elite group of

  • hackers to catch the shark that killed his friends.

  • So, that is a movie that has not been made.

  • But the question is,

  • is that the right category or is the correct category?

  • It's just another movie, in which case, you know,

  • there are lots of those, it's super competitive,

  • incredibly had to make money.

  • No one ever makes money in Hollywood doing movies.

  • It's really hard.

  • And so you always have this question about.

  • Does the intersection, does,

  • is it real, does it make sense,

  • does it have value that one should ask?

  • And of course, there are start up versions of this.

  • Where you, and the sort of the really bad versions you

  • just take a whole series of buzz words.

  • Sharing, mobile, social, apps, you combine them,

  • and you have some kind of narrative.

  • And, whether or not, that's a real business or not,

  • is, it's generally a bad sign.

  • So it's, it's almost this pattern recognition when you

  • have this rhetoric of this

  • sort of intersections, it generally does not work.

  • The something of

  • somewhere is really mostly just the nothing of nowhere.

  • It's like the Stanford of North Dakota.

  • One of a kind, but it's not Stanford.

  • So, let's look at the opposite.

  • The opposite lie, is if you are, let's say,

  • the search, company, that's down the street from here.

  • And has about a happy 66% market share and, you know?

  • Is completely dominant in the search market.

  • Google has not almost never describes itself.

  • As a search engine, these days.

  • And instead, it describes itself in all these

  • different ways.

  • So, it sometimes says it's an advertising company.

  • So, if it was search, you'd say, well, it's, like, it

  • has this huge market share that's really, really crazy.

  • It's like a incredible monopoly.

  • It's much bigger than, it's much,

  • much more robust monopoly than Microsoft,

  • ever had in the 90s.

  • Maybe that's why it's making so much money.

  • But if you say it's an advertising market,

  • you could say,

  • well, there's search advertising is 17 billion.

  • And that's part of online advertising,

  • which is much bigger.

  • And then, all US advertising is bigger.

  • And then by the time you get to global advertising,

  • that's close to 500 billion.

  • And so you're talking about 3.5%.

  • So a tiny part of this much larger market.

  • Or if you don't want it to be an advertising company

  • you could always say that you're a technology company.

  • And so sorry.

  • Let me just see.

  • And so

  • the technology market is something like a $1 trillion

  • market, and the narrative that you tell is that Google

  • in the technology market is well we're competing with

  • all the car companies with our self-driving cars,

  • we're competing with Apple on TVs and iPhones.

  • We're competing with Facebook.

  • We're competing with Microsoft on office

  • products, we're competing with Amazon on cloud

  • services, and so, we are in this giant technology market

  • where there's competition in every direction you look.

  • And no we're

  • not the monopoly the government's looking for and

  • we should not get regulated in any way whatsoever.

  • And so I think one has to always be super aware that

  • there are these very powerful incentives

  • to distort the nature of these markets

  • one way or the other.

  • So, the evidence of the narrow markets in

  • the tech industry is if you basically just.

  • If you look at sort of the, some of the big

  • tech companies, Apple, Google, Microsoft,

  • Amazon, they just they've just been building up

  • cash for year after year and you have these incredibly

  • high profit margins and I would, I would say that the.

  • That one of the reasons the tech industry in the US.

  • Has been so successful financially.

  • Is because it's prone to creating all these monopoly

  • like business.

  • And that's and

  • it's reflected by these companies.

  • Just accumulate so much cash.

  • That they don't know what to do with it

  • beyond a certain point.

  • And so let me

  • say a few things about how to build a monopoly.

  • And, I think one of the sort of very counter

  • intuitive ideas that comes out of this monopoly thread.

  • Is that you want to go after small markets.

  • If you're a startup.

  • You want to get to monopoly.

  • You're starting a new company,

  • you want to get to monopoly.

  • Monopolies you have a large share of a market,

  • how do you get to a large share of a market?

  • You start with a really small market and

  • you take over that whole market, and then.

  • And then over time you find ways to expand that market

  • in concentric circles.

  • And the thing that's always a big mistake is going

  • after a giant market on day one.

  • Because that's typically evidence that you

  • somehow haven't defined the categories correctly.

  • And it normally means that there is going to be

  • too much competition.

  • In one way or another.

  • And so I think almost all the successful companies

  • in Silicon Valley had some model of

  • starting with small markets and expanding.

  • And if you take Amazon, you start with.

  • Just a bookstore.

  • We have all the books in the world.

