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  • On December 24th, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in order to prop up the faltering

    1979年12月24日,蘇聯入侵阿富汗,以支撐搖搖欲墜的阿富汗。

  • communist government they had helped install.

    他們幫助建立的共產主義政府。

  • Smelling an opportunity to make its ideological enemy bleed, the United States covertly began

    美國嗅到了讓其意識形態敵人流血的機會,祕密地開始了

  • a process of funding and arming a resistance to the Soviet invasion.

    一個資助和武裝抵抗蘇聯入侵的過程。

  • The clandestine operation would prove crucial in defeating the Soviet Union's efforts in

    這一祕密行動將被證明對擊敗蘇聯在中國的努力至關重要。

  • Afghanistan, and as the Red Army pulled out of the nation in defeat in 1989, Americans

    在阿富汗,隨著1989年紅軍在失敗中撤出該國,美國人

  • cheered their great success.

    為他們的巨大成功歡呼。

  • They had no idea that their 'victory' had planted the seeds of America's own defeat

    他們不知道他們的 "勝利 "已經為美國自己的失敗埋下了種子。

  • just thirty years later.

    就在30年後。

  • To understand what went wrong in Afghanistan, first one has to understand recent Afghan

    要了解在阿富汗出了什麼問題,首先要了解最近的阿富汗

  • history.

    歷史。

  • In 1953, Afghanistan's king, Mohammed Zahir Shah, wished to modernize his country.

    1953年,阿富汗國王穆罕默德-查希爾-沙阿希望使其國家現代化。

  • Zahir Shah recognized that he lacked the expertise to lead a major modernization effort, and

    查希爾-沙阿認識到,他缺乏上司重大現代化努力的專業知識,並且

  • that his country needed an expanded government.

    他的國家需要一個擴大的政府。

  • To that end, he relinquished some of his own power and made his cousin, General Mohammed

    為此,他放棄了自己的一些權力,讓他的表弟穆罕默德將軍

  • Daoud Khan, prime minister, with a focus of expanding government with the recruitment

    總理達烏德-汗,重點是通過招聘來擴大政府。

  • of economic and policy experts, further relinquishing his own absolute power.

    的經濟和政策專家,進一步放棄了自己的絕對權力。

  • The move was a popular one with the Afghan people, who saw it as a selfless act.

    此舉受到阿富汗人民的歡迎,他們認為這是一種無私的行為。

  • Next though, the nation would need international aid, so the new Afghan government reached

    但接下來,這個國家將需要國際援助,是以,阿富汗新政府達到了

  • out to both Cold War rivals, the Soviet Union and the United States.

    對兩個冷戰對手--蘇聯和美國--都是如此。

  • Zahir Shah however did not wish to be a client state to either nation, and feared what had

    然而,查希爾-沙阿並不希望成為這兩個國家的附屬國,他擔心的是

  • happened to the eastern bloc nations as they were one by one swallowed up by the Soviet

    東部集團國家的情況是,它們一個接一個地被蘇聯吞沒了。

  • Union.

    聯盟。

  • Therefore he sought a careful balance of aid from both the Americans and Soviets, allowing

    是以,他尋求美國人和蘇聯人的援助的謹慎平衡,允許

  • neither absolute influence.

    既沒有絕對的影響力。

  • The Americans provided great economic aid and expertise, but in what would prove to

    美國人提供了巨大的經濟援助和專業知識,但在後來證明的

  • be a disastrous move, Zahir Shah allowed Daoud Khan to seek Soviet aid in the training of

    作為一個災難性的舉動,查希爾-沙阿允許達烏德-汗尋求蘇聯的援助,以訓練他們。

  • Afghanistan's military.

    阿富汗的軍隊。

  • This meant that every year hundreds of senior Afghan officers left for the Soviet Union

    這意味著每年都有數百名阿富汗高級軍官前往蘇聯。

  • to undergo months of training- and inevitable indoctrination into Stalin's version of communism.

    接受幾個月的培訓,並不可避免地被灌輸到斯大林的共產主義版本中。

  • The effect wasn't immediate, but gradually over time, these senior officers began spreading

    效果並不立竿見影,但隨著時間的推移,這些高級官員開始傳播

  • their communist ideals throughout the military ranks, resulting in a military that had a

    他們的共產主義理想貫穿於整個軍隊,導致軍隊有一個

  • dramatically different vision for Afghanistan than Zahir Shah- who wished neither Soviet-style

    與查希爾-沙赫相比,他對阿富汗的看法有很大的不同,他既不希望蘇聯式的阿富汗,也不希望阿富汗的經濟發展。

  • socialism or cutthroat American capitalism.

