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  • So today's top chef class is in how to rob a bank,

    今天的頂尖主廚要教大家 如何搶銀行,

  • and it's clear that the general public needs guidance,

    很顯然一般民眾需要一些指導,

  • because the average bank robbery nets

    因為銀行搶案

  • only 7,500 dollars.

    平均只搶到美金 7,500 元。

  • Rank amateurs who know nothing

    這完全是不懂得如何做假帳

  • about how to cook the books.

    業餘等級的水準。

  • The folks who know, of course,

    當然,那些內行的人,

  • run our largest banks,

    都是大銀行的高層,

  • and in the last go-around,

    上一次他們一出手,

  • they cost us over 11 trillion dollars.

    我們就損失 11 兆美元。

  • That's what 11 trillion looks like.

    11 兆美元看起來像這樣 。

  • That's how many zeros?

    這個金額有幾個零?

  • And cost us over 10 million jobs as well.

    也讓我們損失超過 1000 萬個 工作機會。

  • So our task is to educate ourselves

    所以當務之急是自我教育,

  • so that we can understand

    以了解

  • why we have these recurrent,

    為何金融危機一再發生,

  • intensifying financial crises,

    而且變本加厲,

  • and how we can prevent them in the future.

    以及如何防範於未來。

  • And the answer to that is

    答案就是

  • that we have to stop epidemics of control fraud.

    我們必須杜絶大規模 管理詐欺的行為,

  • Control fraud is what happens

    管理詐欺是指

  • when the people who control,

    管理者,

  • typically a CEO,

    尤其是執行長,

  • a seemingly legitimate entity,

    管理一個貌似合法的機構時,

  • use it as a weapon to defraud.

    把這個機構當成詐騙的武器。

  • And these are the weapons of mass destruction

    這是金融界裡

  • in the financial world.

    最具殺傷力的武器。

  • They also follow in finance a particular strategy,

    在金融界裡, 他們也採用一種特定的策略,

  • because the weapon of choice in finance

    因為他們在財務上所用的武器

  • is accounting,

    就是會計方法,

  • and there is a recipe for accounting

    以會計方法管理詐欺行為

  • control fraud, and how it occurs.

    及其發生有個秘訣,

  • And we discovered this recipe

    我們在很不尋常的情況下

  • in quite an odd way that I'll come back to in a moment.

    發現了這個秘訣, 我稍後再談。

  • First ingredient in the recipe: grow like crazy;

    第一個秘訣是: 瘋狂地擴張公司資本;

  • second, by making or buying really crappy loans,

    第二個秘訣是: 放出或購買高風險貸款,

  • but loans that are made at a very high interest rate

    這種貸款的利率

  • or yield;

    或收益非常高;

  • three, while employing extreme leverage --

    第三個秘訣是:利用高度財務槓桿

  • that just means a lot of debt --

    這意味著對資產而言

  • compared to your equity;

    有著很大比率的負債;

  • and four, while providing only trivial loss reserves

    第四個秘訣是:提供極少的準備金

  • against the inevitable losses.

    去因應呆帳損失。

  • If you follow those four simple steps,

    如果你遵循這四個簡單的步驟,

  • and any bank can follow them,

    任何銀行都做得到,

  • then you are mathematically guaranteed

    保證一定會發生

  • to have three things occur.

    以下三種情況,

  • The first thing is

    第一是:

  • you will report record bank profits --

    銀行有很高的帳面利潤

  • not just high, record.

    不只是高,而是史無前例地高。

  • Two, the CEO will immediately be made incredibly wealthy

    第二:以目前管理階層的薪資結構,

  • by modern executive compensation.

    執行長將一夕致富。

  • And three, farther down the road,

    第三:長久以來,

  • the bank will suffer catastrophic losses

    銀行將蒙受巨大的損失

  • and will fail unless it is bailed out.

    除非獲得金援,不然就會倒閉。

  • And that's a hint as to how

    了解事情的來龍去脈後,

  • we discovered this recipe,

    我們才發現了這個秘訣,

  • because we discovered it through an autopsy process.

    這是經過我們抽絲剝繭分析出的。

  • During the savings and loan debacle in 1984,

    1984 年貸款危機期間,

  • we looked at every single failure,

    我們研究每一個破產案例,

  • and we looked for common characteristics,

    尋找其中的共同點,

  • and we discovered this recipe was common

    我們發現這個秘訣

  • to each of these frauds.