  • So it's a better bookstore than anybody else

  • has in the world.

  • When it's starts in the 90's, it's online,

  • there's things you can do you can't do before.

  • And then you gradually expand into all sorts of

  • different forms of e-commerce and

  • other things beyond that.

  • You know, eBay you start with Pez dispensers.

  • You move on to Beanie Babies and

  • eventually it's all these different auctions for

  • all these sorts of different goods.

  • And what was very counter intuitive about many of

  • these companies is they often start with

  • markets that are so small that people don't think

  • that they're valuable at all when you get started.

  • The PayPal version of this was, we started with

  • power sellers on eBay which was about 20,000 people.

  • When we first saw this happening in December of 99,

  • January of 2000 right after we launched,

  • there was a sense that these were all,

  • it was such a small market it was terrible.

  • We thought these were terrible customers to have.

  • It's just people selling junk on the internet.

  • Why in the world do we want to

  • be going after this market?

  • But, you know, there was a way to get a product that

  • was much better for everybody in that market.

  • You could, and we got to something like 25, 30%,

  • you know, market penetration in two or three months.

  • And you got some walk in.

  • You got brand recognition and

  • your able to build the business from there.

  • So I always think these,

  • these very small markets are quite underrated.

  • The Facebook version of this I always give is that you

  • know if the initial market of

  • Facebook was 10,000 people at Harvard, it went from

  • zero to sixty percent market share in ten days.

  • That was a very auspicious start.

  • The way this gets analyzed in business schools is

  • always, that's ridiculous,

  • it's such a small market it can't have any value at all.

  • And so, I think the business school analysis of

  • Facebook early on, or of PayPal early on, or

  • of eBay early on is that the markets were perhaps, so

  • small as to have, almost no value.

  • And they, they would have had little value had

  • they stayed small, but it turned out they were ways to

  • grow them concentrically and, that's what made them,

  • that's what made them so valuable.

  • Now I think the opposite version of this,

  • is always where you have super big markets.

  • And, and I, there's so much,

  • so many different things that went wrong with all

  • the clean tech companies in the last decade.

  • But, but, one,

  • one theme that ran through almost all of them,

  • was that they all started with massive markets.

  • And every clean tech PowerPoint presentation that

  • one saw in the years 2005 to 2008,

  • which was the clean tech bubble in Silicon Valley.

  • Started with, we're in the energy market,

  • we're in a market that's measured in hundreds of

  • billions of trillions of dollars.

  • And then once you're a minnow in a vast ocean.

  • That's not a good place to be.

  • That means that you have tons of competitors and

  • you don't even know who all the competitors are.

  • And so you want to be a one of a kind company,

  • where it's the only one in a small ecosystem.

  • You don't want to

  • be the fourth online pet food company.

  • You don't want to be

  • the tenth thin film solar panel company.

  • You don't want to be the 100th restaurant in

  • Palo Alto.

  • Your restaurant industry is a trillion dollar industry,

  • so if you do a market size analysis you conclude

  • restaurants are a fantastic business to go into, and

  • it's often, large markets, large existing markets

  • typically mean that you have tons of competition, very,

  • very hard to differentiate.

  • So the first very counterintuitive into a idea

  • is to go after small markets, often markets that

  • are so small people don't even notice them.

  • They don't think that they make sense.

  • That's where you got a foothold, and

  • then if those markets are able to expand,

  • you can scale into a big monopoly business.

  • You know, a second sort of, the sort of several

  • different characteristics of these monopoly businesses,

  • that I like to focus on.

  • There's probably no sort of single formula to it.

  • I also ways think that that in technology there

  • is always a sense that you know,

  • the history of technology is such that every.

  • Every moment happens only once, so you know the next

  • Mark Zuckerberg won't build a social network.

  • The next Larry Page won't be building a search engine.

  • The next Bill Gates won't be

  • building an operating system.

  • And if you're copying these people,

  • you're not learning from them.

  • But it's, and so,

  • there is always these very unique businesses that

  • are doing something that's not been done before,

  • end up, end of having the potential to be a monopoly.

  • The opening line in Anna Karenina that all

  • happy companies, sorry, all happy families.

  • All happy families are alike.

  • All unhappy families are unhappy in

  • their own special way.

  • And the opposite is true in business,

  • where I think all happy companies are different

  • because they're doing something very unique.

  • All unhappy companies are alike because they fail to

  • escape the essential sameness that

  • is competition, and so

  • one sort of characteristic of a monopoly technology

  • company is some sort of proprietary technology.