    社會主義或殘酷的美國資本主義。

  • Zahir Shah eventually forced Daoud Khan to resign from his post as Prime Minister as

    查希爾-沙阿最終迫使達烏德-汗辭去了總理的職務,因為

  • his pro-communist ideals began to interfere with the king's own progressive agenda for

    他的親共產主義理想開始干擾國王自己的進步議程。

  • the nation.

    的國家。

  • By 1973, Zahir Shah was more popular than ever with the Afghan people, given his great

    到1973年,查希爾-沙阿比以往任何時候都更受阿富汗人民的歡迎,因為他的偉大的

  • leaps forward in modernization and liberalization of Afghan society, including the equality

    阿富汗社會在現代化和自由化方面的飛躍,包括在平等方面的飛躍。

  • of women.

    的婦女。

  • However, Khan had long been building support amongst the military elite, all indoctrinated

    然而,可汗長期以來一直在軍事精英中建立支持,他們都是被灌輸過的。

  • into communism thanks to the Soviet Union.

    由於蘇聯的緣故,進入了共產主義。

  • In 1973, as Zahir Shah was abroad on a trip to Italy, Daoud Khan staged a coup, forcing

    1973年,當查希爾-沙阿在國外訪問意大利時,達烏德-汗發動了一場政變,逼迫

  • the king into exile.

    國王被流放。

  • At first the coup was widely supported as Khan continued the king's liberalization of

    起初,政變得到了廣泛的支持,因為可汗繼續推行國王的自由化政策。

  • women and other segments of Afghan society, however behind the scenes Khan was purging

    汗在幕後對婦女和阿富汗社會的其他階層進行清洗。

  • potential opponents from positions of power, ensuring his own autocratic rule.

    潛在的反對者失去了權力地位,確保了他自己的專制統治。

  • This caused major schisms within the communists, and the creation of multiple opposing communist

    這造成了共產黨人內部的重大分裂,併產生了多個對立的共產黨人。

  • groups.

    群體。

  • Inevitably, Khan is killed in a communist coup in 1978, leading to Nur Mohammad Taraki

    不可避免地,汗在1978年的共產主義政變中被殺,導致努爾-穆罕默德-塔拉基

  • being named president and Babrak Karmal as prime minister.

    被任命為總統,巴布拉克-卡爾馬爾為總理。

  • Growing rivalries between opposing communist groups however severely weaken Kabul's ability

    然而,對立的共產主義團體之間日益激烈的競爭嚴重削弱了喀布爾的能力。

  • to govern the countryside, and sensing an opportunity, Islamic fundamentalists, long

    覺察到機會的伊斯蘭原教旨主義者,長期以來一直在為治理農村而努力。

  • unhappy with liberal policies changing Afghan culture, begin their own uprising- the mujahideen

    對改變阿富汗文化的自由主義政策不滿,開始了他們自己的起義--聖戰者組織。

  • are born.

    誕生。

  • The struggle for power sparked bitter infighting between Taraki and Amin, splitting the Afghan

    權力鬥爭引發了塔拉基和阿明之間激烈的內訌,使阿富汗分裂。

  • government at the highest level and further weakening its ability to fight the growing

    政府的最高層,並進一步削弱其打擊日益增長的恐怖主義的能力。

  • insurgency.

    叛亂活動。

  • Just a year after taking power, Amin supporters murdered Taraki, as Amin implemented more

    在上臺僅一年後,阿明的支持者就謀殺了塔拉基,因為阿明實施了更多的

  • and more brutal measures.

    和更殘酷的措施。

  • The Amin-led communist government was now a stain on the Soviet Union, who believed

    阿明上司的共產主義政府現在是蘇聯的一個汙點,他們認為

  • that if Amin was left in power he would create a bad name for communism on the world stage.

    如果讓阿明繼續執政,他將在世界舞臺上為共產主義創造一個壞名聲。

  • The Soviets thus opt to remove Amin from power, and invade the nation in force on December

    蘇聯是以選擇將阿明趕下臺,並於12月1日武力入侵該國。

  • 24th, 1979.