    普遍存在於每一個詐欺案例中。

  • In other words, a coroner could find these things

    換句話說, 稽查員能夠查到這些事項

  • because this is a fatal recipe

    因為這致命秘訣

  • that will destroy the banks

    不但摧毀銀行

  • as well as the economy.

    也會摧毀經濟。

  • And it also turns out to be precisely

    結果它正是

  • what could have stopped this crisis,

    可以阻止這類危機的方法,

  • the one that cost us 11 trillion dollars

    這危機讓我們損失 11 兆美元,

  • just in the household sector,

    這只是住房領域(房貸部門)而已,

  • that cost us 10 million jobs,

    也讓我們失去 1000 萬個 工作機會,

  • was the easiest financial crisis by far

    這是目前為止最輕而易舉

  • to have avoided completely

    完全解決金融危機,

  • if we had simply learned the lessons

    只要我們從大規模管理詐欺中

  • of epidemics of control fraud,

    記取教訓,

  • particularly using this recipe.

    善加運用這個秘訣。

  • So let's go to this crisis,

    接下來我們開始討論這類危機,

  • and the two huge epidemics

    二種大規模貸款詐欺

  • of loan origination fraud that drove the crisis --

    導致發生危機的來源是:

  • appraisal fraud and liar's loans --

    估價詐欺和欺騙性貸款。

  • and what we're going to see

    我們將發現:

  • in looking at both of these is

    第一:對於這些詐欺行為

  • we got warnings that were incredibly early

    在相當早之前

  • about these frauds.

    就會獲得警訊。

  • We got warnings that we could have taken advantage of easily,

    第二:藉由這些警訊 我們可以輕易採取預防措施,

  • because back in the savings and loan debacle,

    早在儲貨危機發生時,

  • we had figured out how to respond

    我們就知道如何因應

  • and prevent these crises.

    以避免發生這些危機。

  • And three, the warnings were unambiguous.

    第三:這些警訊相當明確。

  • They were obvious that what was going on

    清楚顯示

  • was an epidemic of accounting control fraud building up.

    大規模的會計管理詐欺行為 正在擴大。

  • Let's take appraisal fraud first.

    我們先來看估價詐欺。

  • This is simply where you inflate the value

    簡單地說,估價詐欺就是

  • of the home that is being pledged

    誇大用來擔保貸款

  • as security for the loan.

    的房屋價值。

  • In 2000, the year 2000,

    在 2000 年,

  • that is over a year before Enron fails, by the way,

    這是安隆破產的一年多前,

  • the honest appraisers got together a formal petition

    正直的估價師共同擬定一份請願書

  • begging the federal government to act,

    要求聯邦政府採取措施,

  • and the industry to act,

    及相關業者採取措施,

  • to stop this epidemic of appraisal fraud.

    去阻止大規模的估價詐欺行為。

  • And the appraisers explained how it was occurring,

    估價師解釋這類詐欺行為如何發生,

  • that banks were demanding that appraisers

    銀行要求估價師

  • inflate the appraisal,

    誇大其估價,

  • and that if the appraisers refused to do so,

    如果估價師拒絕配合,

  • they, the banks, would blacklist

    銀行就會將這些正直的估價師

  • honest appraisers

    列入黑名單。

  • and refuse to use them.

    不再僱用他們。

  • Now, we've seen this before

    在儲貸危機期間

  • in the savings and loan debacle,

    我們已經看過這種情形,

  • and we know that this kind of fraud

    我們知道這種詐欺行為

  • can only originate from the lenders,

    只可能來自貸方,

  • and that no honest lender would ever inflate

    不誠實的貸方

  • the appraisal,

    想要為估價灌水,

  • because it's the great protection against loss.

    因為這是防止損失的最好方法。

  • So this was an incredibly early warning, 2000.

    所以,這個預警訊號 早在 2000 年就出現,

  • It was something we'd seen before,

    這是我們之前看過,

  • and it was completely unambiguous.

    且是相當明確的警訊。

  • This was an epidemic of accounting control fraud

    這些大規模會計管理詐欺行為

  • led by the banks.

    是由銀行所主導的。

  • What about liar's loans?

    接下來,什麼是詐欺貸款呢?

  • Well, that warning actually comes earlier.

    實際上,這個警訊出現的更早。

  • The savings and loan debacle is basically

    儲貨危機基本上是發生於

  • the early 1980s through 1993,

    1980 年代的早期 一直到 1993 年,

  • and in the midst of fighting that wave

    在打擊會計管理詐欺

  • of accounting control fraud,

    的行動中,

  • in 1990, we found that a second front

    在 1990 年,我們發現

  • of fraud was being started.