  • My sort of crazy, somewhat arbitrary,

  • rule of thumb is you want to have a technology that's

  • an order of magnitude better than the next best thing.

  • So Amazon had over ten times as many books,

  • maybe not that high tech, but you figure out a way to

  • sell ten times as many books in an efficient online way.

  • You know, PayPal, the alternative for

  • PayPal was using checks to send money on eBay,

  • took seven to ten days to clear.

  • PayPal could do it more than ten times as fast.

  • So you wanna have some sort of very

  • powerful improvement in some order, maybe an order of

  • magnitude improvement on some key dimension.

  • Of course, you know,

  • if you actually come with something totally new it's,

  • it's just, it's just like an infinite improvement.

  • So I would say the,

  • the iPhone was the first smartphone that worked and

  • so that's, you know that's like I mean,

  • I mean maybe not infinite, but

  • it's sort of definitely order of magnitude or

  • more of improvement.

  • So I think, the, the technology is designed to

  • give you a massive delta over, over the next,

  • the next best thing.

  • I think, I think there often are network effects that

  • can kick in that, really help.

  • The thing that's very, and these,

  • these lead to monopolies over time,

  • the thing that's very tricky about network effects is,

  • they're often.

  • They're often very hard to get started.

  • So even though everyone understands how

  • valuable they are, there is

  • always this incredibly tricky question why is it

  • valuable to the first person who is doing something?

  • Economies of scale, if you have something of

  • a very high fixed costs, very low marginal cost.

  • That's typically a monopoly like business.

  • And then there's this thing of branding.

  • Which is sort of like this idea that gets lodged in

  • people's brains.

  • I never quite understand how branding works, so I never

  • invest in companies where it's just about branding.

  • But it is, I think,

  • a real phenomenon that creates real value.

  • I think one of the things, I'm gonna come back to

  • this a little bit, towards the end.

  • But one of the things that's very striking,

  • is that software businesses are often, are, for

  • some reason, very good at some of these things.

  • They're especially good at the economies of scale part.

  • Because, the marginal cost of software is zero.

  • And so if you get something that works in software.

  • It's often significantly better

  • than the existing solution.

  • And then you have these tremendous economies of

  • scale, and you can scale fairly quickly.

  • So even if the market starts small,

  • you can grow your business quickly enough to stay at

  • the same size as the growing market.

  • And maintain the sort of monopoly power.

  • Now, the critical thing about these monopolies is,

  • it's not enough to have a monopoly for just a moment.

  • The critical thing is to

  • have one that lasts over time.

  • And so in Silicon Valley there's always this idea

  • that you wanna be the first mover.

  • And I, I always think it's, it's, in some ways,

  • the better framing is you wanna be the last mover, or

  • you wanna be the last company in a category.

  • Those are the ones that are really valid.

  • Microsoft was the last operating system,

  • at least for many decades.

  • Google is the last search engine.

  • Facebook will be valuable if it turns out to be the last,

  • social networking site.

  • One way to think of

  • this last mover of value is this idea that most of

  • the value in these companies exists far in the future.

  • If you do a discounted cash flow analysis of a business.

  • You look at, you have sort of all these profit streams.

  • You have a growth rate.

  • The growth rate's much higher than

  • the discount rate.

  • And so most of the value exists far in the future.

  • I did this exercise At PayPal in March of 2001.

  • We'd been in business for about 27 months.

  • And we sort of had, the growth rate was 100% a year.

  • We were discounting future cashflows by about 30%.

  • And it turned out that about three quarters of

  • the value of the business, as of 2001,

  • came from cash flows in years 2011 and beyond.

  • And whenever you do the math on any of these tech

  • companies, you get an answer that's something like that.

  • So if you are trying to analyze any other

  • tech companies in Silicon Valley, Arabian B, Twitter.

  • Facebook, any emerging internet companies,

  • any of the ones in Y-Combinator.

  • The math tells you that three quarters, 80,

  • 85% of the value is coming from cash flows in

  • years 2024 and beyond.

  • It's very, very far in the future.

  • And, so one of the things that we always overvalue in

  • Silicon Valley is growth rates, and

  • we undervalue durability.

  • Because, growth is something you can measure in the here

  • and now, and you can always track that very precisely.

  • The question of whether a company's still gonna be

  • around a decade from now.

  • That's actually what,

  • what dominates the value equation and

  • that sort of is a much more qualitative sort of a thing.