    24日,1979年。

  • They prop up Babrak Karmal as prime minister, but only succeed in painting the national

    他們支持巴布拉克-卡爾馬爾(Babrak Karmal)擔任總理,但只是成功地給國家畫上了陰影。

  • government as a puppet state controlled by the hostile Soviet invaders- exactly what

    政府是一個由敵對的蘇聯侵略者控制的傀儡國家--這正是

  • the Zahir Shah and the Afghan people had worked so hard to avoid.

    扎西爾-沙阿和阿富汗人民曾如此努力地避免。

  • The result is inevitable, and a massive insurgency begins.

    結果是不可避免的,一場大規模的叛亂開始了。

  • This is where America begins to lay the groundwork for its own defeat.

    這就是美國開始為自己的失敗奠定基礎的地方。

  • Stinging from its loss in Vietnam, largely due to its own ineptitude but helped along

    在越南的失利讓它痛苦不已,這主要是由於它自己的無能,但也得到了幫助

  • by Soviet support, America was looking for payback.

    由於蘇聯的支持,美國正在尋找回報。

  • The invasion of Afghanistan was the perfect theater for extracting that payback, and not

    對阿富汗的入侵是獲取這種回報的最佳場所,而不是

  • long after the Red Army first crossed the border into Afghanistan, a major movement

    在紅軍首次越過邊境進入阿富汗後很久,一個重大的運動

  • to supply the Afghani insurgency began.

    以供應阿富汗的叛亂活動開始。

  • In order to facilitate the arming and financing of the mujahideen however, the US needed a

    然而,為了便於武裝和資助聖戰者組織,美國需要一個

  • way into the nation.

    進入國家的方式。

  • With hostile Iran on one side, America was forced to work with Pakistan- yet the Pakistani

    一邊是敵對的伊朗,美國被迫與巴基斯坦合作--然而巴基斯坦的

  • government was ill-equipped to handle the clandestine nature of the work that needed

    政府沒有能力處理所需工作的祕密性質。

  • to be done.

    要做的事。

  • Only one agency was well suited to the effort, the Interservices Intelligence Agency, or

    只有一個機構非常適合這項工作,即三軍情報局。

  • ISI.

    ISI。

  • Up to this point, the ISI had been a small organization struggling for legitimacy, but

    在這之前,三軍情報局一直是一個為合法地位而奮鬥的小組織,但

  • the influx of American support was exactly the booster shot that it needed.

    美國支持的湧入正是它所需要的助推劑。

  • This would come back to haunt the US.

    這將反過來困擾著美國。

  • Facilitating the transfer of millions of dollars of equipment and funds to the mujahideen,

    為向聖戰者組織轉移數百萬美元的設備和資金提供便利。

  • the ISI quickly grew in power and influence in the Pakistani government, eventually rivaling

    三軍情報局在巴基斯坦政府中的權力和影響力迅速增長,最終與

  • that of the military itself.

    軍隊本身也是如此。

  • Unknowingly, the US had just created its own worst enemy, as thirty years later the ISI

    在不知不覺中,美國剛剛創造了自己最大的敵人,因為三十年後,三軍情報局

  • would actively double-cross the United States in its efforts against the Taliban.

    在美國打擊塔利班的努力中,他們會積極地與美國作對。

  • Even worse, the US government didn't bother to vet who was receiving aid, allowing the

    更糟糕的是,美國政府不屑於審查誰在接受援助,讓

  • ISI to directly control who would rise to power in Afghanistan- largely religious fundamentalists

    三軍情報局直接控制誰將在阿富汗上臺--主要是宗教原教旨主義者

  • indoctrinated into extremist views by Saudi Arabian clerics.

    被沙特阿拉伯神職人員灌輸了極端主義觀點。

  • The future Taliban.

    未來的塔利班。

  • Not long after the start of the war in 2001, it became clear that the ISI had its own agenda

    2001年戰爭開始後不久,人們發現三軍情報局有自己的議程

  • concerning the Taliban.

    關於塔利班的問題。

  • For Pakistan, the Taliban could provide a strong buffer between itself and rival Iran,

    對巴基斯坦來說,塔利班可以在自己和競爭對手伊朗之間提供一個強有力的緩衝。

  • and under its autocratic rule some semblance of border security with its shared Afghan

    在其專制統治下,與阿富汗共同的邊界安全有了一定程度的保障。

  • border could be achieved.