    出現第二波的詐欺行為。

  • And like all good financial frauds in America,

    如同美國所有經過精心策畫 的金融詐欺,

  • it began in Orange County, California.

    起源於加州橘縣,

  • And we happened to be the regional regulators for it.

    我們恰巧是當地的監管單位

  • And our examiners said,

    我們的稽查人員說,

  • they are making loans without even checking

    銀行根本沒有查核

  • what the borrower's income is.

    借款人的收入情況就放款。

  • This is insane, it has to lead to massive losses,

    真是太離譜了, 必定會導致巨大的損失,

  • and it only makes sense for entities engaged

    這種情況只有金融機構

  • in these accounting control frauds.

    參與會計管理詐欺。

  • And we said, yeah, you're absolutely right,

    我們對稽核人員說,你們說的對,

  • and we drove those liar's loans

    於 1990 及 1991 年

  • out of the industry in 1990 and 1991,

    我們將詐欺借款逐出金融業,

  • but we could only deal with the industry

    但是,我們只能處理

  • we had jurisdiction over,

    權限範圍內的業務,

  • which was savings and loans,

    也就是儲蓄和貸款業務,

  • and so the biggest and the baddest of the frauds,

    其中最大、最惡劣的銀行-

  • Long Beach Savings, voluntarily gave up

    長灘儲貸銀行,主動放棄此業務,

  • its federal savings and loan charter,

    主動放棄聯邦政府頒發的 儲蓄和借貸執照,

  • gave up federal deposit insurance,

    放棄聯邦銀行的存款保險,

  • converted to become a mortgage bank

    變成一家抵押銀行,

  • for the sole purpose of escaping our jurisdiction,

    只為了逃避我們的監管,

  • and changed its name to Ameriquest,

    並把公司名稱改為 Ameriquest,

  • and became the most notorious

    是早期欺騙性借貸詐欺行為中

  • of the liar's loans frauds early on,

    最為惡名昭彰的銀行。

  • and to add to that,

    此外,

  • they deliberately predated upon minorities.

    他們還故意欺騙少數民族。

  • So we knew again about this crisis.

    所以我們了解這類詐欺性貸款危機。

  • We'd seen it before. We'd stopped it before.

    我們之前看過,也阻止過。

  • We had incredibly early warnings of it,

    在相當早之前就接獲警訊,

  • and it was absolutely unambiguous

    此警訊相當明確

  • that no honest lender would make loans in this fashion.

    正直的貸方絶不會做這種放款。

  • So let's take a look at the reaction

    我們看一下銀行業,

  • of the industry and the regulators

    監管機關,

  • and the prosecutors to these clear

    檢調單位的反應

  • early warnings that could have prevented the crisis.

    就能夠及早獲得警訊, 預防危機的發生。

  • Start with the industry.

    先從金融業開始,

  • The industry responded between 2003 and 2006

    從 2003 年到 2006 年,

  • by increasing liar's loans

    金融業的詐騙性貸款業務

  • by over 500 percent.

    增加超過 500%。

  • These were the loans

    這些貸款

  • that hyperinflated the bubble

    過度膨漲,泡沬化,

  • and produced the economic crisis.

    造成經濟危機。

  • By 2006, half of all the loans called subprime

    截至 2006 年,半數所謂的次級貸款

  • were also liar's loans.

    就是詐欺性貸款。

  • They're not mutually exclusive, it's just that together,

    這兩者非獨立運作,而是互相影響,

  • they're the most toxic combination

    形成你所能想像的

  • you can possibly imagine.

    致命組合。

  • By 2006, 40 percent of all the loans

    於 2006 年,有 40% 的貸款,

  • made that year, all the home loans made that year,

    所申請的房屋貸款

  • were liar's loans,

    是屬於詐欺性貸款,

  • 40 percent.

    高達 40%!

  • And this is despite a warning

    儘管銀行業的

  • from the industry's own antifraud experts

    反詐欺專家警告

  • that said that these loans were an open invitation

    這些詐欺性貸款

  • to fraudsters,

    有如引狼入室,

  • and that they had a fraud incidence

    詐騙率

  • of 90 percent,

    達到 90%,

  • nine zero.