  • And so if we, if we went back to this idea of these

  • characteristics of monopoly, proprietary technology,

  • network effects, economies of scale, You can think

  • of these characteristics as ones that exist at a moment

  • in time when you capture a market and take it over.

  • But you also want to think about,

  • are these things going to last over time.

  • And, so, there's a time

  • dimension to all these characteristics.

  • So, net worth effects also have a great time element,

  • where as the network scales the network

  • effects actually get more robust, and so

  • if you have a network effect business that's often one

  • that can become a bigger and stronger monopoly over time.

  • Proprietary technology is always a little bit of

  • a tricky one, so

  • you want something that's order magnitude better.

  • Than, the state of the art in the world today.

  • And that's how you get people's attention.

  • That's how you initially break through.

  • But then, you don't wanna be superseded by somebody else.

  • And so there are all these areas of innovation where,

  • there was tremendous innovation, but

  • no one made any money.

  • So, you know?

  • Describe manufacturing in the 1980's.

  • You could im-,

  • you could do a better disk,

  • build a better disk drive than anybody else.

  • You could take over the whole world.

  • And two years later someone else would come along and

  • replace yours.

  • And the course of 15 years,

  • you got vastly improved disk drives, so

  • it had great benefit to consumers, but it didn't

  • actually help the people who started these companies.

  • And so there's always this question about having a huge

  • breakthrough in technology, but then also being able to

  • say, explain why, yours will be the last breakthrough, or

  • at least the last breakthrough for

  • a long time, or when you make a breakthrough.

  • And then you can keep improving on it

  • at a quick enough pace that no one can ever catch up.

  • So, if you have a structure of structure of

  • the future where there's a lot of innovation and

  • other people will come up with new things in

  • the thing you're working on.

  • That's great for society.

  • It's actually not that good for

  • your business, typically.

  • And then economies of scale, we've already talked about.

  • So I think this last mover thing is very critical.

  • I'm always, you know,

  • I don't wanna overdo the chess analogies, but

  • the first mover in chess is someone who plays white.

  • White is about a 1/3 of a pawn advantage, so

  • there's a small advantage to going first.

  • You wanna be the last mover, who wins the game, so

  • there's always the, Capablanca world champion,

  • Capablanca must begin by studying the end game, and

  • I do think that's, while I wouldn't say that's the only

  • thing you should study.

  • I think the sort of perspective of

  • asking these questions, why will this still be

  • the leading company 10, 15, 20 years from now, is a,

  • is a really critical one to try to think through.

  • Let me, let me sort of,

  • I want to sort of go in two slightly other directions

  • with this monopoly vs competition idea.

  • And I think so I think this is the, the central idea,

  • in my mind for, for business for starting business for

  • thinking about them and there are some, interesting

  • perspectives I think it gives on the whole you know,

  • on the whole history of innovation and

  • technology and science.

  • Because, yeah we've, we've lived through,

  • 250, 300 years of incredible technological progress in

  • you know many, many different domains.

  • You know, steam engine to railways to

  • telephones, refrigeration, household appliances,

  • you know the computer revolution, aviation.

  • All sorts of different areas of

  • technological innovation and then there's sort of

  • analogous thing that one can say about science,

  • where we've lived through centuries of enormous

  • amounts of innovation in science as well.

  • And the thing that I think people always miss when

  • they think about these things is that because X and

  • Y are independent variables, some of these things can be

  • extremely valuable innovations.

  • But the people who invent them,

  • who come up with them, do not get rewarded for this.

  • And certainly, you can go back to, you need to

  • create X dollars in value, you create Y percent of X.

  • I would suggest that the history of science has

  • generally been one where Y is 0% across the board.

  • The scientists never make any money.

  • They're always deluded into thinking that they live in

  • a just universe that will reward them for

  • their work and for their inventions.

  • And this is probably the fundamental delusion that

  • scientists tend to suffer from in our society.

  • And even in technology, there are, sort of,

  • many different areas of technology,

  • where there were great innovations that created

  • tremendous value for society.

  • But the people did not actually capture that much

  • of the value.

  • And so I think there is a sort of whole history of.

  • Science and

  • technology that can be told from the perspective of

  • how much value was actually captured.

  • And certainly, there are entire sectors where

  • people didn't capture anything.

  • So you're the smartest Physicist of the 20th

  • century, you come up with special relativity,

  • you come up with general relativity.

  • You don't get to be a billionaire,

  • you don't even get to be a millionaire.