    邊界可以實現。

  • If America defeated the Taliban, this would completely undermine its own national security

    如果美國打敗了塔利班,這將完全破壞其自身的國家安全

  • strategy, as well as potentially give the US staging grounds for interference in Pakistan

    潛在地給美國提供了干涉巴基斯坦的舞臺,這也是美國的戰略。

  • itself.

    本身。

  • It was no secret that the United States had stationed quick reaction forces in Afghanistan

    美國在阿富汗駐紮了快速反應部隊,這已不是祕密

  • not just to respond to Taliban aggression, but to cross the border into Pakistan to secure

    不僅僅是為了應對塔利班的侵略,而且是為了越過邊界進入巴基斯坦以確保其安全。

  • Pakistani nuclear weapons in case of a national emergency.

    在國家緊急情況下,巴基斯坦的核武器。

  • With rampant corruption in Pakistan, including the discovery of several senior officials

    隨著巴基斯坦的腐敗猖獗,包括髮現幾名高級官員

  • tasked with securing Pakistan's nuclear weapons having ties to terror networks, there was

    負責確保巴基斯坦核武器安全並與恐怖網絡有聯繫,有

  • an ever-present threat of Pakistan being stripped of its nuclear arms by the US.

    巴基斯坦被美國剝奪核武的威脅始終存在。

  • In order to ensure that the Taliban was not defeated, the ISI facilitated the covert funding,

    為了確保塔利班不被打敗,三軍情報局為祕密資助提供了便利。

  • training, and medical treatment of wounded Taliban fighters, even going so far as to

    訓練,並對受傷的塔利班戰士進行醫療,甚至不惜以身試法。

  • invite them into its northern border areas to use as sanctuary.

    邀請他們進入其北部邊境地區,作為庇護所使用。

  • The agency also worked to spin American drone attacks on Taliban and other terror targets

    該機構還致力於將美國無人機對塔利班和其他恐怖目標的攻擊轉為行動。

  • in Pakistan's northern regions in order to put international pressure on the US to cease

    在巴基斯坦北部地區,為了向美國施加國際壓力,使其停止對巴基斯坦的襲擊。

  • such attacks.

    這種攻擊。

  • For example, the Pakistani government forbade the US from verifying casualty reports from

    例如,巴基斯坦政府禁止美國核實來自中國的傷亡報告。

  • drone attacks, and instead relied on the personal testimony of victims of said attack.

    攻擊,而是依靠上述攻擊的受害者的個人證詞。

  • This allowed the ISI and Taliban to spin casualty figures in a way that favored them, greatly

    這使得三軍情報局和塔利班能夠以有利於他們的方式編造傷亡數字,極大地

  • exaggerating civilian casualty counts while diminishing the presence of legitimate military

    誇大了平民的傷亡人數,同時削弱了合法軍事人員的存在。

  • targets- who often used civilians as willing human shields anyways.

    目標--反正他們經常利用平民作為自願的人肉盾牌。

  • But the ISI would go even further.

    但三軍情報局會走得更遠。

  • When American troops put pressure on Taliban forces, the ISI allowed them to cross the

    當美國軍隊對塔利班部隊施加壓力時,三軍情報局允許他們越界。

  • border into Pakistan where US soldiers could not follow.

    在美國士兵無法跟蹤的情況下,進入巴基斯坦邊境。

  • When senior Taliban and other insurgent or terrorist officials were targeted for destruction

    當塔利班和其他叛亂分子或恐怖分子的高級官員成為銷燬目標時

  • or arrest, the ISI leaked America's plans in order to ensure their survival.

    或逮捕,三軍情報局洩露了美國的計劃,以確保其生存。

  • Lastly, while it was never proven, it's almost certain that the ISI had helped Osama Bin

    最後,雖然從未被證實,但幾乎可以肯定的是,三軍情報局曾幫助奧薩馬-本-拉赫曼(Osama Bin)完成了他的任務。

  • Laden evade American efforts to capture him, even going so far as to permit him residency

    拉登逃避美國的抓捕努力,甚至允許他居住在美國。

  • in the heart of one of Pakistan's military enclaves- a place they never believed the

    在巴基斯坦軍事飛地之一的中心地帶,一個他們從不相信的地方。

  • US would risk a raid into.