    是九十喔。

  • In response to that, the industry

    金融業的反應是,

  • first started calling these loans liar's loans,

    首先:一開始稱這種貸款 為詐欺性貸款,

  • which lacks a certain subtlety,

    這個稱呼不是很好,

  • and second, massively increased them,

    第二是:大幅地增加這種貸款,

  • and no government regulator ever

    政府監管機關沒有

  • required or encouraged any lender

    要求或鼓勵貸方

  • to make a liar's loan

    去做詐騙性貸款

  • or anyone to purchase a liar's loan,

    或買入詐騙性貸款,

  • and that explicitly includes Fannie and Freddie.

    當然包括房利美和房地美。

  • This came from the lenders

    這詐欺性貸款的手法

  • because of the fraud recipe.

    歸咎於貸方的問題。

  • What happened to appraisal fraud?

    估價詐欺又是怎麼一回事呢?

  • It expanded remarkably as well.

    同樣也是非常快速地膨漲起來。

  • By 2007, when a survey of appraisers was done,

    2007 年, 有一份估價師的調查報告,

  • 90 percent of appraisers reported

    90% 的估價師表示,

  • that they had been subject to coercion

    貸方曾向他們施壓

  • from the lenders trying to get them

    要求將估價

  • to inflate an appraisal.

    灌水。

  • In other words, both forms of fraud

    換句話說,這兩種型態的詐欺,

  • became absolutely endemic and normal,

    已變成通病和常態,

  • and this is what drove the bubble.

    這是造成經濟泡沫化的原因。

  • What happened in the governmental sector?

    政府單位又是怎麼一回事?

  • Well, the government, as I told you,

    至於政府,就如我所說的,

  • when we were the savings and loan regulators,

    我們在執行儲貸監管業務時,

  • we could only deal with our industry,

    只能處理我們負責的業務,

  • and if people gave up their federal deposit insurance,

    如果貸方放棄聯邦政府存款保險

  • we couldn't do anything to them.

    我們也束手無策。

  • Congress, it may strike you as impossible,

    至於國會議員,或許你不相信,

  • but actually did something intelligent in 1994,

    事實上,他們在 1994 年 做了一點聰明事,

  • and passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act

    通過了「房屋所有權和權益保護法」

  • that gave the Fed, and only the Federal Reserve,

    賦予美國聯邦儲備局(美聯儲), 只限美聯儲

  • the explicit, statutory authority to ban liar's loans

    明確的法定權力,禁止貸款人的

  • by every lender,

    詐欺貸款業務,

  • whether or not they had federal deposit insurance.

    無論貸款人是否擁有聯邦存款保險,

  • So what did Ben Bernanke and Alan Greenspan,

    當柏南奇和葛林斯潘

  • as chairs of the Fed, do

    任職美聯儲主席時, 是採取何種措施

  • when they got these warnings

    以回應以下的警訊:

  • that these were massively fraudulent loans

    大規模的詐欺貸款

  • and that they were being sold to the secondary market?

    以及把這些貸款賣給次級市場?

  • Remember, there's no fraud exorcist.

    請記住,沒有人可以讓這些詐欺消失。

  • Once it starts out a fraudulent loan,

    一旦發生詐欺貸款,

  • it can only be sold to the secondary market

    只能透過更多的詐欺貸款

  • through more frauds,

    轉賣給次級市場,

  • lying about the reps and warrantees,

    捏造財務報告和保證條款,

  • and then those people are going to produce

    然後再包裝成

  • mortgage-backed securities

    不動產抵押貸款證券

  • and exotic derivatives

    和衍生性金融商品

  • which are also going to be supposedly backed

    而為這些產品擔保的是

  • by those fraudulent loans.

    詐欺貸款。

  • So the fraud is going to progress

    所以詐欺貸款

  • through the entire system,

    貫穿整個金融借貸系統,

  • hyperinflate the bubble, produce a disaster.

    惡性通貨膨脹造成泡沬化, 造成災難。

  • And remember, we had experience with this.

    請記得,這類災難我們經歷過,

  • We had seen significant losses,

    我們遭受巨大的損失,

  • and we had experience of competent regulators

    監管機關也阻止

  • in stopping it.

    這類危機的發生。

  • Greenspan and Bernanke refused

    葛林斯潘和柏克南拒絕

  • to use the authority under the statute

    法律賦予他們的權力

  • to stop liar's loans.

    去阻止詐欺貸款。

  • And this was a matter first of dogma.

    首先,這是完全是其個人武斷的看法。