  • It somehow doesn't work that way.

  • The railroads, incredibly valuable.

  • Most of them just went bankrupt,

  • because there was too much competition.

  • Wright brothers, you fly the first plane,

  • you don't make any money.

  • And so I think there is sort of a structure to

  • these industries, that's very important.

  • And I think the thing that's actually rare,

  • are the success cases.

  • Most the, so it's actually unique when you really think

  • about the history in this, in this 250 year sweep,

  • it's unusual, Y is almost always zero percent.

  • It's always zero in science.

  • It's almost always in technology, and

  • so it's very rare where people made money.

  • You know, the early,

  • the late 18th, early 19th century, the first

  • industrial revolution was textile mills, steam engine,

  • the sort of automated things.

  • And you had these relentless improvements,

  • that people improved efficiency of

  • textile factories, manufacturing generally.

  • At a clip of 5 to 7% every year.

  • Year after year, decade after decade.

  • You had 60, 70 years of

  • tremendous improvement from 1780 to 1850.

  • But even in 1850, most of the wealth in Britain

  • was still held by the landed aristocracy.

  • The workers didn't, you know,

  • the workers didn't make that much,

  • the capitalists didn't make that much either.

  • It was all competed away.

  • There were hundreds of

  • people running textiles factories.

  • It was an industry that just,

  • the structure of the competition prevented people

  • from making any money.

  • And so I think there are, in my mind,

  • there probably are only two broad categories in

  • the entire history, the last 250 years,

  • where people have actually come up with new things, and

  • made money doing so.

  • One is these sort of vertically integrated

  • complex monopolies which people did build in

  • the second industrial revolution at the end of

  • the 19th and started the 20th century.

  • And so this was like Ford, it was the vertically

  • integrated oil companies like Standard Oil.

  • And what these vertically integrated monopolies

  • typically required was this very complex coordination.

  • You've got a lot of pieces to fit together in

  • just the right way, when you assembled it,

  • you had a tremendous advantage.

  • This is actually done surprisingly little today.

  • And so I think this is sort of a business form that

  • when people can pull it off is very valuable.

  • It's typically fairly capital intensive.

  • We live sort of in a, in a culture where is very hard

  • to get people to buy into anything that's super

  • complicated, and it takes very long to build.

  • But I, you know,

  • when I sort of think about my colleague Elon Musk

  • from PayPal success with Tesla and Space X, I think

  • the key to these companies was the complex vertically

  • integrated monopoly structure they had.

  • So if you sort of look at Tesla or Space X you ask,

  • you know, was there sort of single breakthrough?

  • They certainly innovated on a lot of dimensions.

  • I don't think there was

  • a single tennex breakthrough and battery storage,

  • or you know, maybe working on some things in rocketry.

  • But they hadn't,

  • there was no sort of single massive breakthrough, but

  • what was really impressive was integrating all these

  • pieces together, and doing it in a way that was more

  • vertically integrated than most of their competitors.

  • So, Tesla,

  • you also integrated the car distributors, so

  • they wouldn't steal all the money, as has happened with

  • the rest of the car industry in the US.

  • Or SpaceX, you basically pulled in

  • all the subcontractors where most of the large aerospace

  • companies have single source subcontractors that are able

  • to sort of charge monopoly profits, and

  • make it very hard for

  • the integrated aerospace companies to make money.

  • And so vertical integration I think is sort of a very

  • under explored modality of technological progress,

  • that people would do well to look at more.

  • And then I think there is, there is something about

  • software itself that's very, very powerful.

  • Software has these incredible economies of

  • scale, these low marginal costs and there is something

  • about the world of bits, as opposed to the world of

  • adams, where you can often get very fast adoption.

  • And, and the fast adoption is critical to capturing and

  • taking over markets because even if you

  • have a small market if the adoption rate is too slow,

  • there'll be enough time for other people to

  • enter that market, and compete with you.

  • Whereas if you have a small to mid size market, and

  • have a fast adoption rate.

  • You cannot take over this market.

  • And so I think this is

  • one of the reasons Silicon Valley has done so well, and

  • why software has been this phenomenal industry.

  • And what I, what I would suggest, what I would want

  • to leave you with is there are sort of these different

  • rationalizations people give for why certain things work,

  • and why certain things don't work.

  • And I think these rationalizations always

  • obscure this question of creating X dollars in value,

  • and capturing Y percent of X.

  • So the science rationalization we're

  • always told, is that

  • the scientists aren't interested in making money.