    美國會冒著被突襲的風險進入。

  • While 1980s America could not have known that the ISI would turn out to be one of its worst

    雖然1980年代的美國不可能知道三軍情報局會成為其最糟糕的機構之一。

  • enemies, it also made no effort to police where hundreds of millions in weapons and

    敵人,它也沒有努力去監督數以億計的武器和設備在哪裡。

  • funds were actually being channeled, leaving the effort almost entirely to the Pakistanis.

    資金的實際使用情況,幾乎完全留給了巴基斯坦人的努力。

  • This directly led to the bulk of these weapons and money going straight into the hands of

    這直接導致了這些武器和金錢的大部分直接進入到

  • groups with extremist ideologies, including displaced Afghans who had been indoctrinated

    具有極端主義意識形態的團體,包括被灌輸了極端主義思想的流離失所的阿富汗人。

  • by Saudi clerics into fundamentalism.

    沙特神職人員的原教旨主義。

  • Rather than carefully vet who could eventually be left in power after a Soviet withdrawal,

    而不是仔細審查蘇聯撤軍後誰能最終上臺。

  • America simply turned on the money hose and let the chips fall where the ISI wanted them

    美國只是打開了錢的管道,讓籌碼落在三軍情報局想要的地方。

  • to, possibly one of the worst policy mistakes ever made by the United States.

    到,可能是美國有史以來最糟糕的政策錯誤之一。

  • Had the US been directly involved in the dissemination of funds and equipment, it could have empowered

    如果美國直接參與資金和設備的傳播,它可能會賦予

  • groups favorable to US interests in Afghanistan, avoiding the 2001 invasion altogether.

    對美國在阿富汗的利益有利的團體,完全避免了2001年的入侵。

  • With the invasion well into its planning phases however, modern America continued to blunder

    然而,隨著入侵已進入計劃階段,現代美國繼續失誤。

  • in critical ways.

    在關鍵的方面。

  • First, the United States was warned by the Northern Alliance seeking to overthrow the

    首先,美國被試圖推翻的北方聯盟警告說

  • Taliban that it should wait on using military force.

    塔利班認為它應該等待使用軍事力量。

  • By 2001, the Taliban was pulling itself apart at the seams, as internal struggles for power

    到2001年,塔利班已經開始分崩離析,因為內部爭權奪利。

  • and public dissatisfaction led to major infighting.

    和公眾的不滿導致了重大內訌。

  • It was believed by Afghan insiders that given a few years, and international political and

    阿富汗內部人士認為,只要有幾年的時間,國際政治和經濟形勢都會發生變化。

  • economic pressure, the Taliban would simply implode.

    在經濟壓力下,塔利班會直接內訌。

  • However, President Bush and his administration was not interested in a political, long-term

    然而,布什總統和他的政府對政治性的、長期的 "一帶一路 "倡議不感興趣。

  • strategy to defeat the Taliban.

    打敗塔利班的戰略。

  • America had been attacked by Al-Qaeda, which the Taliban directly supported and allowed

    美國受到了基地組織的攻擊,而塔利班直接支持並允許基地組織攻擊美國。

  • to operate in Afghanistan, and the US rightly wanted blood.

    在阿富汗開展活動,而美國理所當然地想要流血。

  • Military action was inevitable- but even here the US could have acted without sowing the

    軍事行動是不可避免的,但即使在這裡,美國也可以在不播種的情況下采取行動。

  • seeds of its own inevitable defeat.

    導致其自身不可避免的失敗的種子。

  • Rather than an invasion of Afghanistan, America should have carried out punitive attacks against

    美國不應該入侵阿富汗,而應該對阿富汗進行懲罰性攻擊。

  • Al Qaeda using its long range striking power.

    基地組織利用其遠距離打擊能力。

  • While these would not have been enough to erode Al Qaeda's power completely, it could

    雖然這些還不足以完全削弱基地組織的力量,但它可以

  • have had a significant effect on the terror group.

    已經對該恐怖組織產生了重大影響。

  • Even more importantly, it would send a clear message to the Taliban- continue supporting

    更重要的是,它將向塔利班發出一個明確的資訊--繼續支持

  • our enemies and you'll be next.

    我們的敵人,你將是下一個。

  • In 2001 there was already major friction between the Taliban and Al Qaeda, who had begun to

    2001年,塔利班和 "基地 "組織之間已經有了重大的摩擦,後者已經開始

  • operate across parts of Afghanistan as if they were in control.