  • They're doing it for

  • charitable reasons, and that you're not

  • a good scientist if you're motivated by money.

  • And I'm not even saying people should

  • always be motivated by money or something like this.

  • But I think we should be a little more critical of this

  • as a rationalization.

  • We should ask, is this a rationalization

  • to obscure the fact that Y equals zero percent.

  • And the scientists are operating in this sort of

  • world where all the innovation is

  • effectively competed away, and

  • they can't capture any of it directly.

  • The software distortion that often happens,

  • is because people are making such a vast fortunes in

  • software, we infer that this is the most

  • valuable thing in the world being done full stop.

  • And so if people at Twitter make billions of dollars,

  • it must be that Twitter is worth far more than anything

  • that Einstein did.

  • What that sort of rationalization tends to

  • obscure, is again that X and Y are independent variables.

  • And there are these businesses where you

  • capture a lot of X and there others where you don't.

  • And so, I do think the history of innovation has

  • been this history where the microeconomics,

  • the structure of these industries has mattered

  • a tremendous amount.

  • And when there is sort of this

  • story where some people have made vast fortunes, because

  • they were in industries with the right structure, and

  • other people made nothing at all, because they were in

  • these sort of very competitive things.

  • And we shouldn't just rationalize that away,

  • I think it's worth understanding this better.

  • And then finally, let me come back to this

  • sort of overarching theme for

  • this talk, this competition is for losers idea.

  • Which is always a provocative way to

  • title things, because we always think of

  • the losers as the people who are not good at competing.

  • We think of the losers as the people who are slow on

  • the sports team, on the track team in high school,

  • or who do a little bit less well on the standardized

  • tests, and don't get into the right schools.

  • So we always think of losers as people who can't compete,

  • and I want us to really rethink,

  • and revalue this and consider whether it's

  • possible that competition itself is off.

  • That we've sort of, it's not just the case and

  • we don't understand this

  • monopoly competition dichotomy intellectually.

  • So that's, sort of,

  • why you wouldn't understand intellectually,

  • because people lie about it.

  • It's distorted.

  • We have all these history of innovation

  • rationalizes what's happening in all these very,

  • very strange ways.

  • But I think it's more than just an intellectual blind

  • spot, I think it's also a psychological blind spot

  • where we find ourselves, you know, very attracted to

  • competition in one form or another.

  • We find it reassuring if other people do things.

  • The word ape, already in the time of Shakespeare,

  • meant both primate and imitate.

  • And there is

  • something about human nature that's deeply mimetic.

  • Imitative.

  • Apelike, sheeplike, lemminglike, herdlike.

  • And it's this very problematic thing that we

  • need to always think through and try to overcome.

  • And there is always this question about

  • competition as a form of validation.

  • Where we go for

  • things that lots of other people are going for,

  • and it's not that there is wisdom in crowds, it's

  • not when lots of people are trying to do something that,

  • that's proof of it being valuable.

  • I think it's when lots of people are trying to do

  • something that is often proof of insanity.

  • There are twenty thousand people a year who move to

  • Los Angeles to become movie stars,

  • about 20 of them make it.

  • I think the Olympics are a little bit better,

  • because you can figure out pretty quickly whether

  • you're good or not, so there's a little bit less of

  • a dead weight loss to society.

  • You know?

  • >> You the sort of educational experience at

  • a place, the pre Stanford educational experience.

  • There's always sort of

  • a non-competitive characterization, where I

  • think most of the people in this room had machine guns,

  • that were competing with people with bows and arrows.

  • So it wasn't exactly a parallel competition when

  • you were in junior high school and high school.

  • There's always a question,

  • does the tournament make sense as you keep going?

  • And there is always this question if people go on to

  • grad school, or

  • post doctoral educations, does the intensity of

  • the competition really make sense?

  • There's the classic Henry Kissinger line

  • describing his fellow faculty at Harvard.

  • That the battles were so

  • ferocious, because the stakes were so small.

  • Describing sort of academia.

  • And you start to think on one level this is

  • a description of insanity.

  • Why would people fight like crazy when the stakes are so

  • small?

  • But it's also,

  • I think simply a function of the logic of the situation.

  • When it's really hard to differentiate yourself from

  • other people.

  • When the differences are, when

  • the objective differences really are small.

  • Then you have to compete ferociously to maintain

  • a difference of one sort or

  • another, that's often more imaginary than real.

  • There's always a sort of a personal version of

  • this that I tell where I was sort of hyper tracked.

  • My 8th grade junior high school yearbook,

  • one of my friends wrote in,

  • I know you'll get into Stanford in four years

  • as a Sophomore, sort of when it is going to Stanford four

  • years later, the end of high school.

  • Went to Stanford Law School.

  • You know, ended up at a big law firm in New York,

  • where from the outside everybody wanted to get in.

  • On the inside everybody wanted to leave.

  • >> And it was this very strange dynamic, where after

  • I sort of realized that this was not the best idea,

  • and left after seven months and three days.

  • You know, one of the people down the hall from me told

  • me, it's really reassuring to see you leave, Peter.

  • I had no idea that it was possible to

  • escape from Alcatraz.

  • Which of course, all you had to do was go out the front

  • door and not come back.

  • But so much of people identities got

  • wrapped in winning these competitions,

  • that they somehow lost site of what was important.

  • What was valuable.

  • And you know, competition does make you better

  • at whatever it is you're competing on.

  • Because when you're competing,

  • you're comparing yourself with the people around you.

  • You're figuring out,

  • how do I beat the people next to me?

  • How do I do somewhat better at whatever it

  • is they're doing.

  • And you will get better at that thing.

  • I'm not questioning that, I'm not denying that.

  • But, it often comes at this tremendous price that you

  • stop asking some bigger questions,

  • about what's truly important and truly valuable.

  • And so I would say, don't always go through the tiny

  • little door that everyone's trying to rush through.

  • Maybe go around the corner, and

  • go through the vast gate that no one's taking.

  • Thank you very much.

  • I guess there's time for,

  • do you want to take a few questions?

  • >> Sorry?

  • >> Oh yes, people want to take,

  • I'll take a few questions with few minutes time.

  • Yeah, go ahead.

  • >> Since, yeah, as you mentioned,

  • you already mentioned further competition often

  • look similar because the narrative of

  • people tell our selves.

  • Do you have any ways to

  • easily determine the difference when your

  • looking at an idea that is better than your own idea?

  • >> Well I'd say the question I always try to focus on is

  • what is the actual market?

  • So not what's the narrative of the market,

  • because you can always tell a fictional story about

  • a market that's much bigger or much smaller.

  • But what is the real objective market?

  • So, it's always, yeah, you always try to figure it out.

  • And you realize people have

  • incentives to powerfully distort these things.

  • Yeah?

  • >> Which of the aspects of monopolies that you

  • mentioned would you say >> Well

  • they have network effects with the ad network.

  • They had proprietary technology that gave them

  • the initial lead, because they had the page

  • rank algorithm which was sort of, an order of

  • magnitude better than any other search engine.

  • You have economies of scale,

  • because of the need to store all these different sites.

  • And at this point, you have brand, so

  • Google has all four.

  • Maybe the proprietary technology's somewhat

  • weaker at this point.

  • But, definitely, it had all four, and

  • maybe three out of four now.

  • Yeah.

  • >> How does this apply to and, second, what's it like.

  • The seconds what?

  • >> What's with the i-Phone? >> That's

  • sort of a set of companies that are doing

  • different copycat payment systems on mobile phones.

  • There's Square, there's PayPal.

  • They just have sort of different shapes.

  • That's how they differentiate themselves.

  • One is a triangle, one is a square.

  • And so you know...

  • >> Maybe at some point the apes weren't out of shape or

  • something like that.

  • But I think, pounds here we started with focus on

  • the intelligence community which is small sub-market,

  • you had a proprietary technology that used

  • a very different approach.

  • Were it was focused on the human

  • computer synthesis rather than the substitution,

  • which I think is the dominant paradigm.

  • So there's a whole set of things I would say on

  • the market approach, and on the proprietary technology.

  • Yes?

  • >> When you have design thinking methodology in

  • a start-up thinking, which is used to mitigate risk by

  • not creating things that people don't want.

  • But I think young innovators have inspiration create

  • complex systems that last's through time.

  • >> Could you repeat the question?

  • >> Yeah. So the quest is what do I

  • think about lean start-up's, iterative thinking,

  • where you get feedback from people,

  • versus complexity that may not work.

  • So, I am personally quite skeptical of all the lean

  • start-up methodology.

  • I think the really great companies did something that

  • was, sort of.

  • Somewhat more of a quantum improvement that

  • really differentiated them from everybody else.

  • They typically did not do massive, you know,

  • customer surveys.