    在阿富汗部分地區開展活動,彷彿他們已經控制了局面。

  • This was a continued source of friction between the Taliban factions, and a campaign of shock

    這是塔利班各派別之間持續摩擦的根源,並開展了一場震懾運動。

  • and awe against Al Qaeda targets could have capitalized on that friction, spurring the

    對 "基地 "組織目標的 "威懾 "可能會利用這種摩擦,刺激 "基地 "組織。

  • Taliban to end its support for the terror group- which was supposed to be the entire

    塔利班結束對恐怖組織的支持--這應該是整個聯合國的目標。

  • point of the 2001 invasion in the first place.

    2001年入侵的意義首先就在於此。

  • If the Taliban had refused, then punitive actions could be taken, once more using long-range

    如果塔利班拒絕,那麼就可以採取懲罰性行動,再次使用遠程

  • striking power, against the Taliban itself, pummeling it into submission.

    攻擊力,針對塔利班本身,將其打得落花流水。

  • The mistake was trying to remove the Taliban from power altogether.

    錯誤在於試圖將塔利班完全趕下臺。

  • By attacking it, America only succeeded in causing the Taliban to join ranks in common

    通過攻擊它,美國只成功地使塔利班加入了共同的行列。

  • purpose, eliminating the chance of its inevitable collapse due to infighting.

    目的,消除其因內訌而不可避免地崩潰的機會。

  • Military power however may not have been necessary at all, and another option would have been

    然而,軍事力量可能根本沒有必要,另一個選擇是

  • to use economic power.

    使用經濟力量。

  • Remember, the goal was to eliminate Al Qaeda's ability to launch attacks against the US.

    記住,目標是消除基地組織對美國發動襲擊的能力。

  • A much simpler way to achieve this would have been to simply pay off the Taliban.

    實現這一目標的一個更簡單的方法是直接向塔利班付款。

  • The Taliban itself was not inherently ideologically opposed to the US the way Al Qaeda was, and

    塔利班本身並不像 "基地 "組織那樣在意識形態上固有地反對美國,而且

  • by that time had already been receiving tens of millions of dollars from the US to curtail

    當時已經從美國獲得了數千萬美元的資金,以遏制中國的經濟發展。

  • the cultivation of poppies for heroin.

    種植罌粟以獲取海洛因。

  • The US could have simply turned the cash hose on and bribed the Taliban to turn against

    美國本可以簡單地打開現金管道,賄賂塔利班,讓他們轉而反對美國。

  • Al Qaeda entirely- cash has always spoken louder within the Taliban than ideology, and

    在塔利班內部,現金總是比意識形態更有說服力。

  • there were numerous factions that would have gladly accepted American money in order to

    有許多派別很樂意接受美國的錢,以便

  • strengthen themselves.

    加強自己。

  • By making the Taliban, and the severely economically challenged Afghanistan, reliant on US aid,

    通過使塔利班和經濟上受到嚴重挑戰的阿富汗依賴美國的援助。

  • it would have been even more compliant to US interests as time, and money, went on.

    隨著時間和金錢的推移,它將更加符合美國的利益。

  • The best way to fight a battle after all is to have someone else fight it for you.

    打仗的最好方法畢竟是讓別人為你打仗。

  • The influx of cash would have staved off an inevitable collapse of the Taliban, as the

    大量現金的湧入將避免塔利班不可避免的崩潰,因為

  • Northern Alliance had warned would happen if the US simply waited, but the US should

    北方聯盟曾警告說,如果美國只是簡單地等待就會發生,但美國應該

  • never have invested itself in regime change in the first place.

    首先就不應該把自己投入到政權更迭中。

  • It should have set off to achieve its one, singular goal of defeating Al Qaeda.

    它應該出發去實現其唯一的目標,即擊敗基地組織。

  • Instead, it allowed itself to get sucked into a quagmire of conflicting goals and strategies

    相反,它讓自己陷入了目標和戰略衝突的泥潭。

  • that quickly had nothing to do with the defeat of the terror group that attacked America

    迅速與襲擊美國的恐怖組織的失敗毫無關係

  • on September 11th.

    9月11日。

  • Once the invasion was underway however, even more blunders were to come.

    然而,一旦入侵開始,更多的失誤就會出現。

  • First, the US became entirely too reliant on Pakistan in its efforts to plug up the

    首先,美國在努力堵上巴基斯坦的嘴時,完全變得過於依賴巴基斯坦。

  • Pakistani-Afghan border.