  • The people who ran these companies sometimes,

  • not always, suffer from mild forms of Aspberger's, so

  • they were not actually that influenced,

  • not that easily deterred by what other people thought or

  • told them to do.

  • So I do think we're way too focused on iteration as

  • a modality, and not enough on trying to have a virtual

  • esp link with the public and figuring it out ourselves.

  • I would say that, the risk question

  • is always a very tricky one because there are, you know?

  • They're, they're, it's not, it's often.

  • I think it's often the case that you

  • don't have enough time to really mitigate risk.

  • If, if you're gonna take enough time to

  • figure out what people want.

  • You often will have missed the boat by then.

  • and, and then, of course, there's always the risk of,

  • of doing something that's, that's not that,

  • significant or meaningful.

  • So, you know? You could say a track in

  • law school is a low risk track from one

  • perspective, it may still be a very high risk track in

  • the sense that maybe your not, have a high risk of

  • not doing something meaningful with your life.

  • So, we have to think about risk in these,

  • very complicated way.

  • I think risk is for a very complicated concept.

  • Yes. I was just checking for

  • the last advantage, but then doesn't that

  • imply that there's already competition to begin with

  • between the chess pieces on the chess board?

  • >> Yeah, so, there's always this terminology thing,

  • so I would say that there are categories in

  • which people sort of are bundled together.

  • I would say the monopoly businesses were in effect

  • they really were a big first mover in some sense.

  • You could say Google was not the first search engine.

  • There were other search engines before, but

  • on one dimension,

  • they were dramatically better than everybody else,

  • they were the first one with page rank,

  • with sort of an automated approach.

  • Facebook was not the first social networking site.

  • My friend, Reed Hoffman, started one in 1997,

  • and they called it Social Net.

  • So they already had the name,

  • Social networking, in the name of their company,

  • seven years before Facebook.

  • Their idea was that it was gonna be this virtual

  • cyberspace, where I'd be a dog and you'd be a cat.

  • And we'd have all these different rules about how

  • we'd interact with each other.

  • >> In this virtual alternate reality.

  • Facebook was the first one to get real identity.

  • So, it was, so I would say,

  • I hope Facebook will be the last social networking site,

  • it was the first one in a very important dimension.

  • People often would not think of it as the first because

  • they, sort of, lump all these things together.

  • >> I have one more question.

  • >> Okay, one question, let's take one here.

  • >> If you're theoretically someone who,

  • worked at Golden College and left there after six months,

  • and is now going to do science at Standford.

  • How would you recommend rethinking

  • >> I don't have a great,

  • I'm not great at the psychotherapy stuff so

  • I don't quite know how to >> solve this.

  • There are these very odd studies they've

  • done on people who go to business school.

  • There's one they've done at Harvard Business school

  • where it's sort of the anti-Asperger, personality.

  • We have people who are super extroverted,

  • generally have low convictions, few ideas.

  • And you have sort of a hothouse environment.

  • You put all these people in for two years.

  • And at the end of it, they systematically end up,

  • the largest cohort systematically ends up

  • doing the wrong thing.

  • They tried to catch the last wave.

  • You know in 1989 everyone in Harvard tried to work for

  • Mike Milken, it was one or

  • two years before he went to jail for

  • all the junk bond stuff.

  • They were never interested in Silicon Valley or

  • tech, except for '99 and 2000 when they timed the dot

  • com bubble peaking perfectly.

  • They did, and then '05 to '07 was housing.

  • Private equity, stuff like this.

  • I do think this tendency for

  • us to see competition as validation is very deep.

  • I don't think there's any sort of

  • easy psychological formula to avoid it.

  • I don't know what sort of therapy to recommend.

  • >> But my first.

  • My first starting point,

  • which is only like maybe ten percent of the way,

  • is to never under estimate how big a problem it is.

  • We always think this is

  • something that afflicts other people.

  • It's easy for

  • me to point to people in business schools or people

  • at Harvard or people on Wall Street, I think it actually

  • does afflict all of us to a very profound degree.

  • We always think of advertising as

  • things that work on other people.

  • How, who are all these stupid people who fall for

  • all those ads on tv,

  • they obviously work to some extent and

  • they work, to a disturbing extant on all of us.

  • And it's something we, we all should work to overcome.

  • Thank you very much.

Good afternoon.

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B1 中級 美國腔

第5講--如何創辦創業公司 (Lecture 5 - How to Start a Startup)

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    Steven Wu 發佈於 2021 年 01 月 14 日
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