    巴基斯坦-阿富汗邊境。

  • As American troops fought and defeated the Taliban, the enemy would simply slip past

    當美國軍隊與塔利班作戰並將其擊敗時,敵人會簡單地溜走。

  • the border into safe areas that US troops couldn't follow.

    邊境的安全區域,美國軍隊無法跟蹤。

  • With the ISI's treachery well-known by American military commanders early in the war, the

    由於三軍情報局的背叛行為在戰爭初期就被美國軍事指揮官所熟知,是以

  • United States should have done more to put pressure on Pakistan to correct its bad-actor

    美國應採取更多措施向巴基斯坦施加壓力以糾正其不良行為者

  • attitude, even to the point of outright economic sanctions if necessary, leveraging global

    態度,甚至在必要時進行直接的經濟制裁,利用全球

  • partners to do the same.

    夥伴們也要這樣做。

  • Overly reliant on Pakistan to defeat insurgent and terror strongholds in the lawless border

    過度依賴巴基斯坦來擊敗無法無天的邊境地區的叛亂分子和恐怖據點

  • regions however, the United States was fearful to put too much pressure on the nation.

    然而,美國害怕給這個國家施加過多的壓力。

  • Without Pakistan's full cooperation in the elimination of the Taliban, it could never

    如果沒有巴基斯坦在消滅塔利班方面的充分合作,它永遠不可能

  • achieve victory, as the Taliban and allied insurgents always had a safe haven where to

    取得勝利,因為塔利班和盟軍叛亂分子總是有一個安全的避難所。

  • recuperate and rearm in Pakistan.

    在巴基斯坦進行休整和重新武裝。

  • In 2003, the US invaded Iraq for reasons that continue to be questioned today- and let's

    2003年,美國入侵伊拉克,其原因至今仍受到質疑--讓我們看看

  • be clear, the nation had no weapons of mass destruction.

    明確地說,這個國家沒有大規模殺傷性武器。

  • Whatever the reason, the sham directly led to the inevitable defeat in Afghanistan, as

    不管是什麼原因,這個假象直接導致了在阿富汗不可避免的失敗,因為

  • it split US forces between two insurgencies.

    它將美國部隊分割在兩個叛亂團體之間。

  • The dual wars also led to a loss of focus in both conflicts, inevitably leading to disaster

    雙重戰爭也導致了這兩場衝突的重點喪失,不可避免地導致了災難的發生

  • in both wars.

    在這兩場戰爭中。

  • The thinning of manpower and resources however had perhaps the greatest effect, as modern

    然而,人力和資源的縮減可能產生了最大的影響,因為現代的

  • counterinsurgency doctrine states that friendly forces should outnumber insurgents ten to

    反叛亂理論指出,友軍的人數應該是叛亂分子的十倍。

  • one in order to establish a large enough security presence to make it difficult or impossible

    一個,以建立足夠大的安全存在,使其難以或不可能。

  • for insurgents to operate.

    叛亂分子的行動。

  • In Afghanistan, at its height of US involvement that ratio was 5 to 1.

    在阿富汗,在美國介入的高峰期,這個比例是5比1。

  • In order to achieve even that losing ratio however, the United States blundered yet again.

    然而,為了達到這個失敗的比例,美國又一次失誤了。

  • With the onset of the Iraq war, it was clear that the US did not have the manpower to secure

    隨著伊拉克戰爭的爆發,美國顯然沒有足夠的人力來保障

  • both Iraq and Afghanistan against national insurgencies, and America was left with two

    伊拉克和阿富汗都有國家叛亂,而美國只剩下了兩個

  • choices: either institute a national draft, which would be political suicide for any administration,

    選擇:要麼實行國家徵兵,這對任何政府來說都是政治自殺。

  • or hire mercenaries.

    或僱用僱傭兵。

  • The United States opted for the latter, single handedly resurrecting a career that had almost

    美國選擇了後者,單槍匹馬地復活了一個幾乎已經

  • completely died out in the modern Westphalian-order age.

    在現代威斯特伐利亞秩序時代完全消亡。

  • Eventually the US had as many mercenaries in Afghanistan as it did its own troops, and

    最終,美國在阿富汗的僱傭兵數量與它自己的部隊一樣多,而且

  • while mercenary use can be a very effective force multiplier, to the Afghan people it

    雖然使用僱傭軍可以是一個非常有效的力量倍增器,但對阿富汗人民來說,它是一個非常有效的手段。